

8^o Polam.
2095⁵

Penrose

MORAL PRINCIPLE
OF FAITH;
OF THE
MORAL PRINCIPLE
OF
THE ATONEMENT,
ETC., ETC.

LONDON:
B. FELLOWES, LUDGATE STREET.
1841.



MORAL PRINCIPLE

THE A TO Z METHOD

OF ETHICS

CONSTITUTION AND COMPARISON

OF THE MORAL PRINCIPLE

MORAL PRINCIPLE

LONDON:

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THE A TO Z METHOD

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OF THE
MORAL PRINCIPLE
OF
THE ATONEMENT.

ALSO,
OF FAITH;
AND OF ITS TWO SORTS,
CONVICTION AND CONFIDENCE,
AND OF THE CONNEXION BETWEEN THEM.

BY THE
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INTO THE NATURE AND DISCIPLINE OF HUMAN MOTIVES.

“ Non itaque justitia Christi, sed fides nostra, nobis imputatur in justitiam.”

BULL, EXAM. CENS. p. 36.

Παντὶ δόγματι καὶ λόγῳ τῆς ἐν τούτοις ἀληθείας ἐχομένου παραφύεται τι ψεῦδος·
παραφύεται δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ὑποκειμένης τινὸς ἀρχῆς κατὰ φύσιν ὀρμώμενον, ἢ τῆς κατ'
αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑκάστον αἰτίας, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῶν τὴν ἐκθεσμον σπορὰν ἐπὶ διαφθορᾷ
τῆς ἀληθείας τετιμηκότων σπουδαζόμενον.

ATHENAGORAS DE MORTUORUM RESURRECTIONE, IN INITIO.

LONDON:
B. FELLOWES, LUDGATE STREET.
1843.

OF THE
MORAL PRINCIPLE

THE ATONEMENT

OF FAITH

THE CONVICTION AND CONFIDENCE

THE ATONEMENT
OF FAITH

THE ATONEMENT
OF FAITH

PREFACE.

THE general object of the following Treatise is, as will readily be seen, to set before the reader a full and unembarrassed exposition of the most essential doctrines of Christianity. I do not fear that any one will tax me with the having written in a spirit of controversy. Nor, indeed, shall I be found to introduce any controversial matter whatever, except for the purpose of unravelling some of those confusions, which appear to me to interrupt the natural union between the right interpretation of the doctrines revealed, and that strictly moral or religious application of these doctrines, which God wills us to make. Many, or most of those confusions, are rather verbal than real; but they are not the less mischievous on that account.

If there be any one controversy rather than another to which I would be willing to abstain from all specific reference, it is that which is at the present time exciting a great and injurious,

though I hope and believe only a transient, ferment in the public mind. Neither yet does the argument of the following pages lead either necessarily, or directly, to the particular ground with which that controversy, so far as I have any knowledge of it, is professedly occupied. Yet since, though I know not how, the doctrine of justification by faith *has been brought* into that controversy, and is, I believe, expounded by some of those writers in it, from whose properly ecclesiastical opinions I widely dissent, on what I imagine to be substantially its real principle, I think it necessary to say here preliminarily, that I do not agree with these writers in their leading opinions. And I think this the more necessary, because it will be seen^a that I do really hold that many *rituals*, or *forms*, may, *under circumstances*, possess a moral or religious importance, or application, not less certain than that which *doctrines* possess; and that this principle is not contested by St. Paul himself. There are some forms which I revere for their antiquity; some for which I should be sorry to think the appellation of *sanctity* a term too strong. But it is not on this account the less true, that while the Christian *doctrines* are to be accounted of as the *medicine* and *nutrition*, of the soul, its *forms* are in their own proper

^a See the observations on Rom. iii. 20. in Chap. XIII. and Chap. XV. No. viii.

nature only the *vehicle*, which serves to convey that medicine or nutriment. Nor do I imagine that any person can read the following Treatise with the attention which I would fain bespeak of him, without finding in it clear proof that this is the case. If I endeavour to check all that superstition, both formal and doctrinal, which would give to any of the means of holiness an importance which is due only to the end, this is by showing how its *doctrines* tend to holiness. And this I show especially of that great doctrine of the Atonement which I assume as being the hinge of our whole system; as being that on which we have all, whether learned or ignorant, whether babes or men, alike to depend, and the saving value of which all alike are, or ought to be, skilled to appreciate. Many, or most of those writers, whom I may be thought to designate (I have no thought of designating any individual) in these observations, would, I believe, allow very much of what I thus say. But it is not, I think, the less true that their general disposition is to attribute to the tithe and scruples of mint or of cummin, or to other matters which man is free to alter or modify, a practical importance which does not belong to them, and which belongs only to the weightier matters of the law, or to those *principles* of it which are of God's appointment. And I also think that this their

error falls of itself, if the great truths for which I endeavour in this Treatise to procure a less imperfect credence than they at present seem to me to possess, be but felt and acknowledged as they ought to be.

I have one other observation which, before I conclude this preface, I beg to make. I do not believe that there can be any person who entertains a more real deference than I do for the authority and opinions of the truly great luminaries of the intellectual world. I also believe that as many, and as great names are to be found among writers on divinity, as among the writers on any other object of human thought; and that of these some of those from whom in this Treatise I state myself to disagree on some considerable points, are by far the greatest. In fact, it is because I sincerely respect the authority of these writers, that I set myself to enter a dissent against what I think their errors. But there is one reflection also, and I think it a very valuable reflection, which it appears to me that we may derive from their errors themselves. I also believe that I may have sometimes stated my disagreement with these great writers the less scrupulously, because I have been habituated to make this reflection.—If *all* these writers, able as they are, or if many of the greatest of them, are more or less in error, and on important points,

who shall be right?—What must not *he* be, if there be any such, who *is* right *in all things*, and without any exception ^a?

Above all, if we find, and this not in one writer but in many writers, and all these coming to us with the same sanction, that we cannot, in any instance, fix *on them* any charge of any error, not even in the mere argumentation, rightly interpreted, of what they say ^b, *how*, and on what principle, have we to account for this?—To me, certainly, it appears that this fact, if it be a fact, though not absolutely a *demonstration*, is yet scarcely anything less than a demonstration, of the absolute truth of the doctrines which these writers affirm. If almost all, or, as far as I know, all, without exception, of even the best and greatest reasoners, of whom we have no ground to believe that they were divinely inspired, have been wrong *in something*, every really good and direct argument for the divine authority of writers who are wrong *in nothing*, becomes irresistible; and

^a Quanto rectius hic, qui nil molitur inepte?

^b I do not mean to imply, and I do not think, that any error of mere argumentation or ratiocination, any more than in facts unessential to their doctrine, would be anything of a discredit to the New Testament writers. But still I am not aware that any such error is to be found in their writings, if we do but allow them, as we ought, the free use of that *argumentum ad hominem* which it was their immediate business to employ, and the *not* employing of which *would*, as I think, tend to discredit them.

this especially taking also into consideration the particular circumstances of birth, and of education, in which the sacred writers were placed. Or, to give one particular instance, and that in the case of confessedly the ablest and the most learned of their whole number. That writer is St. Paul, one of the most involved of arguers, and yet the most accurate. It seems to me almost impossible, but that HE would have fallen (which I think he has *not*) into inconsequences from which BUTLER, one of the clearest of all arguers, is not free; if either the mind or the pen of the apostle had not possessed, though in some undefined and undefinable way, a special direction from the divine Spirit, which in these later ages, and in every age of our religion since its first age, none has received.

No reader will, I trust, infer from my laying this stress on the freedom of the sacred writers from logical error, that I am blind to their greater merits, or to the still more powerful evidence of the truth of our religion which these their greater merits also disclose. The crown itself of this their innocence of error is in the moral perfection of the doctrines which they reveal, and of the devotional application of those doctrines, which they, in every page which they have left to us, make and enforce. The very object of this whole Treatise is to show that this is the case: and I the

rather take my leave of the reader with the reiteration of this at once a characteristical, and the chief moral, feature of Christianity, because Paley has adduced it as such rightly and well^a. This great and religious writer underrates, as I apprehend, the analogy between the religion of Christ, and the religions of heathenism : and it will be accordingly seen that, on this ground, as indeed on some other grounds, I am compelled to differ from him. But nothing can, I think, be either truer or happier than his delineation of that inestimable *superiority* both of knowledge and of precept, which it is *our* gift to enjoy.

J. P.

^a Evidences, Part II. end of Ch. ii.

LONDON, Aug. 3, 1843.

THE edition of Grotius de Satisfactione to which I refer in this Treatise is that included in the common folio edition of his theological works. The edition of Dr. Hey's Lectures, is that printed at Cambridge in 1797: that of Tucker's Light of Nature, the edition by Sir Henry Mildmay, in six volumes: the edition of Lardner, that in eleven volumes by Kippis. I hope that almost all the other books to which I refer will be found to be sufficiently designated in the places where the references occur. In nearly *all* those instances in which I quote any authority at second hand, I refer to the writer by whom it has been in point of fact pointed out to me: and inasmuch as I have lived almost intirely at a distance from libraries, I have also been sometimes obliged to refer in the same secondhand way to writers once very familiar to me, but to whose works I have not happened to have access at the time.

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OF THE
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OF
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CHAPTER I.

Of the high moral importance of this doctrine, of which Christ's dying for us is the prominent part: and of the mischiefs arising on the one side from INADEQUATE, and, on the other side, from DISTORTED views of its nature and efficacy.

THE Christian religion is, as indeed no Christian doubts, a great and holy plan, originating in the divine mind, and promulgated by divine authority, for the moral government and improvement of man. So far, moreover, as we account of our religion itself as having this end, we necessarily account of all its doctrines, as having the same end also. As these certainly are not, and cannot be, *in themselves*, those actual virtues, moral or religious, which they serve to create or to nurture, so neither, thus considered, are they, or can they

be, anything but the *means*, of creating or nurturing those virtues^a. Neither yet have we any doctrine, of which what I have thus said is more

^a The *doctrines* of our religion, and those few and simple external, or positive, *institutions*, of which it enjoins the observance, stand in this point of view on the same footing. Compare what is said by Butler, as quoted in the beginning of Chap. II. Sect. vii. of this Treatise, on the moral end or object of all such institutions, and also what will be said of Faith generally in the beginning of Chapter IV. Archdeacon Goddard, in his very valuable Bampton Lecture Sermons, although he says, (not meaning however, I think, anything really inconsistent with the principles which will be brought forward in this Treatise,) that “moral means were insufficient to restore mankind” to happiness, adds as follows. “In proportion as revelation unfolds itself, these [the moral distinctions] are seen to have been the primary and antecedent truths out of which arose the need of redemption, and with reference to which revelation is conducted : and moral terms are employed, not less to designate the character of the Gospel scheme, and of the divine proceedings under it, than to express the duties which it imposes on ourselves.”^b In the same manner it had been said before^c, “Hence the distinct exhibition to mankind of such unmerited and voluntary sufferings on the part of the one proper Mediator, as while they fulfilled their doctrinal and sacrificial purpose, itself essentially a moral one, might instil the horror of sin.” In the same manner Mr. Conybeare : “For be it ever remembered, that it is in a form of combination with these moral tendencies, and with a direct application to them,

^b Sermon VII. pp. 223, 224.

^c Sermon IV. pp. 85, 86. For a fuller exposition of this whole subject, see both these Sermons, especially from p. 83 to p. 90, and pp. 99, 100.

manifestly true, than it is of Christ's atonement; the most sacred, and in some sense the most essential, of all our doctrines. We have not, indeed, any other, which so directly and forcibly exemplifies both the necessity of our seeking pardon for, and of dying to, sin, and the greatness of God's love for the human race. It moreover adds necessarily and intensely to the practical or moral effect of this doctrine, to be also taught that our pardon is obtained for us, and God's great love exhibited, by a process so wonderful as that of the manifestation of the Divine in a human nature, and even of the death of God's own Son for our sakes. Neither yet is this doubted of. All who admit the doctrine call on us to apply, and improve, the lesson conveyed by it. Neither yet does God, though in him are hid many treasures of which we cannot fathom the depth, *reveal* to us, as I apprehend, anything of which he does not teach us the wisdom, as well as the truth; or in which we may not learn to see, as far as is, or probably can be, made known to man, the connexion between *our* weakness and *his* strength.

What I have thus said is, I suppose, admitted. And yet, even amongst those who admit it, we

that the Scriptures *always* exhibit these doctrines,"^a *i. e.* those which the atonement implies.

^a Theological Lectures, p. 364; and see pp. 359, 360. 365.

often, as it seems to me, find two opposite errors, which intercept, in a very great and injurious degree, the moral efficacy which this our cardinal doctrine was intended, and if rightly understood is calculated, thus to have. On one hand, there is the very INADEQUATE view of it which leads the Socinian, if we may take the views of the Socinians on this point from their most recognised writers, to regard the RANSOM, the SACRIFICE, the BLOOD, of Christ offered up for human sin on the cross, as being merely, or little else than, the sanction of his doctrine, or an “accident” of his mission^a. On the other hand, we find also what I here call a DISTORTED view of it; an error not less, perhaps even more, mischievous than that of the Socinian; inasmuch as it infects the language of devotion itself with notions abso-

^a “Quicquid enim Socinus de nexu liberationis nostræ cum morte Christi loquitur ita summam explicari potest. Liberatio (ut ipse sentit) ex sanctimonia vitæ sequitur; sanctimonia ex spe præmii: spes primo et potissimum ex resurrectione nascitur: morti autem tribuitur, aut qua via est ad resurrectionem, aut qua resurrectioni conjuncta et comparata spem eandem confirmat.” Grotius de Satisfactione, pp. 328, 329. Dr. Hey, Vol. III. 293, refers to the Racovian catechism to the same effect. See also “Unitarianism the Doctrine of the Gospel,” by Dr. Lant Carpenter, pp. 295, 296. 331. 334, as quoted in Veysie’s Defence of the Preservative against Unitarianism. Exeter, 1810, pp. 174. 177. 229. 239. See also Priestley’s History of Corruptions, I. 199, quoted in Magee on the Atonement, I. 247. See also Chap. XIV. of this Treatise, Sect. xvii.

lutely derogatory to either the goodness or the power of God; and to his consentience with Christ, even in that plan of mercy which he has himself through Christ appointed. I also apprehend that, though the doctrine of the atonement is, of all our doctrines, that of which, both from its nature and its importance, the moral effect ought to be the greatest, there is not any other of which, (and this through the prevalence of these two opposite errors,) the effect is really and practically intercepted so much.

Of what I have here spoken of as the Socinian error on this point, I do not purpose to speak in this volume at length, or professedly. I set out as addressing myself to those persons only, who consider that error as known and acknowledged, and who account of Christ's death as expressive of the penalty which is due to sin, or which is required by, and inflicted on it, and which is inflicted I suppose irreversibly, in the moral order of the universe, on all sin unrepented of. Also, though I rather scruple to make use of terms in the use of which the Scripture does not go before us precisely, it will be seen hereafter^a that I see no objection to the speaking of Christ's death as expressive of a real *satisfaction* made to the divine justice in man's behalf. Assuredly the language of Scripture does not breathe anything less than

^a In Chap. II. Sect. i.

this. It is not less inconsistent with the principles of sound criticism, than I should account it profane, to make any attempt to *get out* of its natural meaning by any forced refinement or construction. Few errors, also, are I think more to be regretted, than that any of those writers, who assert the doctrine of Christ's being sacrificed for us, should take anything of the tone of apology which they sometimes do take, in asserting a doctrine which is both our succour and our hope; who speak of it as something which *may be called* a sacrifice^a; as if the divine will and conduct were *to be defended* for having provided an escape for the guilty through the sufferings of the innocent;—or for having *conceded* to the weakness or prejudices of man a dispensation analogous to human sacrifices. All such language as this is undoubtedly anything else than in correspondence to that language of Scripture, which speaks of the atonement as both the power and wisdom of God. Neither yet is the moral end which this doctrine is intended to answer promoted so emphatically in any other way, as by taking all this language in its fullest sense. If Christ, the pure and holy, showed by his voluntary sufferings, and voluntarily taking on himself the death due to sin, both the deepness of the stain which sin inflicts, and that, unless forsaken, God does not, or if any

^a See Chap. XIV. Sect. xvii. note 4.

one rather chooses to say, *cannot* pardon it^a, (I do not contest the accuracy of his expression,) what imaginable mercy can be so effectual as this to urge the sinner to repent? If *He* thus showed also his tender love for mankind, what other imaginable motive can win so effectually to labour after that holiness to which he invites? or how else, we may perhaps ask, *could* any human imagination delineate so well the personal kindness taken in us by the Father of all? How else *could* this be taught so expressively, as by revealing to us, as it is revealed, that he has even united *himself*, in a way in which he never was united to any one else, with the man thus chosen by him to be at once this miracle of patience and of love! No other doctrine, either of the saint or the sage, was ever, since the beginning of the world, so pre-eminently moral as this; or, I repeat, leads so effectually to such highly moral conclusions. And this accordingly, as I have said, I look upon as being, when taken in this plain sense, the only *adequate* foundation on which the Christian building, at least in all that length and breadth of which it is capable, and for which it was designed, can be possibly raised^b.

^a See Chap. XIV. Sect. i.

^b This plain moral import of the doctrine of the Atonement is not anywhere, as far as I know, stated more clearly and satisfactorily, or more rightly coupled with that of our Saviour's

Thus much being premised, I now come to show that, even in building on this right foundation, it is yet but too common to DISTORT the superstructure, and perhaps, as was also said before, to do *more* mischief by infecting the language of devotion with notions derogatory to the goodness or power of God, and his consentience with Christ, than is necessarily done by contracting INADEQUATE notions of the moral import of the sacrifice made by him. And this it is, moreover, quite clear both may and will be done, if we allow of the germination of any feeling that HE, the Father of mercies, the God of all consolation, the original author of our salvation and sender of Christ, is not *Himself* as long-suffering and as full

divinity, than in the Homily of the Passion. "If God hateth sin so much that he would allow neither man nor angel for the redemption thereof, but only the death of his only and well-beloved Son, who will not stand in fear thereof? We did the deeds wherefore he was thus stricken and wounded: they [the Jews] were only the ministers of our wickedness. Let us know for a certainty, that if the most dearly-beloved Son of God was thus punished and stricken for the sin which he had not done himself, how much more ought we sore to be stricken for our daily and manifold sins which we commit against God? No man can love sin, which God hateth so much, and be in his favour." p. 248. fol. 1726.

"He thought it not enough to spare himself, and to send his angel to do this deed, but he would do it himself, that he might do it the better, and make it the more perfect redemption." Ibid. p. 249.

of love to us as the Christ whom he sent. It is no less clear, also, that this is a feeling which we *may* imbibe, and which it is to be feared that many do imbibe, even while they profess to deprecate it. No verbal disclaimers of any such conclusion will suffice to remove its effect on the mind, if we hold principles out of which it necessarily springs^a; and nothing, as I apprehend, can be more incontestible than that such principles both exist in, and are inextricable from, much current opinion respecting the *method* by which Christ's atonement has that availableness which it is admitted to have to our acceptance with God. Nothing, I suppose, can be more commonly held, than that Christ's death, or God's dispensation of mercy by him, was a dispensation either necessary, or chosen, to enable, or induce, even GOD to forgive. Nor can anything, as I apprehend, be more certain than that every such notion, so far as it amounts to a practical belief, wars, and must war, on the real reception of any just conviction of the divine power and goodness into the hearts of men.

Thus, accordingly, it is said by Dr. Wardlaw: "If God could with perfect consistency and pro-

^a Of all such disclaimers in this or in the like cases, it may I suppose justly be said; "*nomine tollunt, re relinquunt*," the difference which they disclaim. See, however, what will be said on this subject in the next paragraph, and also in Chap. II. Sect. ix. Head 3.

priety have pardoned sin without any such atonement as we believe has been made for it, we may, with great safety, conclude from what we know both of his wisdom and of his goodness, that the atonement would never have been heard of; for a wise being does nothing in vain, and a good being inflicts no suffering in vain. Surely, when the blessed Redeemer, perfectly pure and holy, and the object of unmingled approbation and love, thrice prayed in agony of spirit, that, *if it were possible*, the cup might pass from him, he would never have been permitted to drink it,—to drink it even to its bitterest dregs, had not his drinking it been indispensable,—had it not been necessary to the reconciliation of justice and mercy, in their exercise towards guilty man.”^a Again, also, there are many who, though they dare not to say that Christ’s death *enables*, yet say, and this even more erroneously, that it *induces*, or is a *consideration*, or *motive*, with God, to forgive those sins which are forgiven through Christ. “The expiation on the cross,” says Grotius, in one of his best and most useful treatises, “*moves* God to remit.”^b “God,” says Barrow, “out of his infinite goodness and mercy, in consideration of what his beloved Son

^a Discourses on the Socinian Controversy, pp. 219, 220, ed. of 1819.

^b “Expiatio in cruce peracta Deum movet ad remittendum, et jus nobis acquirit.” De Satisfactione, p. 316.

..... hath performed and suffered is become reconciled.”^a Secker, in like manner, “In consideration of this meritorious goodness of his, which he engaged, before the world began, thus to manifest, the Most High established with him a covenant of grace.”^b “This consent of his to be crucified, our heavenly Father has been pleased to consider an inducement to bestow [pardon] on all who shall qualify themselves for receiving it.”^c Doddridge also speaks of Christ’s death as a “valuable consideration” with God; and, again, as “some ample and honourable amends,”^d that is, some other amends than can be made by the sinner himself, for those many great trespasses against him which man has committed. I admit, most freely and gladly, that all this language, in many of those who use it, does not amount to any thing more than a very wrong phraseology. If I did not believe that those writers, for example, to whom I have referred, were men of as much feeling of real piety towards God, as they are, on most points, able teachers of his word, I should be the less solicitous to animadvert on this their error. They

^a Sermon on Justification. Works, Vol. II. p. 76, fol.; and compare Sermon XXVII. in the same volume, Sect. iii. p. 392.

^b Sermons, Vol. I. Sermon VII. ed. of 1770.

^c Vol. VII. Sermon II. pp. 34, 35.

^d Sermon on Salvation by Grace, pp. 16, 17. See, also, the Homily of Salvation, as quoted by Bishop Tomline, in his Refutation of Calvinism, p. 149.

all of them admit, or would admit, no less clearly that God led the way of redemption, than they affirm the redemption to be a consideration which leads him to forgive^a. That admission, so far, certainly, and so long as the full sense and perception, both of it and of its consequences, is present to their minds, *reduces* their error; *may* reduce it practically even to nothing. If they have absorbed the true life-blood into the system, the noxious element mingled together with it *may* wholly disappear. But it is not the less certain, that the natural meaning of the words disturbs, and must disturb, like that vulgar idolatry which, though repudiated by the creed, is fostered by the worship of the Roman Catholics, the qualified sense which it is thus attempted to put on them. The attempt succeeds in, I trust, many minds; though not perfectly, perhaps, except in the best and highest minds. But it is, and always must be, unwise, in any matters strictly and practically religious, to adopt either usages or terms, of which the apprehensions of even the ignorant and the prejudiced cannot receive the necessary qualifications; and this especially in the proposition of a doctrine, which, if those qualifications are misunderstood, or not kept in view, makes of Christ a secondary Deity, perhaps a benignant God, in opposition to a severe

^a See what will be farther said on this subject in Chap. II. Sect. ix. Head 3; and also in Chap. XIV. Sect. xv. Head 4.

God, which is what he certainly is not, and which it is almost the very first principle of Christianity to teach that there is not, and cannot be.

I would observe, also, that by putting in Christ, as he is other than God, or by putting in that most true ransom and propitiation made for us by his blood, as a motive or consideration with God to forgive, we certainly bring in, not only, as has been shown, a notion of difference between God's goodness and Christ's, but also an insensibility to God's ever watchful presence and providence. And this insensibility is of a character or principle, altogether opposite to the whole spirit or meaning both of the Christian and also of the Jewish revelation. An original, and perhaps a benevolent, designer the voice of nature acquaints us with. There was a sort of deity in the fate itself of heathen antiquity. But one great object, as I apprehend, of all revelation is to teach us of God, that he is a being who is about our bed, and about our path, and spieth out all our ways; and especially that he brings HIMSELF in actual contact with us through Christ. Anything which abstracts God in any degree from any divine office, or function, or, which is the same thing, which obscures, or abstracts from, our perceptions of the freedom and simplicity with which HE grants us either pardon or blessing, is assuredly so far in opposition

to, not in accordance with, this great principle of the doctrine which he has revealed.

Besides this, and although what may perhaps be most properly called the *confusions*, often brought into the truly pious though ignorant mind by that unfortunate phraseology of which I have been speaking, are perhaps of all things the most worth disentangling, I also apprehend that the *error* which it produces often goes farther, and into worse consequences. I apprehend that it is a phraseology which also tends greatly to impede the reception of the Christian faith itself into many minds, which if not yet pious, or though perhaps too easily *offended* by stumbling blocks, yet are not obdurate, and might often be led to embrace the whole truth, if it were but presented to them in a happier form. It is not difficult to find instances in which the same thing is done by other stumbling blocks. Among those persons, for example, who become familiar with the arguments of the Socinians, respecting our Saviour's divinity, but without rigidly examining the basis on which those arguments rest, I believe it to be done very frequently. There must be many among these persons, as many, probably, as in any other class of mankind, who have not by nature any inclination to detract from the claims of religion, or to think slightingly of sacred things. But they

observe, or detect, though indeed it is what lies on the surface, the vanity or inadmissibility of those many evasions of the plain language of Scripture which are necessary to reconcile it to the Socinian creed. They are then apt to assume, and I admit that they assume wrongly and hastily, that these evasions would not be attempted, unless there were some reasonable cause for at least *wishing* to make them, and they may then even conclude, and perhaps not unfairly, that it may be more reasonable to reject Scripture altogether, than to attempt to evade its natural meaning. No less also, or I would rather say still more, but still on the same principle, in the case before us. Any language, however modified, which but seems to trench either on God's power or goodness, offends many who will not listen to any qualifications attempted of it, and inclines them to whisper to themselves in secret, if not to exclaim, that they feel an instinctive and incredulous hatred of every proposition so exhibited to their minds.

I allow that even this whisper may betray a defect of that humble and reverent patience, with which it is the duty of all to whom the doctrines of our faith are presented, to study and examine as far as they are able, and with all helps within their reach, its real import and meaning. Yet it may be a fearful topic for many expositors of religious truth to consider, how far this defect itself may not still be less attributable to any wilful in-

disposition of their hearers, or readers, to the truth itself, than to those who present it in a light which, at the very least, makes on the hasty eye a false impression; or in language with which there can be but few among the wise and good who really sympathize, and into which many, whose education has led them to regard it with awe, yet cannot, and do not, enter with understanding.

There can scarcely be any persons, I imagine, of any class whatever of religious opinion, who will on reflection dissent in the least from what has thus been said. Certainly, if their attention could now be recalled to it, I should not apprehend any dissent on the part of those able and pious writers, on whose incautious language on this point I have been here animadverting. But if thus much be admitted, the conclusion ought to be inevitable, that we can have no right to urge Christ's most true and real sacrifice, or satisfaction, for the sins of the world, as having any influence whatever on the divine power or will, except *through* that effect which it both has, and was intended to have, in restoring in man the moral image of his Maker, and in advancing him in the way of holiness. There is none who claims even for God, without the production of *this* effect, either the power, or the will, to bestow on his imperfect creatures any good gifts whatsoever. There are not any whom he accepts through the Atoner, who are not, through him, made

meet for acceptance. But if the atonement has this moral effect, and at the same time we dare not limit God by any other condition, nothing can follow more clearly than that we have no right to affirm it to operate with him, except through its moral efficacy alone. Neither yet does the interposing of *this* condition, if so it is to be called, appear to be anything else than the absolutely affirming, though in a negative form of words, the inherent holiness of God^a. At the same time it is also to be remarked, that though thus we certainly must not dare to *affirm* on this point, anything more than has been here stated; so neither have we a right to *deny*, either of this most merciful and sublime dispensation of God through Christ, or indeed of any of God's counsels, that they have not, or may not have, ends in his creation which *we* cannot discern. Everything which He does runs up, and must run up, at the last, into something which mortals cannot hope to comprehend or define. But still he reveals not anything *to us* which is beyond the reach of *our* understandings, nor, as I think, does he reveal anything as properly a matter of religion, which does not serve as a preparation of the human heart, to produce that good fruit for which his Spirit waters the soil.

To prove in detail the truth of what I have thus said, and to pursue the illustration of it into some

^a See Chap. XIV. Sect. i.

of its consequences, is the object which I propose to myself in this treatise. And this I purpose to do:

I. By considering^a the particular objections which will be made to what has been said: these objections being all included in the one general notion, that besides that effect which Christ's sacrifice or propitiation has to our salvation, through its moral influence to subdue sin and to implant holiness, the Scripture revelation authorizes us to pronounce, that his death gains *also* for us something more—some other point, either definite or indefinite.

II. By showing^b that those particular passages or texts of Scripture, on which only these objections can be founded, do not, in their natural and critical meaning, either bear them out, or in any way countenance them, but the contrary: or, in other words, that though these texts state most truly and pointedly that Christ is our ransom or sacrifice, they always mean that he is *so* our ransom and sacrifice, *as* we, through the Divine Spirit, lay hold of his doctrine, especially that of his death, or passion, and are thus led by him to those moral ends which he came to promote; and that we cannot affirm them to mean anything more.

III. I shall next proceed to show^c that this

^a In Chap. II.

^b In Chap. III.

^c In Chap. IV.—X.

view, or rationale, of the doctrine of the ATONEMENT, is a view coincident with, and illustrated by, everything which we know, or are taught, of the effect or value of that Christian FAITH to which Christ's promise is given.

IV. I shall^a take up the consideration of the *peculiarity* of the Christian doctrines, and show in what it consists; and shall show also that the charges sometimes made of a *theoretical* disregard of, and reluctance against, the truths of religion, and against these doctrines in particular, are greatly exaggerated.

V. I shall review^b, and briefly comment on, several passages of Scripture, not included amongst those before explained under Head 2°, but which bear more or less generally on the subjects discussed.

VI. I shall subjoin^d, in a number of supplementary dissertations, various inquiries on points affecting both our moral judgments on the same subjects, and the intellectual processes by which those our judgments are, or ought to be, formed. To these dissertations I shall then add, lastly^e, a very fragmentary collection of observations and maxims, which may, I hope, tend to serve still farther that cause of truth, which is always one, by bringing out, in the briefest way possible, some

^a In Chap. XI. and XII.

^b In Chap. XIII.

^c i. e. Chap. III.

^d In Chap. XIV.

^e In Chap. XV.

of those stronger or varied lights which may be thus made to reflect on it. Among the dissertations ranked under this last head, I shall insert such, though I hope accurate, yet scanty, notices as my limited reading enables me to give, of the doctrine of the atonement, as taught by the Fathers. In their most valuable writings, attempts are, no doubt, often made to *explain* this great doctrine on theories or philosophies, even wilder and more gratuitous than are ordinarily current in the present age. But while in their hands, it did not the less, I believe, retain, *as taught practically*, a religious simplicity, which no recovery which has yet been made from the errors of what are called the dark ages, has completely restored. To these notices I shall add a few observations on some of the forms, which the doctrines of Atonement and Faith have assumed in subsequent times, and especially at the great era of the Reformation; together with various references to the writings of both ancient and modern divines, and these usually of the greatest eminence and excellence. If such writers do not always guide us directly where to tread, they yet teach us, even by having fallen into some of those errors, from which no merely human wisdom seems to be altogether exempted, what to avoid. On this last portion, moreover, of the office which I have here prescribed to myself, I enter with the greater willingness and zeal, be-

cause I believe there is nothing which serves more effectually to the promotion of truth, than the tracking of it, to a certain extent, through the sea of opinion. Neither yet is there anything of which I would more studiously avoid all possible appearance or imputation, than that of putting in any pretension to be a discoverer of any *new* truth ; which, on these subjects, subjects on which all truth comes to us from Scripture alone, there is not any. In every age, no doubt, past and present, the natural and revealed light and intelligibility of almost all religious truth has been greatly disturbed, or infected, by the prevalence of some extraneous philosophy. This, in one age, has been that of the Gnostic, or that of the Manichee; in another, that of Augustin, or of the schoolmen, or of the Jesuits; not here to speak of later theorists. Nor is any hope, I suppose, to be entertained, that from errors so produced, we shall ever be freed. Abstracting, however, these errors, from which no merely intellectual ability appears to afford sufficient protection, and into which many of the best instructed, and also many of the most devotional expositors of our religion often fall, I certainly do not either know or believe that I shall be found really to differ on any matter of principle, with any of those writers with whom I would most wish to agree. The only praise, if praise it is to be called, to which I lay the least claim, is that of a diligent and

thoughtful working out of *their* principles, and this without carrying them too far. I may fail, I suppose that I shall fail, to satisfy all readers that I take the best method of working them out, and that I carry them far enough. But still, no reader who acknowledges the doctrine of the ATONEMENT, as received in FAITH, to be the prominent feature of that Gospel by which we are saved, can fail to see the importance of, at the same time, unfolding these doctrines fully, and defining them accurately, or rather of unfolding and defining how far their real nature or character is cognizable by man, or to be collected from Scripture. For thus only *can* they be represented in both force and true simplicity, or so as to promote their effective hold on the mind.

CHAPTER II.

Of the objections which will be made to what has been said in the last chapter.

To what has been said it will be objected, that, besides that effect which Christ's sacrifice, or propitiation, has through its moral influence to subdue sin and to create holiness, the Scripture authorizes us to pronounce also that, as it *may* do, for any thing that we know to the contrary^a, so that it also *does*, something more. This objection will be conveniently distributed under nine heads, or sections, to the consideration of which I shall, in this chapter, proceed. I greatly fear that the general notion or feeling involved in all of them, forms a portion of the ordinary creed of the Christian world, and perhaps especially of the creed of those persons who are the most seriously impressed, as none can be impressed too seriously, by the goodness and mercy both of God himself, and of that divine revealer of his will, who died, and died on the cross, for our sakes. This fact, moreover, if it be the fact, that such is the ordinary creed of

^a See what was said to this effect in p. 17.

such men as these, I account to be a fact of great moment in the case; of far more moment than anything which I can discern in the objections themselves; and, indeed, that it is this fact which only constitutes the strength of those objections. Indeed it is a fact which gives a presumption of their validity. For good men, even when inconsequent in their logical deductions, have yet almost always a foundation in truth for their belief. There is no maxim more certain than that he who does God's will, or truly desires to do it, both in general knows best what that his will truly is, and best appreciates the revelation made of it. But still this fact, important as it is, is a presumption only. The whole case rests for decision on the critical judgment of that voice of reason and revelation, to which we have always to make our final appeal.

I. In the first place, then, it will be objected to what was said in the last chapter, that one object, and as many divines hold, the first object, of Christ's atonement, is the promotion of God's own honour and glory, and the saving, or satisfying of his justice; and this in a sense distinct from the operation of these divine attributes, as displayed or evidenced in the salvation of man.

In the answer to this objection, I shall have to enter in some detail into the general use, and application to religion, of those ANALOGIES of earthly things, by which only we can obtain any know-

ledge of what God is, or of the nature of the invisible world. *All* our knowledge on these subjects is wrapped up in ANALOGIES; and of these the ATONEMENT itself, or what is indeed the same thing, our REDEMPTION, or Christ's SACRIFICE for us, is the most impressive and prominent^a.

II. It will be objected, secondly, that by Christ's death being represented to us, as it is in Scripture, clearly and unequivocally, as a real ransom or sacrifice, it must necessarily be understood to have the same efficacy, or sort of efficacy, which the inspired writers must have known to be commonly attributed to sacrifices both in the Jewish and in the heathen world.

III. It will be said, that the line of argument which I take in this Treatise makes repentance alone, or repentance and holiness, or these virtues through faith, directly available to man's salvation, and thus implies that we are saved by our own merits, and not by Christ's.

IV. That this same line of argument is inconsistent with the common doctrine that even good heathens, and others who have not known Christ, are yet saved *through* him.

V. It will be objected that it is also inconsistent with the doctrine that Christ, not God, is to be the judge of the world, and that he is also our

^a Compare pp. 2, 3.

Mediator and Intercessor with the Father; and also with the doctrine of the efficacy of his prayers for his church, and of his sacraments.— And, certainly, if the right interpretation of those doctrines, which are most true doctrines, imply any interposition of Christ, not conducive to holiness, between God and man, we need not scruple to admit, if Scripture be supposed to teach, a similar interposition in the work of atonement or redemption also.

But in answer to this objection I shall show, that those doctrines do *not* imply any interposition inconsistent with, or affecting, the direct link of connexion between man's moral improvement, or holiness, and God's immediate acceptance of it.— And for the farther clearing of a point so important, I shall then subjoin two separate sections: the one, section

VI. On the general principle of the efficacy of prayer, or of the principle on which only we have a right to affirm that our own prayers for ourselves and others, and those of Christ for his church, are heard and answered.

VII. I shall then state how the same principle operates on our similar refusal to attribute to the Christian sacraments any other than a moral influence or efficacy.

VIII. I next proceed to the objection that if Christ be understood to be our Atoner, or Re-

deemer, or Saviour, only as he saves from sin, or as he sanctifies, our salvation by him can be understood only in the same sense in which we might be said to be atoned for, or redeemed, or saved, by the blood of the martyrs; or by their example, and that of other good men; of which, doubtless, we may make the same *kind*, at least, of moral application which we make of His.

IX. And lastly, I come to the objection that my argument is inconsistent with the Protestant doctrine of the imputation of Christ's merits, or righteousness, to believers: that it destroys, as indeed it does, the distinction which many eminent divines have laid down between our deliverance from the slavery of sin and from the penalty of it; and also that it identifies unduly the *justifying* and the *sanctifying* office of Faith.

SECTION I.

In the first place, of the objection, that one object, and (as many, or most, divines hold) the first object, of Christ's atonement is the promotion of God's own honour and glory; and this in a sense distinct from the operation of these divine attributes, as displayed, or evidenced, in the salvation of man.

"FAR be it from us," says an able, and exact, and comparatively recent writer, "to suppose that always our own good, and never his own glory, ought to be the immediate object of the measures

of God's government."^a Grotius states quite explicitly that the *first*, and most direct, end of the atonement is to dispose GOD to forgive^b: from which it follows, and is meant to follow, that its preparing man for forgiveness is only a *secondary* effect which follows from it. President Edwards states expressly, and at great length, that "it was [God's] supreme regard and value for himself, which caused him to value and seek that his internal glory should flow forth from himself through grace in man's salvation."^c Nor is this, as I apprehend, anything less than the common doctrine of divines, a doctrine often expressed by saying that God's motive in the act of creation was that of *energizing*, his motive in the act of creating man that of creating admirers of his own power, and attributes, or glory, or that he created him for his own sake. Neither yet is there wanting a real humility in taking this view of the case; humility, that is, so far as concerns the

^a Veysie's Bampton Lecture Sermons for 1794. Sermon VIII. p. 215.

^b See Chap. XIV. of this Treatise, Sect. ii., and particularly the extract in Note 3. to that Section.

^c Dissertation on the end for which God created the world, Chap. II. Sect. vii. New York edition of his works, 1830, Vol. III. p. 85, and compare Sect. vi. p. 76, and Sect. vii. p. 84. Hobbes states the case as follows: "Finis ergo ejus qui se coli vel jubet, vel patitur, is est ut quamplurimos eo modo vel amore vel metu obedientes reddat." De Cive, xv. 13.

moral feeling, and personal piety, of those who take it. But though almost all who take this view of God's motive or design profess to identify the two objects of His glory, and of man's salvation, by showing that man is saved *also* through a holiness which unites him with God, it is yet assuredly language which we should be fearful to use. Assuredly it is anything rather than a *limiting* of the divine counsels to fear to assert anything of them, which concerns not us, and which is not revealed. If any one chooses to form the *conjecture* that either Christ's mission, or his death, answers some ends in creation other than, or over and above, its moral influence on those whom it sanctifies, he is free to form it. Holding it thus as a conjecture, he may also, perhaps, still proceeding conjecturally, find texts of Scripture on which he may think to support it. But let not conjecture rank with truth: nor let it ever be imagined that *we* can speak intelligibly of God's glory, except as it grows out of *our* glorifying him by our own obedience. We should rather on the other hand ask: "If thou sinnest, what doest thou against him: if thou be righteous, what givest thou him, or what receiveth he of thine hand?"^a—or rather still we should leave the question itself, if asked argumentatively, among those secret things which belong to God, and content

^a Job, xxxv. 6, 7.

ourselves with the humble study of those revealed things, which belong to us, and our children.

But, not thus to travel out of that sphere which does belong to us, and with which we are conversant,—Christ's death, or mediation, it will be said, was necessary to save, or satisfy, God's honour or justice;—to make it proper or consistent for him to extend that pardon to sinners which he desired to give.

Doubtless, in some sense, it was so. Christ's death *was*, or *is*, an essential or necessary part of the great scheme of God's mercy; and no one, I suppose, imagines that *that* scheme which had this great act or agency of his for its very foundation could be effected without it. And this, I suppose, is the sense in which the best and wisest of all those who account of the death of the Saviour as necessary to maintain the honour and justice of God would, if pressed to define their meaning, define its necessity^a. But then, on this point, there is, so far, no dispute. Christ's death is still regarded only, as what all hold it to be, a part, and the most essential part, of the means which God, who is free in all things to choose, *has* chosen. The only question is, whether we have a right to account of it as being also something more than this, or something extrinsic to it: as something which the honour, and justice, and

^a See Chap. XIV. Sect. i.

glory of a perfectly pure, and wise, and good Being (and this his honour, justice, and glory considered independently of his will to benefit mankind) may be held to require, or in which they are involved or concerned. If there be any one who, after what has been said, deems that we may dare to affirm this of GOD, I have nothing left to add, except to urge him to read with due attention the citation which follows; and then, as cursorily as he pleases, the three questions which follow.

“There was a certain creditor, which had two debtors: the one owed five hundred pence, and the other fifty. And when they had nothing to pay, he frankly forgave them both.”

Question 1. Have we a right to presume that this creditor required an atonement, or mediator?

Question 2. If not, have we a right to say that he did wrong, or that he compromised his own justice or honour?

Question 3. Have we a right to limit the operation of GOD's honour, or justice, or glory, in a way in which we do not limit *his*^a?

In point of fact, all these words, or attributes, of honour, justice, and glory, and so indeed also

^a See Dr. Hey's Lectures, Book IV. Art. ix. Lecture XXX. p. 166, and compare p. 303.

those of will^a, and design, no less than those of anger, or jealousy, or sovereignty, are, and can be, when used in speaking of God, nothing more or less than the terms, or expressions, of those imperfect ANALOGIES of earthly things, by which, and by which only, we either do, or can, obtain any knowledge whatever of heavenly things. Nothing can be more certain, or more a matter of absolute necessity, than that to forget the cautions which this consideration requires, in the use of all such terms and expressions, is to run into error^b. As, for instance, to speak of God who is always ready to be propitiated, as *made* propitious, or *rendered placable*^c, does and must introduce,

^a Hobbes, De Cive, xv. 14.

^b “Præterea, videndum duximus, quomodo sine troporum et figurarum umbris caput doctrinæ Christianæ gravissimum ad veterem simplicitatem et puritatem vere Christianam explicemus; adeoque vim potius formularum obviam ex usu Judaico, librisque V.T. quam formulas ipsas persequamur; ne quod propter similitudinem transfertur ad Christum id proprie ei tribuamus, unde Judæorum vanitas et superstitio omnis emanavit, ac in scholas mentesque Christianas errores haud paucos inductos videmus.” Doederlein, Institutio Theologi Christiani, Lib. II. Part II. c. 2. De opere et beneficiis Christi, Sect. 256. Obs. 2. Cf. eundem, Sect. 267, Obs. 7.

^c “Nam quomodo in filio unigenito singulare amoris sui pignus nobis dedisset, nisi jam ante fuisset gratuito favore complexus. Imo quia prius diligit postea nos sibi reconciliat.” Calv. Inst. II. xvi. Sects. 2 and 3. See also the extracts in notes 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, to Sect. ii. of Chap. XIV. of

amongst persons incompetent to discern and appreciate the limitations of this analogy, much disturbance, at the very least, of their just apprehension and feeling of his unparalleled and divine benignity. But then also it is no less certain that the caution by which we may, if we will, escape or conquer, this danger or inconvenience, is always at hand. This caution, practically, is, that we never attempt to infer any meaning from any analogy, except in reference to that *end*, or those *ends* only, on which it is plainly meant to communicate meaning; or in which the *gist*, as is said, of the analogy lies. All these ends, moreover, must be comprehensible ends. We may speak, indeed, and perpetually do speak, on matters of which we do not, and cannot, know *all* the bearings. But we must be able to comprehend those bearings of them of which we do speak, or we can have no meaning at all.

There will be no other equally clear and easy way of making this plain, as by instancing particularly some of those analogies in which we are this Treatise, and also Veysie's Preservative against Socinianism, p. 19, and Tucker's Light of Nature, Vol. VI. p. 616, where it is observed, in speaking of prayer, that prayer operates "not by moving God or Christ, but by bringing ourselves into a frame of mind capable of receiving benefit from the provisions they have made for our use." Compare *ibid.* pp. 352, 353, 354. 470. 481. But on the efficacy of Prayer see also the sixth section of this chapter.

accustomed to speak of our relations to God, and by showing of them severally how they are to be used, and this caution applied.

In the first place, then, of one of the plainest cases. We speak of God as in analogy to a *husbandman*. The husbandman tills his field for himself, and for his own purposes. But the only religious inference which we draw from *this* analogy, is that, as the wheat is gathered into the barn, and the tares rejected, so God deals with us.

So of God as our *sovereign*! The deference which we pay to man we owe, and in an incomparably higher degree, to Him. The state and the dignity, with which we speak of his throne as accompanied, we account of as merely human modes of speaking, which, though they convey a real sense of his real and incomparable supremacy, we yet never attempt to press into any minute or close comparison.

Let us now proceed to the analogy in God to *anger*. That we do not mean, in speaking of the anger of the Good and the Almighty, to attribute to this Holy Being any feeling similar, or akin *in the whole*, to human anger, is universally recognised^a. What we mean is to say that as it is our interest, and sometimes our duty, to shun and deprecate the anger of man, so it is always both our interest and our duty to obey the commands of God.

^a As by Calvin, Inst. II. xvi. Sects. 2 and 3.

And we mean, I apprehend, to imply and confess also, that God has both more power to reward and to punish, and higher claims on both our obedience and our love, than man can possess. If any one ever carries on this analogy so far as to assign to the Divine Being anything of the imbecility or irritation which human anger ordinarily includes, there can be but few Christians, I suppose, who will not at once disavow this meaning when thus stated.

So, in like manner, of God as *jealous*. As it may be said even of a tyrant, that he requires an undivided allegiance, and will not grant any favours, except where he sees or supposes that allegiance, so God grants not his good things, except to his true servants. God is in analogy also even to the *unjust judge*, inasmuch as both are accessible to prayer. And so in innumerable other instances which may be supposed, or which Scripture sets before us on authority. But in all these instances, it is, and can be, only one or more of our own particular relations to God, in which the analogy consists, or to which it extends. So far it is relevant; no farther. And thus, to go back, if that can be necessary, to speak once more of his *honour* and *glory*;—we certainly never can in the least comprehend what these are *in Him*, but only that there is that in him which requires devotion and

obedience from us^a. And though there is more difficulty in stating the case of his justice, or benevolence, or of his *moral* attributes, yet as none doubts that he is the real original from which all moral goodness whatever is derived to man, so also many writers have shewn abundantly that we must in no case ascribe to *Him* any of those limitations as to his method of exerting them, which only the imperfections of our human faculties may impose *on us*. Or, to apply what has been said to the atonement particularly, what we infer of God from his thus giving his Son to die for us, is that he gave him in that love, of which Scripture assigns and reason must acknowledge, this great instance, as its most eminent proof. But we do not, or at least ought not, to infer from it, that this God's great love would have been embarrassed with any difficulty in accomplishing the same end in some other way. We infer in the same manner God's justice from the same clear and impressive evidence which the same act affords us, that sin

^a See Hey on St. Paul, pp. 59 and 60. Οὐκ ὡς ἔχει τὸ θεῖον οἶόν τε ἦν λέγεσθαι· ἀλλ' ὡς οἶόν τε ἦν ἐπαίειν ἡμᾶς σαρκὶ πεπεδημένους, οὕτως ἡμῖν ἐλάλησαν οἱ προφῆται, συμπεριφερομένου σωτηρίας τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀσθενείᾳ τοῦ Κυρίου. Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. 391, as quoted by Suicer in voce γινῶσις. Εἰ σαυτὸν οὐκ ἔγνως ὅστις εἶ, εἰ ταῦτα οὐ κατέλαβες, ὧν καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις μάρτυς, πῶς θεὸν ἀκριβῶς, ὅπερ τε καὶ ὅσον ἐστίν, εἰδέναι ὑπολαμβάνεις; πολλῆς τοῦτο τῆς ἀνομίας. Greg. Nazian. Orat. XXIX. p. 493. Ibid.

leads to death; but we do not infer from it that sin could not have been otherwise pardoned^a. In the same manner we must also look, as was said before^b, in all other such cases, to the true, or rather the real, *gist* of the analogy. While we keep this principle in our minds, we may even speak of God as *placable*, without implying even a suspicion that except for Christ he could have been otherwise. As a human superior may be appeased by gifts, so God, who is always good, will pardon sin on repentance.

And so, still more, with regard to most of those other analogies in which divines are used to speak of *saving* or *satisfying* the honour or justice of God, or of Christ's death as being that *ransom* or *sacrifice* which it truly is^c. All these analogies are, no doubt, strong *figures*. But for that very reason they are the more appropriate to both a real and a strong case. As the bloodshedding of the heifer and the goat, though meant directly only as a sacrifice for offences against the civil or the ceremonial law of the Jews^d, was yet a real lesson in holiness for all who regarded it as typical, which it was, of a cleansing from sin, so Christ's

^a See Chap. I. pp. 9, 10, and as before, Chap. XIV. Sect. i.

^b Page 33.

^c See Chap. I. pp. 5—7.

^d Jahn's *Biblic. Arch.*, Sects. 375, 384, and Doederlein's *Inst. Theol. Christ.* II. 390.

death more eminently and significantly. Also, and this too is a correct analogy^a, as these sacrifices were *believed*, though like the penances of the church of Rome believed superstitiously, to constitute a propitiation for sin itself, and this even for those who looked not beyond the mere “opus operatum,” so Christ’s death does constitute a propitiation for those who turn this great instance of the divine love to the moral ends designed by it. As a prisoner is redeemed by paying a *ransom*, so all they who choose to escape from the bondage of corruption, may obtain liberation from it, if they will lay hold of the price which Christ has paid to set them free : that is, if they will lay hold of it as an effectual motive to break its chain. As a creditor, when *satisfied* by payment, remits a debt ; so God, when we have made to him that offering of faith and repentance which Christ enables us to make, remits our heavy offences.

That this is all which we mean, or can mean, either by the use of the word sacrifice, or the word ransom, or indeed of the word satisfaction, (a word

^a Thus Butler rightly observes, that the sacrifice of Christ was of that real “ efficacy for obtaining the pardon of sin, which the heathens may be supposed to have thought their sacrifices to have been, and which the Jewish sacrifices really were in some degree, and with regard to some persons.” Anal. Part 2, Chap. V. pp. 304, 305, edit. of 1740 ; and see Clemens Alex. as quoted by Lardner. Works by Kippis, III. 293, Note y.

which, though not found in Scripture, may yet be no less freely used than the others; because, if used with any meaning, it can be in the same meaning only with that of those other words which *are* used in it,) I have thus, I think, made evident; and indeed is what I apprehend that the most intelligent writers on the subject clearly allow^a. But not to mean this, nor make it prominent, is to stop in our attempt to penetrate into the interpretation or meaning of the moral scheme of Christianity, at the very threshold of that sanctuary into which it invites us.

The same reasoning applies also no less to the employment of analogies, which, though all analogies which have in them anything real, are safe in point of truth, so long as we do not press them too far, may yet be *offensive*. Thus, to be as brief on this point as possible, we often find Christ's office in heaven spoken of as in the analogy of that of a favourite, or friend at court; and what he has done for us said to be "charged or entered as the balance of our account in the book of God's re-

^a No safer or clearer writer can be consulted on this subject of analogy, and especially on the analogy of sacrifices, than Dr. Veysie. See his Bampton Lecture Sermons, pp. 123. 126. 131. 134, 135; or his Defence of the Preservative against Socinianism, pp. 153, 154; see also Bishop Gaskell's Treatise on the Trinity, pp. 479—481, as printed in the Enchiridion Theologicum.

membrance."^a Language such as this, able and excellent as are some of the writers in whom it is found, can scarcely be read without pain. It has, and must have often, if not always, the injurious effect of complicating with mean and trivial images the explanation sought for in it, and which it is intended to give, of that most august of all the works of the divine wisdom and mercy which has ever been vouchsafed to mankind.

But still offences against taste are not offences against truth^b, nor yet are they offences against piety; or at least they are not so necessarily. Language, also, which it may be at one time unwise to use, may yet be wisely used at another time: and there may probably be at all times, or in every country and age, persons of infantine or gross conceptions, to whom many methods of speaking which can scarcely seem to the well educated and the refined to be other than disparaging to the true greatness and goodness of God, may yet be innoxious. And to these persons some

^a See Stackhouse's *Body of Divinity*, pp. 568. 580—582, and Doddridge on Rom. iv. 9; see also Doddridge's *Sermon on Salvation by Grace*, p. 16. Witsius's *Œconomia Fœderis*, lib. iii. c. 8, (this is Doddridge's reference,) and Scott's *Essays*, pp. 132, 133.

^b On a great misconception on this point by Tucker, see Chap. XIV. Sect. vii. See also Ludlam's *Essays on Scripture Metaphors*, Vol. I. pp. 8. 47. 132, 133, and the *Observations on Hervey*, p. 135.

very mean analogies may not only be made to speak correctly the truth which they contain, but also to convey it not less usefully than it can be conveyed to them by better analogies. "As a humble and retiring individual, who has not the courage to approach his king personally, will yet venture to address him through a favoured servant, from whom he has already experienced acts of benignity, so it is our happiness to be able to approach God through Christ." No argument can be more valid. We derive really from our knowledge of, or relation to, Christ, the courage to hope that our petitions will be granted by God, which the suppliant of the earthly king derives, and with a less grounded assurance, through the king's favourite. So far the analogy holds,—holds with as sure a relevancy as any which the whole science of reasoning can possibly furnish. But if we go on to argue, that because we thus know God's goodness to us through Christ to be no less ready, and real, or rather to be more ready and real, than that which we suppose to be the goodness of the king as bestowed through the favourite, it must therefore be exerted in the same or a similar manner, or be bestowed on the same or similar inducements or motives^a, we argue falsely. We thus

^a For which, as was observed in pp. 33 and 37, we must look to the *gist* for which the analogy is alleged, *i. e.* out of the analogy itself.

allow ourselves to come to a conclusion no less wide of the premises than if we were to conclude, that because there are some analogies between man and the inferior animals, they are equally destined to attain a future inheritance. And to this I think it is to be added, that though all analogies, and necessarily those of Scripture as much as any others, are capable of being thus perverted, I think that Scripture itself gives us one caution not unworthy of remark, against this perversion. This caution the Scripture, I think, gives us by clothing with a vagueness which has been often observed, and which is at once magnificent and very indistinct, everything which it says, and which indeed it is its business to say, of the nature and operations of the invisible world. It is clear to me that this is at least partly that it may not give any handle to our distorting the divine attributes into too close a resemblance of those human passions or faculties from which only we *can* reason concerning them. And this, to give an example, I think that we see particularly evidenced in the august descriptions with which we are furnished of the most transcendently important to us of all the events of futurity, the general judgment at the last day. It is plain, and indeed universally acknowledged, that we have no right to infer from those descriptions any thing whatever of *resemblance* between the proceedings

of that great day, and the formularies of human tribunals; but only that the decisions respecting us, which will then be declared, will be decisions correspondent, so far as the parity of the cases may allow or require, to the decisions pronounced by a human judge. There is nothing in the whole of Scripture more, if so much, interspersed as these descriptions are with the most evident figures. Especially they are so intermingled with, as in some places scarcely to be dissevered from, the almost mystical announcements of the approaching destruction of Jerusalem. And I do not doubt that this is at least partly for the purpose of guarding us against taking them in a too literal sense^a.

^a It can scarcely be necessary to add, that all these cautions in the use of the language of analogy are to be observed the more rigidly, when we employ this great instrument of the imaginative faculty for the purpose of exposition or argument, than when we use it only in the looser way of exhortation or eloquence. It has been observed by Ludlam, in the two first passages referred to in Note b, p. 40, that the metaphor of debts is "nowhere used by the Apostles to illustrate the great mystery of the redemption:" and again, that they who represent punishment as "a debt due to God, consider it as beneficial to God just as property is to man." If what has been said in this section of the nature of all reasoning from analogy [or metaphor] be but correct, nothing can be more irrelevant than the first, or more unfounded than the second, of these observations. See, however, the passages in pp. 132, 133, subsequently referred to in the same note, in which the metaphor

SECTION II.

The second of the objections which I proposed to consider in this chapter, is the objection, that as Christ's death is represented to us in Scripture as being clearly and eminently a sacrifice, it must, therefore, be understood as having the same efficacy, or sort of efficacy, which the sacred writers must have known to be commonly attributed to sacrifices, both in the Jewish and in the Heathen world.—This, I think, is the most precise wording in which I can put a common objection not often, I believe, clearly understood by those who make it.

AFTER what has been said, in the second part of the last section, of the nature of analogy, and of the analogy of sacrifices more particularly, I may be very brief, I apprehend, on this point here. It was there^a assumed as incontestible, that Christ's death is a real sacrifice, or to express the same meaning more fully, that it is in a real analogy to the expiatory sacrifices, both of the Jewish law and of the heathen religions. Neither is it less incontestible, that both Jews and Heathens did

above spoken of, and other similar metaphors, are to a certain extent defended or justified, by treating them as merely popular or rhetorical methods of speaking. Right: but no popular or rhetorical method of speaking is ever to be justified as consistent with truth, except by a correct interpretation of those analogies by which truth and *it* are connected. This does justify it,—*so far*.

^a See particularly pp. 36—38.

often think, and that the inspired writers must have known that they did and would think, with respect to their sacrifices, that they had an effect to obtain the divine acceptance or favour, over and above that which they possessed through the moral application of them made by the worshipper. The Jews, or, at least, many of them, thought that Jehovah, the Heathens that their false gods, were propitiated by perfumes, or by incense, and that they delighted, for their own sake, in the blood of the victims brought to their altars; or, as some say, and I believe say rightly, they thought that the sin of the sinner was transferred to the victim sacrificed^a. This was, in fact, one form of that general desire to escape from self-denial and holiness by taking refuge in opinion or in rituals, which has been in all ages the bane of true religion; and it is only necessary to refer to the writings of the Jewish prophets, to prove at once its error and its prevalence. But assuredly there is nothing in this which can be in the least degree incompatible with what has been said. We have, of course, to allow, as has indeed been already observed^b, and as I shall also show farther elsewhere^c, that the *meaning* of the prophets, in adducing these analogies, is to be admitted as our clear rule for interpreting them. But it does not hence follow, that an abuse which

^a Outram de Sacrificiis, p. 269.

^b Pp. 33, 34.

^c See Chap. XIV. Sect. viii. § 2.

they must have foreseen, would be made of them, is to be either that rule or that meaning^a. And this, especially, since no other means of teaching anything of what it was their business to teach could be devised^b. They *could not*, except through the analogies of earthly things, teach men to form any conception whatever of things divine. Their case and conduct, moreover, on this point, were precisely the same with the case and the conduct of Christ himself. *He*, we are told, foresaw that he was come, in some sense, to send not peace on earth, but a sword. It does not hence follow that he was not the prince of peace, or that he did not take the wisest means of promoting it^c. So long

^a See again, Chap. XIV. Sect. viii. § 2. In the same manner, in the long controversy about the *compliances*, as they have been called, of Moses (whom we must presume to have foreseen the abuse which followed) with the superstitions of Egypt, it has, I think, been proved that, in point of fact, his meaning was to array type *against* type, ceremony *against* ceremony: that is, one analogy *against* another. The opposition was not the less, because similar, or in some cases even the same, facts, or language, were chosen, not as the *basis*, but as the *expression* of both. And this, agreeably to what was said in p. 32, was the only way in which he *could* teach even the truth itself to men, whose minds had been educated in these analogies. The actual history, however, of Moses' proceeding in this matter has too much obscurity in it to be brought forward in *illustration* of a clearer case.

^b Compare p. 32.

^c So, also, in the case of the Apostles. They, too, may, or must have, foreseen that *their* recognitions of the analogies

as men are ignorant and prejudiced, and, above all, so long as they are studious to escape from the precepts of real holiness into the regions of either doctrine, or ritual, so long, we may be well assured, that they will always pervert even the most wholesome nutriment, the most wisely administered, to the ends of ignorance and prejudice. If the vessel itself, according to the homely proverb, be not sweet, whatever you pour into it will turn sour. That still may be, and often is, truth itself which is poured in. Neither, assuredly, can anything be plainer than that the *leading* object of the Jewish prophets, in speaking on the subject of sacrifices, is to teach pointedly and expressly the *moral* lesson which they give; and that if this moral application be *not* made of them, they are altogether useless, or worse than useless, before God. This is a sentiment which meets us at every turn in their writings, is the very point on which their godly jealousy was most alive^a.

Also, even amongst Heathens, this same sentiment, although, as might be expected, less prominent than amongst Christians or Jews, is yet by of ransoms and sacrifices would be so interpreted, as to assign to Christ's death an import with God, even abstractedly from the moral application of it. It certainly does not follow that *therefore*, or because they may have foreseen this abuse, it really has that farther import.

^a See pp. 37, 38, and also Chap. XIV. Sect. vi., and Sect. viii. of the same chapter.

no means unknown or unacknowledged. The recognitions, indeed, made on this subject by some of the greater heathen writers, are amongst the most remarkable, as well as most valuable, of their remains. Of some of these I shall speak farther in a future chapter^a. They are often such, that we cannot but trace them to the same principle of the religious life which spoke in Isaiah and Amos. Nor is it too much to add, that they may sometimes almost remind us of the still higher authority, on which we are taught that even the widow's mite is in the sight of God a costly offering^b; and that "to love Him with all the heart, and with all the understanding, and with all the soul, and all the strength, and to love his neighbour as himself, is more than all whole burnt-offerings and sacrifices."

^a Chap. XIV. Sect. vi. § 2.

^b *Immunis aram si tetigit manus,
Non sumtuosa blandior hostia
Mollibit aversos Penates*

Farre pio et saliente mica.—HOR. Od. III. 23.
Compare Eurip. Fragm. apud Clem. Alex. (No. 155 in Musgrave's Euripides.)

SECTION III.

The third objection was, that the line of argument which I take in this treatise makes repentance alone, or repentance and holiness, or these virtues through faith, directly available to our salvation; and thus implies, that we are saved by our own merits, and not by Christ's.

OF the general use and meaning of the word merit, I must reserve what I have to say till I come to speak, in a subsequent chapter, of the doctrine of faith and works^a.

With regard to what may be called the natural availableness of repentance, or rather our ground, abstractedly from revelation, for hoping that God will blot out our past sins on our forsaking sin, and studying to please him by future holiness, nothing is more certain than that the great stream of modern divines, including the best and the ablest, deny that we have any sufficient ground for this hope, or any on which we can build it with confidence. Secker^b, Sherlock^c, and even Butler^d, the most prudent of writers, and still more valuable for what he has not said, than for what he has said, unite in this view of the case. Archbishop

^a Chap. X.

^b Sermons, Vol. II. Serm. vii. p. 151; and compare Sermon VII. of Vol. I. pp. 166, 167.

^c Sermons, Vol. II. Serm. ii. and Vol. IV. Serm. iii. ed. of 1758.

^d Analogy, Part II. Chap. V. pp. 295 and 306. Compare also pp. 291 and 292, ed. of 1740.

Magee, if I recollect rightly, calls the notion that repentance will be of itself available with God, a strange notion. The elder Balguy observes that “as there is no redemption without repentance, so repentance is insufficient without redemption.”^a Dr. Wardlaw says, in plain words, that “there is, as has frequently been observed, as good ground for affirming that former obedience atones for present sins, as there is for affirming that present obedience atones for antecedent transgressions.”^b And if the argument could be good for anything, it is certain that it must be carried this length. In truth, however, all such outraging observations as this, would, if they had *any* weight in them, rather tend to argue the Scripture doctrine of repentance to be of folly, than prove it to be of grace, would tend to dispute the equity or reasonableness of at the same time forgiving the sinner for past sin, and warning him who standeth to take heed lest he

^a On Redemption, p. 55. See also Norris’s Sermon on Christ’s Satisfaction; Sermons, Vol. IV. p. 141. 144. See also Sumner’s Records of Creation, II. 236—242. Even Paley, who was, perhaps, led into this error by Soame Jenyns, speaks to the same effect; Sermons, Vol. I. 96. 122, 123. See also Conybeare’s Sermons, II. 134, 135. 140, and Soame Jenyns’s Internal Evidence, pp. 112, 113.

^b Discourses on the principal Points of the Socinian Controversy, p. 220, ed. of 1819. This passage is quoted with approbation by Magee, I. 7. See farther on this subject Chap. XIV. of this Treatise, Sect. ix.

fall. Assuredly we know, if we know anything, that we have to deal, both in our passing through this life, and in our reception into another life, not with a rigid accountant, but with a loving father; and we must estimate the son who purposed to go when he was commanded, but went not, and the son who at first refused, but afterwards repented and went, as of like desert at the last in the father's judgment, ere we can imagine any other than a similar rule to be the rule of God^a. And indeed who sees not, that, since all men are sinners, the alternative is unavoidable, that either God will accept repentance, or, if not repentance, yet an imperfect virtue, or none can be saved? This is enough; or if there be any one who, on reflection, does not think it so, it must be vain to argue with him. I will only add farther, therefore, on this matter, that the true state of the case is briefly set forth by Johnson, and with a force of argument which, eminent as are some of the authorities to which he is opposed, I see not how it happens that any sane mind can resist^b.

^a See Ezekiel, xviii. 31, 32.

^b Rambler, No. 110. See also Maclaine's Answer to Soame Jenyns, pp. 38—41; Warburton's Divine Legation, Book IX. and his Letters to Dr. Hurd, p. 421. 423; also a Sermon before the University of Oxford on John xiv. 1, by Walter Harte, p. 19, 8vo, 1737. See also Chap. XIV. of this Treatise, Sect. ix., and the conclusion of the extract from Whichcote's Letter to Tuckney, in Sect. xxxiii. of the same Chapter.

SECTION IV.

The fourth objection to what was said is, that if we hold nothing more concerning the availableness of Christ's death, or atonement, than that it avails us through that moral application of it which we ourselves are able to make, we cannot hold the common opinion that even good Heathens, and others who have not known Christ, are yet saved through him.

DOUBTLESS, I must admit this consequence. Doubtless, also, it is the common opinion that Christ's blood, or death, has in some way blotted out not only the sins of those who believe in him, and who repent, but also what has been called the sin of the world, or that wrath of God which has come on us through Adam's transgression^a. On this point, it will be enough for me to say that though, as was observed in Chapter I.^b, I am far from affirming that the divine wisdom may not have had purposes in Christ's death which we cannot discern, yet neither can we dare to assert the contrary; or that the magnificent declarations made in Scripture, of the extent of its efficacy, are not limited, by the nature of the case, to those who both can and do make that moral application of it, in which alone we can discern it to possess any moral range or effect. If Scripture speaks at

^a See a note in the beginning of the 2nd chapter of Paley's Evidences, Part II.; another note in his Natural Theology, p. 566, ed. of 1803; and also his Sermons, Vol. I. p. 106.

^b Page 17.

all on this point, I should say that it does seem to take it for granted, that all those for whose sake our Saviour came, as they must have *heard* of him on whom they have believed, and cannot hear without a preacher, so cannot derive any benefit from him except through *faith*. Nothing more, nothing else, seems to be in its view anywhere. From our not daring to carry our doctrine of the efficacy of Christ's redemption farther than this, it does not at all follow that they who do not know, and therefore cannot make a moral application of it, are consequently disabled in any way from receiving the bounty or mercy of God. That is not barred.—I moreover apprehend, that this notion of Christ's death having any effect, (except, indeed, through some indirect moral influence of his religion,) for any who are ignorant of him, is an exceedingly modern notion. At least, I have not found any symptom of it in any one of the Fathers. We meet in almost every page of their writings with the not altogether unfounded notion, that there was a Christianity even before Christ; and that the old Fathers were, in a certain sense, saved through him. But this, as far as I have observed, is always on the prevalent supposition that the same *Λόγος*, or wisdom, which was in Christ, was also with them, though in a less clear and perfect revelation or form; and that, *so far*, they who lived *before*, no less than they who lived *after*, his

incarnation, might be said to owe their redemption *to him*. But as for the notion that they were redeemed by him, otherwise than through their *faith* in him, or through their own moral application of that obscure knowledge of him which they had received, I have searched for it in vain^a. Of course, I do not now speak of that *mystical* effect of Christ's coming into the world, or rather of baptism in his name, which has been attributed to it from the earliest age^b. My business *here* is not with the principle on which virtue is infused in man, but with the principle on which it is accepted by God^c.

^a See the extracts from Justin, Clement, Augustin, and Chrysostom, in the first chapter of Casaubon's Exercitationes on Baronius, "Ad apparatus annalium." Irenæus contra Hæreses, III. 22, has the following passage:—"Christum non venisse propter unius sæculi homines; *sed propter omnes qui juste pieque viventes in ipsum crediderant, ac deinceps credituri essent.*" In Chap. XXIII., he says that the Patriarchs and Prophets *viam munierant* for his coming; and in Book IV. c. 21, "Ob quæ non solum prophetam eum dixit (Gal. iii. 5. 7.) fidei, sed et patrem eorum qui ex gentibus credunt in Christum Jesum, eo quod una et eadem illius et nostra sit *fides*, illo quidem credente futuris quasi jam factis, propter repromissionem Dei, nobis quoque similiter speculantibus eam quæ in regno est hæreditatem." P. 258 in Massuet's Edition.

^b On *that* point I refer the reader to what will be said in Section vii. of this chapter, and particularly to Note 3 to that section.

^c See Chap. IV. of this Treatise, and the references in Note 4 to that chapter.

It is again objected, however, that other worlds also, besides our own, may be benefited by the lesson that sin, though repented of, and repented of in faith, yet cannot be pardoned without payment of the penalty; and that this penalty, if remitted to the guilty, must be paid (as the temporal penalties of sin often are paid) by the innocent. We are made a spectacle, it is said, both to angels and men.

Granting this^a, it still does not appear that the inference so drawn is either lost, or is weakened, by our fearing to add to the certainty that Christ's death serves to create, or invigorate, human repentance, the somewhat audacious assertion that it has some farther influence besides on the divine will, to accept that repentance when so created, or invigorated. If, when we are spoken of as a spectacle to angels, anything more be intended than an accommodation to the Jewish traditions, (and I see not why the sense should be so restrained,) it is not imaginable that those messengers of God's will to man, or ministers of his glory, should fail to revere, or haply even to profit by,

^a Nor in truth is this anything but an extension to other worlds of a principle, which we *do* recognise as a part of that moral lesson which the doctrine of the Redemption affords to mankind. See farther on this subject Chap. XIV. Sect. i., and also the extracts from Grotius and Outram, in Notes 2 and 5 to the second Section of the same Chapter.

this great example of both his justice and his love. But it is not on this account the less certain, that man only, fallen man, is set before us by the sacred writers as the only direct end and object of the whole dispensation. God's dealings with angels, whatever allusions, either fearful or encouraging, may be made to the existence of any such beings, or to their offices, neither are nor can be revealed to beings, whose faculties, moral and intellectual, are conferred on them for the purpose of regulating their conduct on earth. And it must, of course, be the same also with respect to his dealings with any other moral agent of any world but our own.

SECTION V.

But Christ, again, is to be our judge: he is to come, it is said, in the clouds of heaven, with all his holy angels round him. He is also now our mediator in heaven, as he was on the earth, and our intercessor with God. Have we not here, therefore, and on decisive authority, that very sort of interposition between God and man in the exercise of indisputably divine prerogatives, which it has been argued that we should not dare to affirm?

ON this head I have little to do, but to refer to what was stated in the first section of this chapter on the nature of the Scripture analogies in general, and on the descriptions given us of the great last day in particular. On the clear principles there laid down, I think it must be confessed, that it is not safe to infer anything more

from these descriptions than that Christ's Gospel, and the faith which we repose in him, shall be, as they must be, the just criterion by which the Almighty metes out the sentence of that day according to human deserts.

But though this be all, perhaps, which from these descriptions, taking them alone, we may be entitled rigidly to affirm, and though the taking them in this sense relaxes nothing of the reality of the judgment of that great day, (inasmuch as, according to what has been said before^a, all figures of this kind point no less certainly than plainer language to real conclusions,) I cannot but add that, taking in other bearings of the case, I am far from interpreting them into so mere an allegory. If not in these analogies, we have yet, I am fully persuaded, other and decisive ground for believing that the very same Christ, who once walked with his disciples in Galilee, will come personally in the last day, though doubtless in some manner at present incomprehensible and unimaginable by us, to be the judge of quick and dead. I consider it indeed as absolutely incredible, that any mere man should be set up, though under a divine commission, in such an office as this. But if Christ be God, we draw no severance between God and him. Nor is this plainer from any particular passage of Scripture, than from the context of that verse of John v. 22, in which the judicial

^a See pp. 34, 35.

function of the last day may seem at first sight to be attributed the most absolutely to Christ alone. "For the Father," it is there said, "judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son." There is no one passage, as I think, of Scripture, which on a careful study may be more clearly seen to teach the practical union of God with Christ, than that of which this verse is a portion. If it teach any severance, which however it does not, it is not a severance of God from Christ, but of the Son from the Father^a.

But how then does Christ mediate? In what way can he be an *intercessor* with the Father, at whose right hand he sits and reigneth for ever? We always suppose that his mediation, though begun on earth, is continued also in heaven.

To this it is to be answered, that into the pre-

^a "I am aware, indeed, that the Socinians will here object that this power of judging the quick and dead, may be delegated by Him to whom all judgment belongeth—to human instruments We, no less than they, allow that our judge participated in our nature, and we are soothed by the reliance on his sympathy, resulting from the conviction thus graciously accorded that he is not one who cannot be touched with a sense of our infirmities. We gratefully allow that he is *truly and fully man*; but we hesitate to admit that, had he been *merely man*, the proceedings of his awful tribunal could have been recorded in such terms as those in which they are recorded. In those records we conceive that we witness the proceedings of plenary autocracy, not of delegated authority; of Divine power, not of human weakness." Conybeare's Theological Lectures, p. 445.

cise nature of Christ's glorified office, as into the nature of his glorified body, it is vain to inquire. The use in Scripture of these highly wrought figures of sitting and reigning at God's right hand, may, like that of his coming in the clouds to judgment^a, be partly meant to show that this is, and must be so. It is not possible to affirm anything of his mediation, except as it is his mission, or anything of his intercession, except that to come to God through faith in him, and the products of that faith, is to come through his intercession: or, in other words that this faith, and its products, have for us an effect analogous to, and far more real and certain than, the benefits which may commonly be gained, or sought, through human intercession, from human pity, or benevolence. Our human methods of speaking, as indeed the best commentators clearly teach, forbid us to come nearer than this to any conception of what the whole of the love and the glory of the intercessorial function may be^b.

^a See before, p. 57. In the same manner also with regard to our interpretation of the texts which speak of our being caught up to meet the Lord in the air, and so forth. Paley, in Sermon xxxiv. of the first printed collection, refers to these texts in proof that we shall know Christ personally in the future world. But I cannot think that we have any right to interpret this language quite so closely. See farther on this subject, Chap. XIV. Sect. x.

^b See again Chap. XIV. Sect. x. and also the observations on 1 John ii. 1, 2, in Chap. XIII. of this treatise.

May we not put the whole case also as follows?

Man is the erring child of a kind father. The father sends another and a faultless son to bring the prodigal back. When brought back, repentant, subdued, grateful both for his father's kindness, and for that of the brother who mediated, *can* we estimate as we ought the father's forgiveness, if we hold that it must still pass only through the faultless son, and is not given directly to the prodigal himself? All hold, I apprehend, that when Christ at the time of the end, whenever that end may be, shall have given up the kingdom to God, that part of his office which required him, though a son, to take our nature upon him, will clearly be over. Still as the Word, or as God, he is the Son for ever. As such he is both our pardoner and our judge.

Or we may again put the same case in another way. When Christ shall, in heaven, present his saints, his redeemed, to God, he will present them as sanctified, "*pro modulo humano*," by his Holy Spirit, and through repentance and faith in his blood. Does Scripture entitle us to add to *this* statement? Does it entitle us to add that Christ will *join* to this *presentation* of those whom he has thus redeemed, any argument or petition that God, over and above his own merciful consideration for a repentance and faith so produced, may or should accept them *the rather* for the Redeemer's sake. And the accepting them for

his sake must here be understood to be an accepting them, because he by his most painful and meritorious death had satisfied the divine honour or justice ; or had, at the least, done something which was wanting, to dispose God to grant, or to make it fit that he should grant, the inestimable blessings obtained through that precious bloodshedding. The point is whether the analogies which the Scripture uses to make known to us what these blessings are, and how obtained, are used in a sense which comes nearer than the nature of analogical language requires, or than as I think I have shewn, we should be disposed to come, to an identification of the divine attributes and perfections with merely human weakness or feeling.

SECTION VI.

Of the moral efficacy of prayer.

BUT it will again be urged that to *intercede* is to *pray*: that Christ prayed, while on earth, both for his disciples, and for his enemies, and that we are no less taught that he prays for them in heaven. Why pray, unless his prayer is to have some efficacy, unless it be in itself a motive, so to speak, with the Father?

To this it is easy to answer, in general, that we of course speak of Christ's *praying* for us only in the same or a similar analogy, to that in which we speak of him as our intercessor or judge. What

human prayer does with man, that, and much more, Christ's agency does with God. This is the meaning; we cannot, without going into error, mean anything more. And this must, I suppose, be sufficiently apparent from what was said before of other analogies. But as there is a difficulty often made on the subject of prayer, or of its moral efficacy, I wish here to make on this subject some farther remarks. Every thing of which the efficacy is moral, or so far as it is moral, we doubtless may estimate: and there does seem at first sight a difficulty in comprehending how the prayer of one being can morally affect another being; or can conduce to, or be the cause or instrument of, his obtaining any of those spiritual graces or gifts in particular, which our bounteous Father vouchsafes to all. All these gifts flow forth in proportion to those moral efforts of mind which men make for themselves; and it is the very object of this whole treatise to show that we cannot affirm them to flow forth in any other way. How then is it possible that they can be in any way dependent on the prayers of others?

To this question it may be answered as follows:—

I. It is plain that for a man to pray *for himself* is only an expression, and a necessary expression, of that desire to be in God's favour, and to obtain the gifts bestowed by him, which no pious mind

whatever, if alive to the perpetual presence and providence of the Divine Being, can fail to be actuated by. That desire is itself a prayer; and the giving utterance to it in words^a is merely the investing it with what we may call substance and strength. A man's praying *for himself* is therefore plainly nothing else than one, and an important, branch of that moral exertion which all acknowledge to be the way to God's favour, and to the rewards which he grants.

II. It is the same also, in some measure, and no less evidently, with regard to our prayers for others. As prayer for ourselves is a necessary part of Christian *piety*, so is prayer for others a no less essential part of Christian *charity*. If, as before, we have just conceptions of God's perpetual goodness and providence, it is not possible for us really to love our brother, any more than ourselves, without praying for him.

III. But though thus we must pray for others, yet *how* are *our* prayers, morally speaking, to benefit *them*? How can we do for others, what they, and they only through the Divine Spirit, must do for themselves?

The answer to this question is, that this is, and can only be; either, first, by directly putting the person prayed for into external circumstances more

^a Verbis conceptis.

morally advantageous than he would else be in : or secondly, by obtaining from God that he be put in such circumstances by the secret guidance of Providence^a ; or, thirdly and lastly, by obtaining for him, through the Divine Spirit, a larger infusion of that internal power or grace which always prevents and follows us in every privilege given, and in every good thing which we think or do.

1. How our prayers serve directly to put the person prayed for into external circumstances more morally advantageous than he would else be in, it is not hard to discern. We may see, or suppose, for example, that a pious mother prays to God that in his great goodness he will turn the heart of a thoughtless son. These her prayers, though it is to be feared often lost on the son, are yet doubtless often heard and granted. But how heard, and how granted ? Doubtless, in part at least, or sometimes, through that moral influence on the heart of the son himself, which his knowledge of her strong crying and tears for him must always tend to awake, in all his intervals of a better mind, and which the perpetual care and presence of the Divine Spirit is always ready to precede, and to foster.

Again.—Is it not highly probable that among those who heard the prayer of St. Stephen, there

^a See Magee on Atonement and Sacrifice, Vol. I. pp. 143, 144.

was at least *one*, on whom, if not at the time, yet afterwards, his having heard it had a very strong moral effect?

So also, and in a still more eminent degree, with regard to the prayers of Christ. If, as we may surely hope to have been the case, any of even those who crucified him were forgiven through the particular influence of that his particular and touching prayer for them which he made at the time, is it clear that it was not because they were smitten at heart by that exceeding goodness, which at that trying moment he so manifested? We may even ask whether the goodness which at that trying moment thought not of self, and showed so consistent and unaffected a love of even those who were then administering to his death, was not certain to be acknowledged by them when the hour of party triumph and fanaticism had gone by? If the goodness which led Christ to *die* for us be meant to be turned by the Holy Spirit to our own good through faith and repentance; the goodness which led or leads him to *pray* for us, which is the same goodness, must be meant to be turned to the same end in the same way. It is plainly the goodness which led to both these acts, not the acts themselves, for which we are grateful. And at all events it is certain that the whole actual efficacy of prayer is always proportionate to the degree in which it obtains for those for whom it is offered

the graces of repentance and holiness. Even the Saviour's prayer must for the unrepenting, while they continue unrepenting, or if they do not repent at all, be, as it was for Jerusalem, always in vain.

2. But how, it will still be asked, can it be consistent with God's justice to bestow with so much apparent partiality even external advantages; the bestowing of which, external as they are, amounts to the putting some persons, rather than others, into more advantageous moral circumstances; and this not in reference to the moral effects which they make for themselves, but to the prayers of another?

It might be enough to answer, that this may only be a part of the insoluble problem, why some have in fact those moral advantages over others which we see that they have; or why some are more favourably placed than others for moral improvement:—a problem of the solution of which we can know nothing, except that it alters not in the least the connexion, or proportion, between moral desert and moral reward; and that a man is not on this account the less judged according to that which he hath, and doth, and not according to that which he hath and doth not. But we may also see, that if it be a branch of indispensable charity in us that we should pray for others, that charity must be without its reward unless the prayer be heard. That it is a branch

of such charity even the heathen world was not ignorant. But we Christians know also that it is a charity, which, according to the whole system of the revelation given to us, cannot be perfected, unless we have that promise of the divine blessing on our prayers, which God makes in Christ to all virtue whatever, and which he who makes it binds himself to perform^a.

3. Neither yet, as will appear on the least consideration, does it make any difference in this argument whether the privileges, or advantages, which God is thus led to grant to some over others, be granted through the medium of external circumstances, or of internal grace. The point is the making the difference. And it is also to be observed that God's grace goes always along with all external advantages themselves, and is what makes them salutary^b.

That the prayers of Christ for his church, which are a portion of his merits, are as such rewarded, there is I suppose none who can doubt. It is also plain that *the way* in which they are rewarded is by putting Christians into those better moral circumstances, external or internal, of

^a Price's Four Dissertations, third ed. pp. 207. 221. 224, 225. 227. "Justum est ut reddat quod debet: debet autem quod pollicitus est." Bernard, quoted in Bishop Tomline's Refutation of Calvinism, p. 170.

^b See farther on this subject, Chap. XIV. Sect. xi.

which I have spoken in the last paragraph, and of which they must themselves make the application. That they are also rewarded on exactly the same principle with those of mere man for man, I do not say. But neither does Scripture intimate that they are rewarded on any other principle. And it deserves consideration whether, if we were taught that they are rewarded on any other principle, this doctrine would not lead us into that danger of detracting in various ways from the goodness of God, or of making profane or undue distinctions between him and Christ, of which I spoke at length in Chapter I. But if all which we see, or are taught, is that they are rewarded only by putting Christians in circumstances of which they must themselves make the moral improvement, it is evident that we cannot hold them to interfere with, or disturb, whatever estimate may be formed in the divine mind of that which they make.

SECTION VII.

Of the moral efficacy of the sacraments.

It has been rightly observed by Butler, that all the “positive institutions” of Christianity (of course he includes, or rather must specially mean, our sacraments) are to be regarded “as means to a moral end, and [that] the end must be acknow-

ledged more excellent than the means. Nor," he adds, "is observance of these institutions any religious obedience at all, or of any value, otherwise than as it proceeds on a moral principle."^a It is, moreover, notorious that a very considerable body of divines, a body comprising men inferior to none in mere vigour of mind^b, hold undoubtingly that we cannot affirm of either Baptism or the

^a Analogy, Part II. Chap. i. p. 230, edit. of 1740. In the same manner Leland, after saying of Tindal that he "confounds positive and arbitrary precepts, and by arbitrary means things for which there is no reason," adds as follows: "But all God's precepts . . . are subservient to morals." *Deistical Writers*, Vol. I. p. 118.

^b Nothing can be better or abler on this subject than Calvin's own statement, *Inst.* IV. xiv. 13—17. John Knox states the case as follows: "Furthermore, it is evident that baptism is ordained to be ministered in the element of water, to teach us that like as water outwardly doth wash away the filth of the body, so inwardly doth the virtue of Christ's blood purge our souls from that corruption and deadly poison, wherewith by nature we were infected, whose venomous dregs, although they continue in this our flesh, yet by the merits of his death are not imputed unto us, because the righteousness of Jesus Christ is made ours by baptism: not that we think any such virtue or power to be included in the visible water, or outward action; for many have been baptized, and yet never inwardly purged: but that our Saviour Christ, who commanded baptism to be ministered, will, by the power of his Holy Spirit, effectually work in the hearts of his elect, in time convenient, all that is meant and signified by the same." *Liturgy of the Church of Scotland*, pp. 60, 61. edit. of 1840.

Lord's Supper, that it is anything else than is here designated. On a point which has been so often and so well argued, and I might say demonstrated, as this point, and in works which come under daily observation, it is not my object to dwell. But inasmuch as on the principles which have been laid down in the preceding section, I apprehend that something more may be conceded to the *possibility* of the truth of the opposite tenets, than, as far as I know, is always conceded, I here subjoin a few brief considerations respecting that view of them which seems to me the only reasonable and clear view to take.

I presume that it will be allowed that the efficacy of the prayers of our blessed Lord for his church, and that of the sacraments instituted by him, must stand, as far as they can be supposed to be independent of our own application of them, on the same footing. *If* God is moved by Christ's *prayers*, either to put the members of his church, for his sake, into more favourable external circumstances, or to infuse into them an internal power of contending successfully against temptation and evil, which but for him they would not enjoy, the other case follows. He may then also well be moved by him, and for his sake, to infuse into all those who are baptized into his name, or spiritually made partakers of his body and blood, a similarly increased, or peculiar, power or grace.

That there is any reason for distrusting, *if it be taught*, this doctrine that God grants what is commonly called a *mystical* virtue^a, in addition to that moral help which he certainly does grant in the sacraments, I do not dare to aver. But then it does not the less appear to me to be a doctrine wholly foundationless, equally foundationless with any notion which may be entertained, that Christ's *prayers* can have any effect to strengthen or save us, otherwise than through our own moral improvement of those moral circumstances in which we are placed by our knowledge and reception of his doctrine and history. For example, I see not the least reason to imagine that, supposing the truths included in the religion of Mahomet to be brought *better* before the Mahometan, than the perfect

^a See Bethell on Regeneration, or almost any other book on the same subject. The *definition* of this mystical virtue or change supposed to be worked in the sacraments, is not that it is a change worked by the Divine Spirit (all *moral* good is *his* work): but that it is a work in which *we* are morally inert, and even unconscious. For example,—the faith which led the *catechumens* of the ancient church to apply for baptism was a *moral* attainment, or virtue, or change, in them. It was not the less wrought out in them by the Spirit. The change supposed to be worked in the baptized *infant*, in giving an increased strength to all the good, and in diminishing the strength of all the evil, tendencies of his nature, or in subduing or abating the power of sin over him, is a *mystical* change. But this, if it exist, although the work of the Spirit *exclusively*, is not more his work than the other.

truth of Christianity is brought before *some* Christians, we can hold that the Divine Spirit works in the Christian with the more energy. Or, what I apprehend to be only the same case in other words: let us suppose the best possible *moral* circumstances of the Mahometan to be morally equivalent to those in which *some* Christians are placed. This, allowing the greatest imaginable efficacy to all that Christ has done for us, may yet be supposed; and I see not that in this case we can pronounce that any greater strength, or purer will, is given by the Holy Spirit for the improving of these circumstances, to the one, than to the other.

In thus saying, I am quite aware that, as far at least as the doctrine of the sacraments, especially that of baptism, is concerned, I go against the general opinion of the early church. The common doctrine, and I suppose almost from the beginning, was, that this sacrament at least had the mystical, (or as I may say, and as it has often been said, the magical^a,) not moral, effect of blotting out the stain of original sin, or of placing the baptized person, even the infant, in a state of spiritual union with God, which the unbaptized did not, and could

^a See Neander's Church History, (Rose's Translation,) Vol. I. pp. 274. 361, 362; and compare *ibid.* pp. 384. 388; and also Vol. II. pp. 313, 314. 317—319.

not enjoy^a. Ancient and general, however, as this doctrine was, it appears to me, as I have said, to be altogether an error^b. That the Reformers were divided concerning it is well known.

One reason, probably why so many of the fathers fell into error on this point, is, that both Baptism and the Eucharist appeared to them in the aspect of those initiations, or *τελέται*, from the heathen notions of which they were not enough disentangled^c. Another reason, of course, was the *analogy* which subsisted between Baptism and the rite of circumcision practised among the Jews. But this is a topic which would carry me into much too wide a field, if I were to attempt here to pursue it^d.

^a See Wall on Infant Baptism, in initio, and Origen, Gregory of Nazianzum, and especially Augustin and Bernard, as quoted by him, Part I. Chap. V. and Chap. XI. Sect. ii.; also Chap. XV. Sects. i. ix. and XIX. Sect. viii. Compare also Athanasius, who speaks of this benefit as *purchased* for us by Christ, which is the same thing with its being obtained by his death. Synops. S.S. Lib. vii. in Epist. ad Rom. Op. II. 125.; and also Adv. eos qui damno officiunt genus nostrum : Op. II. 270. I take these last references from Mr. Faber's work on Justification, pp. 123. 125, where the passages are quoted.

^b See Calvin, as referred to in Note b, p. 69.

^c See Neander, as referred to in Note a, in the preceding page.

^d See, however, as before, Chap. XIV. Sect. xi.

SECTION VIII.

But if Christ, it is further said, be understood to be our Atoner, or Redeemer, or Saviour, only as he saves from sin, or as he sanctifies, our salvation by him can be understood only in the same sense in which we might be said to be atoned for, or redeemed, or saved, by the blood of the martyrs, or by their example, and that of other good men, of which, doubtless, we may make the same kind of moral application which we make of his^a.

IN answer to this argument, it must, I think, be admitted, that as Christ's death saves or redeems us through our own moral application of it, so we *are* also in part saved, or redeemed, through that particular enforcement of the lesson afforded by his death, and of any similar lesson, to which either the example or the teaching of good men may happily lead^b.

^a See Grotius de Satisfactione, p. 304, and compare pp. 337. 340.

^b Outram, commenting on the meaning of St. Paul in Col. i. 24, observes: "Ubi eam mortis Christi vim quam cum martyribus communem habuit, non piacularem, commemoravit." De Sacrif. II. Sect. iv. p. 312. Gregory of Nazianzum, speaks of the folly of pursuing perishable objects, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀναβάσεως ἢ θεώσεως, ἢ οὕτως εἰπεῖν τολμήσω, ἧς οἱ μάρτυρες μεσιτεύουσι: to which passage his editor subjoins the following note: Hoc est, ut Nicetas exponit, ἧς μέσεται γίνονται οἱ ἅγιοι, τὸν μὲν λαὸν παρακαλοῦντες ἀναβαίνειν καὶ θεοῦσθαι, τὸν δὲ θεὸν ἱκετεύοντες ἐπικλί-

But Christ is still the alone *author* of Christian salvation. He *only*, from his own dwelling in light inaccessible, came to teach it. *His* death is at least the type, or the original, of every thing which even his best servants ever do, or can do, either by teaching or example, to promote its object or end : and he *only*, since the foundation of the world, has gone, or could go, as our High Priest, into the most Holy Place, without any necessity of making an offering for his own sins, as well as for the sins of the people. He only, therefore, is or can be, either the Redeemer, or the Saviour, in any really significant or commensurate sense of the word.

SECTION IX.

I now come lastly to the objection that the line of argument which has been here taken, is inconsistent with the Protestant doctrine of the imputation of Christ's merits or righteousness to believers: that it destroys, as indeed it does, the distinction which many eminent divines have laid down between our deliverance from the slavery of sin, and from the penalty of it: and also that it identifies unduly the justifying and the sanctifying office of faith.

ON this subject I have to observe, in the first place, that the doctrine of the imputation of

μεσσαι καὶ βοηθεῖν. Opp. Prunæi, Vol. I. 140, and II. 537, ed. Paris, 1609 and 1630. See also Augustin to the same effect, who adds, that Christ is *the* mediator, as needing no intercessor for himself. Aug. as quoted by Bossuet, Avertissement aux Protestants sur le Reproche de l'Idolatrie, Sect. xix.

Christ's righteousness to believers in him is held in two ways.

In the one of these ways, Christ's righteousness is said to be imputed to us, and we accepted for its sake, as it is infused or made inherent in us through faith : or, in other words, as we are led to imitate his divine example, and follow his holy law. Than this doctrine so explained^a, nothing can be truer or more important. This, in point of fact, is the one cardinal doctrine of salvation by Christ,

^a As in Rom. iv. 3—6. 22—24. : “Qua fides dicitur homini in justitiam imputari. Nam locutio illa sensu alio accipi non potest, quam hoc, quod Deus in Evangelio fidem nostram (nempe δι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένην, ut Paullus ipse explicat) pro justitia nostra reputat, et præmio remunerandam censet. *Non itaque justitia Christi, sed fides nostra, nobis imputatur in justitiam.*” Bull. Exam. Censuræ, p. 36, ed. Grabe, et cf. sqq. See also Tucker's Light of Nature, Part II. Chap. XIV. Sect. xi., the first paragraph ; than which nothing, as I apprehend, can be more correct. Unless, perhaps, it may be objected that the language is scarcely *strong* enough to denote, or include, that most impressive lesson of holiness, which we are especially taught by our blessed Saviour's *death*, namely, the duty and necessity of *dying* to sin. Into the theory of the imputation of Christ's infused or inherent righteousness, as held particularly by the Church of Rome, I do not profess to enter. Abstracting their most intolerant limitation of this grace to their own communion, and waiving also some minor objections to their method of propounding the doctrine itself, I hope and believe that the divines of that church hold it rightly. See what will be said in Chap. X. of this treatise, and in Chap. XIV. Sect. xv. Head 5.

namely, that we are saved or accepted through our own moral application, through the Spirit, of what Christ has done and suffered, and taught; a doctrine not altered, though I think embarrassed, by the use of the much too technical word, imputation, provided only we be careful to use it in this sense alone, or as only implying, in the words of one of the most estimable of the Christian fathers, that Christ "is made to us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption, as he makes us wise, and righteous, and holy, and free."^a Thus far it is not possible for anything to be more correct than the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness to mankind. But then it is also no less true, as Bull has justly observed^b, that the intelligible language in which to put this doctrine in this sense, is not that Christ's righteousness, but that our own faith, is the thing imputed to us.

The other sense in which the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness to us is held, and the sense in which it is held commonly, though not universally, among Protestants, is that we are saved *for his sake* alone, not even through faith in him, in any other sense than as it unites

^a Theophylact, as quoted by Bull, Exam. Censuræ, ed. Grabe, p. 42.

^b Bull, as quoted in the Note in the preceding page.

us with that body of which He is the head, and so allows us to claim for his sake a reward which is properly his only, and not our own^a. And then again, they who hold this doctrine in this sense make also, and must make, a distinction between the deliverance obtained for us by Christ from the *power* of sin, and our deliverance from the *penalty* of it; a notion which appears to be founded on the belief that no virtue except a perfect virtue (and Christ's only was perfect) can be rewarded by God, and no sin forgiven, except through the merits of his perfection. On this belief it moreover follows that, inasmuch as man is never sinless, and yet has his sins forgiven; never perfect, and yet to be rewarded with heaven; the penalty will be remitted, even while the offence remains; the reward vouchsafed, though undeserved. It follows also on the same principle, that the righteousness imputed to us is Christ's *extrinsecal* righteousness; that is, a righteousness *considered exclusively of*, although *working*, when rightly and gratefully applied^b, our own imitation of it. If this doctrine be the true doctrine, it is clear that we are both saved and rewarded; not through Christ as the mediator, through whom we are taught and led to approach

^a See what will be said on this subject in Chap. XIV. Sect. xv. Head 3, and the notes under that head.

^b See Chap. XIV. Sect. xii.

our heavenly Father in the garb of that holiness which, imperfect as it is, and always with much in it to be forgiven, he will deign to accept; but *for his sake alone*, and altogether independently of everything which we do, or can do, for ourselves. If so, the whole argument of this treatise falls at once to the ground. Christ's death, or his mission, must be, and is accounted of on this view of the case, as being in the very strictest sense that *consideration* or *motive* with God which I have endeavoured to show that it cannot be, and we may be justly accounted of, or described, as obtaining salvation, not only *through* him, (as all must,) but, as is said, *for his sake alone*.

I proceed to shew therefore,

I. That nothing can be more gratuitous than the assumption on which, as it seems to me, this whole argument, if it be to be so called, rests, namely, that God cannot accept any virtue short of perfection.

II. That it is utterly vain, and indeed subversive of our best moral feelings, to attempt to draw any distinction between our deliverance from the power of sin, and from the penalty of it.

III. I shall then, thirdly, state the just objections which I think may be taken to the common, though I fear inveterate, habit of saying that we are saved *for Christ's sake*, or *propter Christum*, a

form of words for which Scripture affords not any foundation; instead of saying that we are saved *by* or *through* Christ. At the same time I shall recognise that there is a good and pious sense in which these words both may be, and I hope mostly are, used.

IV. and lastly, I shall show that in denying all right to affirm that Christ's death, or mediation, (or God's grace,) operates any otherwise than through its moral effect, I yet do not confuse any reasonable or critical, or really existing distinction which can be alleged to subsist between the *justifying* and the *sanctifying* office of Faith.

In this whole discussion I reserve the question of human merit, on which I must necessarily often touch very closely, for a more convenient period of treating of it ^a.

I. In the first place, then, with regard to the doctrine that God cannot accept any virtue short of perfection. On this point, I think I may be very brief. Great, undoubtedly, as is the weight which we may justly ascribe to the opinion of the divines who hold this doctrine^b, nothing is clearer to me than that there can be none more gratuitous. Neither Scripture, nor reason, give us any more

^a See Chap. X.

^b I subjoin a collection of extracts and references to this effect in Chap. XIV. Sect. xiii.

ground for affirming that man's righteousness, to be approved and accepted of God, must be, or must be made, pure and perfect, than we have for expecting a schoolboy's task work, if I may use reverently so familiar a comparison, to be free from faults; or for affirming that it is an incongruity to suppose the contrary; or that it cannot be held to be rewardable at his master's hands, unless its faults are corrected, or I might almost say glossed over, by the help of a tutor or friend. Nor is this the less true, because both our will and our power to make ourselves acceptable at God's hands are both originally implanted in us and subsequently cherished by Him and his Spirit, and come through his Son. It is no less true of our acceptableness to God, than of any merit, which we may be allowed in his sight, and which indeed, as will be seen hereafter^a, is the same thing with our acceptableness to him, that so far from being incompatible with bounty, it is its gift and fruit^b.

II. With regard to the next point, that of a

^a See, as before, Chap. X. and Chap. XIV. Sect. xxx.

^b Bossuet's *Histoire des Variations*, II. 258, or, as the same true doctrine is stated in the scarcely less sublime than quaint epigram by Mirandola:

“Namque tua est nostris major clementia culpis,
Et dare non dignis res mage digna Deo.
Quanquam sat digni si quos dignatur amare,
Qui quos non dignos invenit ipse facit.”

The *word* merit may, indeed, be defined, if defined arbitra-

distinction to be made between a deliverance from the power of sin, and a deliverance from its penalty;—that such writers^a as some of those who make this distinction could ever have imagined it,

rily, so that this shall not be. Thus Mosheim, “*Mereri est viribus suis jus ad præmia sibi acquirere.*”^b On this definition it is of course easy, and Mosheim goes on to prove very incontrovertibly, that man cannot merit, because all his good works come not from his own strength but from the grace of God. But then, as above said, this definition is arbitrary, and worse than useless.

^a [Dicit] “Socinus esse quidem effectum mortis Christi liberationem nostram a pœnis, *de liberatione enim a servitute peccati hic agendi non est locus.*” Grotius de Satisfactione Christi, p. 328. “If, by ‘sanctifying the offender,’ you mean that the death of Christ has an immediate effect in cleansing the offender from that sinful pollution which made him offensive to God, and of procuring for him access to God in this life, and the hope of everlasting glory hereafter; such an effect I do ascribe immediately to the death of Christ: but if you mean that the death of Christ, of itself, and independently of anything which he did and taught, has the power of effecting a moral change in the offender himself, this is no part of my doctrine, nor can anything which I have said respecting the sanctifying influence of Christ’s blood be justly interpreted in any such sense.” Veysie’s Defence of the Preservative against Socinianism, pp. 156, 157. Some of the grosser expressions by Romaine and Whitefield, and others, of what in substance is only the same doctrine, are quoted in Bishop Marsh’s Reply to Milner’s Strictures, pp. 106, 107.

^b *Elementa Theologiæ Dogmaticæ*, II. 213. See farther on this subject Chap. XIV. Sect. xxxi. and particularly the citations from Augustin in the two first notes to that Section.

is to me all but incredible. Assuredly no fonder, or more unfounded imagination can ever have entered into the human mind, than that any such distinction can possibly exist. Take away the cause, and you remove the effect. So always, in this case, and so only, will it, or can it, be removed, or expunged. And that this always is, and will be so, is as much the continuous doctrine of every page of the sacred volume, as that Christ came into the world, or that he suffered for us. *How, or by what, if any, farther process, the forgiveness of sin is wrought out in the divine mind, may still, if Scripture be held to teach any doctrine on this point, be a legitimate province of inquiry.* That to all to whom Christ is revealed it is given through his doctrine, and faith in him, is among the most certain of truths. That but for him, it could not have been given at all, may be deemed by many a topic for argument. But that either without any process, or by some process or other, the offence will be forgiven in exactly the same degree, and by the same steps in which the sin is repented of, and forsaken, and its power destroyed, is really too plain to be worth the proving^a. “No man,” observes Baxter, “is judged righteous by God, that is not first made righteous.” “Pardon of sin,” he again observes, [though it be not that

^a The point, however, is well proved in the second volume of Mr. Knox's Remains, p. 147.

righteousness which answereth the *precept* of the law, *yet*] “remitteth the punishment, and the fault so far as it inferreth punishment.”^a “Christ came not to possess God with any false opinion of us, nor is he such a physician as to perform but a supposed or reputative cure: he came not to persuade his father to judge us to be well, because he is well. We must bear his image, and be holy as he is holy, before he can love us in complacency.”^b

III. To these observations on the theory of the imputation of Christ’s merits to man, as formerly held by divines, I have now to add, that I apprehend that the same error lurks also, and if in a less technical aspect, yet for that very reason with a still more mischievous tendency, in our common habit of speaking of our being saved *propter*

^a Baxter’s Breviate of Justification, Sections xxviii. xxxi. xxxv., and see the quotations from the Confession of Augsburgh, which will be inserted in notes 4 and 5 to Chap. XIV. Sect. xxx. That the fault itself, however, the *reatus*, cannot in strictness be said to be remitted or blotted out is well stated by Doederlein, Vol. II. 356, sq.

^b Baxter’s Preface to his Confession of Faith. See also Rotherham’s Essay on Faith, Sect. viii. and Doederlein’s Inst. Theol. Christiani, as this work will be quoted in the note in Chap. XIII. to Matt. ix. 13. See also Dr. Whichcote’s first letter to Dr. Tuckney, pp. 13—15, and his third letter, pp. 123—126, and compare Cudworth’s Sermon on 1 Cor. xv. 57, p. 77 of the quarto edition, and particularly Dr. Henry More’s Mystery of Godliness, VIII. 5, 6, 7. (I take these last references from Jebb’s Sermons, p. 92.) In the third volume of Mr.

Christum, or *for Christ's sake*, instead of merely *per Christum*, or *by Christ*. Every thing, as I apprehend, which we are taught on this point in Scripture, is that God sent Christ that *per*, or *by*, Knox's Remains, p. 227, we have the following noble hymn by Wesley on this subject.

“ JESU, Redeemer of mankind,
How little art thou known
By sinners of a carnal mind,
Who claim thee for their own ;

“ Who blasphemously call thee Lord,
With lips and hearts unclean ;
But make thee, while they slight thy word,
The minister of sin.

“ O wretched man ! from guilt to dream
Thy harden'd conscience freed ;
When Jesus does a soul redeem,
He makes it free indeed.

“ The guilt and power with all thy art,
Can never be disjoin'd ;
Nor will God bid the guilt depart,
And leave the power behind.

“ Faith, when it comes, breaks every chain,
And makes us truly free ;
But Christ hath died for thee in vain,
Unless he lives in thee.

“ What is redemption in his blood,
But liberty within ?
A liberty to serve my God,
And to eschew my sin !”

See farther on this subject, Chap. XIV. Sect. xv., and Chap. XV. No. lxvii.

or *through* him, we might be freed from sin, and its consequences. Change here the *per* into *propter*, and the incongruity is manifest. Yet, if it were a safe word to use anywhere in speaking of Christ's mediation, it would be as admissible here as anywhere. Moreover, as there is certainly no equivalent in Scripture^a to this use of it, so neither is there, as far as I have observed, and as I believe, in the Fathers. I do not find any in the Sacramentary of Gregory. Nor yet do I find among the Fathers the notion expressed by this word, any more than I find in them the word itself, or any equivalent word. For the notion involved in that of the imputation of Christ's righteousness in its extrinsecal sense is that of its operating on God as a consideration or motive. And this notion is not even touched on by the opinion, or rather superstition, which it is acknowledged that they did hold, of the mystical or magical effect of Christ's coming into the world, and of the being baptized in his name^b. I think, therefore, that the use of this word *propter* and its equivalents in thus speaking of Christ, is both improper and dangerous; that it has necessarily either no meaning attached to it, or a wrong or unnatural meaning; and that it is much

^a I scarcely need remark that the expression, "for Christ's sake," in our version of Eph. iv, 32, is in the original ἐν Χριστῷ.

^b See before p. 72, and note a, p. 71.

to be regretted that it has taken that possession which it has taken, of the formularies both of our own, and of other churches; the church of Rome, although it also holds that Christ's righteousness is made ours, only as it is infused, or made inherent in us, being by no means excluded.

At the same time, agreeably to what was observed in my first statement of this objection^a, it is but fair, I think, to allow the validity of even those *forced* qualifications, by which the real meaning of this form of expression, censurable as it is, may still be *made* consistent with truth; and which, probably, is also the real meaning with which it is commonly used by the best instructed divines, and into which, as I shall show in sufficient detail hereafter^b, we have also, I apprehend, a full right to interpret both our own church formularies, and those of some other churches in which it is found. If, or in those cases in which, the perfect consentience of God with Christ be both clearly affirmed, and also so impressed on the understanding as that our conviction of it cannot be weakened, even words which tend to weaken or dissever it, may be used with impunity^c. But this is an impunity which does not justify their use. To *pray* to God that he will accept us propter

^a Under Head 3, p. 79.

^b Chap. XIV. Sect. xv. under Head 4.

^c Pages 11, 12.

Christum, or for Christ's sake, *may* thus, I think, be interpreted into a prayer that he will accept us sinners in that great love in which he sent Christ, a willing victim, to die for our sakes. And this is also, I apprehend, what every pious mind *not bewildered with controversy* really does mean, whenever it uses either this, or any corresponding mode of expression. And that this is on this point the whole real meaning of the pious mind, we may, I think, infer from fact no less than from argument. I apprehend it to be altogether certain, that at that awful period of bodily decay, when, if ever, the delusions of our theories, as well as the deceits imposed on us by our senses, come to be dissipated, the dependence on Christ's merits, which is actually felt by those who estimate them the most highly, does in fact resolve itself into a single and humble dependence on that love and mercy of GOD, which CHRIST has indeed alone manifested, but of which all that we can at that moment appreciate is that he grants salvation of grace, and not as of debt^a. The penitent has then ceased to speculate (there may be many for whom it would have been better if they had never speculated) on any thing which has ever passed, or been supposed to pass, between God and his Son,

^a See a letter "On the Theology of the New Testament," by Mr. Alexander Knox, to Mrs. H. More, especially p. 86. Remains, Vol. III.

The profit which he now finds himself to have derived from what he has been taught of the perfect merits of Christ is that he really gains *through Christ*, from God's mercy and love, everything, and more than everything which Jews and heathens, "in their greatest bravery,"^a hoped for from any less perfect, or any erroneous, ministry of reconciliation. It does not detract from the justness of this conclusion, that he may still abide, as in almost all instances he will abide, in all his expressions, whether oral or mental, of both his faith and his hope, by the "verba et voces" which he has learned or been taught.

IV. I have now to shew in the last place, that in denying all right to affirm that Christ's death or mediation (or God's grace) operates any otherwise than through its moral effect, I yet do not confuse any reasonable, or critical, or really existing distinction which can be alleged to subsist between the *justifying* and the *sanctifying* office of Faith. If I did, I allow that this error would be fatal to my whole argument. For if Christ justifies us, only as he sanctifies, or makes us meet for acceptance at God's hand, there cannot be any, or at the least not any *essential*, difference between the two principles. Neither is there any. Undoubtedly, I think that in the meaning of the two *words* there is a difference. In the plain view of human affairs,

^a Taylor's Ductor Dubitantium, IV. ii. 2. 11.

without any metaphysics or refinement, we certainly account of the man who becomes sensible of the ill desert and guilt of sin, and who repents of, and forsakes it, as in one condition; and of the man who has been brought up habitually, or who lives, in the fear of God, as in another condition. And this is also the sort of view of the case which the language of Scripture leads us to take^a. Neither is it, I think, anything else than obvious or natural, to be inclined to fix in thought on some imaginary era (often perhaps the real era of baptism)^b as the era *at* which repentance and forgiveness may be supposed to be achieved or attained, and *from* which the work of holiness begins to be reckoned. Now this era, whenever it is, is plainly an era at which in a Scripture sense we may be said to be justified, or placed in a justified state^c, and is also an era at which we are not yet supposed, though thus set in the right road,

^a Compare Rom. v.

^b In speaking of baptism, I speak of the baptism of adults, the only baptism, on the characteristic nature or import of which we derive any light whatever from Scripture.

^c This expression, however, of a justified *state*, I will own that I do not much like. It is not Scriptural, and is, I think, too technical, though perhaps sufficiently authorized. "Fides hoc proficit, ut in primitiis credulitatis accedentes ad Deum justificet, si deinceps in justificatione permaneant." Hieronymus, in Epist. ad Galatas, c. iii., as quoted by Mr. Faber, p. 167. See also Barrow's Sermon of Justification, p. 85. Works, folio, Vol. II.

to have made progress in it. I suppose, also, that in many, or most of those individuals who truly repent and turn from their sins, there must often really be some turning point, and often more than one, and at different times, at which they may be almost conscious of the change taking place in their souls, a change always produced by that afflux of the Divine Spirit which confers equally the grace of repentance for past sins, and the grace of the sanctification of the Christian character. I will also allow, that when the soul is thus turned or renewed by repentance, it presents more of a *tabula rasa*, more of an equal surface from which all wrong impressions are removed, and on which good impressions may be easily made, than at the earlier period of its natural birth. For though the infection of nature remains, as our article most truly states, even in the regenerate, I believe it to be often less, *after* the soil of the heart has been prepared by repentance to receive the seeds of Christian virtue, than *before* we can either have on the one hand received that preparation, or on the other hand have been depraved by actual sin.

But then still, though thus to be justified, and to be sanctified, must be properly held in one sense, and that a true sense, to mean different things, they are yet only different steps of the same process. It is one continuous course of the same divine care and benignity, which at first con-

verts the soul from sin, and then leads it on in the paths of righteousness^a. Both parts also of this same process are always, in all ordinary cases, going on in all of us at the same time. In the expressive language not of any Romanist, (although Romanists too might be quoted to the same purpose,) but of Luther himself: "We are all (he speaks of the justified) both sinners, and righteous. We are sinners inasmuch as, at the best, we do but imperfectly mortify our carnal affections, and so long as we live in this world have in us a remnant of sin, which keeps us back from attaining the fulness of the Spirit. On the other hand, nevertheless, we are also righteous, inasmuch as we have the first fruits and earnest of the Spirit, through faith. And for Christ's, and our faith's, sake God in his fatherly goodness does not impute to, or condemn in us [even here] that remnant of sin which shall be eventually altogether broken and abolished by death."^b The

^a See Chap. XIV. Sect. xiv.

^b "Omnes sumus et peccatores et justi; peccatores quidem propter imperfectam mortificationem carnis, et quia in hac vita manentibus in nobis reliquiis peccati non consequimur plenitudinem spiritus; justi, quia primitias et arrhabonem spiritus per fidem habemus; et propter Christum et fidem Deus nobis paterne favens quod reliquum est peccati non imputat neque judicat, donec per mortem prorsus peccatum frangatur et aboleatur." Præfat. in Epist. ad Rom. Opera V. 97. ed. Wittebergæ, 1554.

work therefore of repentance is never over: the work of sanctification, so long as we continue to be the denizens of this world, never complete.

Hence, I apprehend, it follows that all *this* controversy about the difference, or the identity, of the justifying and the sanctifying process, is, like so many other controversies, properly to be regarded as rather an affair of terms or nomenclature, than as having any real or essential bearing on the doctrine before us. It disturbs not the position that we are made acceptable, or saved, or justified, or sanctified, in that degree only, in which we are made morally meet for acceptance. Degrees of course there are, although we might almost say that acceptance is all in all. The doctrine of acceptance is the same, whether we speak of that which God accords to the contrite sinner, who comes round, though at the eleventh hour, into his fold, or that which he gives to him who has been brought up from childhood in the knowledge of his law, and has walked steadily, though with only a human steadiness, in the right way from the first^a. In which of these two cases we are most encouraged or most bound to be grateful to him, it is not easy to say^b.

^a Compare the observations on Matt. ix. 11, in Chap. XIII., and see pp. 80, 81 of this Treatise; and see also Bossuet's *Histoire des Variations*, Book III. Sect. xxxv.

^b In farther pursuance of this subject, I subjoin in Chap.

XIV. Sect. xv. a brief review of various passages from the Fathers, in which the doctrine of the Imputation of Christ's Righteousness, in its extrinsecal sense, has been supposed to be held, and also of the same doctrine as held avowedly by the Reformers of the sixteenth century, and as it may be traced also in the opinions, or rather practice, of the Church of Rome. I shall then add, in Sect. xvi., a few additional observations, chiefly on the use of the words *cause* and *condition*, in speaking of the efficacy of Christ's death, and of faith and repentance. If, after reading these sections, the reader desire to see anything more in confirmation of what has been said in this chapter, I beg to refer him to an Essay on the Doctrine of Imputation by Archbishop Whately, contained in his volume on the difficulties in St. Paul. But though nothing can surpass the terseness and ability with which the subject is treated by this masterly writer, I do not see that he adds anything, in the way of argument, to what had been previously stated by Bull and others to the same effect.

CHAPTER III.

A selection and particular exposition of various texts of Scripture, in which our blessed Saviour is prefigured, or spoken of, as bearing our sins, or as a price, or as our redemption, or ransom, or as dying, or suffering, or sacrificed, for us¹; and that these texts in no way contradict what has been said.

THE texts which I shall here select are Isaiah, liii. 4, with which I shall briefly compare and couple the

¹ The common phrase that Christ's death or sacrifice is a *vicarious* sacrifice, or that he died *in our stead*, is not to be found in the Scripture. I should rather say that it is not to be found in our translation; for there are some passages, as for example in Matt. xx. 28, which could not, I imagine, be rendered more precisely than by these words. Nothing, as it seems to me, can be idler than to make any objection to them. In point of meaning they are, and can be, if taken alone, or abstractedly from the arbitrary inferences sometimes coupled with them, nothing else but the mere equivalents of the bearing our sins, or dying as our ransom or sacrifice. See Bull, *Apologia pro Harmonia*, Sect. i. § 9. "No more," says a very judicious writer, "is intended by [Christ's dying in our stead] than that he died that we might live, or escape the death to which we are considered as exposed." (Hampton's Answer to Priestley, p. 23.) *How* Christ's death furnishes us with this escape, or puts it in our power, is in no way more inferable from the use of the *word* vicarious, than from any of those other analogies. The *thing*, the *substitution*, is exactly the same, what-

5th, 6th, 11th, and 12th verses of the same chapter; Matt. viii. 16, 17; xx. 28; Luke, xviii. 14; John, i. 29; x. 11; Rom. iv. 25; v. 6. 19; 2 Cor. v. 14—21; Gal. iii. 13. 19; Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14—22; and Hebrews, ix. 12, 13, 14; 1 Peter, ii. 21.—Of all these texts I have, however, in the first place to observe in general, that they may all be resolved into one and the same analogy. Christ died to bear our sins^a, died as a victim, as a ransom, died to pay our forfeit or penalty. All these are only so many summary ways of stating one and the same act, one and the same doctrine. If any one form of expression by which we designate this act or this doctrine, can, if taken alone, be construed into a mere declaration that he came to blot out our sins, or to remove, or to pardon them; he still not the less does that by his death, an act which, if he died at all for sin, puts him at once into the strictest analogy to the expiatory victims of the Jewish law. And so again, on the other hand, if the *way*, in which his death gains this great benefit for us, is by its leading us to repentance and virtue to which we should otherwise not be led, or at least not be led so effectually, the speaking of his death

ever the way in which it becomes, or is made, available. See Ludlam's Essays, Vol. I. 98.

^a For a farther comment on these words, see the observations on Matt. viii. 16, 17. in the subsequent part of this chapter.

as paying our ransom or penalty, expresses not anything more than the speaking of him as bearing our sins in that same sense of his blotting out, removing, or pardoning them. All objection also to this limitation (if it is so to be called) of the efficacy of the sacrifice consummated, or of the ransom paid by Christ, to the moral use to be made of it, applies as forcibly to any one of these forms of expression as it applies to another. That objection, such as it is, consists entirely in the one notion that if He, our divine liberator, has borne our sins, that is, the burden of them, or has paid our debt, that debt, or ransom, or forfeit, or price, so paid, is paid, and therefore will not be exacted over again^a. The same notion then goes on to the conclusion that by man so freed by Christ, nothing more remains to be done, or nothing by which he earns anything of his own salvation; although, on the other hand, it is, I suppose, also held in general^b that they who are insensible to so

^a I do not mean that this notion, though very ill reasoned out, does not often proceed from a good principle, or from the humble and pious feeling that *we*, sinful mortals, are too poor to be able to pay the mighty debt which we owe. See Chap. XIV. Sect. xii.

^b But not, I think, held wisely. On this hypothesis of Christ having so paid our debt that it will not be exacted over again, the notion that his gift or grace is given irreversibly, is much more logical and consistent than to suppose that we *can* disqualify ourselves. See again Chap. XIV. Sect. xii.

great a benefit, may still disqualify themselves from the receiving of it. That this conclusion is a wholly illogical extension of the analogies of human ransoms, or redemptions, or debts, was, I think, made sufficiently evident in the last chapter. It is also, I think, especially evident that the analogies drawn from the Jewish sacrifices lead rather to an altogether contrary conclusion. For if *they* were meant to have a moral application made of them, and were religiously valueless otherwise, much more the redemption by Christ.

But neither yet is it less true that even in the very narrowest and most literal sense of these words, or analogies, or rather of this one analogy, there is nothing to intercept the unity or simplicity of that moral conclusion, which alone, as was before stated, it is found to supply. The burdened labourer has his heavy burden taken away from him. But this is that he may take instead an easier yoke: or, which is essentially the same thing, that he may have a novel strength conferred on him, by which he may be enabled to resume and carry to the end of the day his former burden. A slave has his freedom bought for him, but he must himself take that freedom up. A captive is redeemed by paying his ransom, but when the ransom is paid, and he is conducted to the frontier of liberty, he must cross by his own efforts the waste which intervenes before he can reach his native land, or he

must himself embark in the ship prepared to carry him there^a. But what is all this other than the act of the man himself, or than an application of the free grace and bounty given,—an application which is as much a condition of, as much a part of the earning of the liberty gained, as that grace or bounty is the gift itself^b. And so also still more, if more can be, in the case of penalties inflicted by a judge for real crime. The criminal has incurred a penalty; his friend pays it; the criminal is set free: but the principle on which he is set free is not that the payment of the penalty is to be accounted of as an equivalent for the offence committed. The fine (I speak of course of the fine paid to the public) is often but a very inadequate compensation for the injury done. But the principle is that it is considered as enough to mark the offence, and to deter both the criminal himself, and others by his example, from a repeating of it. Nothing therefore can be more untrue than that the payment of a penalty due to human laws is to be considered as an exoneration, abstractedly from all conditions or works, of an offence against them. Conditions or works are, according to this view of

^a “Sic fratrem Pollux alterna morte redemit.” But Castor also *it* and *redit*.

^b See on the use of the words *cause* and *condition*, in speaking of the doctrine of Christ's death, and our application of it, Chap. XIV. Sect. xv. and Chap. XV. No. lxiv.

the case, even implied in inflicting the penalty. An offended *individual* may indeed sometimes require a recompense to himself. But then we travel so far *out of* the analogies which connect us with God.

I proceed to the consideration of those particular texts which I have above enumerated.

ISAIAH, liii. 4.—“Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows.”^a

I take these words as applied to the Messiah; and I suppose it^b to be evident that the speaking of his bearing of our griefs in this verse, and his bearing our iniquities and sin, in verses 11 and 12; of the Lord’s laying our iniquity on him^c; and his having our chastisement on him^d, which chastisement is the same thing with the forfeit or penalty which our sins have incurred^e; are expressions precisely equivalent. What he bore was clearly a suffering laid on him by God, laid on, (and this all acknowledge,) not strictly as *His* punishment, since guilt only is properly said to be punished, but as taking place of the punishment which our sins had deserved. On the farther detail,

^a Compare verses 5, 6, 11, 12.

^b Agreeably to what was said in p. 96.

^c Verse 6.

^d Verse 5.

^e *Judicially stricken* is Lowth’s rendering of the word rendered *stricken* in our translation of verse 4.

throughout this whole chapter, of what his sufferings were, and of their consummation in his death, I need not enlarge. That the whole of this detail is true of Christ, even to the letter, is, I believe, allowed even by those who hesitate in their recognition of his being *designed* in the prophecy. But *how* Christ thus bears our iniquities, or *what* he gains for us by his death or his sufferings as here described, is not the less a point on which the letter says nothing; and on which even those who acknowledge that he *is* designed in it must still of necessity form their whole judgment for themselves on principles which the letter does not supply.

I apprehend, however, that there can be no doubt but that the sense to which we are guided in 1 Peter, ii. 24, 25^a, is the only adequate interpretation to which we can come: namely, the sense that he bare our sins, by dying or suffering for us, or in the apostle's words, "in his own body on the tree." The apostle himself then goes on to say of the principle on which his so dying becomes available to us. "That we *being dead to sins* should *live unto righteousness*: by whose stripes ye were *healed*. For ye were as sheep going astray; but are now *returned* unto the shepherd and bishop of your souls."

^a Compare also Exod. xxviii. 43. and Leviticus, xix. 8.

In the same manner Clement of Alexandria interprets this 4th verse of the liiird of Isaiah, of Christ as the rectifier or reformer of our iniquities^a. Justin Martyr, speaking of our being healed by Christ's *stripes*, explains by saying that "by his stripes all are healed *who approach the Father through him*; by his blood *all who believe in him* are purified."^b In the same manner Tertullian, "For this is the effect of Christ's blood, that whom it has cleansed from sin, and brought into the light of God's favour, it presents as clean, if they continue to walk as children of light,"^c I do not quote these interpretations as laying any stress on the authority of the Fathers, which is but little, for the precise sense of the *words*, but only as showing how the *doctrine* was in their time understood. And on doctrine, *practical doctrine*, they are after Scripture our best authorities. They were "better divines than critics, they frequently admirably and justly state a scriptural principle, or bring home a moral truth in the very place where they may chance to give a

^a Διορθωτὴν δηλονότι καὶ κατευθυντῆρα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν. Pæd. l. I. viii. 67.

^b Bishop Kaye's Account of Justin Martyr, p. 76.

^c "Hæc est enim vis Dominici sanguinis, ut *quos jam delicto mundarit*, et exinde in lumine constituerit, mundos exinde præstet, *si in lumine incedere perseveraverint*." De Pudicitia, c. 19. Bishop Kaye's Tertullian, p. 336.

wrong exposition of the passage on which they are commenting.”^a

MATT. viii. 16, 17.—“And he cast out the devils with his word, and healed all that were sick,—that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Esaias the prophet, saying: Himself took our infirmities, and bare our sicknesses.”

To the preceding interpretation of this passage from Isaiah, it is objected that these verses of St. Matthew interpret it differently. Accordingly, the authors of what is called the “Improved Version” translate the last clause as follows: “He took away our infirmities, and removed our diseases.” They do not mean by this translation to limit the office of the Saviour to the healing of bodily diseases only, but on the contrary fully agree with us that his healing of bodily disease was an emblem or type of his removing sin by his doctrine. But still they limit the sense in which we have to account of him either as our Saviour, or as bearing our sins, to the same sense in which a teacher of righteousness, though not suffering, might be said to take away or remove them through the mere teaching of a pure doctrine, or through the example of a holy life.

To the objection itself, as thus argued, it might be enough to answer, that if St. Matthew quotes

^a Bishop Jebb’s Life, II. 238.

this prophecy as he is thus supposed to do, yet St. Peter, as was shown before^a, quotes it in that fuller and more pointed sense which it was also shown to possess.

At the same time, however, it is also material to observe, that whichever of these interpretations we prefer, both, as was shown in p. 96, come to the same thing, and that neither of them says anything of the *principle* on which Christ's salvation issues, or becomes available. The only difference (I do not mean that this is a slight difference) between the two, is that the one states a part of the *process*, which in the other is left to be filled up.

MATT. XX. 28.—“ And to give his life a ransom for many.”

Our blessed Lord here uses the word ransom in a sense often misunderstood, if not by the disciples whom he was addressing, yet in after times. A similar misunderstanding prevailed among the Jews in regard to the expiatory sacrifices appointed in the Mosaic law. All these had a moral import. They were not always understood as having it. The cases are parallel^b.

LUKE, xviii. 14.—“ I tell you that this man went down to his house justified, rather than the other.”

It is to be observed that this publican is not

^a p. 101.

^b See Chap. XIV. Sect. viii. Head 2.

supposed to have had any personal knowledge of Christ himself, or of salvation through him. Not that this makes much difference in the argument.

The whole case, let us use what words we will, is briefly as follows:—That God, a kind father, puts Christians in that most advantageous position with regard to himself, in which a man acquitted at a human tribunal is placed as to his judge. And, moreover, as the person tried before the human judge, though acquitted rightly and justly, may yet have been blamable, and in some cases more, and in others less, blamable, and as therefore his acquittal may fairly be, and often is, spoken of as the more or less *complete*, so also it may be with God. He also, though his pardon is always free, yet may acquit, or justify, imperfect virtue, and crime repented of, in differing senses and measures. They, for example, who are justified with faithful Abraham, and by works^a, as they certainly cannot be estimated, or rewarded, so neither can they be said in this sense to be justified, in the like manner with those great sinners, who, though they find, through God's mercy, place for repentance, yet obtain it hardly, and with tears.

^a James ii. 21, on which verse and on the various senses of the word *justification*, and its connexion with St. Paul's doctrine of faith, see the observations on Rom. iii. 28. in Chap. XIII. The *justification* of Abraham is identified with *blessing* in Gal. iii. 8, 9.

On these principles, it becomes, I think, quite clear that we have no right whatever to argue that in any case, much less in the case before us, God's mercy is meted out to us in any method or scheme, by which a transference of Christ's merits to us can be brought in even for the purpose of the most remote illustration. At the same time, I must again guard myself from being supposed to affirm positively that there is *not* any process, or any process in which Christ bears a part, by which God justifies, or grants the pardon of sin even to those who know him not. Of the processes in the divine mind, as we do not affirm, so neither can we dare to deny any thing, except so far as either Scripture or reason leads the way.

JOHN, i. 29.—“Behold the lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world.”

Christ, as he is “the lamb” is evidently nothing less, or nothing else, than a *victim*. Nothing more absolutely sacrificial, or more expressive, in the strictest possible sense, of a substitution, can be affirmed or implied, of his office or character, than by the use of this analogy or appellation. The word *αἵρων* translated “taketh away” might be translated “beareth,” as indeed it is in the margin^a. But it is the same word which is used also in 1 John, iii. 5. “Ye know that he was

^a See what was said on this phrase in pp. 96. 101.

manifested to take away our sins:" where the evident meaning is that he was manifested to lead us to forsake them. Sin, *ἁμαρτία*, in this verse, John, i. 29, is in its direct meaning to be understood rather as denoting the penalty of sin than sin itself. But it does not hence follow that Christ, though a real victim, takes away the penalty, otherwise than by removing the ground of offence.

JOHN, x. 11.—"I am the good shepherd: the good shepherd giveth his life for the sheep."

Giveth his life, "that the sheep may follow him,"^a "may enter into the fold by him who is the door,"^b "whose voice they hear,"^c by whom they are "gathered into,"^d and therefore obey the rules, or conform to the principles of, his religious society.

ROM. iv. 25.—"Who was delivered for our offences, and raised again for our justification."

Nothing indicates that this verse can imply anything more than that Christ was raised again to assure us, that *if* we so apply the lesson of his death as to be led by it to work out our rescue from sin, we shall obtain acceptance at God's hand. As also again in Gal. i. 4, "Who gave himself for our sins, that he might deliver us from this present

^a Verse 4.

^b Verse 9.

^c Verses 4 and 16.

^d Compare Chap. xi. 52.

evil world ;” or, as in 1 Peter iii. 28, “ For Christ also has once suffered for our sins, the just for the unjust.” But this, “ that he might bring us to God,” or “ to good conversation in Christ,” or to that “ answer of a good conscience by which we are saved.”^a

ROM. v. 6. 19. — The declarations made in these verses of Christ’s having died for us, and made us righteous by his obedience, are in like manner on the same basis of his having given us access to grace *by faith*^b, and of our having “ the love of God shed abroad in our hearts.”^c Or, as in Ch. vi. 1, 2. 4.—“ That we should not live any longer in sin,” but, on the contrary, “ walk in newness of life.” Or, as it is said again in

2 COR. v. 14—20.—That “ Christ died for all, that they which live should not henceforth live unto themselves ;”^d and that “ if any man be in him he must be a new creature,”^e and so “ reconciled to God.”

Ver. 21.—“ God hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin ; that we might be made the righteousness of God in him.”

Christ being made sin here evidently means his being made a sin-offering, or subjected to the

^a Verses 16. 21, and compare Heb. ix. 14.

^b Verse 2.

^c Verse 5.

^d Verse 15.

^e Verse 17.

penalty due to the sinner : and the concluding words cannot imply less than that we cannot be accounted as righteous in or through him, unless we are *made* righteous ;—though this of course with the understood reserve that all human righteousness, although actual, is but imperfect.

In the same manner, also, precisely in

GAL. iii. 13.—“ Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us.”

Curse is here the same with *sin* in the last cited verse ; and, in the verse which follows, it is affirmed distinctly, that the reason why he was made a curse was that we might receive the promise *through faith*.

GAL. iii. 19.—“ And it [the law] was ordained in the hand of a mediator.”

All messengers from God are in some sense mediators. The title is in this verse given to Moses. The Jewish high priest, though not designated in Scripture by this appellation, was also a mediator^a. The only question must be in what sense Moses (to speak here of him only) is to be understood to have had a mediatorial office conferred on him.

On this I have first to observe, that we do not doubt but that the Jews were placed, by this

^a Compare Heb. v.

mediation of, or message by, Moses, in a state in which they were enabled through that repentance and faith to which his law, *pro tanto*, was their guide, (and for the sake of which alone it was of any moral benefit to them,^a) to work out for themselves the approbation of God. But no one imagines, that when thus brought to repentance and faith *through Moses*, that repentance and faith were also accepted or approved *through him*, or as in consideration of his office or mediation, or for his sake. Why then should we imagine anything else of the strictly analogous case of the mediation of Christ?

This question is commonly answered by saying, that those good men who were brought to the sense and practice of religion by Moses's law, or who, under any other circumstances, were a law unto themselves, are still saved by Christ's sacrifice for the sin of the world. And this, if it be so, is doubtless an answer in point. If it can be proved that any one is saved by Christ who never either heard of his name, or is benefited directly or indirectly by the doctrine which he taught, everything which is said in this treatise is baseless throughout.

But then, as I have said elsewhere^b, this *cannot* be proved. I do not mean that it is not to be

^a See Heb. xi., and Chap. XIV. Sect. vi. of this Treatise.

^b See Chap. II. Sect. iv.

proved that Christ personally will judge the whole race of mankind, and mete out their eternal recompense to all;—not only to Christians, but also to all those whose heathenism or superstitions have been in any way mitigated by his doctrines, and also to all those whose darkness or ignorance no ray of those his heavenly doctrines has yet irradiated. This is a doctrine which I apprehend that the Scripture does teach^a. But then it does not teach that Christ *judges* otherwise than as he is God: or that he refers, or that God refers, in anything to the doctrine of that cross which Christ bore in the days of his flesh, except as he sees it to have been religiously received by some, or profanely rejected by others. Haply, also, even that glorified humanity, which at that awful period, the mingled nature of man with God may still retain, will then be seen to show God's mercy and holiness even more conspicuously, than *we* are able to see it now even through his Son.

EPH. i. 7.—“Redemption through [Christ's] blood” is here coupled with the being chosen by him^b to be holy and blameless, and into the adoption of children^c; with the being gathered together in one^d, and with a *trusting* in him^e.

So also our redemption as spoken of in

^a See Chap. II. Sect. v., and Chap. XIV. Sect. x.

^b Verse 4. ^c Verse 5. ^d Verse 10. ^e Verse 12.

COL. i. 14. 22, is in like manner coupled with our being strengthened into patience and long-suffering^a, and the being made *meet* for the inheritance of heaven^b; with the being reconciled after an alienation by wicked works^c; and the being presented holy and unblamable and unreprouable in God's sight^d.

And so also, in those most pointed and specific references to the Jewish doctrine of sacrifices which we find dwelt on with so much amplitude in the epistle to the Hebrews, especially in Chapters ix. and x.

HEB. ix. 12.—“Neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood, he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us.”

Mr. Veysie, addressing a Socinian, observes on this verse as follows. “The Apostle in this place speaks of Christ's entrance into the most holy place, that is, into heaven, with his own blood: you speak of his yielding up his own life to accomplish the will of God concerning mankind, which, in my apprehension, are two very different things.”^e—It would, I believe, be very hard to refute the Socinians, if it depended on showing the difference.

^a Verse 11. ^b Verse 12. ^c Verse 21. ^d Verse 22.

^e Defence of the Preservative against Socinianism, p. 236.

HEB. ix. 13, 14.—“For if the blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh; how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?”

Why *much more*, if it still purge only through that moral application of it, which is the same lesson which those daily and yearly sacrifices were meant to instil?

The answer is, because though it teaches only what is generically the same lesson, it teaches it in a higher and holier way; because God's giving his *Son* to die for us is a stronger proof of the guilt of sin, and of the penalty to be inflicted on it, than any sacrifice of an inferior victim could have accomplished: and also because it is the most emphatic evidence possible of the divine love^a.

But *his* first loving us is the great and efficient motive^b why we should love him; and if we *love* him the more, because our love is sublimed by the more liberal motives, so we shall of course also *do* the more for his sake. And thus we come round again through all these most unreserved affirma-

^a See what was said on this subject in Chap. I., and compare the extract from Lombard in Chap. XIV. Sect. xv. Head 2.

^b 1 John, iv. 19.

tions of the efficacy of Christ's blood, or of his death, to its having its efficacy through that same moral application of this great lesson of holiness, in which both reason and Scripture, both love and fear, both reverence for the purity, and gratitude for the mercy of our heavenly Father, clearly unite^a. I moreover believe, though I would not undertake absolutely to prove, that the same doctrine is implied also in the argument reiterated both in this Chapter^b and in Chapter X.^c to the effect that Christ's dying *once* is enough. One reason, as I apprehend, why it is enough, is that it is enough to found that moral application of which I have spoken, and, indeed, does far more to found it than either was or could be done by the many preparatory *figures* of the daily and yearly sacrifices of the law.

1 PETER, ii. 21.—“Because Christ also suffered for us, leaving us an example that ye should follow his steps.”—Compare the four following verses.

^a “Quanto sanguis Christi, filii Dei, et innocentis, præstat sanguine carentium ratione animantium, tanto purgatio debet esse major. Uterque ad colendum Deum; sanguis pecudum ritualiter, sanguis Christi præcipue animo, etc. *Sanguini* autem purgatio ista tribuitur, quia per sanguinem, id est, mortem, Christi, secuta ejus excitatione et evectione, gignitur in nobis fides (Rom. iii. 25.) quæ deinde fides *corda purgat*.” (Act. xv. 9; Rom. iii. 22, etc.) Grotius in locum.

^b Especially in verses 25, 26 and 28.

^c See particularly verse 14.

Christ's death was a sanction of his mission, and as such a sanction only it is regarded, or said to be regarded, by most Socinians. As being such a sanction, it is said by Priestley and others^a that it may also be regarded *figuratively* (that is analogically) in the light of a price or a ransom. And so it may be. There is a real, though a very faint, analogy between Christ's death, though regarded merely as a *sanction*, and human *ransoms*. As a friend pays a price to purchase a friend's release from captivity, so Christ has paid the price of his most precious blood in order to prove by this testimony of his sincerity, and by the miracle of his resurrection, that there is a future state; a doctrine which, if this proof leads us to believe in that state, may lead to our fitting ourselves for it. So far, so true. Christ, though we take no other footing than this, pays the price, we get the benefit. But, if this were all, we could scarcely abstain from asking the question, why God was prodigal of such means for the purpose of teaching what might have been taught from Sinai; or if we dare not ask such questions as this, yet how comparatively impotent and unaffecting the lesson so taught, compared with that which we derive from it as an example by which the Son of God himself teaches us the lesson of dying to sin, and that we may safely confide in Him who so loved us as to

^a See Veysie's Bampton Lecture Sermons, pp. 118, 119.

send his own Son to die for us, that he will give life to those who come to him by repentance!

The question is not, however, which of these two analogies gives us the *best* meaning, but which gives us the *real* meaning of the Apostle in the verses before us. This must be determined, of course, by ascertaining the proper object or intent of the appeal which he makes. But that object shews clearly that the *best* meaning which I have above stated, and the *real* meaning, are one and the same. The appeal of the whole passage is to the motive of *love* for him who has done such great things for us, not to the *benefit*, though that is no less real, which we derive from it^a.

To the texts which I have thus cited, than which there are none which express more unreservedly the whole office of Christ, or all which he has done for us, more need not be added. I rather forbear also the alleging any more, because no abstract or epitomizing of, or indeed commenting on, what is said by the sacred writers to this effect can ever do full justice to their constant anxiety to show that all the facts of God's merciful dispensation to us are subservient to faith, and faith to holiness. Neither is there anything more remarkable in their writings than the perpetual recurrence which they make to this application on all occasions, and often in the

^a See what will be said farther on this subject in Chap. VIII.

midst of currents of argument, in which their own ardour to set forth in the fullest and most comprehensive sense the doctrine of grace might be thought to tend to carry them off from it.

The reader may, however, compare, if he thinks proper, the texts:—Mark, x. 45; John, xi. 50. 52; 1 Cor. vi. 20; vii. 23; xv. 3; Gal. i. 4; Eph. v. 2; Col. i. 14; 1 Tim. ii. 6; 1 Peter, i. 18, 19; iii. 18. I do not think that he will find, either in these texts or in any other, the least necessity for farther exposition or explanation of what has been said.

CHAPTER IV.

Of faith in general, and of the two sorts into which it is divisible, namely conviction and confidence; and that both these sorts of faith when accepted by God are accepted on a moral principle; and also that the production of a truly moral confidence in God and Christ is the great and direct end and design of Christianity.

I THINK that it appears clearly from what has been said, that, whatever place the great gift of the atonement by Christ may possess in the inscrutable counsels of God, *we* have no right to ascribe to it any efficacy to our salvation, other than it possesses through that moral or religious application of it, which the Divine Spirit leads us to make.

But that application must be made by faith. Faith only can either discern, or apply, either facts, or doctrines, which must of necessity be *discerned* before they can have any influence over the mind, and *applied*, before that influence can be productive of the moral good which they are intended to work. I, of course, speak here of faith, as it is a human faculty, or as it is the exercise of that faculty;—as it is the faculty addressed by our blessed Saviour and his apostles in proffering, or proposing, the

Christian religion to men's understandings and hearts^a. I proceed, therefore, to state in the present, and the two following, chapters both how this our faith possesses this operation, and how it is to be attained.

In the first place, then, it is plain that this principle itself, or human faculty, of faith bears, or divides into, two senses, or is of two sorts: that in the one of these senses it denotes the intellectual faculty by which we discern the facts of God's dealings with us, those facts being, of course, the truth: and that in its other sense it denotes that moral faculty by which we apply those facts to our practical use. In the first of these senses we may identify faith with *conviction*: (for though all perception of, or assent to, even the truth, cannot, in our commonest use of words be said to *amount to* conviction, I may be allowed to take the appellation of the principle from its most perfect form.) In the second of these senses we may identify it with *confidence*: meaning by confidence all degrees of that practical energy with which, whenever a conviction is clear, it is right and reasonable to decide our wills accordingly to it^b. In one or other of these two

^a See on the use of the word *Faith*, as it means THE FAITH, or the Christian religion, Chap. XIV. Sect. xix.

^b For a fuller statement of the differences between, and the definitions which may be made of, *conviction* and *confidence*, see Chap. XIV. Sect. xx.

senses or in some combination of both, that human faith, which, and which only, can be a faith acceptable to our heavenly Father, must therefore consist. And, certainly, knowing, as we do, that the will, and the will only, is, or can be the seat of religion^a: and that through that only source either of devout contemplation or of active obedience he calls us to himself, another step in our argument, easy to take, and which has often been taken, seems to present itself. It is certainly *easy* to add the inference, that the whole of the intellectual process of faith, or that part of it which consists in conviction, is to be accounted of as subservient to the moral part of it, or to the production of that confidence in God, or determination to act as he requires, in which, and in which only, the truly or inherently acceptable principle of a religious faith must always consist.

But this, though a simple theory, and though not inaptly representing the general features or character of the case, cannot yet be taken without many and material qualifications as an accurate statement of it. Nor yet, if it could be so taken, would any so obvious a theory have missed, abundant as human error is, and always will be, of universal acceptance. And the reason, as I apprehend, or the chief reason, why we cannot so

^a Θελησάτω μόνον ἀπαρτίσαι τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἐπιτεύξεται. Clem. Alex. Strom. iii. 427, as cited in Neander's Ch. History, II. 69.

take it, is that it supposes the conviction of the understanding, and even its conviction of truth, to be of no moral nature or value whatever, except as productive of an ulterior object, that is, as productive of will, or of confidence. But this is by no means the case. For though nothing can be more certain than that no act merely intellectual can be in itself, or speaking of it singly, acceptable to God, yet the acquiring of it may be so. The working out of those right conclusions either from nature or Scripture, which many temptations of sense, and warpings of intellect, tend to disturb or pervert, is a work of the will, or is a religious work^a. The successful dispersion or the rejection of those falsehoods or errors which the same or similar temptations and warpings induce or create, is no less an attainment as properly religious as any which can be named. He for example who, living in a society in which the Gospel, or any of its essential doctrines, is scorned, has yet that fairness of judgment, that disposition to feel about for, and to admit, discarding all idols both of opinion and pleasure, what God has declared, is a religious man. And he is moreover a man who in the conviction which he has thus attained of the truth of the Gospel possesses a faith which is in its nature not

^a Internos motus ἐργων nomine comprehendimus. Gal. v. 19, 20; Rom. i. 28—31. Doederlein Inst. Theologi Christiani, II. 87.

less acceptable, than the faith of him who confides in, and acts on, its salutary doctrines, when seen and acknowledged¹.

Again, it is plain that *confidence* also, as far as it is a confidence in any mere opinion or doctrine, however true or salutary that doctrine may be, as in the doctrine of God's being, or of Christ's atonement, cannot be *alone, or of itself*, the proper foundation of that acceptableness with God which we attribute to faith. On the contrary, such a confidence, and even in the truth, may be sometimes unacceptable to him. The zeal or confidence, for example, of the Levite, or of the inquisitor, may be a confidence in doctrines or propositions abstractedly true: and the honest will of the Samaritan, or of the Albigensian, may often be seduced into false opinions. And yet the Levite and the inquisitor may be cast out in the great day, and the poor Samaritan and Albigensian find acceptance. It is plain, therefore, that neither

¹ Ὅρα δὲ εἰ μὴ αὐτόθεν ἡ πίστις αὐτὴ τὸ ἐπαινετὸν περιίστησιν, ὅτι πιστεύομεν ἑαυτοὺς τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεῷ, χάριν ὁμολογοῦντες τῷ εἰς τοιαύτην πίστιν ὁδηγῷ, καὶ λέγοντες αὐτὸν οὐκ ἄθεε τὸ τοιοῦτον τετολμηκέναι καὶ ἠνυκέναι. Origen contr. Celsum, Lib. III. p. 134, in Spencer's edition. "Car la préparation de l'âme a recevoir la grace justifie aussi en sa manière." F. Paolo, Histoire de Concile de Trente, par Courayer, Vol. I. p. 306, 307. See also Hey's Lectures on Divinity, Book IV. Art. XI. Sect. xvii., and Gilpin's note on Matt. viii. 13; and also the citations, especially those from Barrow and Horsley, in Chap. XIV. Sect. xxii.

the conviction of the truth, nor even a confidence in true opinions or doctrines, is always that quality which makes our faith well pleasing to God. And yet, on the other hand, both, or either of, these kinds of faith may be pleasing to him, under some circumstances.

But it is also scarcely less plain that the common quality which may make both these kinds of faith well pleasing to him is that they equally arise, or may arise, out of moral and religious acts of the mind, out of a thirsting for truth, out of a sincere desire to do right, or to prefer the rule of conscience or duty to every other impulse whatever². Many writers, accordingly, have shown at length that the absolute goodness or acceptableness of all faith does thus reside in the moral acts of which it is the fruit or expression, or we may say the representative, and in nothing else^a. This, moreover, was evidently the principle on which our blessed Lord, during his abode on earth, vouchsafed both his gifts of bodily healing, and also that spiritual illumination and aid of which those gifts were significant, as the reward of faith³. The

² See p. 121, and the quotations in note 1, p. 122, and Neander's History of the first planting of the Christian Church, Vol. II. 127-129.

^a See a collection of references on this subject in Chap. XIV. Sect. xxii.

³ On the analogous doctrine of the Rabbins respecting the moral prerequisites to the conferring under the Old Testament

honest desire to know and to obey the commands of God; the departing not from the temple night or day; the humble contrition which felt the need of, and looked for, a Saviour; these, inspired as they were by the Holy Spirit, were moral virtues of the very highest order or class. And these also, together with all those other virtues which predisposed Christ's disciples to trust in his miracles, or to see that he fulfilled the prophecies of the Messiah, were clearly the immediate causes, or principle, of the trust which they reposed in him^a. Or if, haply, there existed among his disciples any of an unmoved or selfish character, any whom the living coal from God's spiritual altar had not warmed, to them, no less certainly, so long as this was their case, no promise was given. If there were any whose faith in Him was the mere intellectual conviction of the cogency of the evidence which proved his Messiahship, all that faith was in itself a wholly unacceptable faith. Neither yet could it be more useful than it was acceptable, except as calculated, (which, however, it clearly was^b), to rouse into action feelings which previously had lain dormant in their hearts.

dispensation the gift of prophecy, see Smith's Select Discourses, 8vo, 1821. Discourse on Prophecy, Chap. VIII.

^a This particular case of our Saviour's personal disciples will be stated more at length in the observations on Matt. viii. 10, in Chap. XIII.

^b As will be shown in Chap. VI., and note 4 to that chapter.

So also the desire to serve God acceptably was, beyond all doubt, the principle which obtained the favour of God for what we suppose to have been the erroneous faith of Abraham. Even this father of the faithful was a man brought up among idolaters, and supposed to have been himself an idolater; perhaps to have believed that his idol might be propitiated by human sacrifices. Yet *his* faith procured to him from God a special call out of the midst of idolatry to a station of the most signal favour and privilege. In like manner, the acceptableness of the confidence which Stephen and others felt in our Saviour, arose either out of the moral goodness in which it was founded, or out of the aid or origination which it gave to their moral resolves. And the only reasons, as far as we can discern, why the infidel is less acceptable in God's sight than the believer, are, first, that his error or ignorance absolutely precludes him from those best and highest perceptions which a truly moral nature finds in religion, and in our own religion especially; and, secondly, because we assume, what is doubtless *commonly* true, that the believer is led to believe by an honest will, or by the conscientious desire to think and do what is right, and that the infidel is led to disbelieve by some vicious propensity. If ever this moral character of the two men is inverted,

so also is their acceptableness with God^a. Or, to be more particular, if our faith, whether we take it in its sense of conviction, or in that of confidence, be formed not out of good motives, but out of bad motives; if it arise, as it may arise, (at least in part if not wholly,) from a mere blind impulse or determination to credit, as well as to enforce, either opinions or practices which it finds established and deems profitable; or if again it arise, as in like manner it may arise, out of any malignity of pride, or party, or schism; all faith such as this, although even when thus admitted into the understanding I do not think it to be denied that it may become the parent of good^b, is yet so far, and in itself, a wholly unacceptable faith, and often worse, because less venial, than error itself. Also, though those particular arguments on which our *convictions* practically rest, may be but weak^c, (and there are many weak arguments used though in behalf of a good cause;) or though we place our *confidences* also unreason-

^a It is impossible for this argument to be treated better or more convincingly than in Tucker's *Light of Nature*, Pt. II. Chap. XV. Sect. ii. Works, Vol. VI. pp. 7—9.

^b See what will be said on this subject in Chap. VI.

^c See Jeremy Taylor's *Discourse on Faith, Life of Christ*, Part II. Sects. ii—vi., and compare Origen against Celsus, p. 9, Spencer's edition.

ably or conjecturally, still, so far as this is only intellectual and not moral error, both our convictions and our confidences may, nevertheless, be moral or good. But still in the same manner, also, on the other hand, if motivated, as they may be, in sin, they are, as far as they are thus representative of sin, sin in themselves. And accordingly there is nothing which more shocks the really humble and pious mind, than that undoubting confidence in even Him who was sent as the Saviour of sinners, which some sinners feel. I speak of those who, to escape the pain of a wholesome repentance, and the self-denials exacted by it, nourish in themselves the immoral assurance that they are redeemed without repentance, or that they are become at once, by however sudden and passionate a conversion, children of God^a.

Thankful, moreover, truly thankful, notwithstanding the greatness and guilt of this depravation, ought we to be that the dispensation under which we are placed does make the allowance thus made for that darkness of understanding which characterizes the corrupted state of weak and fallible man: or that God will not the less accept and approve the faith of the honest and true heart, because coupled with the errors either of invincible ignorance, or of venial prejudices.

^a See Chap. XIV. Sect. xxv., and the dialogue which will conclude the long note appended to that section.

Much cause have we all to pray that our divine Father will pardon the iniquities of even our holiest things; much cause to be thankful that he seeth not as man seeth, that he shroudeth our errors with the healing wings of his mercy, and that he accepts equally as of faith, though not of a faith equally pure, or useful, or fruitful, every sincere desire to please him. As such his just judgment accepts, with equal impartiality, both that enlightened acknowledgment of his power, and devotion to his will, which flows from the lips, and which commonly, we must suppose, beats with the greatest and best zeal in the heart, of the rightly instructed student of his works and word, and the pious fervour of the ignorant. He disdains not the prayer of the poor Indian who discovers him in the wind or the clouds; or the mistaken homage of the ascetic, whose knotted scourge, and painful vigils, though he has never commanded them, he will not always despise, and assuredly also will often compensate ^a.

It appears from what has been said, that both our convictions, and our confidences, the two sorts

^a See a tract intitled, Reflections on Sentimental Differences in point of Faith; a very excellent little essay, and by some writer, if I recollect rightly, of eminence. This essay was first published anonymously in 1751 or 1752, and an account of it is inserted in the Monthly Review for July, 1752, p. 39.

or senses into which all faith is divisible, are, or may be, in their moral origin one, and differ not necessarily in point of acceptableness with God. It remains to add ^a, that there is still this great difference between the two sorts; that while our *convictions* can be acceptable to God only as the fruit or the representative of the moral acts producing them, an acceptable *confidence* is acceptable also for its own sake, as inclusive of will, and therefore as being in the degree in which it is acceptable, an act of virtue or of religion itself, and estimated as such for itself in the sight of God. Every conviction of truth, indeed, has also, when formed, as will be shown distinctly in the two following chapters, a farther usefulness and operation. It clears away obstructions, it unfolds principles, obstructions which intercept, and principles of which the tendency is to edge and excite, the moral powers and dispositions of the mind. But this plainly alters not its nature, nor puts it on a level with that *confidence*, which, when founded on good motives, or on a moral will, is virtue itself; and no less also, when built up and made perfect on these principles, is the noblest end, and highest glory of religion. To confide, as we ought to do, in God, includes the will both to dare, and to suffer, in whatever province whether of exertion, or of patience, he calls on us to walk. To

^a And this agreeably to what was stated in pages 120, 121.

confide, as we ought to do, in Christ includes, with the perception, the affectionate estimate of that his love for us, and of the Father's in him, which is our legitimate ground for confiding in him. The inducing or enabling us, moreover, to place an unreserved confidence in him, the giving us the strength, which, as has been said, enables us so to do, was the direct end of his coming, and an end to which both the catechumen and the martyr are alike instructed to look. "Lord, increase our faith," is a prayer for all^a. I do not say that even the mere morality of the religion which he taught, meaning here by its morality its mere precepts or rules of life, had not its use (as doubtless the imperfect morality of Plato and Socrates had its use with some): but still its *character* does not the less consist in the vivifying nature and effect of the peculiar doctrines which he revealed. Nor can any mere conviction of the truth of those doctrines, nor any merely intellectual appreciation, however correct, of their nature, ever produce their proper fruit, or indeed produce any fruit, except as they produce also this feeling of confidence. Without this feeling, or without producing or tending to produce it, they are valueless.

^a On the identity of faith (in this sense) and of religious practice, see farther the beginning of Chap. VI. and also Chap. XIV. Sect. xxv. of this treatise.

CHAPTER V.

That the intellectual conviction and the moral confidence may be disjoined, but that the intellectual conviction furnishes the only reasonable or religious method of producing that confidence, and that all conviction of truth tends to produce it. Also that all essentially religious truth is equally comprehensible by all not absolutely defective understandings.

BUT some say that these cannot be disjoined. It was the doctrine of Plato, for example, and is a vein of thought which pervades his whole philosophy, that all vices arise solely from ignorance¹. This includes in its full extent the position that the conviction of the understanding governs the will. And that the same notion, or I would rather say delusion, has descended to our own times, and taken an extensive possession of even common

¹ See particularly the Protagoras, p. 159. ed. Bipont. Οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτος ἦν Σιμωνίδης, ὥστε τούτους φάναι ἐπαινεῖν, ὃς ἂν ἔκων μὴδὲν κακὸν ποιῇ· ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἱ ἔκοντες κακὰ ποιοῦσιν. Ἐγὼ γὰρ σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡγεῖται οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων ἔκοντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν, οὐδὲ αἰσχροτάτα καὶ κακὰ ἔκοντα ἐργάζεσθαι· ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσασιν ὅτι πάντες οἱ τὰ αἰσχροτάτα καὶ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντες ἔκοντες ποιοῦσιν.

minds, I suppose need not be proved^a. I apprehend it, however, to be of the first importance to lay down and render evident, as one of the first principles of religion, that this is not the case.

So far as the conviction does influence the will and the conduct, I suppose it to be allowed that it must of necessity be through the perception that those acts of will or conduct, to which the conviction relates, are matter of either duty or interest. But that the conviction that a thing is a man's duty is often a very inefficient motive to lead him to do it, is really too plain to be argued. Nor is the motive of even the most clear and recognised interest more effectual in all cases than that of duty. Temper, appetite, sympathy, malignity, and every other affection, or, as the ancients would have said, passion of mind, come in its way. There are many spendthrifts, who know that they are ruining both their fortunes and their happiness, and yet go on with their ruin. There are many drunkards, who know quite clearly that drunkenness, whatever the immediate temptation to it, is both inflicting on them an overbalance of suffering, and hastening their death. Still they do not, will not, give up that evil habit. Or to come back to more direct religion,—there are many who are as much convinced that there will be a future state of rewards and punishments, as they are con-

^a See, however, Chap. XIV. Sect. xx.

vinced of any arithmetical or mathematical truth, and who yet are knowingly vicious. Nothing, it must be allowed, can be more inconsequent than such conduct, and yet it is common. To make a conviction operative, (or if the word persuasion were not often used in a merely tentative sense, I should say to turn it into real *persuasion*²;) the facts or the arguments on which it rests must be not only admitted, but *dwelt upon*. Merely to allow, or merely to be satisfied, that they are incontestable, will not do. Hence the importance, in all moral education, of the line on line, and precept on precept. Hence the utility of the constant, or daily, reading of the Scripture, and of books of devotion, and of constant, or daily, prayer. In fact, it appears to be almost a law of our nature, that to make *any* opinions effective, they must be thus wrought reiteratedly into the framework of our minds. And even then, or when thus wrought in, (or as in the case of religious faith some would say *realized*;) they are of no moral avail, unless

² See Chap. XIV. Sect. xxvii. of this treatise, and also Tucker's Light of Nature, Part II. Sect. xv., and Chap. XIV. of this treatise, Sect. xxiii. Also on the consistency of a deep *sense* of religion with a persisting in wickedness, see Butler's Sermon on the Character of Balaam, pp. 127—134. The metaphysical philosophy of this fact, or this paradox, if it be so to be called, may be found in one of the many valuable passages of Degerando's work, *Du Perfectionnement Moral*, Vol. I. p. 324, 325.

they actually turn the inclination or will. The line of distinction (and the plain sense of the matter shows that there is such a line) between faith as it is a *mere* conviction, as yet destitute of all actually vital or fructifying power and energy, and as it is the germ of moral good, is in the turning point.

But then again it is no less evident, that our convictions themselves constitute the only instruments to be anywhere found within the whole province of reason or religion by which this point can be turned. There may be, and are, other *impulses* to the same effect ^a, but there are none else which address themselves to our consciences on the principle of enforcing our duty to God, or the interests of our promised immortality. All, for example, who come to God must necessarily either know, or at least suppose, that he is. To acquire confidence in him we must know, or suppose, that he is to be confided in. But we cannot know, or suppose, this *rationally* or *religiously*, as in like manner we cannot rationally or religiously either strengthen a weak, or correct an ignorant or misguided confidence in him, except *through* the convictions. It is the same in all things; if a drunkard will not leave off his habit, the only method by which an adviser can hope to reclaim him is by inculcating on him the *truth*, the *facts* of the case.

^a And these not to be neglected, see pp. 149, 150.

If a child does not love his father, the truth, or facts, of the father's love must be proved and impressed on him, before any love can be possibly formed in him by moral or rational process of mind. And even in eloquence or poetry, arts which seem to travel most widely out of the region of fact, the case is the same. It is either by impressing, or realizing, fact or truth, or by giving to fiction the appearance of one or the other, that they have the effect which they have. I have heard it urged, indeed, on some occasions, that people should *try* to believe, to which it has sometimes been added, that they should try to believe as much as they can. This last folly Sanderson and others have refuted sufficiently. But in real fact, all trying to believe, like a trying to love, is at most nothing more, or nothing else, than a mere vague and unproductive effort, or rather emotion, of mind, which must subside, or at least must be converted into some calmer and more rational and practical habit or feeling, before any real belief can rise from it^a.

It is thus, I apprehend, altogether evident that there exists no other rational or religious way of promoting the moral ends of religion, or of creating or advancing a real confidence in it, except by establishing and impressing on our convictions the doctrines of truth. That this is really the case, and

^a See the observations on Mark, ix. 24. in Chap. XIII.

eminently so, with regard to that great and cardinal doctrine which I have been in the former part of this Treatise expressly considering, has, I think, been sufficiently shown. Nor yet do I suppose that there exists any point whatever, or any conviction of even the minutest truth, which in the degree of its importance does not answer some purpose of good, which the opposite error, in the like degree, impedes or neutralizes. I beg to add, however, that in thus speaking of *minuter* truths, I do not imagine that we have any one truth or doctrine propounded to us as strictly *religious*, or strictly *of faith*, which is not exactly as much within the province or comprehension of the very rudest peasant in whom the faculties of moral agency are but once lit up, as in that of the ablest scholar and divine. I do not, of course, mean to imply that *all* persons, of whatever rank, high or low, of merely intellectual acquirement or ability, actually do comprehend all doctrines rightly. There are many, and this among good, as well as able men, who err in some; although, as far as they are good men, they are not frustrated, I trust, by their error, of the same reward, to which the same degree of goodness would, through God's mercy, have led them, if it had been founded on a conviction not of error, but truth³. Neither yet

³ “ But in my judgment these differences are only scientific, and ought not to disturb that fellowship which is above all

do I mean to imply that there is *not*, on the contrary, I think that I see that there *is*, a divine philosophy *about* many of our doctrines, which none but an intellectually, as well as a morally prepared mind can be competent to estimate, and which it may yet be useful to know. There is no less, as I conceive, a subserviency of knowledge to the clearing and confirming our convictions of truth, than there is of those convictions themselves to their moral results. Why else, indeed, should St. Paul have written those epistles, or those parts of his epistles, which assuredly, even when written, must have been found much too learned and intricate for the comprehension of any but the instructed and the intelligent!

But though all religious knowledge, or theology has, I believe, thus its use; and although, what is a consequence of this, the *method*, or *arguments*, or *language*, in which it is set forth, must of course vary with varying knowledge or ignorance, no less than with country or clime⁴; all that portion of science." Preface to the first volume of Neander's History of the First Planting and Training of the Christian Church, p. xvii. Ryland's Translation, 1842.

⁴ See Jahn's Biblical Archæology, Sect. 374, and compare the extract from J. J. Gurney in the note in p. xiv. of the Preface to the first vol. of Neander's History, referred to in the last note; also pp. 57, 58. 70, 71, of the same volume of that History; and the second volume of Rose's translation of Neander's Church

the truth which possesses the properly *religious* character, is not the less always simple, and always the same⁵. To account of God as infinitely powerful, and good, and holy and just, and of his coming in Christ as our redeemer from sin, and of his Holy Spirit as working in our hearts, is an attainment which we do not discern that the learned and able are in any degree more competent to make than the ignorant. Both the learned and the ignorant may equally regard prayer, and devotion, repentance, and confidence, and the other duties which God requires of us, as God's due. But this is all which can render our convictions themselves, however acquired, *religious* convictions; all which a religious faith, so far as it is the instrument to religious practice, either is, or can be. And but few attempts, I am persuaded, have proved more injurious to both, than the attempts too often made to stretch their meaning into matters not strictly and properly appertaining to either the one or the other; but only to the in-

History, pp. 196, 197. 202-205; with which compare also pp. 208. 210.

⁵ "L'homme le plus vulgaire, lorsqu'il prie, lorsqu'il souffre, et qu'il espère dans le ciel, cet homme, dans ce moment, a quelque chose en lui, qui s'exprimerait comme Milton, comme Homere, ou comme Tasse, si l'education lui avait appris à revêtir de paroles ses pensées." Madame de Staël.

tellectual process or argumentation on which they are built, or to the details of conduct or practice to which they apply^a.

^a Compare Balguy's Second Charge ; on the nature and end of the Christian revelation.

CHAPTER VI.

Of the reaction of the moral qualities on the intellectual. Also, that the strength of faith depends chiefly, though not, as far as we can see, wholly, or in any assignable degree, or proportion, on its taking its rise in, or together with, the moral qualities.

It was observed in pp. 129, 130, that the feeling of confidence spoken of in this Treatise, or that a confidence founded in good motives, and identical with a moral will, is virtue itself, and that, when duly built up and made perfect, it includes the whole of religion. But *will* so identified with, or built up into, *confidence*, is, as was also, I suppose, there made sufficiently evident, the act itself. That any man feels any really moral will to serve God, or to do good, and yet that he does not do it, is in strictness inaccurate. The will itself is, in all such cases, no less inert than the conduct. To suppose the contrary is an absurdity exactly correspondent to the dreamy or worse folly rebuked by St. James, of saying to a destitute brother or sister: "Depart in peace, be ye warmed and filled," and yet not giving them those things that are needful. Hence it is plain that from a

right faith in its sense of confidence, though, as was subsequently shown, not in its sense of conviction, good works follow of necessity¹. And it has also been shown to be not less plain, that conviction, properly impressed, is the only religious and rational method by which a truly moral confidence is to be attained, or worked out, and that every conviction of truth tends in its degree to impress it. That there is a reaction also of the will on the intellect, is no less evident. Each is naturally in its most perfect state where the other is in perfection: where at the same time the most correct knowledge or conviction guides the will to the best objects, and where, on the other hand, the sincerest will, and the most earnest desire to think and act religiously and rightly, exclude most entirely all the worst causes of intellectual error or depravation. But on this point of the importance of an honest will to keep or make the intellect clear and straight, I will only refer to the obvious text, John, vii. 17, and to a sermon on this text by Paley, a sermon written with his usual terseness and judgment².

¹ See also what is said on this subject in Chap. XIV. Sect. xxv., and especially the reference in that Section to Bull's *Harmonia Apostolica*, which in truth includes the whole principle on which we assign to the word *Faith* the emphatic sense which is commonly and justly given to it.

² Sermon XIV. of the collection first printed. And see

Taking these points, therefore, as proved, I proceed to observe, that *that* faith, whether conviction or confidence, which is thus formed by an honest will, or on its own moral judgments and choice, and not merely out of an unhesitating, or perhaps little else than passive assent to the truths or evidence, however uncontroverted, or incontrovertible, presented by education or accident, is the strongest sort of faith. The kindred influence of the same honest and good dispositions by which it is formed, goes along with it in all its operations, and makes it the more effective. And this is the reason why the faith of many of the martyrs and confessors of the primitive church, and of the Reformation, was so energetic and powerful. This was not, or was not so much, that *their* convictions took stronger hold of the intellect, than the like convictions must have often taken in the minds of many who have lived since the truths in their times fought out have been received, or established. There must

Soame Jenyns's Internal Evidence. "But here I must previously observe, that the most unsurmountable, as well as the most usual obstacle to our belief arises from our passions, appetites, and interests; for faith being an act of the will as much as of the understanding, we oftener disbelieve for want of inclination, than want of evidence. The first step towards thinking this revelation true, is our hopes that it is so: for whenever we much wish any proposition to be true, we are not far from believing it." Pp. 110, 111. Compare also pp. 81-83, *ibid.*

have been many who have lived both since the primitive times, and since the time of the Reformation, who doubtless have been intellectually as much convinced as any confessor or martyr who can be named, of the doctrine of a future state, and that God rewards a patient devotion to his will, or a death incurred for His sake, with glory and happiness; and who yet may have shown, or would have shown, a much less degree of alacrity or constancy in His cause. But the reason was that the honesty, and the courage, and the spirit of denying the world, which must have had a much greater share in teaching those blessed confessors and martyrs to *see* the truth, than in teaching most of those to whom by their labours, and testimony, it comes ready established, constituted a training which *prepared* them to act on it also, when seen. They who, without the same or an equivalent training, are only taught the same things as mere matter of knowledge, in schools and colleges, have not the same preparation. And the reason why an early religious education is, as it is, an inestimable blessing, is not so much that the child is taught the convictions of truth, as that he is taught at the same time, and in the teaching of those convictions, the moral dispositions on which those convictions act, and which also react on those convictions, and bring them to perfection. These dispositions chiefly are,—the

will to be, as is said, a good child:—the desire to be God's servant, and to hear and obey his speaking:—the awe in regard to things sacred which impresses every innocent mind not yet hardened by a familiarity with mere talking and controversy about religion. To these dispositions may also sometimes be added a peculiar readiness to give up self, or to give up the world, which is often felt much more sincerely and powerfully in our earlier years, than in manhood or age, when those cords of habit which fasten us to the earth are stiffened by time. It is this, the moral education by Lois and Eunice, which ordinarily, I believe, does far more to promote the effectual, or operative, faith of their descendant, than the intellectual convictions which they instil. All this, however, does not in the least detract from what was said in the last chapter of the importance and necessity of those convictions themselves as the foundation, the *only* rational and religious foundation, of all faith whatsoever.

In point of fact, if we remount as far as we can to the first elements of our mental conformation, we find the provinces of moral action, and of the intellect, so blended together, as to baffle all our powers of analyzing them. There must, as far as we see, be the will to set the understanding in motion; there must be the understanding to determine the will. Into the mental faculty, as it is

thus concrete at its first birth, we can look no farther³.

In its subsequent stages of progress, we may readily discern that the action and reaction of the two components of this faculty are by no means commensurate in different men. By nature fitted to correspond and agree, they yet but rarely correspond and agree exactly. These, like almost all other qualities of mind, good and bad, seem to be thrown out among mankind in a sort of confusion. This confusion is not so great but that it allows us to discern with sufficient clearness both that the good have an affinity for the good, and the bad an affinity for the bad qualities. But still it is such as to disable us from pronouncing, without a more decisive observation than we are often able to make, of any particular case, that this affinity is not interrupted in that particular case; that its advantages are not lost in one case, its disadvantages compensated in another case. In the particular case of faith there are some whose intellectual vision is so clear as to keep them free from those erroneous convictions, into which their habits, or their party, must tend to carry them. There are others whose goodness of will carries them in

³ Witsius, in stating, and very well stating, this concrete union of the faculties of the understanding and the will, refers to Scotus II. Dist. XV. 1, and to Scaliger Exercit. CCCVII. Sect. xv. De Œconomia Fœd. III. vii. 4, 5.

safety, that is, without any moral taint or depravation, or perhaps without any assignable weakening of their confidence in God, or zeal to serve him, through every danger which false or erroneous convictions tend to produce. It is not on this account the less true that all sound convictions tend always to good; that they naturally may, and doubtless often do, through God's grace, wake the mind from sordid desires, and teach it to reflect and consider; and that they are, moreover, evidently^a, the only moral or religious means by which any either weak or ignorant, or misguided faith *can be* corrected or strengthened. A man *convinced*, and however fully convinced, of the truth of the proposition that God is, and that he is the rewarder of them that seek him, and who has also read, and re-read, the Saviour's history, and who knows all the facts of it, and doubts not of any of them, *may* still be unmoved even by these great and leading doctrines of faith. The counteracting powers of corruption and selfishness may still keep him down in almost the lowest depths of sin and misery. But still he is better off, at least as to the hope of rising from those depths, than if he knew not those truths at all. And *if*, through the Divine Spirit, he is brought through the knowledge to the meditation, and through the meditation on those truths to the receiving from

^a As was observed in p. 134.

them the impression which they *ought* to make, it may not matter as to the eventual result, that he refers the original knowledge of them rather to some fortunate accident of a merely literary or historical education, than to the better, and naturally much more efficacious cause, a cause which more perhaps than any other deserves to be the object of a Christian lawgiver, his having had a truly moral training from the first. The Pharisee, or the Scribe, though he had doubtless, in many instances, a better knowledge than the chosen disciples, not only of the traditional glosses of the law, but of its real meaning, was not on that account so apt a recipient of the doctrine of Christ, as many whose knowledge or convictions may have been less correct or firm than his own. But still his actual knowledge was an opening to him into the way of salvation, though not of itself an actual treading in it, was what is called a temporal, though not yet converted into a spiritual, privilege to him⁴. And, apparently, the possession

⁴ Of course I differ here from the Calvinists, a part and a necessary part, of whose doctrine of election, is, if I rightly apprehend it, to assume that all *useful* conviction, all intellectual assent which can be, or ever is, turned by God's Spirit to an effect which makes man acceptable to him, must be the original act of that Spirit itself; with which, its illuminating, they also hold that its moral agency is always indissolubly connected or bound up. But that the Divine Spirit may not *apply* to a moral purpose, knowledge or conviction acquired by the use of our natural

of this sort of knowledge in greater or less degrees by the Jews in general, was one reason why it was "necessary," that is why it was a part of the wisdom of the divine dispensation, that the word of God should be preached to them, before it was addressed to the [religiously] more ignorant Gentile world.

In the same manner, when^a a man is led to believe by weak arguments.—The faith of such a man, as far as it is based on those arguments, cannot of course be calculated on as being equally strong, as if it were based on stronger or better arguments. But still, if it be a faith in the truth, it may, however implicit, or however credulous, be a faith which saves him from sin, and may be the only religious and rational means of saving him from it^b. Nothing, therefore, can, as I apprehend, be more certain than that, though, as has been shown in the beginning of this chapter, a good moral training is of the very first importance to promote and facilitate our perceptions of truth, and is apparently the most appropriate operation which the Holy Spirit ever institutes to that end, we must not assume powers is certainly a doctrine of which we have no trace in Scripture, and also a doctrine which cannot be held without confusing all distinction between nature and grace, a danger of which Calvin himself shows himself in some places to be fully aware.

^a As was observed in pp. 126, 127.

^b See Origen against Celsus, p. 9. Spencer's edition.

it to be either identical with that end, or commensurate to it. It also appears that, in all cases, both where the good predisposition exists, and where it does not, the convictions themselves, though not the end of the commandment, are the only rational and religious way which conducts to it.

I say, it will be observed, the only *rational, and religious* way. But I wish it to be observed also, that I do not say that an acceptable confidence in God always, or indeed ordinarily, does in point of fact emanate from conviction alone. Precept, law, conscience, sympathy, though neither of them operates without a degree of intelligence, yet certainly cannot be identified with any rational or religious process of mind, or with any questioning *why* anything is, or *whether* it is, and yet may lead in different degrees to confide in it. Also, in the same manner, there may be, and are, many mental processes not moral but physical, which yet may and do *predispose* to that moral perception and habit, which has been shown to constitute the soil in which both faith and religion most aptly take root. I have not a doubt, for example, but that the instinctive tenderness of the mother both has, and was intended to have, in the tones and attentions in which it is manifested, an effect on the infant: not indeed a moral effect, for at that age there can be no proper morality; but yet an effect

of as much importance to prepare a recipient of moral cultivation as to mere nurture or growth. In the same manner, also, with regard to that physical control, which *must*, from the necessity of the case, be exerted over the child. This is, beyond doubt, in part so ordered for the purpose of preparing him to submit subsequently to the control of religion. These are truths which clearly ought not to be out of the view and serious consideration of those on whom the care of our physical education devolves. But my business here is only with religion, or rather with faith^a.

^a See, however, Chap. XIV, Sect. xxiv.

CHAPTER VII.

Of the connexion between faith and repentance. Also of the desire to believe, as connected with faith both in its sense of conviction, and in its sense of confidence.

I HAVE already^a spoken of repentance as it is properly moral, or as it is available, when considered in its principle, to human salvation. But the question still comes to be asked in what way we have to connect FAITH with repentance. "Repent ye," says our Lord, "and believe the Gospel." Repentance seems to come first, and faith afterwards. And so it does in the sense here intended. But how can we repent unless we *first* know, or believe, that we have done wrong, unless we have *faith* that there is something in us from which we need to be converted, and of which we need to be healed?

If there be here any difficulty, the principles laid down in the last chapter, together with the distinction previously made^b between the two senses of the word faith solve it immediately. The first thing of which the sinner is to be made sensible is the sense of his sin, and this cannot

^a In Chap. II. Sect. iii.

^b See Chapters IV. and V.

be brought home to him in any rational or religious way except through his *convictions*. But, when this is done, the moral will and *confidence* with which the Gospel doctrines inspire him are the active principle by which he effects his escape. And faith in this sense, is that same moral principle of mind, only endued with more of knowledge and power, which we account repentance also to be. The will to turn is exactly the same principle which bids us to go on when we are turned^a.

In the same manner, of aspirations after faith, or the desire to believe, as in the history recorded in Mark, ix. 24^b. The aspiration *after* a thing, and the thing itself, seem to be hardly the same. But if we take faith here in the sense of that confidence which is comprised in a moral *will to act* on that degree, whatever it was, of conviction which the dumb child's father possessed, he may have had it. The thing which he wanted, and to which he prayed to be helped, was of necessity either a strengthening of that will to contend with temptation or sin, or, what appears to have been the real

^a Compare what was said in Chap. II. Sect. ix. pp. 90—93 of the identity of principle in the two processes of *justification*, and *sanctification*. Justification in *one*, and that a very proper, sense, is the grant of God to *repentance*: sanctification, in a sense no less proper, is the effect of faith.

^b See the observations which will be made on this verse in Chap. XIII. of this Treatise.

case, a strengthening through his convictions, of the opinion which he wished to have confirmed, that Jesus was the Messiah. And so now also perhaps in other cases of the same kind. Religion is always, strictly and properly, *will, act, resolve*^a. *Will, act, resolve*, to obey or please God, is always religion. A man may desire to believe, to feel after and to find God, and yet may be so much oppressed with a sense of the evil which exists in the world, or in his own heart, or may have his mind so much distressed, not by sin, but by mental infirmity, as to be more than half incredulous: and yet many such a man may pay more real regard to the will of a God or a Saviour of whom he doubts, than many who doubt not at all. In the same manner, it has been often, and justly argued, that if there were but the *chance* of a future state, it ought, if we were wise, to govern our conduct as much as the certainty. It would *not*, we well know, have the same effect with the many. And yet there may be some with whom it might have much: and if so, an effect which would amount, in the sense of this Treatise^b, to a feeling of confidence, and be far more justly so intitled than the merely indolent opinion, or conviction of that mass of unquestioning believers, who do not doubt of it, but whom it seems not to influence.

^a See Chap. XIV. Sect. xxiv.

^b See farther on this subject Chap. XIV. Sect. xx.

CHAPTER VIII.

Of FAITH as connected with LOVE of God and of Christ.

THERE are but few things in the Christian religion more worthy of remark, or more felt, I believe, by the best men, as among its greatest perfections, than the stress laid in it on the LOVE of God as the most efficient motive to the doing his will. This, of course, is not proposed to us as our only motive. To flee from the wrath to come, is, for example, a motive, which the sacred writers are never backward to enforce. But the dominant principle is to urge us to do God's will, on the principle of LOVE, as loving him, because he first loved us, and gave his Son to die for our sakes, and while we were sinners. Nor is this motive inculcated on those only who have made some progress in the way of religion; or whose hearts have been prepared by knowledge or discipline for the more saintly virtues, or to act on what are and are called the higher motives, of which this is the chief. For this is the chief motive which is urged on the sinner also, and on him as he is a sinner. Of course he must be supposed to know

that sin is misery, and that God offers a way to escape from it. But, *this fact being known*, the love justly due for, and springing from, that bountiful offer, is, as I have said, as much appealed to in addressing the sinner, as in addressing the saint ^a.

There is hardly anything more illustrative than this practice of the inspired writers, of the distinction laid down in Chapters IV. and V. of this treatise, between conviction and confidence. Conviction is, or is of the nature of, *calculation*. But no calculation of even the clearest consequences, as, for example, of those of virtue and vice, is, as was shown in those chapters, to be accounted of as a really efficient or operative principle, till worked up into actual confidence, or character. But LOVE is another thing. Love *is* confidence, *is* character; and this distinction is, moreover, the more apparent, because experience, as I apprehend, shows us plainly, that even misery itself, that is, the misery of vice, does not by any means lead necessarily, if indeed it lead at all, to anything of a resolute will to escape from it. What misery leads to, is discontent; but not in any degree, at least not of itself, or by natural consequence, to that sorrow which produces contrition, and self-abasement, and devotion to God. Vice and sin, indeed, so far from exciting the desire to seek

^a Luke, vii. 42, 43.

from God any remedy for the unhappiness, present or future, which they produce, harden the heart, and sear the conscience, and tend to alienate men from all love of God, and not from the hope only, but also the desire, of heaven. But when God tells us that Christ has died for the ungodly, and purchased their pardon by the sacrifice of himself, the gratitude which this bounty must excite, and the personal interest thus shown to be taken by God himself in even the lost and the wretched, will often strike directly on the very coldest heart. Nor yet is that heart always, properly speaking, the coldest, which is in the sinner's breast. His want of *feeling*, when he does not feel, arises often, and perhaps usually, from his having none to feel for him, and from his seeing himself considered as a sort of outlaw or outcast from all more decent life or society. But GOD does feel for him, and CHRIST died for his sake. On this ground therefore, far more than on any other, he may well be expected to show, as in the rare instances in which he finds himself to be felt or thought for by man, he often does show, some symptoms of a better mind breaking through his vice. No sensibilities, probably, or affections are stronger or more heroic in themselves, and in their own partial operation, than those of the vicious. The Algerine, or the Red Indian, will, in a case which rouses him, make efforts not less great or less disinterested than those

of the martyr ; and will yet the next moment imbrue himself recklessly in blood. I do not say that such sensibilities as these constitute virtue. They amount, when at their best, to but a very qualified species of it. But the power, with which they are thus seen to operate, does not on this account the less indicate, that they are those impulses of mind, to which we may appeal the most wisely, in order to lead men up to virtue itself.

CHAPTER IX.

Of religious resignation.

It is not uncommon to find in books, or to encounter in society, observations which amount to more or less of a *slur* on the common practice of divines in inculcating resignation to God's will as one of the great duties of faith. The argument on which this slur is founded is that we ought to take *joyfully*, not merely to be *resigned* under, all God's dispensations; and this, as in all cases, so especially in that of being at any time counted worthy to suffer evil for the name of Christ^a. And, no doubt, such *joy* is the *triumph* of Faith. Neither is it out of nature. As we have sometimes, even in our earthly feelings, an absolute pleasure in privations which we undergo for the sake of a friend, so we may be even made the happier by submitting to afflictions as to marks of God's love, happier in the affliction itself than grieved by its pain. And this also may be, as it ought to be, not so much out of any immediate reference to the hope of future reward; although that blessed

^a Hebrews, x. 34. Acts, v. 41.

hope is never to be absolutely severed from the goodness of which it is the fruit; but chiefly in glad obedience to God's will^a.

At the same time there are several things to be here remembered:

I. That there is nothing said in Scripture on this subject in which it is in the least implied that the religious joy in affliction of which it speaks ought ever to amount, in even the best men, to anything more than an extremely subdued and temperate feeling; or that a resolute *will* may not include the whole of the religious duty or perfection which it designates. It is rather an affair of mental or bodily constitution, than of really pious elevation of mind, if it be anything more. Our blessed Saviour, though he came on earth willingly to do the will of his Father, and had assuredly a true satisfaction in his own perfect piety, which it would be absolute profaneness in any of his erring disciples to wish to surpass, has left, in what is recorded for us of his own history, a pattern of virtue, of which I see not that any more fervent character than that of a holy and meek resignation can be truly affirmed. "O, my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me: nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt."^b Is there any of his followers who has any better prayer to put up than to be enabled to follow the example

^a See the preceding chapter.

^b Matt. xxvi. 39.

of his patience, or who is in any one perfection of real virtue better than he?

II. It is to be remembered also, that though a very fervent exaltation of religious joy in affliction is not out of nature with all persons, and at all times: (St. Paul himself had apparently a very high degree of it,) yet, like all other exaltations, it may lead, and is in great danger of leading, into both weakness and error. The great sobriety of everything which we read of the goodness of Christ may have been intended to evidence this truth particularly. Nor can anything be plainer than that the real strength of the will is not to be measured by its alacrity. "A man may rather lose," says Jeremy Taylor, "the sensual than the intellectual good, although with that his fancy is more delighted."^a The faith of John, though he professed not, and perhaps felt not, the same readiness to die for his Lord, was at least as strong as that of Peter.

III. It is to be observed that a *joy* in afflictions is a feeling very apt to degenerate into an idolatry of self; or, to speak more precisely, into a selfish vanity, if the character be cheerful; into a selfish pride, if it be saturnine. And this pride or vanity of self is, I suppose, equally sinful, whether it rest on the assumption of moral goodness, or of any spiritual privileges conferred.

^a Ductor Dub. I. ii. 5. 32. p. 54. fol.

IV. As, on the one hand, that faith is confessedly faulty which is enveloped in gloom, so on the other hand there is also an irreligious optimism. As on the one hand it is very possible to think too hardly of God, that is, to think too little of his love; so, on the other hand, the danger is not less to many who rely on his love, lest they think too slightly of sin. There is a very good meaning in a saying of St. Bernard, that we ought to be even more thankful for the grant of escape from the penalties of the one, than for the rewards bestowed by the other^a. I do not, however, take or acquiesce in this saying in an unqualified sense^b.

V. Though religion (as was said before) is not a matter of temperament, yet different temperaments, as they have different predispositions to evil, so have also their respective advantages. The advantages of the cheerful temperament are that it possesses the more power of subduing discontent, of borrowing from the unseen future a light which brightens (and which *may* brighten without dazzling) our estimate of the present, which turns some sorts of pain into godly sorrow, and godly sorrow into that religious joy, which they who are most solicitous to check its extrava-

^a Lætiores quod virgas evaserint, quam quod præmium meruerint.

^b See Barrow's Sermon on Justification, Works, Vol. II. p. 30.

gancies must not wish to proscribe. The advantage of the graver temperament is that it is less easily seducible into those vanities into which the young and the inexperienced are most apt to fall, and which it is the most obvious aim of the moralist to restrain. In speaking of *this* advantage, such as it is, we must not forget that many men of the graver character of mind, who to the eye of the world are clear of reproach, are yet often more really selfish ; and, though they may disguise their want of real religion even from themselves, more irreligious ; than many of the imprudent victims of more notoriously sinful error or levity. But when a man of this character *is* religious under affliction, his religion harmonizes much more with resignation than with joy.

VI. If *repose* be, as it doubtless is, among the characteristics of the religious mind^a, so must the spirit of resignation also be. Joy is flighty. A resignation which feels for what it renounces, but *submits* to law or command, is, at the least, a much *safer* principle. No distinction can in point of *theory* be more unfounded than that which it has been sometimes attempted to draw between following an evangelical counsel, and obeying an explicit command. There may be, and are, cases in which the obligation to fol-

^a See, on the *philosophical analysis* of this principle, Dege-rando Du Perfectionnement Moral, I. 398—402.

low the *counsel* may be quite as great as that of obeying the *command*^a. We must not put down, or war on, that elevation of character in which what we commonly call the nobler virtues have their rise. But, at the same time, I am not sure that, provided this principle be recognised, and also amongst many to whom it has never occurred to argue it, many notoriously imperfect rules both of life and of faith, may not often be productive of a practical benefit, which no definition, however correct, on any larger or extensive principle, of the demands or of the province, of faith, can truly compensate. The spirit vivifies, the letter kills. And yet it is at the least conceivable that a man who keeps the commandments, that is, who willingly *resigns* himself to God's rule of life, and thinks this all he needs to do, may be among the most religious of men. He prays daily to God; he sets apart, we may suppose, as some do, (vain and empty as that sort of charity *may be*,) a suitable alms for the poor; and then accounts of his Christian liberty in the enjoyment of the good things of this world as unfettered by any more indefinite claims on the part of his religion. There is certainly no great elevation in all this. And yet still the man who does all this may be a far

^a Compare also what is said by Paley in his *Moral Philosophy* of the analogous distinction of *rights* into the perfect, and the imperfect.

better man, and therefore of course of a far better spirit, and at the least, as has been said, in a much *safer* moral habit of mind, than many who are more disposed than he to treat all worldly things as being that vanity which many of them in some sense doubtless are, and may by some persons be rightly considered to be ^a.

^a Compare Hey's Lectures, Vol. III. pp. 410, 411.

CHAPTER X.

Of the controversy respecting faith and works, and also of the use and meaning of the word merit in this controversy.

I BEG to premise to this chapter, that I presume that no person can have failed to infer, from what was said of the moral character of faith, in Chap. IV.^a, that faith itself is in strictness to be accounted of as being as much a work as any other work whatsoever. There always must, of necessity, be acts or works of the mind to give it its being; in the same manner in which it is the moral or immoral character of those works which gives it its quality^b. If faith, moreover, be, as I suppose all allow it to be, the work of God, it must be *our* work also. For we are workers together with him in every moral work which he does in us, or does in our minds¹.

^a P. 123 sqq., and see Chap. XIV., Sect. xxii.

^b See pp. 123—126.

¹ Prope est a te Deus, tecum est, intus est, ita dico, Lucili sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorumque bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos: hic prout a nobis tractatus est, ita nos ipse tractat. Seneca, as quoted in Mr. Grinfield's *Connexion of Natural and Revealed Theology*, p. 413; and compare Bull's *Apologia pro Harmonia*, Sect. III. § 4.

But still though thus faith, both in its sense of conviction, and in its sense of confidence, is always a work, it is yet *a work as nothing else is*². The work in which it consists is nothing less than the acquisition of a *principle* which originates all other good works whatsoever. For this reason it is *convenient* that to faith, though thus itself a work, and eminently a work, we give one name, and to all our other works, another name. But it is not the less a work, because it transcends all other works whatsoever, and thus becomes a secondary origin of them all.

From this preface, I think, I may proceed to say that I look upon the whole of the common controversy respecting faith and works as being little else than mere futility, and verbal confusion, both as maintained between Protestants and Romanists, and also within the distinct precincts of the Roman Catholic church itself, and of our own.

I. In the first place, with regard to the controversy with the Romanists. I readily allow that it would be easy to find, not only here and there among Roman Catholic writers, but also among the authorities for which their church has, by its unfortunate pretension to infallibility, made itself

² I *think* that these words are used in speaking of faith by one of our own reformers. I take them here from Jonathan Edwards on Justification, Works, III. 356.

responsible, many both unscriptural and irrational affirmations respecting the efficacy, or value, or claims, of man's at best poor, and imperfect, and faulty, works or attainments. But then, on the other hand, I do not see that these affirmations, were it not for that pretension, are in any degree worse, or more indiscreet, than the affirmations which have been too often made by their opponents respecting the exclusive efficacy of faith^a. In truth, I do not see that we differ on this point, otherwise than as looking at the two sides of the same shield, or that this is not the shield of the same faith to them and to us. *We* see it in its principle; *they* in its effect. Certainly, speaking for myself, and viewing the whole case as I view it, I regard myself as holding only one and the same, and that the true doctrine, in holding the doctrine of justification by faith in what I believe to be the sense of our own articles, and of the confession of Augsburgh, and also the doctrine of justification by works, in what I believe to be the sense of the Council of Trent. The one declaration assumes, and states, that works must follow. The other presumes and states, that faith must precede; and both affirm distinctly, that the original fountain of both our faith and our works is in that grace or

^a Cf. Bull's Harmonia Apost. III. Sect. vi.

mercy of God, which, and which only, prepares for us in all things the way of salvation³.

What I thus say of this question, as between the church of Rome and our own church, I would of course say also, as far as the same point only is concerned, both of the parties into which our own church is divided, and of the sects which are rent from it; and also of the scarcely less prominent divisions which have subsisted within the bosom of the church of Rome itself on the same subject. Admit that salvation is of God's mercy:—admit that there is none who can put up any claim of right to a heavenly inheritance, on any ground of the punctual performance of the whole law:—that is the first point. Again admit that, though without God's preventing grace we

³ “ But this most excellent righteousness, of faith I mean, (which God through Christ, without works, imputeth unto us,) is neither political, nor ceremonial, nor the righteousness of God's law, nor consisteth in works, but is clean contrary; that is to say, a mere passive righteousness, as the other above are active. For in this we work nothing, we render nothing unto God, but only we receive and suffer another to work in us, that is to say God.” Luther's Argument of the Epistle to the Galatians. On this foundation Luther built up one of the best versions which we have, a much better than the Roman Catholic version, of the Christian religion. But query? Would it be harder to build up an equally good version of it, as far as this point of justification is concerned, on the Trent decrees?

can do nothing, we are yet bound, his grace working in and along with us, to do all we can:—that is the second point. The whole question then resolves itself into only this, in which all will agree:—that that man always works the most efficaciously who works the most humbly, and in the most undisturbed confidence not in his own human strength, but in strength from above. That this question of faith and works should indeed be still a *quæstio vexata*, after all that even WESLEY has done to settle it⁴, is, I suppose, a

⁴ It seems to me that in the whole compass of ecclesiastical history there is nothing to be found more really valuable, than the paper by Wesley to which I here allude. This *rescript*, for such it may be called, appears in the form of the Minutes of the Methodist Conference for the year 1770. That even this most influential general of his order, able as he was, should have ventured to issue it, is to me, considering the materials which he had to deal with, very extraordinary, and a very strong argument that he was, at least at that time, (and I do not by any means intend to imply that he did not on the whole continue such to the end of his long life,) a man of real and apostolical zeal for the truth. These minutes are printed in Southey's Life of Wesley, and in the second volume of the Life and Times of Lady Huntingdon, pp. 235, 236. The publication of them excited of course at the time a vehement controversy; and in the conference which was held in the following year, Wesley brought forward an explanatory declaration, which was acquiesced in generally by his friends. This declaration, however, was regarded by many as a sort of evasion of what he had said in the minutes of 1770, and did not prevent a rent in his society. This, if I mistake not, was the

sufficient indication that it will continue to be a *quæstio vexata* for ever, or rather till all those difficulties and jealousies, which in this earthly scene divide the opinions of one class of men from those of another class, shall be extinguished in a flood of light uncontrollable. But that the case is a clear case in itself is altogether certain.

One reason, as I apprehend, and a reason of which we ought not to lose sight, why a case so clear has been so greatly confused, is to be found in the circumstances which rendered the assertion of the doctrine of justification by faith alone almost the text word of the Reformation of the sixteenth century.—For though we know, and even from Scripture, that the controversy respecting faith and works is a controversy which existed even in the apostolical age⁵, it does not seem to have grown occasion on which Wesley was deserted by his Calvinistic adherents. But he, or rather his defenders, at length established his consistency to the satisfaction, or professed satisfaction, of the great body of his followers: and this could only be on the principles which have been stated in this chapter.

⁵ No fanaticism or folly of modern times on this subject can exceed that which Gregory of Nyssa attributes to Eunomius, whom he affirms to have taught *μὴ παρέχειν πράγματα τῇ φύσει πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ὀρέξεων προϊούσῃ, μηδὲ ἀντιβαίνειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, μηδὲ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι περὶ τὴν τοιαύτην τοῦ βίου σπουδὴν· οὐδὲ γὰρ εἶναι τινὰ βλάβην ψυχῆς, διὰ τῶν τοιούτων συνισταμένην, ἀλλὰ μόνην ἀρκεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὴν αἰρετικὴν πίστιν πρὸς τελειότητα.* Lib. I. contra Eunom., quoted by Suicer in voce *πίστις*. p. 739. It does not at all follow from Gregory's charging Eunomius

till the period of the Reformation, into that unfortunate importance which it has since partly retained. These circumstances I apprehend to have been, chiefly, the corruption of that time, and especially of the ecclesiastics who had long ruled, or it may be rather said exaggerated, that corruption; and not any inherent difficulty, or liability to misapprehension, which I have already shown that there is not, in this doctrine itself. The works, which at the dawn of the Reformation were most inforced by the clergy, were not so much what we call, and what the church of Rome, at least in its formularies, now means by good works, that is, works properly moral, or the fruits of faith, as they were fastings, pilgrimages, and austerities. To these they added, in like manner, the founding of monasteries, the building of churches, and other contri-

with this extravagance, that he really held it; although it does follow that it was not left to the age of the Reformation to give it its birth. In fact, it is scarcely possible to look into the works of the Fathers without being made very sensible that their ages were quite as fertile of prodigies as any age by which they have been succeeded. I do not know that there is *any* modern heresy or bigotry which may not be fitted with a very ancient prototype. But it is, nevertheless, I think, quite true that this particular error, the severance of faith from works, though often imputed to the Christians by their adversaries, had not anything like that doctrinal importance in the earlier ages of the church which it has had since.

butions, direct and indirect, to that secular power and wealth of the ecclesiastical order which had long been towering to its fall^a. This, at least as it appears to me, was one great cause, certainly it was a very probable cause, why the early reformers should have taken up the ground which they did take up, and which they often took up unguardedly, of faith against works. And if any abuse, or distortion, such as I have mentioned, of the real import of good works, swelled the first wave of controversy, it was only the natural consequence that the oscillations of that wave should be continued, even after the abuse had ceased. And I think it must be acknowledged that this particular and practical abuse of the doctrine of works has at all events now long ceased to have, if it ever had, defenders among any theological authorities which are worth the naming. The Council of Trent itself was not summoned without sufficient warning to all the divines, many of them exceedingly able divines, who composed it, of the prudence of retracting advances, which many of the clergy of the preceding three or four centuries may have been too willing to make. There is nothing whatever in the decrees of this Council which seems to carry the doctrine of works farther than it ought to be

^a Burnet on the Articles, p. 162 ; and Doederlein's *Institutio Theologi Christiani*, Vol. II. p. 610.

carried. If the clergy, or the monks, had never taught anything on this subject but what is inferable from those decrees, some other corruption than this would have been seized hold of, as the ground on which their adversaries would have united against them. But the ground once taken was not easily changed; and the consequence has been, that, as in the case of other revolutions, we have gone on in a warfare, in which, though the cause has varied, we have yet supposed it to be the same, and therefore have fought it, I do not say, or think, with too much pertinacity, but on a false principle.

In the present state, however, of this controversy, I am inclined to think that the most considerable obstacle to the clearing it away consists in a very unwise and irrational jealousy on our parts to use the word *merit*, as used by the Romanists, to denote the imperfect virtues of mankind. I cannot but wish that all objection to the use of this word could even now be withdrawn. The meaning we cannot, ought not, to get rid of. It also seems to me to be a word, our jealousy of which makes us often unintelligible both to ourselves and others, and for which we have not found any adequate substitute in the attempts which we make to state what is still essentially our own true and sound doctrine of faith and works, without employing it. All are agreed

that God will accept, through Christ, man's imperfect endeavours. The making, through the Holy Spirit, these endeavours is called, in the church of Rome, a *meriting*, as that church speaks of it also as a *cause*, of the acceptance which they gain. But the Roman Catholics mean no more than we do, to set up anything of an independent claim or challenge of right to mercies which they acknowledge as fully as we do, and exactly as has been here stated^a, to flow only from the free and original bounty of God. If the Protestant, on the other hand, use the word merit, as he also uses the word righteousness⁶, as denoting only a complete and perfect obedience to the whole law of God's commands, he uses it in a sense to which the Romanist never denies that man can never lay any claim whatsoever, and about which, therefore, there is no controversy⁷.

^a In pages 168, 169. 173.

⁶ See Chap. XIV. Sect. xiii.; and particularly the extracts there given from the Heidelberg Catechism, and from the Homily of Salvation. All the *facts* of the case, which *are* the case, the Romanist admits as fully as we do. His objection *here* is not to the sense, if he understands it, but to the *word*, the word justitia.

⁷ Ἐμὲ οὖν κρίνον, Κύριε, κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δικαιοσύνην· τοῦτ' ἔστι τὴν ἐφικτὴν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ δύνατον τοῖς ἐν σαρκὶ ζῶσι. Basil. Hom. in Ps. VII. § 6. Opp. I. 103. A. Ed. Ben. Compare Benson on 1 John, i. 8. and the citations from the Fathers in Suicer, voce τέλειος; or see Bishop Jebb's Practical Theology, Vol. I. pp. 94—97; see also before pp. 80, 81. 168; and note

The word *merit*, it is indeed observed, is not found in the Scripture. But this is only, as I conceive, because it is not a Greek word, or of a Greek root. The word which the Scripture does use, and which we translate *worthy*, possesses the same, or I should rather say, a stronger, meaning. The fitness, or meetness, which cannot but be implied in worthiness, assuredly includes everything which can ever be intended by the Romanist in speaking of those acts or qualities, be they what they may, which are said in his language to *merit* reward^a.—It is universally admitted also, that this word is freely used by the Fathers: and though it has been said^b that they are to be regarded

b, p. 81. of this treatise. “My censures of the Papists,” observes Baxter, “do much differ from what they were at first. I then thought that their errors in the doctrines of faith were their most dangerous mistakes, as in the points of merit, justification by works, assurance of salvation, the nature of faith, &c. But now I am assured that their misexpressions, and misunderstanding us, with our mistakings of them, and inconvenient expressing our own opinions, hath made the differences in these points to appear greater than they are, and that in some of them it is next to none at all.” Baxter’s Life, in the extract given in the fifth volume of Dr. Wordsworth’s Eccl. Biography.

^a And this, whether understood *de congruo*, or *de condigno*, a most barren question, on which it needs not to enter.

^b Usher’s Answer to a Jesuite Challenge, Chap. XII. p. 478, Cambridge, 1835; and Stapleton’s Promptuarium Catholicum, quoted in Mr. Faber’s book on Justification, p. 386.

as using it rather in the sense of *working out*, than of properly *deserving*, or *meriting*, the bountiful reward which virtue inherits, I apprehend that, as far as there is any real difference of meaning between these two modes of expression, the most cursory examination of their writings will show that this is not the case. At least they certainly do use it, and I believe that it will be found that they ordinarily use it, in the proper sense of desert. It has found its way also, in this sense, into at least some of the Protestant confessions, and amongst others into that of Augsburgh, which was drawn up by Melancthon himself^a. Hooker, a strenuous opposer of what he deemed the Romanist doctrine of merit, yet, as is observed by his recent editor, hints no ambiguous censure on the affectation of shrinking from the name^b. It is distinctly affirmed by Petau, that both the ancient church, and the church of Rome unite in affixing this sense to the word^c. And this, at all events, is a

^a See the extract from this confession in Chap. XIV. Sect. xxx.

^b Eccl. Pol. V. 72. 9 ; and Keble's Preface, p. xcvi.

^c "Antiqui patres omnes, et præ ceteris Augustinus, cumque iis consentiens Romana et Catholica pietas, agnoscit merita eo sensu, nimirum ut neque Dei gratiam ulla antecedant merita, et hæc ipsa tum ex gratia tum ex gratuita Dei pollicitatione tota pendeant." Petau, as quoted from Archbishop Bramhall, in Tomline on Calvinism, p. 81. See farther on this subject, Chap. XI. Sect. xxxv.

sense to which the most implicit attribution of all good to God's grace has nothing to object, and which the humblest suppliant for His mercy must not disclaim^a.

In thus speaking, as I have done in this chapter, of the futility of this controversy respecting faith and works: and especially of the error and confusion of what are certainly among Protestants very common notions of the Romanist doctrine concerning it, I shall not, I trust, be understood as underrating in any degree the great blessing of the Reformation. In that great struggle there is no one who respects more highly than I do, both the Christian virtue, and the manly courage, of those noble instruments in the hand of a wise and kind Providence, by whom it was achieved. I entertain no hope⁹ that the church of Rome will ever bring itself into a condition in which, consistently with any well-understood principles of sincerity, the schism then made, or at least then proclaimed, can be healed. I do not think that, even if it could be healed, the principles of

^a See the extract from this confession in Chap. XIV. Sect. xxx.

⁹ I should rather have said, perhaps, that I see no outward acts or indications. There *may be* still an under-current which a distant observer cannot discern. See Mariotti's Italy, II. 393, 394.

Christian liberty can allow *us*, or any of the Reformed churches, to desire a reunion with it. Some also of the errors of that church are nothing less than unchristian perversions of the true doctrine of both faith and works: and, moreover, are errors, from which, though they acquired their worst form in the darkest ages^a, and are now, as far as possible, modified by the best Roman Catholic writers, it is not easy to imagine that they can set themselves free.

But still, however the church of Rome may have encumbered the true doctrine of faith with unhappy corruptions, it can scarcely be too often repeated that it yet holds it in substance^b. There is no one point, indeed, I believe, which we affirm of the efficacy of faith, which they do not affirm also, or, I might say, which they do not carry farther than we do, and too far. This they do, in the first place, by disallowing all claims to be of the true faith, except to the members of their own communion; and, in the second place, by assuming an authority in their own church, both in matters of doctrine, and in matters of discipline, which they have no right to assume, and which the many errors into which they have fallen plainly refute.

^a Burnet on the Articles, p. 162, 8vo.

^b Compare pp. 168, 169.

CHAPTER XI.

Of the Christian system in general : and also of the peculiarity of the Christian doctrines, and in what it consists.

A CORRECT, though of course only a general, outline of the Christian system, with a view especially to those principles of it which it has been the object of the foregoing pages to explain or illustrate, may, I think, be stated in the following thirteen propositions :—

I. That this whole system is to be accounted of as a provision for our recovery from sin, through repentance, and for our advancing in holiness.

II. That our ability to repent, and our repentance itself; that our being justified, or forgiven; our being sanctified and saved; and every other moral or intellectual benefit which we possess or may acquire, or good which we do; proceeds always from the free and original love and mercy of God.

III. That to be justified, or saved, or sanctified, is to be freed as much from the power of sin, as from its penalty; as much from that law of sin,

which, in the words of Scripture, is in our members, or earthly passions, as from that awful judgment which God inflicts on the wicked; and that these two things, if they be two things rather than one, are commensurate.

IV. That in everything which God does in us, and which is of a nature to promote directly our moral good, or our salvation, we also must always be workers together with him. As we *will*, so we *work*: and though we of course *will* the most wisely, (and in natural order the more resolutely,) when we base *our* wills on a correct knowledge of what *His* will truly is, or on a conviction of the truth, yet our knowledge and our will in this matter may be disjoined. There may be a correct knowledge with a weak will, and a strong will with imperfect knowledge.

V. That the moral will to please God, or to obey him, or to base our wills on his, or to act accordingly, (all which forms of expression mean only the same thing,) must in all who know and acknowledge, or have the means of knowing, his power and goodness, be absolutely necessary to the being accepted or saved by him. But the having this will is the having faith, in that sense of the word faith in which only it is directly available to the rendering us acceptable in God's sight. Of faith in this sense, in which sense I give to it in this treatise the title of confidence,

we cannot have too much. Without it we can have no religion.

VI. That all to whom Christianity is revealed, and who receive it, can be saved only if Christians: that is, if they add to their faith (or confidence) in God, faith also (or confidence) in Christ. And of this it is reason enough, that if God has given us a revelation, we are bound to accept it, and it would be a rank impiety to set up any way of our own against his.

VII. That not only are we thus bound to seek our salvation through Christ, because this is the way of God's appointment: but also that this way itself is a way full of moral applications, applications both clearer, and better, and stronger, than any other scheme of moral education presents or combines. Christ's DEATH, moreover, is to be especially regarded as the hinge, the moral hinge, of the whole system; inasmuch as it teaches us, in the most expressive manner, the necessity of dying to sin; of expunging, through that same moral application of this doctrine, and through the preventing aid of the Spirit, the *blot* on our nature which sin makes; and as it also teaches us the necessity of a new creation to holiness.

VIII. That as these ends are to be attained, and only to be attained, by faith, that is, as before, by faith in its sense of confidence; so this faith, though still only through God's grace and mercy,

and Holy Spirit, will always attain them: and that by being thus new created to holiness, and making Christ both our principle and our pattern, we are allowed to share his reward; or in other words, to make his righteousness, using here the word righteousness in the sense of goodness or holiness, also our own. But all that we are intitled to understand by saying that we make Christ's righteousness ours is that we make it ours so far forth as we partake it, though, in however imperfect or remote a degree. That it is in any way imputed to us *extrinsecally* of this our own moral application of it, we have no ground whatever to affirm.

IX. That, with whatever application of Christ's righteousness, even the best men must be conscious of sin; conscious that even when they would do good, evil is present with them, and that they do not do the things that they would.

X. That for beings thus imperfect to hold that they can *merit*, even through Christ, an *eternal* reward, and this too for the imperfect virtues of a short life, is to be accounted an arrogance almost too great to be uttered.

XI. But, still, that the dispute about merit, supposing the word to be restrained, as it always must be, when we use it of man, to designate that comparative goodness which man may attain, is a dispute about words. The *word* merit, when

so restrained, means, and can mean, nothing else but a worthiness, or meetness, for God's favour, which Scripture itself teaches that some, and some more than others, attain or possess: and the *thing* itself is consistent with great imperfections, and a most humbling consciousness of them in the soul.

XII. That Scripture does not authorize us to claim any benefit from Christ's merits for those who do not believe in him, as, for instance, for those who have led good lives by the light of nature; or to affirm that he propitiates God, (who indeed, in the sending of him has been justly said to have shown himself to be already propitious,) in any other sense than the obvious sense of reforming, improving, and sanctifying the weak and sinful creature whom God sent him to save.

XIII. That we have no right whatever to affirm that they to whom Christianity is not revealed, or who are barred from receiving it, or from receiving it as what it truly is, by any unfortunate circumstances of birth or of education, or by venial error, are, on this account, the less accepted by God in the degree of their relative goodness and fairness of principle. All such persons may, no doubt, be said to be more or less without what is called the *bond of the covenant*. By being so without the privileges which that bond confers, they lose unquestionably an in-

estimable benefit. But we have no right to affirm that this their loss does not consist wholly in the being so deprived of those great moral and sanctifying applications which its doctrines confer.

Such, though in but a brief outline, is, I think, our whole case.

But if, it will be objected, both Christ and the Christian doctrines are thus, or may thus be affirmed to be, valuable to us only as they are moral, or as improved by our own moral application of them, in what resides the PECULIARITY often claimed for them? MORALS are universal, CHRISTIANITY is, and is always admitted to be, a privilege, or something particular. How, therefore, can Christianity and morals be thus identified?

To this it is to be answered, first, that certainly nothing can be more peculiar, than that which is at once wholly new, and also, but for revelation, wholly undiscoverable. That GOD should have taken our nature on him, and should have appeared on earth even for the great end of human salvation, it never could have entered into the heart of any untaught man to conceive. By bringing in this knowledge, and in all, or many of, the details in which it is given, Christianity undoubtedly discovers to us both "*new* relations to God

and correspondent duties,"^a and so points and excites most PECULIARLY all those pious and all those charitable emotions which the same God has implanted in us. Nature teaches us the fear of God. Revelation that the object of this fear is the object of a rational and reverential affection, not of a blind and sordid terror. Nature teaches us also the love of God: Christianity that we love him in Christ. Nature teaches us the love of our neighbour: Christianity that we love him the more, as not only of a common kindred, but also because Christ died for us all. So also in other instances. But still, in all instances, Christianity is not seen to create in us any *principle* of emotion which we had not before, or which is not deeply imbedded in our nature itself. Though we do see a PECULIARITY in it, we do not see in it any UNLIKENESS to those other works of the same author which we discern by reason or nature^b.

^a Wilberforce's Practical View, p. 16.

^b "From this book," says Soame Jenyns, the errors of whose ingenious Essay are of the more importance, because of the too unreserved approbation bestowed on it by Paley^c, "may be extracted a system of religion entirely new, both with regard to the object, and the doctrines, not only infinitely superior to, but totally unlike, everything which had ever before entered into the mind of man."^d And so again in pp. 26. 79. 83; and this is indeed the leading principle of the whole Treatise.

^c Evidences, Pt. II. Chap. II.

^d Internal Evidences, Prop. II. p. 17.

Even the most peculiar of our doctrines are yet doctrines with which everything around us so wholly agrees, that *when taught* we may almost discern their actual correspondence. Nor is this less true of the doctrine of the offering on the cross, than of any other portion of our whole doctrine. That it is the very consummation of human virtue for a man to devote himself to death for the good of mankind, is both one of the plainest of all truths, and also a truth which no age, whether fertile or barren of great characters, has failed to recognise. How much more truly great to die for their moral benefit, than for their political glory! How much more to suffer in meekness and poverty, than amid the glare and sympathies of pomp and enthusiasm! And assuredly, if God unite himself in any case with that human virtue which he creates and inspires, with whom is it even so *natural* to us to think that he should unite himself as with that one man whom he himself had sent to be, and to exhibit, and to teach it, in PERFECTION^a. If the kindness and generosity of man, of man created in the divine image, deserve to be had in perpetual remembrance, much more the kindness of God! If benevolence, though unguided by revelation, might lead even to die for a good man, how much more God commendeth His love towards us, in that, while we

^a Compare Chap. I. p. 7.

were yet sinners, Christ died for us! But all this is the very likeness of our human nature itself, although the best likeness of it^a. And in truth if we had not this, we should lose altogether that great argument from analogy, on which the evidence of the truth of Christianity partly rests, and of which the destruction would carry away with it all its other evidences strong as they are^b.

In farther illustration of the nature of the peculiarity of the Christian doctrines, and also of this their absolute *likeness* to all those doctrines of real piety which we possess independently of them, I might refer, as before^c, to what we are told of the faith of Abraham, which, though we know that in some [most obscure] sense he saw the day of Christ, we yet certainly cannot affirm to have been illuminated by anything which we could regard as constituting to ourselves a competent knowledge of those peculiarly Christian doctrines which *we* have been taught. How little also, how very little, on any supposition, is there of the *peculiarities* of Christianity in the Psalms, or the Prophets? And yet, with the exception of our increased knowledge of our relations to God and Christ, and of our correspondent duties, who

^a Compare the extract from Wesley, which will be subjoined in p. 189.

^b See Chap. XIV. Sect. xxxiii.

^c See Chap. IV. p. 125.

shall dare to say that even the best Christian amongst us possesses, even by God's gift, any one *principle* of holiness which was denied to David, or denied to Isaiah? If he do possess any which they had not, what is it? How, in this case does it happen that he ever makes the book of Psalms the daily manual of his religious service of God? If that excellent book be a book abounding in all those ejaculations of faith, and of piety, and all those simple truths and highest feelings of religion, which lift up the soul to God, and stay it on him, this is to be accounted for. That piety, holiness, and gratitude, which the good Christian of whom we speak is led by Christ's history and doctrine to make his object or aim, he sees placed before him in the Psalms in their very simplest forms; less involved with narrative than in the Gospels, less clogged with controversy than in the Epistles. There are many great doctrines which he believes, and which he values, which he does not find there; but he does find there the devotion which he needs. But this he would not do, if it were a book which, how defective soever the writer may have been, and was, in some of the applications of the principle of holiness, yet wanted anything of the principle itself. Neither is this any other principle than that which St. Paul himself recognises^a in saying that those

^a In Rom. i. 19. 21.

[heathens] were without excuse who, when they knew God, yet glorified him not. If they had glorified him as it was in their power, and as it was their duty to do, Scripture furnishes us not with any presumption that the law of the Gospel would have been brought in. The theory of the Gospel certainly is, that Christ came to restore a corrupted world, not to make a new world; not to create in our minds any new principle; but to *new* create, or *renew*, principles which had been lost, or sunk, or unproductive, but of which the germ had not at any time ceased to exist. "For even Christianity," as is observed by one of our best divines, and, on the whole, I think, of by far our best school in divinity, "hath not a new design in hand, but more rare and excellent instruments to effect the old. What heathens could speak of it enables us to do."^a "Good sense," says Wesley, "good nature, and good manners, . . . all these put together by the art of God," that is, sublimed by his grace or blessing into their "highest degrees" and "most finished kinds," namely, into "faith, charity, and holiness, I call Christianity."^b Neither can any one, I apprehend, comprehend the real nature of these virtues, or of

^a Patrick's Heart's Ease, p. 2.

^b Wesley's Works, XIV. 118, quoted in Bishop Jebb's Piety without Asceticism, p. 42.

the Christianity which "contains" them, who can call it substantively anything else?

For another proof of what has been said, I beg to refer to the statement before given^a of what I apprehend to be the common feeling of truly good men at the approach of death. The simple *faith*, the thankful *hope*, which almost every religion may haply produce, but which none produces so clearly or certainly, or raises so high as the Christian, is that on which essentially the most sincere recipient of all its doctrines then reposes. But if this be the fact, everything which has been said in this chapter of the *nature* of the peculiarity of the Christian doctrines follows of course^b.

^a Pp. 88, 89, in the conclusion of the 3rd head of Chapter II. Sect. ix.

^b See Chap. XV. No. lix.

CHAPTER XII.

Of the exaggerated charges sometimes made of the existence of a theoretical disregard of, and reluctance against, the doctrines of religion, and particularly against the peculiar doctrines of Christianity: and that this reluctance is, in its principle, much more against the obedience due to a high and pure moral law, than against the doctrines themselves; or, which is the same thing, against faith in its sense of confidence, than in its sense of conviction. Also of the mischief of attempting to draw any line of severance between the religious and the irreligious part of mankind.

IF then, it now comes lastly to be asked, these doctrines are true; if they are thus reasonable; if their very peculiarities are akin to everything which we know of nature; how happens it that they are not more regarded? Nothing is more common than to meet with the objection, that professed religionists do not really believe; and this objection made on the ground that, if they really believed, their conduct would follow their rule of belief. I have met with persons whom I do not suppose to have been seduced into infidelity by any actually vicious propensity, and who appear to me to have been made infidels by this very ob-

jection. And then again there is also said to be, and is, an actual reluctance in our fallen nature against religion : a reluctance chiefly, as I apprehend, that of the sensual, or as it is called in Scripture, of the carnal mind, of a mind unwilling to be convinced of the truth of any doctrine, which either certainly denounces, or from which it follows, or may be supposed to follow, as its consequence, that vice will be punished in a future world. The extent to which this reluctance against, or disregard of, religion goes, is great and fearful, and I do not say that divines exaggerate it. Probably their first, and certainly their most practical object ought always to be to impress on unthinking men both its extent and its folly; or to make the *realizing*, as was said ^a, rather than the investigating or argumentative processes of religion their most studious concern. And then there is also besides this, the reluctance of pride. There is, and is indeed recognised in Scripture, a pride of understanding which sets itself up against all supremacy. And this also is a reluctance which, even when it does not set itself against religion in general, yet will or may be found to set itself against those peculiar doctrines of our own faith, of which I have, I think ^b, shown the perfect reasonableness. As the doctrine of the cross was, of old, a stumbling block, though taken merely as doctrine, both to

^a Page 133.

^b In the preceding chapter.

Gentiles and Jews, so also I think that the doctrines of the Atonement, and the Trinity, and some other doctrines, are in the same way to many persons stumbling-blocks now: or that there exists a *pride* in man's evil heart, which often turns him against these doctrines, and precludes the reception of them. Why, it is to be asked, should this be, if these doctrines be consistent with natural reasonableness: or rather, if their very peculiarity be, as it may be, and I believe is, only the *revealed*^a expression of the unimaginable purity, and tenderness of a loving father, by a wiser process than we could devise?

I. To this it is to be answered, in the first place, that with regard to the argument against the truth of our doctrines from their inefficacy on the lives of those who profess to believe in them, the distinction drawn in this treatise between faith in its sense of conviction, and its sense of confidence^b, solves that objection immediately. What I have already said on this subject I need not repeat.

II. In the second place, with regard to that reluctance against the doctrines of religion itself, and of our own religion in particular, which there really is:—on this head I believe I may safely

^a See pp. 184, 185.

^b See Chap. IV., also Chap. XIV. Sect. xx.

say, that of the two sorts of this reluctance which we acknowledge and lament, the reluctance of pride to submit the understanding to truth, is far less common than that of sense, or worldliness. Divines in general, I believe, speak otherwise. They commonly, as far as I have observed, attribute the reluctance of the "unsanctified heart" to submit to "a holy and humbling plan of redemption" to an actual principle of unwillingness to submit to God's will, because it is His¹. But

¹ Doddridge, *Rise and Progress*, Ch. X. in the beginning. The same excellent writer, after justly urging it as our duty to apply ourselves to God through the mediator, had said previously, (Ch. IX. Sect. ix.) "If you come otherwise, you come as one who is not a sinner. The very manner of presenting the address will be interpreted into a denial of the offences with which you are chargeable." And, again, in the conclusion of the same chapter: "The secret desire which a man feels that he could have been his own saviour, that his own wisdom and his own resolution had broken the bonds of sin in which he was held, constitutes the greatest of all impediments to the reception of the gospel truth." Precisely to the same effect Bishop Van Mildert: "The desire of making a religion for himself, instead of submitting to that which God has been pleased to reveal to him, appears to have been the prevailing folly of man from the beginning. 'Vain man,' says the scripture, 'would be wise,' he presumes to sit in judgment on the propriety of the divine command: to make the conformity of the divine dispensations to his own notions of fitness and expediency, the sole criterion of their equity and wisdom: to provide for himself the means of salvation and acceptance with God: in short, to act as if he were an *independent* being, self-

in this, assuredly, they are wrong. Men, in general, as it seems to me, whenever they admit the thought of religion into their minds at all, (and this only is the case here in question,) are ready to throw themselves before God with a very sufficient humbling of their *understandings* before him and his word. The reason why they will not be religious, is that religion condemns their personal vices: their defect is not a defect of intellectual humility, but of the resolve to obey; a defect which lays hold quite as much as pride ever lays hold, of any, or all, theoretical objections or difficulties which come in its way. In the age of the Apostles, for example, the doctrine of the cross was as much of a scandal to the Epicurean, as it was to the Stoic. Or let us all, or each of us, take the whole mass of our common acquaintance. How many are there among the whole number who are not quite ready to take from God, and if not in a sufficiently thankful spirit, yet without any setting up of their own virtues, or powers against Him, both pardon, and hope! Are there in the whole number two? or are we sure there is one? We may find it difficult to excite in them a sense of their own *demerits*. These they may often think lightly of; they may not think mere pardon so great a boon as it really created, self-redeemed, self-sanctified." Boyle Lecture Sermon on 1 Cor. iii. 11.

is. But this is not because they are *proud* either of their own intellectual discernment, or of their religious character, but because they are *low* in their estimate of what God's holy law requires, and of what his Spirit can do. As for any indisposition to accept God's bounty, *because* it is his, and not their own, though I suppose that there is such a feeling, it is seldom met with. People often indeed rebel against God's law, and this to the last. They rebel against it, because it requires sacrifices, or because they think their own way, though not the best way, sufficiently safe, and that God will not really expect from them that they should have gone in a better way. All this is because they are "unsanctified," but it is utterly erroneous, I think, to say that it is because they are *proud*. It is rather because they are *groveling*².

But if this be the case, if the reluctance which sometimes exists to receive the truths of the

² Whichcote, in his clever book of Aphorisms, enumerates the following as the usually operating principles of irreligion. "I. The pleasures of *sense*. II. The prevalency of *bodily temper*. III. The allurements of *pleasure, gain, and honour* from without. IV. The *presence* of the things of this life, and this world; the *absence* of the things of the other life, and the other world. V. The *great* improvement necessary to a higher life; the *no* improvement necessary to this. VI. The *depravation* of our principles by ill-use; these things make it *hard* to live religiously." Aph. 740.

Gospel, be not found to bear out those vehement statements on the subject which many writers have ventured to make, so neither does the actual failure in the receiving of them. I, of course, do not mean to say that there is no such failure, or that the religious tone of society, out of the real faultiness of which this charge seems to arise, and which is one great cause of that failure, is by any means what it ought to be. But still, whatever the degree in which that tone is faulty, its faultiness does not usually prevent even those who hold it from knowing and recognising to a greater or less extent the real claims of religion. They acknowledge that the law of the gospel is the right law; and they *allow*, though they do not steadily and consistently act upon, the claims of its high and pure morality. Their fault is not so *much* that their judgments are wrong, as that the worldly mind clings to them so inveterately, that they do not act up to, perhaps do not avow, their real judgments³.

³ There are many men who if asked, after uttering a worldly sentiment, "Is that your real opinion?" would be likely to answer, "Why, yes, on our principles: but then we do not say that these are the right principles. If you come to strict right and wrong, we know that we must go to the gospel." These very persons would often regard as a sort of portent or prodigy a man who would avow in words a neglect or contempt of the gospel, and at the very least would *usually* be disposed to shun his acquaintance. See the statement made on this subject

But if this be so, three consequences, as I apprehend, follow.

I. If the reluctance to receive the truths of religion in general, or those of our own religion

in Wilberforce's Practical View, p. 12, a statement than which nothing, I think, can be more untrue, or exaggerated; and which must also have been untrue at the time when it was made, although I have no doubt but that in the lapse of forty-five years a great difference for the better has taken place, at least amongst all the higher and more intellectual ranks of society. A still more remarkable sentence to the same effect is to be found in the Preface to Butler's Analogy: "It is come," it is there said, "to be taken for granted by many persons, that Christianity," (and *Christianity* is here spoken of in a sense very nearly identical with that of religion in general) "is not so much as a subject of inquiry, but that it is now at length discovered to be fictitious. And accordingly they treat it, as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point, among all people of discernment; and nothing remained, but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world." Secker, if I mistake not, and other writers to whose opinions every possible attention is due, speak in the same way. In the present age, Butler *could not* have written the sentence which I have here cited. But both he and Secker lived at a time when the comparatively transient effect of the writings of Bolingbroke, Tindal, and Collins was perhaps at its height. Oscillations both of opinion and of sentiment, in all matters of religion, are common both one way and the other. To come nearer to our own times, Voltaire and Chateaubriand may perhaps represent two extremes. Query also, whether similar oscillations did not take place among the heathens: and, in particular, whether, in the records

in particular, do *not* bear out the charges often made on the subject, few errors can do more mischief than the error of making those charges. If, for example, we tax a man of vicious practice, or of irregular life, with a *theoretical* disregard of religion, we at the same time put *him* in an attitude of resistance, and put ourselves in the wrong. If the charge be not true, which certainly it *may* not be, and we seldom can know that it *is*, he feels that we do him an injustice, and we consequently lose all that influence with him which we might otherwise have. Every unjust attack, moreover, in all such cases, on any man's opinions is the *more* mischievous, because almost all men, as is well known, are more tenacious of their theories, or more solicitous to vindicate their opinions, than to defend their practice. A man, who will readily confess to much licence of conduct, will often be anxious to convince us that though he acts wrongly, yet he thinks rightly and seriously. One cause of this I suppose to be, that he is willing to be at least self-satisfied that his foundation is sound, and that therefore the superstructure, notwithstanding some partial swervings, will come upright at last. Another cause (and this shews which we have of the opinions of the Greek and Roman philosophers, we have not much *more* than the average of the religious scepticism or incredulity of the ancient world? I do not speak of the altogether uncivilized and most ignorant portions of it.

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of itself that the *pride* of human nature is not always its wrong principle) is that there is a profaneness in all recklessness of opinion concerning God and his laws, from which there are few men, even among those whom we cannot call good men, who do not shrink. This recklessness of opinion is, moreover, much less excused or palliated by the sympathy of the persons with whom we live than errors of practice. And there are also many whose religious principles, though unsettled and precarious, are not abandoned; whose stay, though but a weak support, is better than none. A wise adviser does not break even the bruised reed, does not quench the smoking flax⁴. Neither yet *practically*, I suppose, is this often

⁴ I have read, and though in a fictitious narrative, yet it is true to nature, that a young man who had been the victim of excess, spoke when dying as follows to one of his friends:—"My principles," he said, "were perhaps a little unsettled; my conduct, under the temptations of high health and elevated spirits, very irregular. Certainly," he added, "I thought but little, or if we give any emphasis to the word *thought*, I thought not at all, of those doctrines and principles, which I now know and see to be man's only safe reliance. But yet I believe that I should have come right in time, if I had not seen myself regarded by religious people as being that thorough reprobate which I knew I was not. If I did not make scripture the guide of my life, I yet venerated its sacred page at a distance. I turned away not so much from our holy religion itself, as from that hard and false image of it which was presented to me."

done by any friend or confessor of a truly kindly as well as serious spirit, whatever his theories. Almost all such persons *feel*, when they come to practice, that by treating people as, on any point, unprincipled, they are in danger of making them so. Why then make in books, or in systems, imputations which, they are sensible, would be both unjust and pernicious, if cast personally on individuals?—Many, no doubt, may be fearful that they may be compromising the faith intrusted to their hands, if they abstain from making them. But they should rather judge that they establish the faith by so abstaining. If a man be both weak in faith, and faulty in practice, all truly Christian divines will judge rightly in arguing, that the first, perhaps the only, useful thing they can do to him is to strengthen his *faith*. And this they must, and can only do, rationally and religiously, through his convictions. The principle must come first, the practice must follow^a. But then the way which they must take to give more strength to his weak faith is not to scold him out of the little strength which it already has. What they should do in this case is rather to take their creed from their practice than their practice from their creed^b: and on this principle, that we may

^a See Chap. V.

^b “Fore ratus, id si fieri posset, ut majorem passim res ipsæ verbis, quam verba rebus, lucem afferrent.” Outram de Sacrificiis, Præf. p. 4.

be almost certain that there lurks some error in any creed which prescribes a tone of severity, against which all the kindlier and better feelings of our nature always revolt.

II. A second consequence which follows from what has been said is, that if all this sort of exaggeration, which thus makes men out worse than they are, does evil, so also must all exaggeration of the peculiarities of the Christian religion, and especially all affirmation of any unlikeness in it to the religion of reason or nature, (which is the point on which I spoke in the preceding chapter,) do a correspondent evil also. Every reluctance against the truth must always be fostered by connecting with the truth any difficulties not strictly its own. The rebellious mind, which makes unreal difficulties, takes easy hold of any real difficulty which it finds. But all such difficulties have also their operation, and perhaps an operation which is to be still more lamented, on many minds which are not rebellious^a.

III. And lastly. Another, and a similar error, or rather the worse form of this same error, is that of attempting to draw, in our personal conduct and deportment towards other men, too strong a line of demarcation between the well principled, and the ill principled, or even between the good and the bad. Of course I do not mean to say either that a disapprobation of vice and irreligion ought not to

^a Chap. I. pp. 14, 15.

pervade the tone of all decent society, or, what indeed is only the same duty carried out, that this disapprobation ought not to be clearly marked in the deportment borne by good men towards the openly vicious or irreligious. And it is often even shocking to observe the low state of moral feeling and sentiment which is disclosed by the neglect of this duty, or by the violation of it. But this is a wholly different thing from that of making any severance of mankind into two classes on the ground of their principles, the one class consisting of the friends, and the other of the enemies, of the truths of religion, or of what it will often happen that a man's idolatry of his own opinions may lead him very mistakingly to pronounce religion to be⁵.

⁵ See Wilberforce's *Practical View*, pp. 417, 418. This acute and praiseworthy and often temperate writer is not by any means to be confounded with the narrow dogmatists spoken of above. But he cannot, I think, here mean less than that he considers it expedient that all men of strictly religious principle should keep themselves apart, as far as they can, from all society, or intercourse, with the irreligious. And he here understands by the irreligious not only those who have openly thrown off all restraints of religion, but all those persons also whom we venture to judge or pronounce on, as men of worldly habits and characters. He speaks indeed particularly with reference to *the circumstances of his own times*, but then he adds that probably the same conduct is expedient at all times: and I suppose there can be no question but that the conduct in this matter which is expedient at one time, must be so universally. It is also to be recollected that the very meaning

That any attempt at making any such severance is highly *inexpedient*, to say the very least, seems to me manifest. Christianity, if it is to be the salt of the earth, must be in contact with earthy particles. Those seeds of good which are to be found in the hearts of many yet unreclaimed to religion, are probably more kept, by this moroseness, and apparent pride of religionists, from taking root, than by any other cause which can be named. The friend, no less than the wife^a, may often win by kindness the soul as yet unconverted to Christ: and he can know but little of the folds and windings of the human heart, who has not often seen even in the infidel, and the profligate, the existence of *feelings* at least, of touching character^b. These feelings though lost, while the heart yet remains in error or vice, to beneficial effect, are the very material on which the Holy Spirit of God and of Christ is aptest to work. But that Spirit works in all such cases most successfully through human kindness and sympathies.

of taking such a *line* as is here contended for is to form a *party*: and that though an individual of talents and adroitness, and truly Christian spirit, can and will sometimes show in his own conduct, that he combines with his own high feeling of religion a sufficient charity for those whose faith, or whose practice, is less strict than his own, yet his *party* certainly will not do any such thing.

^a 1 Cor. vii. 16.

^b See what was said on this subject in Chap. VIII. p. 156.

Any orthodoxy of belief or even consistency of practice, which induces the believer to shut himself up from all even "innocent"^a commerce with men, not actually too far gone for repentance, may at the very least be of mischief *to them*. All *such* orthodoxy or righteousness is in its consequences, if not in its principle, far more akin to that pride of the Pharisee^b, which turns men back from the true way in which they should walk, than to any better spirit. Assuredly it is noway akin to that engaging and influential spirit of humility, which, more perhaps than any other Christian grace, attracts the wanderer over the wilderness of this world into the fold of Christ.

^a Wilberforce, p. 416.

^b "Whence," says Mintert, "Φαρισαῖος, a *Pharisee*, is the same with ἀφωρισμένος, *separated*." Parkhurst; and so most other authorities.

CHAPTER XIII.

A particular exposition of various texts of Scripture which bear directly or indirectly on what has been said.

2 SAMUEL, xii. 14.—“Howbeit, because by this deed thou hast given great occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme, the child also that is born unto thee shall surely die.”

Grotius, in his treatise de Satisfactione, refers to the cases spoken of in this verse, and in 1 Kings, xxi. 29, as to instances of vicarious punishment. But certainly, in this verse, the punishment, if in strictness it be to be so called, is represented as inflicted for the ends of God's moral government, or, as it is sometimes expressed, inflicted *politically*.

MATTHEW, vi. 30.—“Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith.”

MATTHEW, viii. 10.—“Verily I say unto you, I have not found so great faith, no not in Israel;”

and compare viii. 13. 26; ix. 2. 22. 28, 29; xiii. 58; xiv. 31; xv. 28; xvi. 8; xvii. 17. 20.

The verses here quoted, or referred to, comprise the first fourteen instances in which the word faith, or its opposites, are used in St. Matthew; and in all these it is used in the signification of either confidence, or a want of confidence. So Schleusner, and other lexicographers explain each text: and it were of course easy to multiply citations in which the same words are used in the same senses.

In the first of these texts, Matt. vi. 30, it must be evident to every one that the faith spoken of is not, or at least is not directly, a faith merely speculative, or the mere faith of the intellect. Our Saviour does not mean:—Are ye not convinced that God is? This conviction he here assumes,—does not put it in question. His full meaning is:—“Knowing that God is, and is good and powerful, why do ye not confide in him?” This is the whole of the *direct* meaning. But then it is also implied in the whole tenor of the Scripture history, that our blessed Lord also supposes, or pre-supposes, that reasonable ground might be shown, and ground on which it was the duty of those who heard him to rely, for all that faith, whether conviction, or confidence, which he expected from them. And this no less for the faith which he required in himself as Messiah, than for their faith in God. For he

was no pretender. He asked not of any man what that man could justly deny. The "Do not examine, only believe,"^a objected to Christians by Celsus and Julian, has certainly no countenance in the original record of either its holy founder, or of his apostles. It is also evident that the rational and religious ground, on which our Saviour thus *supposes* the conviction of the understanding, and on which he *requires* confidence, is one and the same. The *feelings*, if conviction may be intitled a feeling, differ: the first is barren, except as producing the second. But the *evidence* in which he assumes or supposes the one, and on which he requires the other, is the same, and cannot be severed. It is also evident, I think, that the faith of which he approves consists in that moral will to act on the conviction of the truth, to which I have given the title of confidence in it, and which must be followed up by a consequent acting; and that the defect of faith which he blames is a defect of active power or force. Acts of the mind, as was observed in pp. 123 and 165, are as much *acting*, or work, as anything else.

But here the question is also to be asked *why* our Saviour, as is seen from these and many other passages, ordinarily vouchsafed his gifts of bodily healing to faith: and if his gifts of healing, that offer also of his gospel, of which those gifts were

^a Μὴ ἐξέταζε, μόνον πίστευε.

the type; or, in other words, why he ordinarily demanded faith as a requisite in those who came to him for his bounties?

To this question it is usually, and most justly, answered, that we suppose him to have seen in most of these cases, as in the case of those persons whom he selected as his personal disciples, a moral or religious goodness, or honesty, or piety, to which he judged the preference which he gave to them as in some sense *due*. That is, we do not suppose in these cases a preference irrespective of moral or religious character, such as that which is assigned to the preference of Jacob to Esau. The faith to which this preference was given must accordingly have consisted^a in little else than its being the compound, or aggregate, of the moral qualities which had produced it.

But still why give a preference to moral qualities? Why not heal, why not offer the gospel to the wicked, as well as to the good? Is it not as much an object of the divine benevolence to save the wicked man from perdition, as to confer on the good man added advantages? And is not this also the great object for which the Saviour of sinners descended from heaven, and took, though himself without sin, man's nature upon him?

I say not that this may not be so. But still in

^a Agreeably to what was said in Chap. IV. pp. 123, 124.

God's dealings, though with a corrupted race, we see in all things that he acts ordinarily through those moral laws of the universe which he had established from the beginning. Salvation is for the sinner. Yet still it might have been ordinarily in vain, (I do not say always in vain, for the grace of God is not bound in its operations,) even for our Saviour himself to have offered his gospel to those whose hearts were unprepared to receive it. This is the same principle on which he himself commanded his disciples, when cast out from one city to go to another city, and to shake off the dust of their feet against those whose hearts were closed against them by worldliness, or pride, or stubborn impenitence. In truth the whole progress of divine faith goes *ordinarily* by the same rule. The heart must always, as far as we can see, be in the first instance *prepared* by some circumstances or other to think seriously, or it will not think. There is often the circumstance of having had a good education:—there are the circumstances of example, pain, affliction, *remorse*,—the Spirit of God predisposing all these circumstances, and acting in them. And these circumstances, however they may vary as to particulars, are nevertheless, as I suppose, nearly the same in point of moral effect, in all ages, and to all teachers of religion. I suppose them to have been in

effect nearly the same to the apostles, as to our Saviour himself, and nearly the same now which they were to the apostles.

To take first the case of our Saviour. The Jew of his time; every Jew who was predisposed to goodness, or beginning to think seriously; was already in possession of a law which he had been *bred* to believe. He was looking for a Messiah: he had some indefinite hope that that Messiah would lead him by the hand, if in the first place to victory over the Romans, yet also through that moral wilderness in which he felt himself wandering. That there was something of this hope in those, or many of those Jews who came to Jesus, cannot be doubted. And in this hope there was *enough* of faith to induce our blessed Saviour, in a divine order not less wise than benignant, to confer *more* on those who had it. But from the inaccessible Scribe and Pharisee he turned away.

So also the greatest of the apostles preached the word chiefly to those of the Gentiles, who felt about, if haply they might find, the God whom they looked for. So also, even in these later ages, and with all that weight and volume of general reception and establishment which our religion possesses, its modern teachers look always, and must look, for the same or similar predispositions in all persons of mature understandings whom

they can invite to the faith. The hearts of all those who have not that predisposition, or who are not so prepared, are not yet, or are not at present, touched by that Spirit of God which must and does speak preliminarily to all who come to him; and, if they are to be reached at all, must be reached by other processes, processes which the teacher of religion, as such, cannot prescribe. They must at all events be made sensible of their real wants, before they can be taught to lay hold of their true remedy. And to these the teacher of religion must often forbear to offer, and this because the offer would be useless to those who will not accept it, that pearl of great price with which he is intrusted. But he offers it to all who are honest, and humble, and serious. Though this is wanted, more than this is never wanted to make a beginning. Every man, be he what he may, who does but sincerely ask himself "what must I do to be saved," has either a faith, or a predisposition to faith, which is already acceptable, and to which more may be given, and which it is the privilege of the modern teacher of the word, as it was that of his blessed Master, to inform, and render correct.

It is also always to be recollected, that all faith, whether thus or otherwise commenced, must either die away, or be progressive, and, if progressive, must add to all the new knowledge of God which

it acquires, a firmer trust in his power, a stronger will to obey his commands, and to turn the doctrines which he has revealed into those actual lessons of patience, gratitude, and humility, which they are fitted to be. Of this faith, moreover, though thus in its nature progressive, it is also to be observed, that we have never any right to assume that its progress is adjusted in any definite order, or catena, or by any certain rule. For, agreeably to what has been already said, that one Spirit which alone worketh all goodness in all, worketh diversely. Neither yet does this delineation of the moral or acceptable principle of faith exclude much imperfection. A humble desire, though with a flagging heart^a, not to think anything too hard for the Lord, was accepted in many. Nor yet do we exclude a faith in Moses' law, or in the prophets, from having been partly the constituents of the faith rewarded by Christ.

But still, it may be objected, such faith may exist, or have existed, not in Christ only, or in God, but in a false Christ, or an idol. Doubtless! and all faith possessed of the same moral nature will always be rewarded equally^b. The religious objection to error, or even to idolatry, is not so much that it is error, (almost all error *may be* innocent,) as that it is delusive and dangerous: that

^a Compare Mark, ix. 24.

^b See what is said of the faith of Abraham in p. 125.

it betrays men to put their trust not in what is really good, any more than in what is really true, but in something of mere pride, or of mere opinion, things which may profit even less than an idol in the day of wrath, or to deify their own vices instead of worshipping God.

I therefore apprehend it to be clear, that it is this religious principle of confiding in God, and if in God in an authorized prophet^a, and the being disposed to believe in and to obey him, a habit of mind no less congenial to a successful search for truth, than fertile of moral practice, which is the faith in the sense of confidence spoken of in the Gospels. That a real confidence in God and Christ implies an actual embracing of their religion is too plain to insist on. Nor is it less plain that the word faith is used in a directly moral sense, when used in the sense of fidelity, as in Matt. xxiv. 45, 46. "Who then is that faithful and wise servant, whom his Lord when he cometh shall find so doing."

Matt. xvii. 20, the last of the verses to which I have here referred, concludes as follows, "For verily I say unto you: if ye have faith as a grain of mustard seed, ye shall say unto this mountain: Remove hence to yonder place, and it shall remove: and nothing shall be impossible to you."

^a Compare Hey's Lectures, conclusion of Book IV. Art x. Sect. 30, and note f to Art xii. Sect. 2.

It is clear that to speak of faith as removing mountains is merely an emphatic, as it also appears to have been among the Jews a proverbial, mode of speaking of a strong faith. The faith to which nothing is impossible is a faith equal to all the demands which may be made on it in the execution of the specific office with which it is charged. Compare v. 22.—I conclude with observing, that Rosenmuller renders the words *ἄπιστος* and *ἄπιστία* in vv. 19 and 20 by *levis* and *levitas*.

MATT. ix. 13.—“I am not come to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance.” And compare vv. 10, 11, and 12.

It is perfectly plain that this verse recognises among mankind in one sense, a class of the good, no less than a class of the bad. On the other hand, it is also certain that, in a stricter sense, *all* are sinners^a. Nor, in truth, is there less of moral insensibility in imagining that man can ever reach while on earth that state of sinless perfection to which we know, from his own avowal, that even Paul had not attained, than in affirming our whole race to be sunk in total corruption. As, in the best men, the victory over temptation and evil, or as the spiritual illumination of their minds increases, so do their obligations increase also; nor

^a Compare Rom. iii. 23.

can they *ever* count themselves to have attained the whole of the moral object which they have in view. I admit that there may be among such men, who are the men in whom the conscience is usually the most sensitive, some whose consciences are *too* uneasy: who aggravate too much^a the imperfections which bow them down; and who equal not the piety of the great apostle, because, while they have his humility, they have not also his hope. I admit also that there do seem to exist sometimes even on this earth, some lovely flowers, often among those which fade the soonest, in whom we can hardly discern the stain of that universal blot, *quæ manet*, in the expressive language of our articles, *etiam in renatis*. Neither is there anything which can be more offensive to a well disciplined mind, than that the awful declarations of the Gospel against both sinners and sin should be hackneyed by too familiar a use into household words. But that any man who has his faculties exercised "by reason of use" to discern evil and good, can yet judge the word sinner to have too intense a signification to allow of his using it properly of himself, is to me incomprehensible. At all events his so judging is equivalent to his thanking God that he is not as other men are. Perhaps

^a People who have been committing faults should confess their faults with the greatest frankness, aggravate it to the utmost," &c. Doddridge's Rise and Progress, xxiii. § 6.

that may pass. But if, especially comparing the opportunities given with the duties done, and with the ready assistance always granted in doing them, this were on the whole a frame of mind compatible with true piety, the truly pious would no doubt sometimes deviate into it. But I doubt the existence of any person of true piety, who on the ground of any attained, any more than on that of any inherited, righteousness, would scruple to fall low on his knees before God's footstool, to smite on his breast and say, "God be merciful to me a sinner."^a

MATT. xviii. 6.—"But whoso shall offend one of these little ones which believe in me."

Those who believe in Christ must here mean generally those who had embraced the religion

^a See Chap. XV. No. xix. "*Sed quia obsequium impunitatem præstat, delictum autem pœnas contrahit, justorum nomine veniunt ii qui causæ suæ non habent quod timeant.*"^b

See the remarkable passage extracted by Magee^c, from the first edition of Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*^d, the work of a mind certainly not disposed by its original constitution to take dark or unhappy views of the order of Providence, and of which the natural feelings are of course shown better in their "first runnings," than in the suppression of them in the later editions.

^b Doederlein *Inst. Theologi Christiani*, II. 359.

^c Vol. I. 209.

^d Pp. 204, 205.

which he taught, and to whom, presumably at least, it was their rule of life. Schleusner rightly couples the sense in which the word believe is used in this verse, and in the parallel verse, Mark, ix. 42, with the sense in which it is used also in Mark, xvi. 16: "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be damned."^a The sole meaning of this verse is that they who rightly, and of course through faith and baptism, embrace Christianity, are put by so embracing it into the only way of salvation; and that they who obstinately refuse to enter into that way refuse at their peril. So in Luke, viii. 12: "The devil taketh away the word out of their hearts lest they should believe and be saved." In all these passages, and in many others, the word faith or belief imports generally *that* faith, or *the* faith, i. e. that religion, into which faith, in its more rigid sense of an intellectual assent to, or conviction of, the truth of Christ's doctrine, is merely the ingress. Compare John, vii. 38, 39, and Acts, iv. 4. 32; xiii. 48; xiv. 1; xvii. 12; xxi. 20. 25.

MATT. XX. 11, 12.—"And when they had received it, they murmured against the good man of the house, saying: These last have wrought but one hour, and thou hast made them equal unto us,

^a See also Rosenmuller in locum.

which have borne the burden and heat of the day.”

To this murmur the householder answers, in v. 13: “Friend, I do thee no wrong: didst thou not agree with me for a penny?”

The analogy to be drawn from this parable is as follows: *As* the just dealing of the householder with those whom he had hired at the first or the third hour is not impaired by his generosity to those whom he hired at the eleventh hour; so the justice of God as God of the Jews, or of Christ, as having called some disciples sooner than others, and in calling the Gentiles last, is not affected by his so doing. That the reward bestowed by God is not always in exact proportion to the love felt, and the labour employed, is not implied. Both Jew and Gentile are still rewarded, each according to his work, and in reference to the burden and heat which he bears, or is willing to bear. The goodness^a or generosity of the householder is analogous to the advantages of external circumstances or internal grace bestowed on the Christian, not to the improvement of either the one or the other. This is the inference to be drawn from this analogy. But it is plain that no one could collect either that this is, or that there is no other inference to be derived from it, without first examining and ascertaining the object *for* which it

^a Verse 15.

is alleged; and this independently of the analogy itself.

MATT. XXIV. 23.—“Then, if any man shall say unto you, Lo! here is Christ, or there, believe it not.”

That is: Do not give credit to, do not let your *understandings* be misled by, any authority or supposed evidence (compare v. 24.) for such pretensions. Schleusner adds justly that nothing emphatic [nothing which implies any turning of the assent or conviction into confidence] is implied either in this verse or in some others to which he refers. Compare v. 26; Mark, xvi. 14; Luke, i. 4; viii. 13; xxiv. 11; Acts, xi. 17; xiii. 12. 48; and xiv. 1. 23.

MATT. XXIV. 45.—“Who then is a faithful and wise servant,” &c.

Compare Luke, xii. 42. The word faithful here plainly implies *fidelity*, and this in a sense which pointedly shows that the actually *doing* the work of a servant must follow from the principle. Compare also Luke, xii. 46, where the portion of the *unfaithful* servant is denounced to be with the *unbelievers*; and v. 51 of this chapter of St. Matthew, where for unbelievers we have the word hypocrites. The unbeliever of Luke is the unfaithful servant of Matthew, one who only person-

ates the servant's character, and *does not* the duty incumbent on him.

MARK, ix. 24.—“Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief.”

I allow that we may say, in some sense, that this man *tried* to believe^a. The word believe is here understood, and rightly so, by the commentators, in the sense of confidence. But what he had to *do*, in order to believe, or to be helped in believing, (and this would equally be the case though we were to understand the word in the sense of conviction,) was not to summon up in his mind any struggle of imagination or sentiment. What he had *to do* was, to put to himself those questions respecting the evidence brought before him of our Saviour's claim to be believed in, on which, if rightly judged and followed into their consequences, a rational faith might be founded. And the farther process of so putting and answering those questions would be this: that conviction would *first* follow necessarily as the intellectual, and *then*, on rightly working in that conviction, and making it operative, that the confidence which our Saviour claimed from him would also follow as the moral, result of the whole. It is farther evident that though this man's *convictions*

^a See Chap. V. p. 135.

may have vacillated, yet his *will* may have been, and apparently was, penetrated and influenced throughout by the very highest moral principles which can be named. To have a mind open and desirous to see God's will in every thing, and yet fearful to desert the interpretation of the apparent authorities; to pray for mercy, and yet haply to doubt of his own title to it, were, in the case here recorded for us, moral virtues of the highest order, and at the same time the indices, as we may well suppose, of many more.

MARK, X. 21.—“One thing thou lackest.”

Why was this young ruler not accepted?—Because his principle could not stand the test which Jesus imposed. Because even natural religion teaches us that, if God speaks, he has a claim to obedience. And certainly it was a very practical obedience which our Saviour here directly required of him. There was nothing doctrinal either in his giving his goods to feed the poor, or in following Christ.

LUKE, I. 4.—“That thou mightest know (*ἐπιγνώσ*) the certainty (*ἀσφάλειαν*) of those things wherein thou hast been instructed.”

Does “certainty” here mean *truth*? If so, is this product of knowledge faith? If so, we sometimes use the word faith in the mere sense of con-

viction: always presuming, however, of that conviction that it is a just basis of confidence.

LUKE, xxiii. 24.—“This day thou shalt be with me in Paradise.”

That these words imply (whatever the difficulties of interpretation on other points) that the penitent thief, as he is called, would be *forgiven*, or *justified*, or *saved*, or *accepted*, and this through faith, has never been doubted. And this particular case is often cited as a case eminently illustrative of the doctrine that man is justified by faith without works, inasmuch as it was a case in which there was no time to perform them^a. And yet I cannot imagine that any case could ever be *invented* to show more distinctly that, in the sight of God, all human faith, and all human good works, appear to be available on the same principle. For what was the case of this thief? What moral work can we ever account of as being more highly moral than that *work* of contrition which must have been going on in his mind? What *faith* can we suppose to have ever been more the aggregate than his may have been of all the best *moral* feelings of which we are susceptible?^b What is there de-

^a See Origen in Epist. ad Rom. Chap. III. as quoted in Mr. Faber's book on Justification, pp. 144, 145; and see Cyril's Catechetical Lectures, xiii. 31.

^b See Chap. IV. pp. 123—126.

pendent on man's weak nature, of which we can pronounce more unhesitatingly than that, if opportunity had been given, he had in that faith the full and steady resolve and disposition to fulfil every work both of religion and charity? This will not be doubted.

But then opportunity, it will be said, was not given, and that disposition is faith, and not work. Not an *external* work clearly: but it is also not less clear that it is an internal work, than that it is *not* an external. The disposition itself is also that very moral habit of the soul which only gives works their goodness; and on which works themselves, so far as they confer any real good on the agent, must always react.

LUKE, xxiv. 47.—“And that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name among all nations.”

Doddridge, referring to this verse, speaks of it as “utterly inconsistent with any scheme of our being justified and saved by any merit or excellence in faith, considered as an act of atonement (or amends) made by us.”^a Of the confusion of almost the whole controversy respecting human merit I speak elsewhere sufficiently^b.

I add here, that even they who hold, or rather

^a Doddridge's Sermon on Salvation by Grace, pp. 17, 18.

^b See Chap. X. and Chap. XIV. Sect. xxx.

profess to hold, this proposition as *doctrine*, do not, I apprehend, often adopt it as *precept*. There is hardly any man who would scruple to urge a sinner to endeavour through God's grace to make amends or atone for his sins, by living well for the time to come. And the only perversion of this doctrine which he would deprecate, would be its perversion into *pride*, into any imagination that, because he may be allowed to hope that he is at length imperfectly doing his duty, and working out a title to the favour of God, he is therefore intitled to look for God's gifts, as not of grace, but of debt, to forget his own weakness, to cease to sorrow for his past sins, or to presume on his own righteousness and to despise others.

JOHN, viii. 24.—“If ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins.”

That is: “Unless you lay aside that perversity which keeps you back from believing.” And so also in v. 45, “Because I tell you the truth, ye believe me not.” The implication is, “Because ye are averse to receive it.” Again in chap. x. 26: Ye are not of my sheep, “because of your own unfair and wilful prejudices.”^a Again in chap. xii.

^a Thalemann, as cited by Rosenmuller on John, viii. 24. and Rosenmuller's own commentary on John, viii. 45; x. 26; and xii. 39. Compare also Rosenmuller's commentary on Rom. ix. 22, 23. Κατηρτισμένα εἰς ἀπώλειαν, *qui suam sibi*

39, 40: "It is not meant that they had a will to believe and could not, but that they set themselves against having such a will."^a And so also in Acts, xix. 9: "When divers were hardened and believed not," or, to render the original with more exactness, "hardened themselves."

ACTS, xiii. 48.—"And as many as were ordained unto eternal life believed."

As many as were predisposed and prepared by an honest desire to learn and do God's will. That desire may probably have been in many instances fostered and guided by the habit of attending the Jewish synagogue.

ACTS, xv. 9.—"And put no difference between us and them, purifying their hearts by faith;" i. e. by *the faith*, or by Christianity.

ROM. ii. 14.—"Do by nature the things contained in the law." Compare the following verses.

Notwithstanding these clear words, there are some, perhaps many, who affirm that in strictness

perniciem contrahunt. Si cum aliis vertis: homines facti ad summam illam perniciem, populariter est intelligenda phrasis pro certo et inevitabili fato perituri.

^a Wall, as quoted in the notes to the Family Bible.

of speech, there does not exist any religion of nature at all. I have also heard it said, that though it may be allowable to speak of a religion of *reason*, as a religion which may exist without Christianity, yet without God mere *nature* is inert, that we are mere mute and unreasoning animals, till touched by him with that spirit which giveth understanding, and which in giving us understanding gives us the only capacity which we have, or can have, of knowing anything of religion.—I might add, that this objection should go farther, and urge also, what is quite as true, that without God we should not be even that mute and unreasoning animal which it supposes us to be.

In reality, however, no jealousy can be more groundless, than the jealousy thus indicated of a word of which Scripture itself, as well as common conversation, might teach the use and the relevancy. If, indeed, we find any one who is setting up nature *against* God, let us by all means show *him* that nature is but a *name* for that mass of facts, and laws, and powers, and qualities, of which God is the moving force and original. But when we speak of the *religion* of nature, our only meaning is to abstract from our knowledge of religion *that* knowledge of God's will, or attributes, or workings, which we owe to some express revelation, or, in brief, to Christ. To speak of the religion of nature no way affects the metaphysics

of the question, *how* any knowledge of religion, except the revealed knowledge of it, comes into the mind. All, in fact, that we mean, or that is ever meant, by so speaking, is to exclude what we are taught in God's *word*; and to make out what may be inferred from his *works*, that is, from every thing else except his word, as well as we can. If any one choose to call this the religion of reason, let him do so, and welcome. We mean the same thing. But let not those be censured, who prefer to abide by a received phraseology, in a case which seems not to present any good ground for the changing of it; and of which it appears to me also that the disuse may tend to encourage in many persons notions of pride and of privilege, which, notwithstanding all professions to the contrary, are far more injurious than almost anything else to Christian humility.

ROM. iii. 20.—“Therefore by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight.”

Of what law, the moral, or the ritual? Not by the deeds, or works of either; and this for the reasons given in the observations which will follow on v. 27. It is, however, material to observe, and though several writers have made the observation, I am inclined to think that it is not enough adverted to, that neither St. Paul, nor even St. James, although St. James in particular

dwells much on what have been called Judaical works, that is, on works performed in a Judaical spirit, (see what will be said on this subject in the observations which will follow on Rom. iii. 28, and James, ii. 21,) draws any distinction between the moral works, and the ritual works. This is for the plain reason that both these sorts of works were equally bound on the Jew by divine command. The Jew could no more set up any claim of acceptance with God, on the ground of performing those works which, if performed in a good spirit, are moral *per se*, and at the same time rejecting the law of ordinances, than the Christian, on the ground of performing works of charity, and at the same time rejecting, that is obstinately rejecting, the use of the sacraments. In point of fact, *all works*, so performed, or as far as combined with a rejection of any part, be it what it may, moral or ritual, of the known law of God, are to be accounted of, religiously speaking, as mere externals. It does not, however, hence follow that there exists not any difference in point of import or value between these two sorts of works. The prophets certainly state their difference very strongly. See what is said on this subject in the passages referred to in the beginning of Chap. XIV. Sect. vi. and in the citations which follow ^a. And the difference, that is,

^a “ Recte monet Moses Maimonides (More Nev. Part III. c. 32.) nihil in his religionibus, quæ in sacrificiis versabantur,

the religious difference, between the two sorts consists, as I apprehend, in this, that the one sort, the moral, are a *test* of sincerity, which the other sort is not; and also that the moral works minister *aliment*, which the others do not, to the moral power employed on them. All positive institutions are analogous to discipline (*ἀσκησις*), but morals to food.

ROM. iii. 25.—“ Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood.”

Faith in Christ's *blood*, an *expression* nowhere else to be found in Scripture, is faith in his religion: faith in his religion is faith in his blood. The *argument* would have been the same if it had been said “ through faith in his incarnation, or in his resurrection,”—the *part* being, according to either of these forms of expression, put for the *whole*. But Christ's *blood*, or *death*, is alleged with the greater and more obvious propriety, in-

Deo per se gratum fuisse, nihil in quo propter se voluntas ejus acquievit. Ex quibus intelligi par est aliam esse earum rerum rationem, quæ ad immutabile jus naturæ pertinent, aliam autem sacrificiorum. Illas per se Deo gratas esse, hæc autem ab illis sejuncta nihil omnino placuisse.” Outram de Sacrificiis, pp. 11, 12. But the sacrificing *in obedience to a divine command*, or in the spirit of such an obedience, is not among the things “ ab illis sejuncta,” but, on the contrary, among those things “ quæ ad immutabile jus naturæ pertinent.”

asmuch as it is to be accounted of as not only the sanction of the whole system, but also as the most eminent instance which the whole system affords of his mercy and love, and the most impressive lesson of the fatal consequences of that sin from which he died to redeem us^a.

ROM. iii. 27.—“Where is boasting then? It is excluded. By what law?—of works? Nay: but by the law of faith.”

That is, by the Christian religion. Compare ch. ii. v. 17. This verse may be *paraphrased* as follows. “How, then, is boasting excluded”? The Apostle answers: “Not by the law of works: for in a law of works you might have boasted, if you could have kept it: but by that law which declares that all are sinners and requires of all to seek for mercy.”

I have already observed on v. 20 of this chapter, that I do not apprehend that the Apostles ever drew any distinction between the moral and the ritual works of the law. Many writers, Bishop Tomline, for example, describe the works here spoken of as being the “numerous outward ordinances prescribed by the law of Moses, and abolished by the Gospel of Christ.”^b But I do not

^a See Chap. I. of this Treatise, pp. 2—4, and p. 7.

^b Elements of Theology, II. 262.

think that St. Paul ever argues so irrelevantly as this interpretation supposes. And though no doubt his particular reference is to the Mosaic law, as is evident from the beginning of v. 29 of this chapter, he had also previously laid down at length and most solemnly in vv. 9—24, and in recapitulation^a of what he had been saying before, the broad declaration that all are sinners. And he had also repeatedly included the Gentiles, to whom certainly the ritual law was not given, in this declaration. Moreover, as thus the Apostle's particular *reference* to the Mosaic law is to that whole law, moral and ritual, so also his *argument* stretches equally to those who were under the moral law of the Gentiles^b. For the very point of his argument is, that "forgiveness is necessary to *all*:" for there is no difference: for all have sinned^c. The dependence which *might* have been put in the moral law, *if* it had, or could have, made the performers thereof perfect, is not disputed.

It is also to be observed that, although St. Paul, throughout this whole argument, very much blends together the moral and the ritual works of the law, and speaks of both as inefficacious, we yet may, if we please, so fill up the links of his reasoning^d, as to see that he, on the same principle with

^a See v. 9.

^b See Chap. ii. vv. 14, 15.

^c Verses 22, 23.

^d Compare Rom. ii. 25—29.

the prophets^a, speaks of the ritual works as inefficacious *per se*, but speaks of the moral works as inefficacious, not *per se*, but because they were not performed. The error among Christians which corresponds most nearly with, or may rather be said to be the *same* with that of those Jews who trusted in the mere performance of the *ritual* law, is of course that of those who trust to mere *rites*, as for example, to baptism. The error among Christians which comes next in rank or order of correspondence, to that same error of the Jews, or which we may call most nearly *analogous* to it, is the error of those who trust to *mere* faith, that is, to an unproductive faith, or to mere opinion, or orthodoxy^b. The Christian error analogous to that of those Jews who trusted in the performance of the *moral* works of their law, is that of those Christians, who, though they do not trust in mere opinion, or in the language of this treatise, in their mere *conviction* or knowledge of the truth, yet trust in a faith less productive, or in the language of this treatise, less *confiding*; or, which is the same thing, in works *pro modulo nostro* less perfect,

^a See what was said before, p. 229; and see also Chap. XIV. Sect. vi.

^b Compare Salvian, as referred to in Chap. XIV. Sect. vi. Note 2; and Tucker's Light of Nature, VI. 75; and the preface to the Theodicée, pp. 1, 2.

than those which we owe to Christ, or to God through him.

ROM. iii. 28.—“Therefore we conclude, that by faith a man is justified without the deeds of the law.”

The preposition *without* is here equivalent to the words “*and not,*” or *without reference to*: that is, without reference to the deeds or works of the Mosaic law; and that these deeds or works include the moral as well as the ritual works of that law, and that the principle, on which the apostle excludes all these works from the office of justifying, extends also to the works of the moral law of the Gentiles, has been shown sufficiently in the preceding observations on Rom. iii. 20 and 27. The same sense would be expressed by saying that faith justifies, but that the deeds of the law do not justify. The farther meaning of this 28th verse must be determined by ascertaining in the first place, the sense in which the apostle uses the word *faith*, and in the second place, that in which he uses the word *justified*. I take here the first of these two points only, the second resolving itself either into a mere question of the *order*, not in the least affecting the *substance*, of God’s plan of salvation, or into mere phraseology ^a.

^a As may be sufficiently collected from what was said on the subject of justification, in Chap. II. Sect. ix. Head 4, pp. 89—94. See also what will be said in Chap. XIV. Sect. xiv.

On the first of these two points then, it is, I think, quite clear, that the faith to which the apostle here attributes the office of justifying must be, to express his meaning at length, that *religion* which comes *by* faith, and which to Abraham was, and to Christians is, of grace or of gift: a dispensation of mercy which justifies, saves, and accepts; which is what no religion of strict law, whether ritual or moral, can possibly do; seeing that the ground of strict law is a ground which fails under every man, Gentile or Jew. This is St. Paul's whole argument, into whatever variety of allusion or illustration pursued in regard to Jewish doctrine or theology.

It is also farther to be observed that in this *argument*, the principle of faith, or any comparison, or contrast, between faith and works, in their controverted sense, does not once come into question. Neither, I think, does it at all appear, that the apostle ever anticipated that this controversy, or that the comparison or contrast on which it rests, would create any misunderstanding of what he here says; nor yet that he was misunderstood in fact by those whom he addressed. Indeed, if it were not for the text Rom. ii. 13, and the conclusion of the same chapter from v. 17 to the end, in which there is evident reference to the Judaical superstition that a barren knowledge of, or, it might be said, faith in, the Mosaic law, is good in

itself^a, I should be inclined to doubt whether *our* question of faith and works was at any time even in the mind of the apostle when he wrote this Epistle. Neither yet does he argue, or affirm, (though if he had he would have affirmed nothing but an important truth,) that faith, as it is the good motive, gives to the works proceeding from it, whatever goodness they have. He does not even argue, (though that is true also,) that faith is the only instrument by which the gracious gifts of God can be apprehended or made our own. But his *argument* is simply, and purely, that it is only a *merciful* and *forgiving* dispensation, (and this alike whether it be the Abrahamic or the Christian,) by which sinful man can possibly hope for the favour of God. That a case so clear as this really is should ever have been seriously disturbed, or confused, is almost surprising. And it is perhaps, still more surprising, that any handle for confusing it should ever have been found in that most concurring argument of St. James, in which the ignorant sometimes imagine an opposition of the one apostle to the other. But, in fact, the whole argument of St. Paul is, that it is God's kindness and forgivingness alone, on which man can depend

^a A point more expressly handled by St. James, though exactly on the same principle with St. Paul, as will be seen in the observations on James, ii. 21. Compare also, Gal. v. 21; and Eph. v. 6.

either for pardon or reward ; (a kindness and forgivingness of which it is rightly assumed, but *not* argued, that we can lay hold, as Abraham did, only by faith). The argument of St. James is, that this faith, first in its germ, and then in its product, must be a working or fruitful faith, and that otherwise it is not that faith which God will approve.

ROM. iv. 5.—“ But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth [τὸν δικαιοῦντα] the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness, [εἰς δικαιοσύνην].”

The righteousness [δικαιοσύνη] of the Jews consisted in the performance, the *adequate* performance, of the ritual and moral works of the law. And though the error of imagining that the *external* performance was everything appears to have extensively prevailed amongst them, and has indeed for that reason, and because they are much reproached with it by our Saviour and his apostles, acquired the very appellation of a *Judaical* error, this is an error which never could have been received as a recognised doctrine, or into which the best expositors of the Mosaic law can have avowedly fallen. The proper meaning therefore of this word δικαιοσύνη amongst the Jews assumes that those works of which it was composed were not only

performed, but also were performed on a moral or religious principle, or as acts of obedience to God. Not *anything* external obtaining for any man the favour of God, but only the principle, the vital principle, from which all works *may* flow, and which was Abraham's.

On this foundation of meaning the writers of the New Testament adopt both the word righteous [δικαίος] itself, and also all the inflexions from it of which they make use. They apply all those words equally, on the same principle, to the different cases of the Jew, the Gentile, and the Christian, exactly according to the different moral circumstances of each case. God's act in justifying, [his δικαίωσις,] of each individual, is the pronouncing or judging that he comes up *so far* to the requirements of that Jewish, or Christian, or Gentile law which he was under, as to obtain his acceptance. And this acceptance God grants to them all, in whatever degree or proportion he sees in all, or in each, the vital principle of a sincere desire to learn his will, and to do it. The conviction and confidence produced by this desire constitute faith in its germ; and this faith so produced must in turn operate both the works of the law, and the works of righteousness^a, unless the connexion between the principle and the

^a Νόμου καὶ δικαιοσύνης.

effect, the tree and the fruit, be disturbed or intercepted by error or vice. This is the faith, these are the works, which God accepts and values. The works of righteousness^a, or of the righteousness of God^b, as revealed in Christ, ought to surpass the works of the law, (and a great part of St. Paul's argumentation is to enforce this truth,) because built on better knowledge, and better promises, and on a clearer revelation of the holiness and love of God. But still both are accepted, and the "iniquities" of both are forgiven, on the same principle, and by the same benignity. And this differs not in meaning from explaining the word just, [δικαίος,] or its derivatives, when used of God, as I have usually explained them in this treatise, by the English words kind or benign. Our meaning is exactly the same, whether we say that God judges or counts men as righteous, [δίκαιοι] when they come up *so far* to his requirements, as that he may kindly accept them: or whether we say that he kindly accepts a sincere faith. It is not implied in either form of words that he at all values the external works of the law, except for the principle from which they *may* flow; nor yet that it is a part of his justice, any more than of his goodness, to exact the *perfect* performance of the moral works of it. Compare the observations which will follow on Gal. iii. 12.

^a Ἔργα δικαιοσύνης.

^b Δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ.

ROM. iv. 25.—“Who was delivered for our offences, and raised again for our justification.”

The justification, [δικαίωσις,] here spoken of evidently denotes a more immediately judicial, and personal act of God, than the commoner inflexion, [δικαιοσύνη,] from the same root, which, as in chap. iii. 25. we translate righteousness. The “righteousness of God” spoken of *there* is rather his characteristic goodness or forbearance, which disposes him to pardon: the “justification” spoken of *here* is rather, as has been said, the pardoning act.

A question still remains how this act is said to be procured for us by Christ's *resurrection*. The stream of Scripture certainly goes to say that our deliverance is purchased for us not by his resurrection, but by his death, or at least by his death as having in it more of the character of expiation or price, than any other part of what he has done for us, or as the most prominent and emphatic part of it. Bishop Horsley, accordingly, has a sermon on this verse, in which he explains it as meaning nothing more than this, as far as *we* are concerned; or as merely meaning that Christ rose because his death *had* justified us. “So soon as the expiation was complete, justice required that the Redeemer's sufferings should terminate, and his resurrection to life and glory was the immediate consequence.”^a

^a Nine Sermons, 8vo, 1815, p. 265, and compare p. 251.

“There was [then] nothing to detain his soul in hell, or his body in the grave.”^a But certainly this is not the purpose for which the fact or doctrine of Christ’s resurrection is commonly brought forward in Scripture. The common reasons for bringing it forward are one or other of the two following:—first, that it furnishes the most decisive evidence of the truth of his mission^b; secondly, that it is the most direct manifestation of his great doctrine, that if we make his death what it was intended to be, the type, or pattern, of our dying to sin, we shall also partake that life of which he is the first fruits. And accordingly I apprehend that this expression of Christ’s being raised again for our justification is to be most rightly interpreted as expressive of these two principles; or as meaning that he was raised, partly to declare to, or assure, us that the act of pardon had passed, and partly to declare also the state or condition in which it had placed us: namely, that it is a state in which we have that future life “in procinct,” the promise of which was as much an object of his mission as his dying for sin. That this promise of a future life, or of heaven, was actually in the apostle’s mind, when he penned this particular passage, may not be

^a Nine Sermons, 8vo, 1815, p. 264.

^b See for example Acts, xvii. 31.

certain. But still the doctrine remains the same, whether it were actually in his mind, or not. For no one questions, even though he may suppose the justification [or *δικαίωσις*] spoken of here to mean no more than the forgiveness of past sins spoken of in chap. iii. 25, that heaven always opens her portals wide to the justified to invite them forward. And that the promise of heaven was actually in the mind of the writer is the more *probable*, because in the 18th verse of chap. v., the only other place in which he uses the same word, or indeed in which it is used in Scripture, he characterizes it expressly as being a *δικαίωσις ζωῆς*, or, as we translate it, "justification of life."

ROM. v. 19.—"For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners: so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." (Compare the preceding verses.)

I understand this argument as follows: that as sin entered into the world by Adam's offence, and was propagated also from him in a long series of corruption and transgression; so we receive from Christ a moral strength to contend with and conquer it. That this propagation of sin is through the corruption of the nature derived from Adam, though a true proposition, is not, that I see, implied in what is said here.

ROM. vii. 14.—“For we know that the law is spiritual: but I am carnal, sold under sin.”

The common, and perhaps the correct interpretation of this argument is that the apostle speaks not in his own character, but in that of some Jew; in whose case, not in his own, he describes that conflict between the carnal and the spiritual man, to which the adverse principles of good and evil which are bound up in our common nature, of necessity lead. But he may also be understood as rather intending to designate a still more general personification of that mingled nature of which he was himself a partaker, and of which no one partakes without being conscious, not of the extremes indeed which this vivid description portrays, but yet of tendencies leading to them.

ROM. x. 9.—“That if thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thy heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved.”

To *believe with the heart* (compare v. 6.) is here plainly conviction of the understanding: *confession with the mouth* one of the virtues, and at that time a peculiarly eminent virtue, emanating from the *confidence* which that *conviction* had rightly engendered. The concluding words of this verse, “thou shalt be saved,” mean of course “thou shalt be put in the way of salvation.”

In here concluding the observations which I apprehend that some readers may not have found superfluous, on this most doctrinal of all the epistles, I beg to add generally, that as it certainly is not the object of the writer to teach that God either could not, or would not, pardon without the mediation of Christ; so neither is it his direct and principal object to teach even the true doctrine that he designed to show his justice, or holiness, or hatred of sin by thus requiring an offering for it. The apostle's direct and principal object is to commend God's *love* in providing a propitiation, and such a propitiation, for fallen man; and this he does especially in those passages in which he speaks expressly of God's "righteousness," [δικαιοσύνη,] a word in which, as has been before observed, his goodness and forgivingness are strictly implied. At the same time it is no less true, that the absolute justice and holiness of God's nature, and (if any one chooses to use such a word, I have no objection to say) his utter intolerance of sin, even while he pardons the sinner, are no less certainly declared by the same argument, and still more forcibly by the facts of the case. In truth, the more we revolve this whole argument, or rather history, the greatest of all histories, over and over, the greater, and the more perfect, as well as the more marvellous, must its heavenly wisdom appear in all respects to be. The more we consider

it, the more we discern both of the justice, and also of the kindness, of the method thus chosen to win at once the sinner from sin, and to impress all men with the love of Christ and of God. No other method, I firmly believe, could have *shown* God to us as the friend of man in an aspect at once so awful and lovely. But still I apprehend it to be a method, of which, if not revealed, we could not have apprehended the need. In other words, I apprehend that we have no right to pronounce that repentance and holiness *might not* have been made attainable in some other way; or that, *if attained*, they do not always, through God's merciful acceptance, prove effectual^a.

1 COR. vi. 11.—“And such were some of you: but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified, in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God.”

“We might in fine add that the word justification is very seldom, or never, used in the sense of making persons righteous, or infusing righteousness into them. 1 Cor. vi. 11; Titus, iii. 6, 7; Rom. vi. 7; viii. 30, are the passages which most countenance that sense, but these not clear.” Thus Barrow, in his Sermon on Justification^b. And certainly not any one of these passages is

^a See Whichcote's Aphorisms, 536. 701, 702.

^b Works, Vol. II. p. 82.

clear in the sense which they are thus imagined to countenance. The verse here cited from the Corinthians, with which that in Titus corresponds exactly, is one of the strongest; and this is interpreted by Griesbach as denoting the mere act of being brought over into that Christian religion, of which, if rightly improved, the fruit is to holiness. I am far from satisfied that this is an adequate rendering: but it would not be easy to prove that it means anything more. Whether an adequate rendering, however, or not, of the full force of the passage, the real doctrine, which all these, and all similar passages, indicate, is one and the same. If to be washed, sanctified, justified, mean in strictness only to be visibly admitted by baptism into that Christian religion which is, or may be, to all who are admitted into it, the vehicle of sanctification and forgiveness of sins, still we are not the less brought into it of God's grace, and through his Spirit, which go along with us in all that work which it conducts us to do. If the precise meaning be rather, that the admission into Christ's religion by baptism, or on repentance, or in faith, is properly to be considered as in itself an acquittal of past sins actual or original; and therefore as an entrance on a new life in which these past sins will not be imputed, still this interpretation is reconcileable with a very sound version of the truth. According to those forensic analogies

to which the apostle on some other occasions clearly refers, the case is on a par with that of the acquitted, or rather pardoned, criminal, to whom the judge says, as our Lord himself said to the woman taken in adultery: "Go and sin no more."

Or again, lastly, *if* it be the meaning of these passages, or of any of them, that the goodness or righteousness by which we are saved, or by which we are made partakers of any heavenly gift, is a goodness infused by God's grace, or by his Spirit, this rendering also is into a true doctrine. For all goodness is so, and so only, infused by the one Spirit, though always in an inscrutable combination with our own working along with it.

1 COR. xiii. 13.—"And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three, but the greatest of these is charity."

Charity is the greatest, because the others are either barren or imperfect, unless they bear this fruit: or else because when the others shall have ceased^a, yet *love* endureth.

2 COR. x. 15.—"But having hope, when your faith is increased."

That is, when you have made a farther proficiency in your religion. The word faith is used also in the same sense in chap. xiii. 5.

^a Compare verse 8.

GAL. ii. 16.—“Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law.”

The works here within the direct contemplation of the apostle appear to be the ritual or ceremonial works. But the same argument applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the moral works also. See the observations on Rom. iii. 27.

GAL. iii. 12.—“And the law is not of faith: [that is: the law, which is a law of works, does not direct the eye to the promise, which is a promise of pardon,] but, the man that doeth them shall live in them.” And again in verse 21: “If there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law.”

A *part* of this argument of the apostle we may paraphrase as follows. “That righteousness, or goodness, which is the ground on which we look for acceptance with God, and which you Jews are disposed to consider as placed in the performance of the ritual, or symbolical, or even of the moral law itself, you must in both these cases so look for in vain. The law is weak against human corruption, and not only this, but it relaxes nothing: you have always the letter against you. But the kindness of God still gives you an anchor of hope. He relaxes not the letter. His holiness allows not of that. But if you love and fear him, as you

are taught to do by those lessons which you have received of faith in his Son; if you have in you this vital principle, or inward life, he will interpret benignantly those lapses both of will and of conduct, for which otherwise you cannot hope to be pardoned."^a

I proceed to a more particular exposition of the verses cited above. As certainly it never was contemplated that life *would* come by the law, or at least by that spotless obedience to it, which, except by Christ, never was paid; so neither is it the meaning of these verses that, abstracted from the Gospel, or from the mediation of Christ, no obedience except a spotless obedience could obtain acceptance with God. The apostle's argument with the Jews on the unreasonableness of expecting life by the law is to be regarded as purely what is called an *argumentum ad hominem*. The law was the groundwork in which the Jews *did* put their trust. St. Paul enters not either into the strength or the weakness of this groundwork itself, but argues that, as it was a groundwork which they did not keep, they could not trust to it: and therefore, as in the fourth chapter to the Romans, that all reward or inheritance is suspended not on law, but on promise, or on gift or grace. It is moreover expressly stated that the law was not given as a law of life, or even as an image of any

^a See the note on Rom. iv. 5.

possible way of obtaining it, but on the contrary was added^a because of transgressions, or to restrain men from sin, or to show them their guilt. Even Abraham, it is implied, was not intitled to assert a spotless obedience, or, in more technical language, could not have claimed a justification by works, understanding by works a perfect performance of the whole law^b. And in the same manner, the

^a Gal. iii. 19.

^b I hardly need add, that no such perfection is implied in the use of the words ἄμωμοι and ἄμεμπτος in Eph. i. 4. and Phil. iii. 6. The meaning of these words stretches not beyond the common meaning of the word δίκαιος, or of that δικαιοσύνη by which^c the Jew, though not sinless, was yet δικαίωθεις, or justified. Neither yet is there anything to imply that even the performance, the *imperfect* performance, of the works of the law, supposing them to be “performed in a proper spirit,” in “obedience to the divine will,” and in “a disposition of sincere piety,” could not give life^d. It may indeed be said, and with justice, that it was the proper spirit, with which those works are supposed to have been performed, which made them vivifying. But then, except in arguing against the *Judaical* corruption spoken of in p. 236, and which will be farther treated of in the observations on James, ii. 21, or against the value of any opus operatum taken alone, an argument of no great compass, and from which there are few if any dissentients, we always presume the good spirit, whenever we speak of works as good, just as much as we assume that works will follow, whenever we speak of a good spirit.

^c See the observations on Rom. iv. 5.

^d Gal. iii. 21. And see Neander's History of the planting of the Christian Church, II. 80, 81.

faith by which he was justified is not to be accounted of as more spotless or meritorious than his works themselves. The goodness and mercy of the Almighty, not the completeness or perfection of either his faith or his works, is the plea on which he had to rely for acceptance. It is the same also as to Christians. The rule of goodness, not the rule of law, is the only living principle of all the dispensations of God to man. That he accepts our imperfect righteousness through Christ, or through the propitiation to which he has kindly shown us the way, is not an argument that but for Christ he could not, or would not, accept anything less than a spotless obedience, but rather to the contrary, or that he is of himself long-suffering, and disposed to accept us. Why else did he provide this propitiation? The only inference which any part of this argument furnishes, either for the supposed case that Christ had not come, or for the case of those to whom he is not revealed, is that the God who is proved by this doctrine to have been kind to us, is kind in nature, and kind to all. God cannot be capricious. I do not like to affirm anything of him, except what is actually revealed either in his works, or by his word. Yet if we might affirm anything not so revealed, there would be no safer or clearer proposition than that the goodness which operated in the infinite mind to the sending of Christ, would have operated in some other way to our benefit,

though he had not come. It has been irrefragably argued^a that *miracles* may in certain contingencies be not less natural than common events. So also, in like manner, may be *some* plan of redemption. But everything in nature which is *plan* is of the mind of God.

COL. ii. 20, 21, 22.—“ Wherefore, if ye be dead with Christ from the rudiments of the world, why as though living in the world are ye subject to ordinances, (touch not, taste not, handle not,) which all are to perish with the using.”

It was shown, under the head of Rom. iii. 28, that St. Paul had there nothing less in his mind than to draw any comparison or contrast between works and faith. His whole doctrine or argument in that passage might be expressed as follows, leaving out the word faith altogether: “ It is therefore evident” (this is his *whole* argument) “that the *works* by which you have to hope for salvation are those works to which, imperfect as they are, God and Christ have given the promise of acceptance;—not the works of any rigid law, which are never performed.”

This is the whole of the argument, which is exactly the same in substance, whether we use the word works in *this* sense, or the word faith, in the sense of the apostle. According to

^a See Butler's Analogy, Part II. Chap. IV.

either version of this argument, we do not the less perceive it to be true that *faith*, as it is the active principle, is the only hand by which those Christian works are performed, which God is in his mercy pleased to accept. This truth also the apostle plainly assumes, inasmuch as this faith is a necessary step to the performing those works. Still the assumption or recognition of this *truth* forms, as I have said, no part of this argument.

There is nothing, therefore, in that verse in Romans *against* works. It is all *for* them. These verses which I have now cited from the epistle to the Colossians *are* against works. But against *what* works? Not against the moral, but, as will be shown under the head of James, ii. 21, against the opera operata, or Judaical works, which had taken the place of the really good works of the law, the works of justice, mercy, and faith.

TITUS, iii. 5.—“Not by works of righteousness, which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost.”

The argument is, that we are saved of mercy, and through Christ; but still with the implication that this is through the moral gifts shed forth in us by the Spirit. The *immediate* reference in the word “washing,” is to the rite of baptism. But

the benefit which redounds from the moral application of the rite is not the less designed and implied.

HEBREWS, ix. 17.—“ For a testament is of force after men are dead; otherwise it is of no strength at all, while the testator liveth.”

I allege this verse, because it gives me the opportunity of exemplifying, under the head of one of the slightest possible analogies, the general nature of all arguments from analogy, or that we must in all cases go to the purposes for which an analogy is alleged, in order to learn its meaning and force^a. I have elsewhere shown this in speaking of the analogy of Christ's death to a sacrifice, which is one of the strongest of analogies. This, as I have said, is one of the slightest. It is plain that, only granting Christ to be a divine, or a divinely commissioned, lawgiver, any law or promise given by him during his life, had no less validity than any which he left at his death. If he had merely come to teach, had so come, we may imagine, in some angelic or supernatural form, and then, without dying, returned whence he came forth, the lesson which he might have given, though less pointed or impressive,

^a This was shown in relation to the very strong analogy between Christ's death, and the Jewish and Heathen sacrifices, in Chap. II. Sections i. and ii., particularly in pp. 37, 38.

would not otherwise have carried with it a less clear obligation on the mind or the conscience. This the writer to the Hebrews does not mean to dispute. His argument, if I may here use that word, is that this redemption, or rather promise of redemption and inheritance, left by Christ, gives *in him* a better expiation, than any which could be found in the law of Moses. The apostle then proceeds, (addressing, as we must not forget, the *Hebrews*,) that this promise is moreover given in an order or method, which *they* in particular might the better understand and appreciate, by recollecting or considering that this is not the only case, in which *death* is to be regarded as the best, or most complete and irreversible, and still more, according to their own institutions and habits of thought, as the most religious, sanction which any compact can have. A *will*, for instance, does not acquire its force till the testator is dead. It is common to ratify covenants by bloodshedding; and, in the sacrifices of the law, which had an especial reference to this of Christ, the victims were *slain*. This is the analogy of the whole law, with little exception. This was the scheme of that preparatory dispensation, under which the Hebrews had lived. Christ's death following on that scheme is exactly the consistent accomplishment of the same providential mercy of God which that scheme

prefigured ; and this, inasmuch as that he, a better and holier sacrifice than any of those of the law, had now, in the consummation of the ages, died for sin, had by his death shut up the word of prophecy, and ascended to heaven.

This is the analogy, an analogy which, though thus slight in the extreme as touching on the validity of the promise sealed for us by Christ's death and left in his word, is yet by no means slight for other purposes.

JAMES, ii. 21.—“ Was not Abraham our father justified by works, when he had offered Isaac his son upon the altar ? ”

Of this argument of St. James, and of its intire correspondence with St. Paul's doctrine of faith, I have spoken sufficiently in the observations before made on Rom. iii. 28.

I should not here add more words, on a perfectly clear, and by all persons whose opinions are worth having, a recognised case, but that even among those who do see or recognise it for what it is, and that the two apostles do thus teach the same doctrine, it is yet common to hold that the meaning of St. James, though not to “ combat ” the statement of St. Paul, is yet to correct a misunderstanding and wrong application of it. Dr. Neander rightly argues that this is not the case, and observes that the “ fundamental error ”

which the apostle combats is that of “taking up the mere dead form” in religion; the “tendency which substituted a lifeless arrogant acquaintance with the letter for the genuine wisdom inseparable from the divine life,” and “which, as it laid an undue value on the *opus operatum* of outward religious acts, so also on the *opus operatum* of a faith which left the disposition unchanged.”^a And this error, as the same excellent writer also remarks, is rather a Judaical than a Christian error^b. In fact it is, as I have more than once observed in this treatise, the error of all times and of all countries, and is indeed the principle to which we may trace almost all superstition; and though St. Paul’s doctrine of faith has been, from very early times, *perverted* to the support of this error, I yet do not see that the error itself can be any way traceable to any original misunderstanding of his doctrine in the *first* age of the church. That first age must, I think, have in general seen clearly what he meant. At any rate the existence of any such original misunderstanding of his doctrine cannot be *proved*. I do not mean even to

^a History of the First Planting of the Christian Church. Translated by J. E. Ryland, and published in the Biblical Cabinet. Edinb. 1842. Vol. II. p. 12.

^b See the extracts in the Note *ibid.* from Justin, and the Clementine Homilies.

conjecture that there was *none*, absolutely. Error is, at all times, too ingenious to allow us to indulge any such fancy as that^a.

Thus far, therefore, it certainly appears to me that Dr. Neander, a writer imbued, I think, with the most just perceptions both of the whole end, and the true philosophy of the Christian system, is perfectly right. On one, however, and that an essential point of the case, it appears to me that his *Lutheranism* leads him wrong. "The error," he says, "which St. James combats, appears as an offset from a principle quite distinct from that *which would admit of an application whether correct, or incorrect, of the Pauline doctrine.*"^b He here means by the Pauline doctrine that doctrine of the extrinsecal imputation of Christ's righteousness^c, which, as I think, must be sufficiently manifest from what was said in the first part of this treatise, could have had no existence in the mind of St. Paul. And of course we cannot assume that a doctrine which St. Paul did not hold, and of which we do not know that it was even invented till much later times, could have been *applied* in his

^a See what was said on this subject, in the observations on Rom. iii. 28, pp. 235, 236.

^b History of the First Planting of the Christian Church, Vol. II. p. 11.

^c Compare *ibid.* pp. 126, 127.

time, as coming from him. But if the Pauline doctrine be, as it is, the true doctrine, that a real and a confiding faith in God and Christ saves or justifies either in itself, or in its certain operation; the opposite error which, if not at that time, yet soon afterwards did, and still does, lay a perverse hold of his doctrine as its support or authority, is exactly that same Judaical error which St. James is here allowed and supposed to combat directly. It is therefore an error, which not only admits of an application of the Pauline doctrine, but which is also best and most appropriately to be remedied by the correctly applying of it.

JAMES, ii. 22.—“Seest thou how faith wrought with his works, and by works was faith made perfect.”

Ἐτελειώθη: not that there was a reaction of his works on his faith, though this was true: but that the strength of his faith operated in, and proved itself by them.

1 JOHN, ii. 1, 2.—“And if any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous: and he is the propitiation for our sins.”

Advocate [παράκλητος]. The sense is here the same with that of the word intercessor, and is

moreover identified with that of the word propitiation: "This intercession of our Lord being the consequence of his giving himself a sacrifice for the sins of the world, and as it were a continuance of that transaction."—Short Defence of the Doctrine of Atonement, by R. Hey, p. 85.

CHAPTER XIV.

I NOW, as I had proposed, proceed to take up severally, various supplementary inquiries and details.

SECTION I.

Of the position that God cannot pardon without a mediator.

It has been often and sufficiently proved by Cudworth, and others, that we are no less sure of the existence of the moral qualities themselves, than we are sure of God's existence; and that we have no right to affirm that those qualities take their rise or their nature only in his express command. In point of fact, indeed, we know not, and cannot know, anything of God except what we infer from the nature of man: and hence it follows, (I spare myself the tracing out the argument in detail,) that to a certain extent we are clearly intitled to affirm even negative propositions respecting the divine attributes. God is holy: therefore he *cannot* be unholy. This is only another form of expressing the same truth. And I think it must be allowed, in like manner, that most, perhaps almost all of, those writers, who venture to affirm of the scheme of our being pardoned through an atoner,

or mediator, that our pardon *could not* otherwise have been granted even by God, are to be understood as making this startling proposition in a similarly qualified sense:—namely, in the sense that God could not do this, consistently with his own mighty plan for the moral government of the world, or with the order which he had himself instituted at the creation. So qualified, no proposition can be more innoxious than this; that is, provided we keep this qualification of it always in mind. As far as we are sure that we understand the plan, we, of course, reject everything of the inconsistency of which with that plan we are equally sure. Probably this is the meaning of Dr. Wardlaw in the passage which I have quoted from him in the first chapter of this treatise. At all events, if pressed, I suppose that he would readily have come down into it. But still the language itself appears to me to be highly objectionable, or that it must have, and has, the practical ill effect of subjecting even God to necessity, in the apprehensions of many, and this in a case in which, if in any case, we are bound to imagine him free.

Nicholls, in his work on the Articles, quotes on this subject the following passage from Athanasius:—"God *could*, even though his Son had not been made flesh, and dwelt among us, have blotted out the curse by merely speaking [or by a mere act of will]. But we have to interpret the dis-

pensation by what we may discern to have been profitable for man, and not be too ready to enter into any calculation as to what may, or may not, have been possible to God.”^a And again, in the same place, the following passage from Augustin : “Not that any other possible method of delivering us was wanting to God : but that there was none more fitting than this.”^b These two clear and accurate, and I had almost said authoritative, statements really include the whole of the case. I add, however, that Irenæus has the following passage : “But if man had not been united to God, *he could not* have been made a partaker of immortality. For it *behoved* the mediator between God and man to bring the two natures together by being made a sharer of both ; and by this means to make man acceptable to God, and to make God known to man.”^c In this passage the

^a Ἦδύνατο καὶ μὴδ' ὅλως ἐπιδημήσαντος αὐτοῦ, μόνον εἰπεῖν ὁ θεὸς, καὶ λῦσαι τὴν κατάραν· ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν δεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις λυσιτελοῦν, καὶ μὴ ἐν πᾶσι τὸ δύνατον τοῦ θεοῦ λογίζεσθαι.

^b Non alium modum possibilem nos liberandi Deo defuisse, sed sanandæ miseræ nostræ convenientiorem modum alium non fuisse. Nicholls, fol. 1712, p. 41 ; and see Dr. Hey's Lectures, III. 324.

^c Καὶ εἰ μὴ συνηνώθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ θεῷ, οὐκ ἂν ἘΔΥΝΗΘΗ μετασχεῖν τῆς ἀφθαρσίας. Ἔδει γὰρ τὸν μεσίτην θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, διὰ τῆς ἰδιάς πρὸς ἑκατέρους οἰκειότητος εἰς φιλιάν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους συναγαγεῖν, καὶ θεῷ μὲν παραστῆσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀνθρώ-

meaning of the two words "could"^a and "be-hoved,"^b is precisely the same, and the same with that of the word "be-hoved,"^b as used in Luke, xxiv. 46, and in other places^c. It evidently is not the writer's meaning to *limit* God's power to a scheme in which God shall be united with man, but to shew how *consentaneous* this scheme is to our apprehensions of what is becoming, and how well calculated to inspire us with faith, or confidence. In the same manner, Origen:

"If there had been no sin, it would not have been

ποις δε γνωρίσαι τὸν θεόν. Contra Hæreses, L. III. vii. p. 211, ed Massuet.

^a ἔδυνήθη.

^b ἔδει.

^c Οὐκ ἠδύνατο ἐκεῖ οὐδεμίαν δύναμιν ποιῆσαι. Mark, vi. 5. Id est difficulter et cum tædio, quasi pertæsus videlicet infidelitatis Nazaræorum. Glass. Philologia S., as quoted in Maltby's Illustrations, p. 272. "Verbum potestatis non raro pro verbo debiti et juris accipitur: ita ut posse idem ac licere, non posse idem ac non licere, seu non debere, significet." Glassii Canon. as quoted ibid. "Non possumus facere quæ dudum facere noluimus, et quæ adfectui aut rationibus nostris contraria sunt. Le Clerc on Gen. xxxvii. 4; and see Grotius (this is Le Clerc's reference) on Mark, vi. 5. "In all these cases," says Dr. Graves, "the Son of God *would not* gratify the vain and unreasonable pretensions of some, or waste his miracles on others, who despised both him and them: for he *could* not do this consistently with the dignity of his office." Essay on the Character of the Apostles and Evangelists, as quoted in Maltby's Illustrations, p. 270.

necessary that the Son of God should have come in the flesh, and been made a victim and slain: but he would have remained what he was in the beginning, ‘God, the Word.’ But because sin entered into the world, and sin requires of necessity a propitiation, and a propitiation cannot be made except by sacrifice, it was necessary that a sacrifice should be provided.”^a The word *necessary* is here of precisely the same meaning with that of the word *suitable* [congruebat] in the following passage from Melancthon: “Because man had sinned it was suitable to the order of justice that the penalty should be paid in a human nature.”^b See to the same effect, Jeremy Taylor’s *Life of Christ*^c, and also Maclaine’s *Letters to Soame Jenyns*. “The Scriptures have not told us,” it is observed in this, as I think, most useful treatise^d, “that

^a “Si non fuisset peccatum, non necesse fuerat filium Dei agnum fieri, nec opus fuerat eum in carne positum jugulari, sed mansisset quod in principio erat Deus verbum. Verum quoniam introiit peccatum in hunc mundum, peccati autem necessitas propitiationem requirit, et propitiatio non fit nisi per hostiam, necessarium fuit provideri hostiam pro peccato.” Homilia IV. in Numeros, as quoted in Grotius de Satisfactione, p. 539.

^b “Cumque genus humanum peccasset, congruebat ordini justitiæ, ut aliquis in genere humano pœnam solveret.” On the Nicene Creed. Opp. fol. 1601, Vol. I. p. 440.

^c Considerations on Sect 1.

^d Pages 86—88.

without a vicarious atonement sin was unpardonable. They have told us," the writer adds, "no such thing: they point out the method chosen by Divine wisdom and mercy for the salvation of man, even the mediation and sufferings of Christ: they declare that through this mediation," or, as he explains himself afterwards^a, "through the effects, which the inestimable sacrifice which the divine Mediator made of himself for the sins of the world was to produce on the spectators of this astonishing and awful scene, the pardon of sin, the succours of grace, and the blessings of immortality are administered to man." We have here, of course, to include all those amongst the *spectators* who may see with the eye of *faith*. The same judicious writer proceeds as follows: "It is only the presumption and temerity of unphilosophical divines that have inferred from the choice of this method that sin was absolutely unpardonable without it, or by any other. I do not believe," he adds, "that any rational divine will at this day maintain that God *could not* have pardoned sin without an expiatory sacrifice, unless he affirms this upon the principle that God cannot do anything but what is absolutely the best, all things considered: and upon this principle it may be said that God cannot do anything but what he actually does^b. But

^a Pages 96, 97.

^b I beg to add here to what is said by Maclaine in addressing

that is not the question: and you and I, sir," it is then said in conclusion, "ought to have clear ideas and accurate expressions, when we treat of such matters as these, and *that* in the face of the sophists of London and Paris, who look out with a sharp eye, when they see such a man as you take up the polemical or apologetical pen in favour of Christianity."

It will have been seen from what I have said in the first chapter of this treatise^a, how entirely I concur in this whole view of the case. But I would also add that, if caution in treating of this subject be thus necessary to the polemic, or the apologist, much more is it necessary to all those less controversial teachers of the word by whom both the babe is to be fed with unpolluted milk, and the man is to be nourished into the fulness of Christ. The errors of the *uncontroversial* teacher, however venial the prejudices in which they may have originated, or however pious the spirit in which they may have been conceived, do much more, I apprehend, than those of theorists, to alienate from the simplicity of the truth those who

Soame Jenyns, that this same principle, which thus assumes a proposition which *we* cannot either affirm or deny, is also the principle of a solution attempted of the same case by Norris, in the 4th vol. of his Sermons, pp. 123, sqq.

^a Compare what is said in Chap. I. of this treatise, pp. 14—16.

are disposed to seek for it in godly sincerity, and do much more to pervert its operation. The sophist himself also lays hold of all *popular*, quite as much as, or more than, on more *recondite* errors.

SECTION II.

Of the statements made by GROTIUS of the operation of Christ's death or mediation as a motive with God, and of a difference of meaning between his language, and that of OUTRAM on this subject.

To the citations in Chapter I. from Grotius, Barrow, and other writers, who make use of the words *motive*, or *consideration*, or of the word *inducement*, or of any equivalent form of expression, to signify the influence of Christ's atonement on the mind of God, nothing, I apprehend, needs to be added for the mere purpose of showing the danger of this language, or the nature of the evils into which it tends to betray. I apprehend also that the evil which may thus be produced by the use of *this* language, is, as affecting directly our sense of the divine benevolence, an evil far greater than that of limiting the divine power, a power which, though it is profane to derogate from it, is yet, I suppose, at the lowest estimate, accounted of as practically adequate to the moral or religious government of the world.

I have already quoted from Grotius^a a distinct,

^a Chap. I. p. 10.

though general, affirmation that the sacrifice of the cross *is* to be understood to operate as a motive with God. And yet in his general summary of the doctrine of the *scheme* of human salvation, this great and most sensible writer leaves us to regard the whole dispensation as of God's original designation, or plan. "The Catholic doctrine," he says, "is that God in his goodness desired to make us happy, but that our sins stood in his way. Christ, therefore, by his appointment, and also of his own great love to mankind, voluntarily paid our penalty for us by his death and sufferings; that thus [or by this act of grace] both God's justice might be made manifest, and we, through faith, might be saved."¹ And to the same effect in other passages which I subjoin in a note², in the last of which he speaks in nearly the

¹ "Catholica ergo sententia sic habet. Deus motus sua bonitate, ut nobis insigniter beneficeret, sed obstantibus peccatis, quæ pœnam merebantur, constituit ut Christus volens, ex sua erga homines charitate, cruciatus gravissimos et mortem cruentum atque ignominiosum ferendo, pœnas penderet pro peccatis nostris, ut salva Divinæ justitiæ demonstratione, nos, intercedente vera fide, a pœna mortis æternæ liberaremur." De Satisfactione Christi, p. 297. "Ut neque," as had been said by Irenæus, "quod est justum confringeretur, neque antiqua plasmatio Dei deperiret." Contra Hæreses, Lib. V. c. ii.

² "Ex his vero quæ de fine diximus, intelligi potest, non modo causam fuisse aliquam [cur Christo pœnam Deus imponeret] sed et quæ illa fuerit; nimirum quod tot et tanta peccata sine insigni exemplo transmittere Deus noluerit." Grotius

same terms which I quoted from Irenæus in the last section, of the *aptitude* of making this manifestation in the person of Christ, conjoint as Christ was in perfect unity with both man and God.

Thus far nothing can be more correct. The writer indeed, does not say; neither, as it has already appeared, did he think; that this Christ's ransom or satisfaction operates *only* through its moral effect on man: but still thus far certainly he does not imply anything else. He then goes on, however, to repeat the statement, that extrinsically of its moral effect on man, it does operate with God *also*, as a motive to forgive, and as

de Satisfactione, p. 316. And again, ibidem, "Conveniens est illi [Deo] quantopere sibi peccata displiceant actu aliquo testari: actus autem ei rei convenientissimus est pœna." "Utrobique Deus relaxat legem, seu pœnæ comminationem, sed non sine compensatione aliqua, ipsam pœnam in alterum transferendo, atque ita simul et clementiam suam et severitatem, sive peccati odium, testatum facit. Sic ergo Deus, credituris in Christum volens parcere, causas habuit sufficientes, justas, magnasque, cur a Christo volente pœnas peccatorum nostrorum exegerit: nempe, ut verbis Æliani utor, ἵνα μὴ διαφθάρῃ τὸ ἅπαρ κεκυρωμένον, et ne minoris penderentur peccata, si tot et tanta sine exemplo transmitterentur." Grotius de Satisfactione, p. 317. "Quod vero pœna in Christum collata fuerit, hoc ita ad Dei et Christi voluntatem referimus, ut ea quoque voluntas causas suas habeat in summa Christi aptitudine ad statuendum insigne exemplum, quæ tum in maxima ipsius nobiscum conjunctione, tum in incomparabili personæ dignitate consistit." Ibid.

having respect to him (or to propitiate him) in the first place, and to man only secondarily³. But this statement evidently introduces that real, though unintended fettering of either God's power or will, which was spoken of in Chapter I. Nothing can be more incontestable than that whenever we use the word *motive*, or any such word as operating in God, we must of necessity, as far as we mean anything, suppose of the motive either as something extrinsic to him, or as something which we suppose to exist in himself, in his own holy and incomprehensible nature, or will. If extrinsic, we regard it, and can only regard it, as a *necessity* to which he is subject (a point to which I have spoken

³ [Dicit] "Socinus esse quidem effectum mortis Christi liberationem nostram a pœnis sed quoad nos, non quoad Deum. Id est, non Deum per eum adduci ut nos liberet, sed nos ut ad liberationem perveniamus. Sed Primum vox λύτρου, et multo magis ἀντιλύτρου ejus sunt naturæ ut rem denotent cujus prior sit effectus circa liberatorem quam circa liberatum." Ibid. p. 328. Again in p. 331. "Socinus contendit non Deum moveri ad remittendum, sed nos parari ad accipiendam remissionem, per vitæ scilicet emendationem. Juxta sensum vero ecclesiæ, qui Scripturis congruit, expiationis effectum [dicimus] proprie versari circa peccata præterita, et actionem primam esse circa Deum, qui ad remittendum moveatur." Grotius then goes on to argue from Hebrews, v. 1, that since Christ is said to be made a high priest ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων τὰ πρὸς τὸν θεόν, *therefore* his office has respect to God (or to propitiate him) in the first place, and to man, as he had observed before, only secondarily.

sufficiently in Sect. I. of this Chapter); if as being in himself, we regard it as a means, or method of acting, which he himself prescribes, or institutes. For that any being should in any other sense prescribe, or institute, a motive to himself is quite unintelligible. And so indeed Archbishop Magee, who, however, clearly holds respecting Christ's death, that it does operate as an extrinsic motive with God, distinctly allows⁴.

To what I have thus said of this, as I think it, clear error of Grotius; I beg to subjoin a few references on the same subject to Outram, a not less able divine than himself, and indeed much more generally and unreservedly appealed to on all questions connected with the particular doctrine of ransoms or sacrifices. No two writers can appear *at first sight* to correspond more entirely than these two⁵. To the statement made by Grotius

⁴ Magee on the Atonement, I. 202, where after censuring the theory by which God is supposed "to have planned the redemption of man through the medium of intercession, but not in consequence of it," he adds as follows: "In which case this theory falls in with the notion of instituted means," as doubtless it does.

⁵ Certainly also they may be said to start (if that word is to be used) from the same point. Compare the extracts from Grotius in note 2, p. 269 of this section, with the following extract from Outram. "Cum enim Deus humano generi, etiamsi pessime de se merito, neque nullam esse viam vellet ad salutem æternam perveniendi, (quæ summa ejus clementia fuit,

that the office of Christ has respect to God in the first place, and to man only secondarily, or, in his own words, that it has its “*actio prima circa Deum*,” correspond very closely *in title* two chapters of Outram’s work, in which he speaks of the “*vis*,” or effect, of sacrifices as a “*vis versata non circa homines, sed circa Deum primo et proprie*.” But though the *expression* thus used by Outram is apparently equivalent to that of Grotius, yet his meaning is different, and only this, namely, that God, and not man, ought to be the primary object of all our prayers, devotion, and sacrifice^a. Than this, nothing can be truer. That there are human affections which centre in God, or which, in the language of Butler, have him “for their end;” and that it is our duty to worship him in a spirit of obedience, and of love, and honour, and religious awe of his goodness and power; and this independently of any benefits which redound from religion to society, or from showing respect to human establishments of religion, is altogether certain. Without this principle there can be no

summa plane misericordia,) neque tanta tamen quanta ejusdem peccata sunt sine summi sui erga ea odii, sive sanctitatis justitiæque suæ insigni nota præterire, factum est ut ipse filium suum quem sibi unice charum habuit, κ.τ.λ. De Sacrificiis, Lib. II. Sect. iv. pp. 318, 319, and compare Chap. XXI. Sect. 2.

^a See pp. 216, 217. 221, 222. 227, 228. 231.

piety; and to speak, *in this sense*, of the honour and glory of God as the primary end of Christ's atonement, or of sacrifice in general, is to speak of it in a sense which every page of this treatise asserts and recognises. But still this sense is no other, than that man is led by these *means* to glorify God for himself, or to that spirit of real devotion to him, without which he can scarcely be said to have a true religion, and this in the same manner in which, when a human father inflicts a penalty on a child for a defect of filial duty, the father's meaning, as it is not that he wants the penalty, so may not be that he requires any act of duty for its own sake. His meaning may be that he requires that act as the means of nourishing in the child, the filial, which is an essentially moral, spirit or principle⁶.

⁶ Cum inter nos et Deum discordiam peccando fecimus, tamen ad nos Deus legatum suum prior misit, ut nos ipsi qui peccavimus ad pacem Dei rogati veniamus." S. Gregor., as quoted in Taylor's Life of Christ, Considerations on Sect. i. § 1. Basil in his Homily on Ps. xlviii. has the following passage, εἰ μέλλοι ἔκων ἀφήσειν τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους^a. No one, I suppose, imagines that any limitation of God's *will* is to be understood in this use of the word ἔκων, any more than a limitation of his power is to be understood in the use of the word ἐδυνήθη, and its equivalents in the passages quoted in the last section from Irenæus and Origen.

^a Opp. Vol. I. p. 79. E. Ed. Benedict.

SECTION III.

Of an over-statement by BUTLER on the same subject.

BUTLER, in precise conformity with that formal and correct definition of the Catholic doctrine extracted from Grotius in the preceding section, states on this subject as follows:—

“Christ offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, and made atonement for the sins of the world. . . . And this sacrifice was in the highest degree, and with the most extensive influence, of that efficacy for obtaining pardon of sin, which the heathens may be supposed to have thought their sacrifices to be, and which the Jewish sacrifices really were, in some degree, and with regard to some persons. How, and in what particular way, it had this efficacy there are not wanting persons who have endeavoured to explain; but I do not find that the Scripture has explained it.”^a Nothing can be better than this; and yet this most able, and most truly philosophical writer proceeds almost immediately, not indeed to explain any particular way, but yet to pronounce that there is some other way than that which appears on the face of it. But to pronounce that there is more than appears on the face of it is at least as rash, and is as much to *encumber* the clear statement which preceded with the proposition that there is

^a Analogy, pp. 304, 305.

a way which is not revealed, and that this way was wanting, and is some other way than repentance and faith, as it is rash to affirm that we can see the whole of the case, and that nothing which we do *not* see has passed, or passes.

The words of Butler to which I think it necessary thus to take exception are these: "Some have endeavoured to explain the efficacy of what Christ has done and suffered for us beyond what Scripture has authorized: others, probably because they could not explain it, have been for taking it away, and confining his office as Redeemer of the world to his instruction, example and government of the church. Whereas the doctrine of the Gospel appears to be, not only that he taught the efficacy of repentance, but rendered it of the efficacy which it is, by what he did and suffered for us: that he obtained for us the benefit of having our repentance accepted unto eternal life; not only that he revealed to sinners that they were in a capacity of salvation, and how they might obtain it, but moreover, that he put them into this capacity of salvation, by what he did and suffered for them: put us into a capacity of escaping future punishment, and obtaining future glory."^a I cannot see how this differs from the proposition of Grotius, that the first intention of Christ's death, or of our redemption by him, is to dispose God

^a Analogy, pp. 305, 306.

to forgive. The way in which, as it seems to me, the case should rather be stated, is, that Christ not only taught the efficacy of repentance, but that he also taught, and showed by taking on himself the penalty of death, that sin unrepented of leads to destruction. It then follows, that God still loves and will save us, if we be not wanting to ourselves; and that he also, through his Spirit, gives us strength to repent. So, that is by all these helps combined, God “puts sinners into a capacity of salvation, and of obtaining the eternal life which he revealed.” That *this* is the doctrine of Scripture is quite evident. I do not deny that it may still have “left in this matter somewhat unrevealed.”^a But I cannot discover that it reveals anything more.

It may, indeed, be farther said that what Christ “did and suffered” for mankind, was the means of putting us “into a capacity of escaping punishment and obtaining happiness,” inasmuch as it was the means of saving God’s authority, marking sin with the reprobation which it deserves, and thus making forgiveness compatible with the moral or *political* order of the universe, or of the divine government^b. And so, doubtless, it was. But then

^a Analogy, p. 305.

^b See the extracts from Grotius, in Note 2, p. 269; and see Note 5, p. 272, of the preceding Section. Neither Watts, in his “Redeemer and Sanctifier,” (Works, 4to, III. 742,) nor

there is nothing in all *this* not to be included in that "instruction and example" which his death, as much as, or more than, any part of his life and doctrine which can be severed from connexion with it, plainly affords, or which can be affirmed to have anything of a mystical in addition to its moral effect. If Butler means only this, he means nothing, which can hardly be. I of course suppose him to be speaking of God's dealings with man only, man being the only being of whose moral circumstances we have any knowledge whatever, or with God's dealings with whom we have any concern^a.

Burnet, (Articles, p. 67,) says anything more. See also, Doddridge's Sermon on Salvation by Grace. "It is certainly the part of God as a wise, holy, and gracious legislator, to maintain [the honour of his law] when it has been violated, and not to treat an offending creature as innocent and righteous, without some provision made for the satisfaction of his injured justice. In the demand of which satisfaction God does not express anything of a sanguinary and revengeful disposition. Far be so blasphemous a thought from us. But he displays a steady regard to that order, which, as the great Sovereign, it becomes him, for the benefit of his subjects, as well as for the glory of his own name and government to pursue." p. 17. On this extract I have, however, to observe, that I believe it to be in strictness an inaccuracy to speak of God's acting for his own glory, *and* for the good of man, as if these are *two* things, when, in fact, we have no right to account of them as more than *one*.

^a With regard to any notion which may be entertained of any possible effect of Christ's atonement on other beings than

SECTION IV.

Of the statements made on the same subject by Barrow, Dr. Henry, and Dr. John Taylor, Bishop Law, and other writers. Also of Christ's death as represented in the light of a pact or covenant between the Father and the Son.

OF Barrow, to whom I here refer chiefly for the reason that I have already quoted him as using the very inaccurate and confusing language, to which I have been making objection in the last sections, I shall only say that in his xxviith Sermon^a he states well, and most clearly, but at too great length to be here cited, the true doctrine that Christ's death or atonement is of the original bounty or designation of God.

I beg to refer also any one, who has the opportunity of consulting a tract of which the merit has I believe scarcely saved it from disappearance, to Hampton's answer to Priestley^b. The author of this tract loses himself in words, in some places; and this can only be because he uses them wrongly. There are, however, few writers who *think* on the real question, if it be a question, more clearly or rightly.

In the same manner, the ingenious Dr. Henry Taylor speaks expressly of God's appointing our man, I beg to refer the reader to what was said in Chap. II. Sect. iv. pp. 54—56.

^a Works, fol. Vol. II. p. 384.

^b Pages 31—34; and compare p. 22.

Saviour's intercession to be a motive for pardoning, and of his combining causes which are to have effect on himself^a. But it will be plain to any one who will read what he says in the places to which I refer in a note, that he does not *intend* anything more by these expressions, than that God so prepares man for the grant he vouchsafes; and that he acts through means. Why then use language so remote from the common, and of which all the natural meaning must be expunged to make it correct? Nothing can be more irrelevant than the defence set up for the same sort of language by Outram^b, a writer who would not have used bad arguments, if good arguments could have been had. See also, Dr. John Taylor's Key to the Romans^c, and the same author's Scripture Doctrine of Original Sin^d, or the Scripture Doctrine of the Atonement by the same author; or see the illustration [or analogy] in a note to Sect. 151 of the Key to the Romans. This illustration is well commented on by Bishop Law in what I believe to be the first edition of his Reflections on the Life and Character of Christ^e.

^a Letters of Ben Mordecai, pp. 656. 663. 667, 668, second edition.

^b De Sacrificiis, pp. 344. 355.

^c Chap. VIII. Sects. 146. 148, 149. 154.

^d Pt. I. Appendix, pp. 74, 75, 76.

^e Pages 301, 302. The edition to which I refer is that contained in the 2nd edition, published in 1749, of the Considera-

This illustration, moreover, taken as it ought to be, merely as an analogy, is in itself, in general, though not wholly, correct; not the less correct, as Law well observes, on account of the apparent lowness of the comparison^a.

See farther on this subject Powell's Third Charge^b, and Balguy's Second Charge^c, and also Bishop Watson's Two Apologies, as quoted by Magee^d. I am not sure that any one of these writers, all of whom seem to take the same ground with Butler, but who express themselves more vaguely, means too much. Their direct argument is that for anything which we know to the contrary, the death of Christ may have other ends than those which we can discover. They are not, any more than Butler himself, so illogical as to conclude that *therefore* he has other ends: but their argument merely is, that since reason gives no ground to affirm that he has *not* other ends, we have no ground for discrediting revelation because it tells us that he *has* other ends. Granted. But, as before, where are we told it? Revelation

tions on the Theory of Religion. I do not find the passage in the edition of 1774.

^a See what is said on low analogies in Chap. II. Sect. i. of this Treatise, pp. 39—41, sqq.

^b Page 346.

^c Works, Vol. I. pp. 167. 175, 176.

^d Vol. I. p. 485.

no more teaches us that there are ends in the redemption not included in its working the reformation of the sinner, and advancing men in holiness, than that there are *not* other ends, and we have no more right to assume what it does *not* teach, than to deny what it does teach.

On the same principle on which it is common to say that Christ's death or atonement operates with God as a consideration or motive, it is also no less common to speak of the method of redemption as a pact or covenant between the Father and the Son^a. But if there be any person who imagines that this explanation explains anything, he will, on reflection, find that it merely embarrasses him in a fruitless confusion. "The old divines" (I here copy from Mosheim) "were content to say, that God was moved by his grace and mercy to make this covenant with us. This, doubtless," the same writer adds, "is most true. God's motive was his

^a "Without doubt," says Mosheim, "the mercy of God is the foundation of the covenant of grace; but this proposition is not enough to explain the principle of that foundation We have therefore to suppose this covenant to have been entered into between the Father and the Son (the Holy Spirit not excluded) from all eternity." *Elementa Theologiæ Dogmaticæ*, Pars III. Sect. i. p. 16. But the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are the one God.

grace and mercy, not our merit. But this cause or foundation is not enough. For God's grace and mercy could not have induced him to grant us favour, or to make a covenant with us, unless a satisfaction to his justice were also made."^a

Surely the old divines were in the right. This *supplement*, as it purports to be, to what they said, is, at the best, nothing but an encumbered and dangerous mode of affirming that God, in making his covenant with us, chose a method which should not only save the sinner, but which should also, at the same time prove his own justice, and the guilt of sin. "For the covenant of God," as is observed by Baxter, one of whose greatest merits is to be always clear and direct on this great point, and indeed on most others, "is but his instrument, by which he giveth us Christ to be our head."^b

SECTION V.

Of Christ's death and sufferings, as connected with the doctrine of his divinity; of the errors to which wrong notions of this connexion is apt to give birth; and of the illustration supplied to the argument of the preceding Sections, and of this Treatise generally, by the correct notion of it.

AMONGST the reasons why Christ's death and sufferings are available to us, I believe that it is not the least common to assign the reason that he

^a Elementa Theologiæ Dogmaticæ, Pars III. Sect. i. p. 12.

^b Breviate of Justification, Sect. xxvi.

who suffered was a divine person. Neither yet is it altogether erroneous so to do. That most true doctrine, the doctrine of his divinity, does come in, as is stated in some of the citations given in the preceding pages, as a part, and as a great part, of the case. But this doctrine is also, I fear, too often connected with his sufferings or his death, as giving them their value on a principle which, notwithstanding all explications of the language in which it is commonly stated, we ought not to dare to affirm, and which, indeed it is even profane not to reject. For surely nothing is more to be rejected, than an error which, if we really hold Christ to be divine, differs not in the least from that ancient notion of Patripassianism, than which none ever has been or can be, considered as more revolting, and which I suppose that every one to whom it has been imputed, has been always studious to disavow. Thus Mosheim, in speaking of Origen, affirms that the belief of the vicarious satisfaction of Christ rests on the proposition that the sufferings and death of his *body* were not only those of the man Christ, but also of God united with man: and that the blood shed by him was the blood not of man only, but also of God: or, he adds, (though this, indeed, is the same thing,) that Christ *expiated* the offences of the human race, not as he was man only, but as he was man and God. Mosheim states also that this belief is

an absolutely necessary foundation of the doctrine of the vicarious satisfaction of Christ^a. And so indeed it is, in the sense in which he held that doctrine: and this is of itself enough to prove that he held it wrongly.

In the same manner the late Bishop Shuttleworth^b: "The sacrifice offered by Christ was the payment of a debt, which not all the collected energies of human merit had the means to liquidate. It was a tender made by God himself of retributive suffering That price, great as it was, our blessed Saviour came on earth for the purpose of paying That price, as God, he willingly paid." Then again: "The salvation to which we look cannot be compensated for by man even in his regenerate state."^c Doubtless it cannot: but where are we told that salvation cannot be granted of free grace, and without compensation? And again: "admit that the thing to be redeemed was great, (and great it undoubtedly was,) still may we not naturally ask: was not also the price paid equally great?"^d

Doubtless it was great: great, that is, *to us*, or in *our* estimate; and *valued*, as nothing else ever

^a Re Rebus Christianis, p. 626.

^b In a Sermon on Justification by Faith, preached before the University of Oxford in, I believe, 1840, p. 5.

^c Ibid. p. 10.

^d Ibid. p. 27.

was valued, by God himself. For we can never speak of anything as being, in a direct sense, *costly* to Him. Waving this point, however, the position here laid down takes us into that doctrine of equivalents for which the true doctrine of Christianity affords not the faintest colour. What Christ did was to give his life, his most precious life, for us, that so he might purchase or ransom us; that so he might *satisfy* the demand of the divine goodness and wisdom; that so it might be shown, even by the death of the innocent, that sin leads to death; and also that he might so effect all the other ends of his passion. That greater mercy, or more consummate love, could be shown than by this sacrifice may be pronounced impossible. Also, I am so far from seeing any objection to, that I think it of the greatest moment to urge and enforce the use of all those strong figures in which this doctrine is conveyed to us, in all their strength. That the mercy and love both of God and of Christ which are thus exhibited were as great as the sin from which they save us, I willingly allow to be, if any one choose to use it, a *safe*, though it would be rather a strange, affirmation. But still to speak of Christ's dying, as he was God, is to use language against which both our reason and our best feelings always revolt. Neither yet is there any the least foundation in Scripture for institut-

ing any comparison between the price paid and the sin atoned for, a comparison which in fact degrades the love by which our redemption is given.

The only other passage which I shall quote from Bishop Shuttleworth is a sentence in which Christ is spoken of as “not extreme to mark what is done amiss, because he himself has already paid that penalty and forfeiture, which he might have demanded at our hands.”^a But why assign his having paid the penalty as the cause or reason why he is not extreme! That he has paid the penalty proves that he is not extreme. Because he is not extreme he has paid the penalty. But to say that he is not extreme *because* he has paid the penalty, is both to expand one act into two acts, and also to go on that same supposition of some sort of balance, *accepti et expensi*, for which, as I have already observed, there appears not to be any ground whatsoever^b.

^a Sermon on Justification by Faith, as quoted before.

^b I have felt it to be doubtful whether it were worth while to dwell thus on an error which *most* writers, I imagine, would disclaim. But in a treatise, of which this error would sap the whole foundation, I have on the whole thought it best to make out what I suppose to be a full refutation of it. Of the degree in which the error itself has taken possession of even highly intelligent minds, I do not know that a more remarkable proof can be given than that Mr. Crombie, in a work published in 1827, lays it down as a principle that “unless an in-

I now proceed to state briefly what I apprehend to be the real connexion between the doctrine of Christ's divinity, and that of his death and sufferings, which, indeed, if we speak more generally, is the doctrine of all, this being the preeminent part, which *as man* he has done for us; and also to show how this connexion applies to, or illustrates, the argument of the preceding sections, and of this treatise in general.

On this point, then, I have to observe, in the first place, that, incomprehensible as the nature of God is, and must be, and indeed, as the nature of man, or of the connexion between the soul and the body, is and must be also, there are four, and four only, suppositions which can be possibly formed respecting the nature of Christ. Either, in the first place, he must be God only; or secondly, he must be man only; or thirdly, which is the Arian doctrine, he must be of an intermediate nature between the two; or fourthly and lastly, which is the true doc-

finite value be offered, satisfaction for sin cannot be made."^a This sentence the writer immediately subjoins to a very clear and exact statement from Witsius of the real nature and limitations of the argument from analogy, a due appreciation of which argument should, I think, have been a sufficient security against any such a perversion of it.

^a On the Character and Offices of Christ, by the Rev. John Crombie. Compare pp. 19-21, and 149.

trine, he is to us, in some respects, as in his effluence from the Father, in the relation of God ; and in other respects, as in his being born and dying, in the relation of man. Neither is anything ever said of him in Scripture, as he is God, which is not congruous to the unity of the Supreme, nor anything ever said of him as he was man, not consistent with his having been “perfect man.” This co-existence in him of the two natures is not ill-expressed by Melancthon in a passage which I subjoin in a note^a. And I apprehend also that *we* are always intitled to interpret, according to the reason of the case, whether what is said of him in any particular passage of Scripture, or in reference to any particular fact of his history, be said of him as he possessed the one nature, or as he possessed the other. It is plain also, I think, that if we are intitled to this liberty we need not ever confuse the two natures.

Again.—So far as Christ is GOD, we make no severance between him and THE FATHER. In that sense, or the sense in which he is the λόγος, or Word, the Father dwells in him, acts in him, does, as far as we know, everything through him,—not only redeems, but also creates, by him. In speak-

^a “Cum in Christo duæ naturæ sint, quædam propria uni naturæ non impediunt quo minus adsit altera natura.” Loci Theolog. de Filio. Opp. Tom. I. fol. 155. Ed. of 1601.

ing, therefore, of God *and* Christ, or of anything in Christ which can be considered as severed from God, or even from the Father, as in his meriting or influencing God, or rendering him propitious, we of necessity speak of him as he is *not* considered as the one God. But this, if we have any meaning in what we say, (and we ought not to speak of anything without meaning,) can only be in the same sense in which we account of him as the *man* Jesus, and in which he suffered. But to Christ, *speaking of him in this sense*, we of course cannot attribute any properly divine prerogative. If the judicial function be a divine function, we must attribute it to Christ, not as he is man, but as he is God. If the office of propitiator, or of dying for us, be a human office, (and this I must beg to repeat that it necessarily is, inasmuch as God cannot propitiate himself, neither yet can he die,) it must moreover be a prescribed office. No human goodness or merit can be anything else. It may not the less be undertaken voluntarily. It does not the less, in virtue of the connexion between the human nature, and the divine, bring God himself, and this in the greatest instance of his mercy, in contact with man. But if we suppose it to be a prescribed office, we also suppose that the prescriber is already propitious, and therefore cannot account of the office itself, or of the Saviour

who voluntarily undertakes it, otherwise than as the prescribed medium or instrument ^a.

^a I subjoin a few citations from, or references to, various considerable writers ancient and modern, which some readers may not be unwilling to see, or consult. "The Lord," says Clement of Alexandria, "*as God* remits the sins of man: *as man* he disciplines him so that he may not sin." ^b Irenæus, as cited by Melancthon ^c, has the following sentence. Ἡσυχάζοντος μὲν τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῷ πειράζεσθαι, καὶ σταυροῦσθαι, καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν· συγγινομένων δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐν τῷ νικᾶν καὶ ὑπομένειν, καὶ χρηστεύεσθαι, καὶ ἀνίστασθαι, καὶ ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι. To this corresponds exactly the following passage from Lombard: "Divina natura quiescebat, ut humana posset pati: sed sustinebat cum in doloribus, ut posset vincere." ^d Mosheim, though in utter inconsistency, as I think, with the passage which I have translated from him in a preceding page ^e, affirms of the Saviour in another work, that "*omnia ejus opera redemptoria per se ad humanam ejus naturam pertinent.*" ^f Exact and correct statements, as to me they seem to be, on this subject may be found in Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity ^g, and in his sermon on the Perpetuity of Faith in the Elect ^h. See also Pearson on the 4th article of the Creed, with the references ⁱ. I do not forget what is said in Scripture in Acts, xx. 28, and 1 Cor. ii. 8, and elsewhere: but these

^b Pæd. L. I. iii. Potter's ed., as referred to in Bishop Kaye's account of the writings of Clement, p. 47.

^c Loci Theologici. de Filio. Opp. p. 55.

^d Sent. Lib. III. 14, as quoted in Ellis's Clavis Fidei. p. 26.

^e Page 284 of this Chapter.

^f Element. Theol. Dogm. II. 69. q. v.

^g Book V. xlviii. 5, and lii. 1. 4.

^h Sect. 4. Works, II. 605. Keble's edit.

ⁱ Pages 187, 188, fol. ed.

SECTION VI.

Of the moral interpretation of rites and ceremonies, and especially of sacrifices, as that interpretation is authorized by the Jewish prophets, and also is to be collected from heathen writers.

I. SEE on this point Psalm xl. 5, 6, and the verses which follow; Psalm, l. 8—13; Isaiah, i. 11—17, the whole of Chap. lviii., and Chap. lxvi. 2—4; see also Jeremiah, vii. 22—24; Hosea, vi. 6; Amos, v. 21—24; and Micah, vi. 2—8. Lowth observes, on Isaiah, i. 11, that “the prophets often speak of the rituals of Moses’ law, as of no benefit without that inward purity *which was signified by them*”; and again on Jeremiah, vii. 22, and Hosea, vi. 6, “that God [not only] always laid a greater

texts do not by any means justify us in speaking of the *sufferings and blood* of God in a precise or doctrinal statement.

^a See also his note on v. 12, and another quoted from Dr. Jenkin in the notes on v. 16, in the Family Bible. “Sacrificia instituta erant ut illi qui ea offerebant internum propter peccata sua dolorem significarent; ut Deo gratias agerent, et omnia se ei debere ostenderent, idque animo religioso, et sanctitatis morum studioso.” Rosenmuller on Isaiah, i. 11. “Sed putant stolidi me [Deum scil.] externa capi atque fucata religionis specie.” [“Religio”] Judæorum illius ævi non [ea fuit] quam lege sanciverat Moses, qui pietatem animi cum externis ritibus semper conjunctam esse voluerat; sed ipsorum commentum, quo sibi finxerant sine mente pia et sancta ritibus illis externis inesse aliquam sanctimoniam.” Id. in Cap. lviii. 3, and lxvi. 3.

stress upon sincere obedience than on external observances, [but also that he] designed the latter as so many mounds and fences to guard and preserve the former." See also Jeremiah, vii. 8, on which verse it was observed in the fifth century by Salvian, that it applied as much to a zeal for orthodoxy, when abstracted from a moral life, as to the Jewish zeal for the temple^a; and compare Matt. v. 20—24; ix. 13; xii. 1—12; Mark, xii. 33, 34; Gal. iv. 3—11; v. 5, 6; Heb. ix. 14; and x. 1. 4. 8. 11. 14. and 18.

Such is the clear interpretation of the rites and sacrifices of the Jewish, to which, moreover, it is plain, and indeed is directly to be inferred from the last quoted passages of the New Testament, that the principle of the Christian law also corresponds. "It was God's wisdom," says

^a See Semler de Statu Christianorum, I. 308. "Præterea ad oculum clara est oppositio: scilicet Taurorum sanguis corpus lustrat: sanguis Christi purgat spiritum." Carpzov. on Hebrews, ix. 14. Δεῖ δὴ τὸν μέλλοντα θύειν μὴ εἰ τὸ ἱερεῖον ἁμῶν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ διανοία ὁλόκληρος αὐτῷ καθέστηκε. Philo quoted ibid. See also Irenæus adv. Hæreses, iv. 32, as quoted by Grabe, Annot. ad Apologiam pro Harmonia Apostol. Sect. iv. Mercer^b observes that that *sacrifice* of the wicked, which is described in Prov. xv. 8 as an abomination to the Lord, is an *external* offering, and that the *prayer* of the upright, which is said in the same place to be his delight, is an *internal* worship.

^b As quoted in Jebb's Sermons, p. 46. 8vo, 1824.

Outram, "that those things which were shadowed forth in the old covenant under the veil of external rites, should be set forth in the new covenant stripped of that veil, and in their true and naked simplicity."^a Calvin also observes from Augustin, that "there was more of confession of sin, than of the expiation of it, in the Jewish ceremonies. For what," he adds, "did the Jews intend by their sacrifices, but to express by inflicting death on the substituted victims, their consciousness of having themselves deserved it? what did they intend by their purifications, but to confess their own uncleanness? By the use of these symbols, they renewed periodically the, as it were, written acknowledgment of their debt."^b "I see," says

^a "Ita enim Deo visum fuit, ut quæ res externis ritibus in veteri fœdere adumbrabantur, eæ vere, nudæ, simplicesque, detractis ritualibus umbris, novo in fœdere proponerentur. Neque eo minus ipsæ res Judæorum ritibus adumbratæ (quod ratio antitypi postulabat) longe potiore vim ac locum, quam in eorum sacrificiis, in sacrificio Christi habuere." De Sacrificiis, v. 327.

^b "Ego autem confido me germanam intelligentiam assecutum, si tamen mihi verum esse conceditur, quod alicubi verissime ab Augustino scriptum est, imo quod ex claris apostoli verbis hausit, in ceremoniis Judaicis confessionem magis delictorum extitisse quam expiationem. Quid enim sacrificiis aliud agebant, quam se mortis conscios fatebantur? quid purificationibus, nisi quod se immundos testabantur? Ita renovabatur subinde ab illis et piaculi et impuritatis suæ chirographum." Solutio, it is then subjoined, in illa testificatione non erat. Inst.

an eloquent writer, “the congregation of Israel waiting, and intently gazing on the slaughtered animals, now disposed in death on God’s altar. Suddenly the fire of wrath comes forth from the Holy Place: the victims are consumed. The people shout, and fall on their faces. What did they see in the divine act which thus gave them occasion for joy and adoration? What, but that the eternal punishment of sin after death had also descended on the substitute, and was removed away from them.”^a But then they of course saw also no less in the same divine act, that sin would be punished.—Thus far of the Jews.

II. Of the moral interpretation made by heathens of *their* sacrifices, the celebrated pas-

II. vii. 17. But neither is this *solutio*, or payment, to be found in that death of Christ itself, of which all these things were prefigurings, except as applied to the heart by faith. “Huc etiam accedit quod preces sacræ *vituli labiorum* appellantur. Cujus dicti ea ratio est, quod preces sacrificia quædam erant, et sacrificia preces quædam. Preces utique sacrificia spiritualia, et sacrificia symbolicæ preces. Quod idem liquet ex 1 Sam. xiii. 12, et Prov. xv. 8. Quibus hæc subiecta est sententia, vel sacrificia impiorum nihil valere apud Deum, imo vero ei displicere; optimi autem cujusque preces plurimum apud eum valere. Cujus comparationis instituendæ nulla prorsus fuisset ratio, nisi sacrificia et preces sacræ eodem plane pertinuisent.” Outram de Sacrificiis, pp. 227, 228.

^a Alford’s Hulsean Lectures, i. 53.

sage in Plato's second Alcibiades^a, in which the oracle of Ammon is represented as giving the reason why the prayers and sacrifices of the Lacedæmonians were accepted by the gods, while the offerings, often the richer offerings, of the other Greeks were rejected, gives us a precisely similar explication. See also Plato's Euthyphron and Gorgias, and the IXth book De Legibus^b, together with Xenophon's Mem., Book I., and compare an extract from Faustus the Manichean, cited in Lardner's works, III. 489, note a. But I recollect no passage whatever to the same effect more remarkable than that which is to be found in the prologue to the Rudens of Plautus, lines 9—30^c. We have also, *in substance*, the same

^a Etwall, 131—136. This also is evidently the passage to which Cicero refers De Legg. ii. 16. "Donis impii ne placare audeant Deos : Platonem audiant, qui vetat dubitare, qua sit mente futurus Deus, cum vir nemo bonus ab improbo se donari velit."

^b As quoted in the Prolegomena to Le Clerc's Ecclesiastical History, pp. 65, 66.

^c This passage, together with some of the others above mentioned, are referred to by Bishop Jebb, who refers also on this subject to Hierocles, of whom he justly observes that his materials are taken from early writers of the Pythagorean school. See Jebb's Sermons, pp. 23 and 40 ; and Hierocles, with the notes subjoined, in Warren's edition, pp. 28—32. I apprehend also that Lactantius, a writer whose mental education, though sanctified by the real Christianity which he felt and believed, was evidently formed in the schools of Heathen

sentiment, though without any specific mention of sacrifices, in the report from the other world, which we find in the conclusion of the last book of Plato's Republic, as there put into the mouth of Her the Armenian. We have here, amid much other matter, a detailed account of the *intermediate* state of good souls in *heaven*, and of wicked souls in *hell*, but without any mention of any but *moral* goodness or wickedness either rewarded or punished^a. Nor yet is it to be imagined that a place among the "sedes discretæ piorum"^b of Horace was thought to be obtained by any other rule, or on a different principle. Any person possessed of a sufficiently extensive and accurate knowledge of the records and monuments of the ancient religions of India, Egypt, and Etruria, might add still stronger proofs than have been here given, that the religions of antiquity were not irreligious. No doubt, as has been a thousand times observed, they were the better, and the more religious, the farther back we go.

philosophy, has not over-adorned even the best *Heathen* philosophy of sacrifices, in the eloquent statement which he makes in the VIth book of his Institutes, Chapters 24 and 25, that a moral worship is all in all.

^a Ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ γῆς πορείᾳ. p. 338. εἰς ἄδου. p. 350. τοὺς μὲν δικάίους, it had been said before, κελεύειν πορεύεσθαι τὴν εἰς δεξιάν τε καὶ ἄνω διὰ τοῦ οὐράνου. . . . τοὺς δὲ ἀδίκους τὴν εἰς ἀριστεράν τε καὶ κάτω. p. 338. Ed. Massey.

^b Od. II. xiii. 23.

SECTION VII.

Of a misconception by Tucker of the true nature and use of analogical reasoning.

“Now let some refined speculatist be scandalized at the thought of angels writing with pen and ink in books, or the need of a formal trial and judgment, imagining the same purpose may be answered as well by an apt connexion of causes with effects, established at the beginning among the laws of nature, he will never be able to make his connexion intelligible to the vulgar: therefore if he deprives them of their books and after reckoning, he will leave them no persuasion at all to hinder them from indulging their own follies and vices, without fear of any damage to ensue therefrom.”^a

It appears from the context that the most original and ingenious author of this paragraph regards as a “mistake” this persuasion, which he thus leaves to the vulgar, as “a persuasion not built upon reason, or on the foundation of truth;”^b as an end of which the utility sanctifies the means;^c or as an innocent error, which, though to be corrected as circumstances allow, it may yet be against the interests of truth to eradicate^d.

It is to be observed, however, that the notion

^a Light of Nature, Vol. VI. Chap. XV. p. 29.

^b Ibid. pp. 26, 27.

^c Ibid. p. 28.

^d Page 31, et cf. sqq.

here objected to as nothing less than *false*, is in reality not less *true*, although, no doubt, it involves a grosser conception of truth, than to speak of God's justice, and goodness, and mercy in more general terms. The difference is only in the refinement of the analogies used. Nor indeed does this penetrating, though at the same time most unscientific reasoner, actually *mean* anything else. He observes in p. 27, that sound reason cannot always stand upon truth "without the intervention of something else as a cushion between." But he would readily have seen, if he had been more practised in technical logic, that this "cushion" ought always to consist in *real* analogies. The "arguments to the man" of which he speaks in the following page, or "those feasible methods of proceeding which we may laudably use, if those methods are not feasible which we would choose," must, to be truly justifiable, always be directed to facilitate our apprehension of *truth*, not to conciliate any support from *error* even to truth itself.

It is quite extraordinary that so clever, so honest, and so fearless a writer, and one who often reasons so very well on the principles of analogy, and seems, as in p. 544 of the same volume, to hold the true perception of the science in his very hand^a, should at other times fall into so much

^a "But perhaps it [superstition] is not an evil weed in the soil where it grows: it may be not superstition, but a com-

confusion respecting it as even to speak of the passage in Matt. v. 3, in which we read of the poor in spirit, as a passage *not* expressed figuratively or analogically^a.

SECTION VIII.

Farther observations (see Chap. XI. Sects. i. and ii.) on the errors arising from the perverted use, in reasoning concerning God, of human analogies; and also of the principle on which these errors are to be corrected; and also of an objection founded on the possible imperfection or inadequacy of the notions entertained on this subject by some of the Scripture writers.

I. It is altogether obvious that in cases in which there exists between the agents, that utter disparity which exists between man and God, all reasoning from the acts of the one to those of the other requires the utmost possible circumspection. The neglect of this circumspection is, in point of fact, the great, and, as far as I see, the sole cause

pendious method of apprehending that which a narrow imagination cannot contain at large, a joining the act of God with the productions of nature or fortune, when the eye is not strong enough to run along the line of second causes, between a figurative representation by sensible images of things that cannot be comprehended in the abstract." Chap. XXI. Sect. xlv.

^a Ibid. p. 528. See also pp. 485, 486 of the same volume, and compare the citation and references in note c, p. 28 of this treatise.

of all, even the worst and darkest superstitions, which have ever deformed man's worship of the Almighty. The misled or ignorant Pagan does not less *analogize* than the best philosopher, when he attributes to his idol or divinity human, often the malignant human, passions, or the human form^a. Neither yet is this error of making God grossly human, because we have no other means of reasoning concerning him, than through human analogies, anything else in its principle than that by which the analogies derived from objects of sense, are, in like manner, often applied incorrectly to the laws of mind, or in which the analogies of the relations which subsist between the individual man, and his father or family, are applied to those which connect him with his king, or the state.

Great, however, as this error is, and as, indeed, I think I have shewn it to be in the chapter of this treatise to which I am here referring, and though I suppose we may be intitled to account of it as being *the* great error which it is the professed object of all revelation to correct, the

^a An error, however, which has also its counterpart in the Epicurean notion of an indolent deity, and in the many oriental and other personifications of creative power into the egg, or brooding principle, or other mystical attributes, which remove God even still farther from us, and perhaps not less erroneously, than he is removed from us in the more dramatic and popular creeds of the Greeks or Romans.

natural method of correcting it is still, as I apprehend, not less to be found, and, I suppose, *only* to be found, in adducing other analogies. And this, accordingly, is what the Scripture writers always do. What they say, (still, of course, suiting their language to the persons whom they address,) is in effect always as follows:—"You must not conceive of God as malignant, but on the contrary, as good. You must not conceive of him as indifferent to vice, but on the contrary as angry with it. As a jealous master, who will not permit his due to be assigned to another, so you are to conceive of God as marking everything that you do, and as an exact punisher of offences. Neither ought you to conceive of him as in analogy with those earthly sovereigns, who when they have exacted lip service have done all that they can do: but you are to conceive of him as one that seeth the heart."

That this is, in substance, the language of Scripture throughout, there is none, I suppose, who doubts. But both the interpretation of this language, and the proof of the doctrine conveyed by it, reside necessarily in the proof of the facts or doctrines natural or revealed, common to the two cases, or functions, of God and of man; from which facts or doctrines common to both cases, and from which only, and with more or less accuracy, as we see less, or learn to see more, of them,

can anything of the character of God, or of his disposition towards man, be ever inferred.

Moreover, that it is thus the very principle of all reasoning by analogy to proceed from looser, or less perfect analogies, to the stricter and better, is plain from what we see to take place around us in ordinary life. Nothing is more common than to find that we have an analogy good to a certain point, and that we are then obliged to throw it away. Thus the child, whose first acquaintance with the larger quadrupeds is with the cow or the horse, is notoriously apt to give the name of horse or cow to any large quadruped which he happens to see. This is his first, or one of his first, steps in analogical reasoning; and it is as much and as indispensable a part of the order of nature, so to lead his mind through this very loose analogy, to an enlarged and real knowledge, as it is to enlarge his bodily frame through the ordinary processes of nutrition and growth. In the same manner, Hume's argument against miracles is a very good argument from analogy against common pretensions to miracles, but is irrelevant to the case of a divine revelation: as also the king of Siam's discredit of the existence of ice was based on an analogy very good for Siam, but without any cogency for the frigid or temperate zones. Hence, I think, it follows that no analogy can be regarded

as cogent, without first proving the truth of the common principle on which it depends^a.

II. It may still, however, be said that, if thus it be always our rule to interpret, or correct, our analogies by the best proof which it may be in our power to obtain of the facts, or of the doctrines which they are adduced to teach, the *actual* meaning of the *Scripture* writers must always be our decisive rule of interpretation of all those analogies respecting God's dealings with man which *they* have adduced: or, to be more particular, as we must not go *beyond* their meaning, or, as was said, their *gist*^b, we must yet not the less go in all cases *as far* as that carries us; we must not interpret, or limit that gist by any theory, however solid it may appear to us, or by any philosophy.

Yet this, if the principles advanced in this treatise be correct, it is not to be contended that we can do altogether. For example, the prophets of the Old Testament, though they saw and felt, as I have shown elsewhere^c, that the sacrifices of the law possessed that moral application in which *alone* I have supposed that we have any title to affirm that their properly religious use consisted, yet probably did not stop here. We still do not imagine but that they had also some reliance, per-

^a See pp. 32, 33.

^b See as before, pp. 32, 33.

^c See Sect. vi. of this chapter.

haps that some of them had much reliance, on the mere rite. If, therefore, we are to take their actual meaning as the absolute guide of our belief, we also must or may be compelled to hold, in a greater or less degree, to the religious efficacy of the rite itself. Also, what is of more importance, we cannot avoid the concluding in the analogous case, that the death of Christ works for us an acceptance in God's sight not to be measured by our own moral application of it.

1. To this objection I answer first, that, as far as the performance among the Jews of the legal rites was of God's command, so far, though they may have been only legal rites, it yet was a moral duty not to neglect them. So far, those rites carried with them, as baptism for example does with us, the same religious obligation which belongs to the weightier matters of the law. And accordingly St. Paul, and on this very principle, as was shown in the last chapter^a, never draws any distinction between the moral works and the ceremonial. That any of the prophets (for I suppose that *Balaam* will not be quoted to the contrary) ever attributed to any legal rites, any farther significancy than this consideration warrants, it would be hard to prove. Certainly there is no trace of any farther meaning in anything recorded of the Saviour himself, or of his disciples.

^a In the observations there made on Rom. iii. 20.

2. And yet, secondly, if the prophets or the apostles did, in common with many good and able men of more recent times, attribute to mere rites, or ransoms, or sacrifices, a value in God's sight which I have here argued that they cannot be proved to possess, it does not follow, either that they were right in so thinking, or, if they were wrong, that this their error invalidates their authority on other points. That the symbols of the Jewish law did not lead the Jews into *all* truth, or that the undefinable, though real, inspiration of the prophets implied that in the *shadow* which they saw of good things to come^a, they always saw with the same clearness, with which Christ has put it in *our* power to discern, their real form, there is, I suppose, none who contends. We take them as sure guides to those truths only which they were employed to teach; and still allow that they held this treasure as in earthen vessels; and that in matters out of their commission, and also as being themselves such vessels, even in matters within

^a "I cannot forbear saying that to determine the sense of the words *called, redeemed, sanctified, &c.*, when applied to the Christian church, by that in which they are used in Moses and the prophets with respect to the whole people of Israel, seems to be as unreasonable as it would be to maintain that the dimensions, the strength, and the beauty of a body are to be most exactly estimated by looking on its shadow."—Doddridge. Postscript to the Preface to his Sermons on Regeneration, p. xvii.

their commission, they were fallible men. But that there are any symptoms of their having a commission to *teach* that ransoms or sacrifices were anything abstracted from the moral application of them, we do not discern; and on the other hand, we may discern clearly that they teach the contrary. Neither yet have we any right whatever to assume that, as far as they did look to some future, though indistinct, realization of the figures, or shadows, in which they knew themselves to be enveloped, they would also be directed to see clearly on what principle that realization should take place. We have no more right to assume this than that they would be directed to anticipate clearly, what, except by Isaiah, seems scarcely to have been anticipated at all, the suffering character in which the future King of righteousness was to appear^a. I need not detail,

^a “Victimæ itaque omnes erant symbolicae, quibus promissiones divinae confirmabantur, et Hebræi vicissim observantiam religionis spondebant, et ita se ad studium pietatis et probitatis excitabant. Si multi Hebræi aliam sacrificiis efficaciam tribuebant, et multitudini victimarum, quocunque animo offerrentur, confidebant: id veritati præjudicare non poterat, imprimis cum hic error persæpe gravissimis verbi argueretur. Symbolicis autem his substitutionibus victimarum in locum transgressoris, aliquam significari veram substitutionem Messiae in locum peccatorum, Hebræorum quidem antiquorum vix unus alterve Propheta perspexit; . . . id tamen significationem ipsam non minus impedit, quam vaticiniis obest, quod prophetæ

I suppose, in what way, or with what reserves, these same principles apply also to the case of the apostles themselves.

SECTION IX.

Of the efficacy of repentance to the forgiveness of past sins.

(This in addition to what was said on the same subject in Chap. II. Sect. 3.)

I HAVE quoted in the Section of Chap. II. to which I here refer, the *outraging*, though not uncommon assertion, “that there is as good ground for affirming that former obedience atones for present sins, as there is for affirming that present obedience atones for antecedent transgressions.” There is one argument, (but of the class of those many arguments which, if they admit of no answer, yet produce no conviction) on which this turn of thought may be for a moment defended; namely, the argument that to God, to whom all *time* is present, the past and the future are but as one. If so, (and so, in some sense, or for some purposes, we suppose it or may affirm it to be,) there is no one thing or act, whether repentance or crime, which, in his sight, either precedes or follows

ipsi ea sibi non esse pervia fatentur. Etsi enim illo quidem tempore hanc sacrificiorum significationem non intelligebant, ad illam tamen aliquando percipiendam præparabantur.”—Jahn. Archæolog. Biblica. Sect. 384.

another. But this is not the language in which he speaks to us either of his ways or of his works^a, nor yet is it language which we could comprehend, if he did.

In addition to the references to Johnson, Warburton and Harte in the note in p. 51, I beg to refer also to the quotations from Fortunatus in Lardner's works, Vol. III. p. 487, 488, notes p and q; and to the quotation from Lactantius, in Vol. IV. p. 47, note q, and also to the quotations in the notes in p. 48. See also Lactantius's Inst. VI. 24; where, however, one of the lost books of Cicero is quoted as on the other side of the question. Plato says (De Rep. X. p. 332. 334, in Massey's edition) τῷ δὲ θεοφιλεῖ οὐχ' ὁμολογήσομεν ὅσα γε ἀπὸ θεῶν γίγνεται, πάντα γίνεσθαι ὡς οἶόν τε ἄριστα; εἰ μή τι ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ κακὸν ἐκ προτέρας ἀμαρτίας ὑπῆρχε. But the numerous passages to *this* effect, which might be brought forward from the ancient writers, do not relate, at least not directly, to the *moral* effect of repentance, but to its inadequacy to remedy the consequences of those piacular crimes which were supposed to require express purgation, or to be of a die too deep to be purged. The two doctrines, however, run much into each other. See the remarkable story told of Ardiaeus in the conclusion of the same book of Plato's Republic. See also Ambrose de Pœnitentia

^a Compare Hebrews, Chap. i.

as quoted by Jeremy Taylor on the effects of Repentance, Works IX. 180^a. “Let us not,” says St. Cyril, “give sentence against ourselves, brethren; let us not abandon our cause as hopeless: not to believe there is hope in penitence is dreadful indeed. For he who is without expectation of salvation spares not to increase the evil: but he who hopes for a cure is easily induced to spare himself. Thus the robber who expects no mercy runs into recklessness: but if he hopes for pardon often betakes himself to repentance. Nay, does the serpent strip himself of old age, and shall not we cast the slough of wickedness? Does thorny ground by good tillage become fruitful, and is salvation to us irrecoverable? Nature then admits of salvation; all that is wanting is purpose of mind.”^b This passage alone contains sufficiently what I suppose may be called the *common sense* view of the case. The only two arguments (if they are two) which I have ever seen produced in opposition to it, are that of Butler, that “this

^a “Nemo enim potest bene agere pœnitentiam, nisi qui speraverit indulgentiam.” “Denique ego quod in me delinquitur valeo, si volo, donare; et Deus non queat in se commissâ remittere? At vero, si justitia non est, non tamen contra justitiam est. Alioquin et justus et misericors simul esse non potest.” Bernard ad Milites Templi, Chap. XI. pp. 837, 838, edition of Paris, 1640.

^b Catechetical Lectures. I copy from the translation published in the Library of the Fathers, II. 16, 17. Oxford, 1838.

notion of repentance alone being sufficient to expiate guilt appears to be contrary to the general sense of mankind;"^a and another, or rather a more restricted form of the same argument, which states (I here allege it in the words of the late Bishop of Chichester) that in minds conscious of their unworthiness, there is always "a degree of misgiving or vague incredulity that God is not and cannot be really so merciful as his revealed word declares him to be."^b

In answer to these objections, I admit at once

^a Analogy, p. 294.

^b "In minds conscious of their unworthiness there is [always] a degree of misgiving when they are told that the great Creator really requires nothing more of mankind than their acceptance through faith, and their sincere practical adoption, of the revealed conditions of their redemption. Is then," they ask, "a pure heart, accompanied with a holy life the only sacrifice for sin which will be henceforward required of us?" "Can it be true, we naturally ask, that God, the pure, the holy, and the just God, really thus puts away, as though they had never been, the multitudinous past sins, the rebellion and the waywardness of those who return to him with a humble and contrite heart." "Such is the mode in which many pious men have in all ages argued secretly with themselves, even where they have not avowed these sentiments in public. They have been conscious of an inward vague incredulity that God is not, and cannot be, really so merciful as his revealed word declares him to be. They, accordingly, in order to make their case more safe, seek after other and other expiations for sin, in superaddition to that one great sacrifice mentioned by scripture." Shuttleworth's Sermon on Justification by Faith, pp. 22—24. 27.

that the general sense of mankind is a *primâ facie* difficulty in the way of any doctrine which runs really counter to it: and this especially, if grounded on any misgiving of the *pious* mind, to believe that God, unless conciliated by expiation or sacrifice, cannot be so merciful as he really is, or pardon sin on repentance.

I. With regard to the first of these objections in particular, (for it will be convenient to take them as two,) I admit the fact, and I allow also that the common habit of seeking in all ages for other expiations for sin may be admitted as a proof that it is contrary to the general sense of mankind to account of repentance alone as sufficient. It is still, however, to be asked, is not this one of those general errors, perhaps one of those many *idola*, which it was the very object of revelation to expunge? Is it not also the more presumably an error, since undoubtedly the great reason why repentance does not, in *human* judgment, expiate guilt, is a reason which cannot have place in the *divine* judgment. The great reason why the most sincere repentance does not regain for the offender in *our* estimation the privilege of innocence, is that *we* can seldom be sure of its sincerity. But the nearer we come to surety on this point, the more he regains it, and we know that God never mistakes.

II. With regard to the other objection, namely,

that minds deeply conscious of their unworthiness feel always a degree of misgiving when told that God forgives on easy terms,—it appears to me that it is quite in the face of the fact, and that none but some few very unsound minds ever entertain any notion of the sort. That it is not the feeling of the best men among ourselves, the writer to whom I am here referring allows, and indeed argues, in saying that it is not the correct faith of the Christian. And observation shows us also that conscious sinners are usually disposed to rely even *too* much on God's infinite mercy, or to flatter themselves, that a being so good must or will be lenient either in himself, or through Christ, even to those who have scarcely studied at all to imitate Christ's holiness, or to conform their hearts to his law. Moreover, that this principle, namely, a consciousness of moral unworthiness, and a misgiving of God's disposition to forgive moral offences, can be much accounted of as a principle of the expiations either of the Jewish, or of the Heathen religions, or of the corruptions of the Christian religion, is clearly untrue. That among the Heathens there existed *more* misgiving with respect to a divine displeasure at moral offences than we find traces of in the books of their philosophers^a, I fully

^a “ O miserum senem, qui mortem contemnendam esse in tam longa ætate non viderit ! quæ aut plane negligenda est, si omnino extinguit animum, aut etiam optanda, si aliquo eum de-

believe^a. But nothing can be plainer, than that their expiations, or rather that the principle on which they offered them, consisted *mainly* not in any humbling sense of infirmity, and still less in any moral hesitation to believe in the real mercy of God; but partly in the desire of compounding for sin, and partly in the real terrors of superstition^b. Even the ascetism and penances of the Christian church, I believe to have been also pervaded by the same principle. I do not deny that a feeling must have often prevailed, that a man might expiate his own sins by his own sufferings. Nor can the same feeling, though in a less degree, have been without its operation in the other cases before mentioned. But at the same time we have no ground whatever for believing that this feeling, so far as it existed, arose from any the least doubt or misgiving of God's leniency. And we have no less also good reason to believe that the practice of ascetism or penance, as far as it has been kept up, has been kept up chiefly by priestcraft; or, when not by priestcraft, by the desire to escape from moral or mental discipline, or holiness, into

ducit ubi sit futurus æternus. Atqui tertium certe nihil inveniri potest. Quid igitur timeam si aut non miser post mortem, aut beatus etiam futurus sum?" Cic. de Sen. Cap. XIX.

^a Though in these we find some, which, as may be seen in Sect. vi. of this Chapter, are very important.

^b See Chap. II. Sect. ii. p. 45.

the easier regions of abstinence, or of the scourge, or of an implicit deference to earthly authority.

SECTION X.

Of Christ's intercession.

“WE must not indeed imagine that Christ *literally* pleads our cause, or in moving and persuasive language intreats his heavenly father to forego his anger, and to receive us again to favour: but the interposition of Christ, if not literally and properly intercession, is nevertheless analogous to it: for what a proper intercession is between one man and another, that Christ is between God and man: and what a proper advocate is before a human judge, that Christ is in the presence of God: it is by his intervention that we are reconciled to God: it is by his agency that we are acquitted and discharged; and therefore he is truly and really our intercessor and advocate, if not literally, and in strict propriety of speech.” Veysie’s Bampton Lecture Sermons, p. 140. This sentence forms a part of a remarkably lucid exposition of the true nature and character of analogical reasoning. (Ibid. 122—143.) See also pp. 76—79; and, on the subject of Christ’s *intercession* in particular, Bishop Brown’s Divine Analogy, p. 166. Also Tucker’s Light of Nature, Vol. V. p. 653, with which com-

pare what is said of *low analogies* in Chap. II. Sect. i. pp. 39, 40, 41, of this Treatise. See also Tucker, Vol. VI. 481, 482. 610, 611.

Gregory of Nazianzum says as follows: "To intercede does not imply (though that is commonly supposed) the existence of any desire to exact a penalty: there would be something of meanness in any such imagination as that: but Christ intercedes as he is our ambassador, or in the way of mediation, and in the same way in which the Holy Spirit is said to intercede for us in Rom. viii. 26." Of this embassy, or intercession by Christ, Gregory then proceeds to argue that his assumption of humanity is an essential constituent. "He took our fleshly nature on him in all things, sin only excepted, that, though we now know him no longer after the flesh, he might, through the power which he so acquired, raise us to a likeness of God. Thus also," it follows, "he is our advocate: not as prostrating himself in a servile way before the Father: (far be from us a supposition so low in itself, so unworthy of the divine nature, and of anything which we can either imagine the Father to require, or the Son to do). But the way in which he is our advocate [as also that in which he is our intercessor and mediator] is by persuading us not to be weary in well doing. And this he does by urging on us the effectual motive

of the human sufferings which he has undergone in our behalf." ^a

SECTION XI.

Of grace, and whether we can affirm it to be specially infused into Christians otherwise than through the advantageous moral [i. e. external] circumstances in which they are placed.

I WISH to re-state here somewhat more formally the argument of the concluding part of Sect. vi. and of Sect. vii. Chap. II. on this subject.

The argument is this. Whatever God does

^a Τὸ γὰρ ἐντυγχάνειν οὐκ ὡς ἡ τῶν πολλῶν συνήθεια τὸ ζητεῖν ἐκδίκησιν ἔχει (τοῦτο γὰρ πῶς καὶ ταπεινότητος) ἀλλὰ τὸ πρεσβεύειν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῷ λογῷ τῆς μεσιτείας, ὡς καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἐντυγχάνειν λέγεται. Εἷς γὰρ θεὸς, εἷς καὶ μεσίτης θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων, ἄνθρωπος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός. πρεσβεύει γὰρ ἔτι καὶ νῦν, ὡς ἄνθρωπος, ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμῶν σωτηρίας, ὅτι μετὰ τοῦ σώματός ἐστι οὗ προσέλαβεν, ὡς ἂν ἐμὲ ποιήσῃ θεόν, τῇ δυνάμει τῆς ἀνθρωπώσεως, καὶ μὴ κατὰ σάρκα γινώσκηται, τὰ σαρκικὰ λέγω πάθη, καὶ, χωρὶς τῆς αμαρτίας, ἡμέτερα. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ παράκλητον ἔχομεν Ἰησοῦν, οὐχ ὡς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν προκυλινδούμενον τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ προσπίπτοντα δουλικῶς (ἄπαγε τὴν δούλην ὄντως ὑπόνοιαν, καὶ ἀναξίαν τοῦ πνεύματος). οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦτο ἐπιζητεῖν, οὔτε τοῦ υἱοῦ πάσχειν, ἢ ὡς περὶ θεοῦ διανοεῖσθαι δίκαιον· ἀλλ' οἷς πέπονθεν ὡς ἄνθρωπος πείθει καρτερεῖν ὡς λόγος καὶ παραινέτης. Orat. xxxvi. p. 587, in the first volume of the ed. by Prunæus, Paris, 1601 and 1630. See also Daillé to the same effect, as quoted by Bossuet, Histoire des Variations, Vol. V. p. 354. I have seen it observed, that there was not anything of *deprecation* in the *intercessions* of the Jewish High Priest. Compare also Chap. II. Sect. i. of this Treatise, pp. 42, 43, and Sect. v. pp. 58—60.

more for Christians than for others he does in one of two ways, or in both these ways: i. e. either by placing them in better moral circumstances than others, or by a larger and special infusion of grace, and that *not* given through those circumstances. This special infusion of grace, if it be given, may be accounted of as equivalent to the subduing in them, more than in others, the infection of that corrupt nature which is derived from Adam. And this accordingly is what is commonly supposed to be done in baptism, and if so done is supposed, at least in the baptism of infants, to be done *mystically*^a.

Now that God does the former of these two things, that is, that he puts Christians into better moral circumstances than others, is evident. But if he does this, no reason, I apprehend, can be assigned why he *may not* infuse into them more grace also, and at baptism. If Christ prays for *such* infusion into Christians either generally or particularly, it doubtless *is* given. We know that God hears prayer, and his prayers pre-eminently.

But that such infusion is given *except through circumstances* the Scripture nowhere informs us. It does not teach us that baptism, except through the moral application of it, is anything more than a rite of admission into the visible church. And

^a On the meaning here to be given to the word mystical, see Note a, p. 71.

though Christ prayed for his disciples, and for his church generally, there is nothing to show that he prayed for any spiritual privilege to be bestowed on any, otherwise than through the application of his doctrine, and the imitation of his blessed example. To imagine anything else is, as it appears to me, to narrow unduly the universal benevolence of the Redeemer of the whole world, of whom we also know that he prayed for Jerusalem not less intently than for his disciples themselves, and that he is as much the Redeemer of the Gentiles as of the Jews.

It is perfectly clear, that we must not limit the inscrutable Spirit of God to any rule, or scale, or method of working. There is not anything in which that Spirit is more inscrutable, or more meant to be so, than in its bestowing external advantages and opportunities as they *are* bestowed. But the *forbearance* which this principle requires of us, gives no reason, but rather the contrary, to *assume* that he bestows any aid whatever on Christians, except on the very same footing on which he bestows them on heathens also. Not only therefore the religious principle on which both Christian faith, and heathen virtue are rewarded, is the same to all men^a; but also, *so far as we know*, the Holy Spirit *may* exert his kindly influence on the same scale, or by the same rule, though in a di-

^a Acts, x. 34, 35, and the parallel passages.

verse operation, in all instances. *His* influence in bringing the religiously minded heathen, and in bringing the religiously minded Christian, within his pale, may be of the same sort, if we may so speak, precisely. The only discernible inequality, in God's dealings with men, is that one inequality which pervades his dealings with the whole human race, whether Christians or not Christians; namely, that some men, or societies of men, are found everywhere who are born or bred with more or less of religious advantages than are possessed by others. *That* inequality, although I doubt not but that there are wise reasons for it, is, I think, inexplicable. In fact, it is one form of the great problem why evil exists, or why there is so much of it. I know not of any other problem either in the religion of nature, or in the book of Revelation, which revelation does not solve.

SECTION XII.

Of the proviso commonly alleged that though we are saved for Christ's sake alone; or by the imputation of his merits; we are still bound to imitate his holiness, or to practise good works, and otherwise cannot be saved.

I SUPPOSE that almost all, perhaps all, those many Christians, who hold that man is saved altogether irrespectively of good works, or that he is saved *propter Christum*, or for Christ's sake alone, yet do

not the less hold that we cannot be saved without good works. According to this theory, good works are still to be considered as the necessary fruit of faith and of gratitude; and this faith and gratitude the no less necessary fruits of God's grace whenever that grace is given effectually^a. But the question is still to be asked *how* or *why*, if good works, or if faith or holiness, do not of themselves anything to our salvation, the rejected doctrine, that we can be saved *without* good works, can be rejected.

The answer to this question is, and can only be, because the grace which saves produces, as has been said, good works *necessarily*; because good works are a test whether we really have that grace or not. But this answer itself may have two meanings.—If we interpret it to mean that the divine grace inspires our own endeavours, or that the divine grace and our own endeavours work always together;—this meaning reduces the whole question to a question of words,—is the same with saying, that we are saved by our own faith, that is, *moral* faith, and good, that is, *moral* works, but that we cannot either believe, or do good works, without God's grace. And this, as I apprehend, is the truth; although the merely saying of the divine grace that it produces good works

^a “Etsi necessario sequi debet,” Melancthon. See the extract at length, in Note 9 to Sect. xv.

necessarily, expresses this truth indistinctly and dangerously.

But if, on the other hand, we interpret good works into a test of faith, or of grace, only inas-much as they evidence our obedience to an *arbi-trary* command of God, we thus destroy, I think, the real import both of grace, of faith, and of good works. If we can affirm of the divine mind anything not revealed in express words, we may well affirm that both sin and its penalties, virtue and its reward, are *there* inseparable, or that they are connected *not* arbitrarily, but “in the way,” as Butler, on the principle which pervades the whole of his incomparable treatise, justly ob-serves, “of natural consequence.” Undoubtedly they ought to be so, in *our* estimate of them. And if *words* could be any protection against *theories*, it might well be thought that the Scrip-ture use of the particular word *καθαρίζω*, which is sometimes alleged *for*^a, is, on the contrary, de-cisively *against*, the making any separation what-ever between the remission granted to sinners by the righteous judge, and the actual purifying of the heart by faith.

^a Benson on 1 John, i. 7. But compare Heb. ix. 14.
καθαρίει τὴν συνείδησιν.

SECTION XIII.

A collection of extracts from, and references to, various writers, by whom it is stated that God cannot, or does not, estimate anything as good which is short of perfection (except, of course, as he justifies us through Christ).

To begin with Aquinas. His definition of a good work is, that it is a work of which all parts are good^a. Luther's startling affirmation that the good works even of the justified are so many sins, is explained by his apologists to mean that, as being human works, they still include imperfection^b. The LXIInd article of the Heidelberg catechism asks the following question:—"Why cannot our good works justify either in whole, or in part?" Answer. "Because a righteousness which God judges to be righteousness, must be absolutely perfect, which ours is not."^c Exactly in the same manner our own homily: "Neither doth faith shut out the justice of our good works but it excludeth them, so that we may

^a See Father Paul's History of the Council of Trent, Book II. Sect. lxxvi. p. 308, in Courayer's translation.

^b Ibid. p. 312, and Courayer's Note 2.

^c "Cur nostra bona opera non possunt esse justitia, vel pars aliqua justitiæ coram Deo?" Resp. "Propterea quod oporteat eam justitiam, quæ in judicio Dei consistat, perfecte absolutam esse, et omni ex parte divinæ legi congruentem: nostra vero etiam præstantissima quæque opera in hac vita sunt imperfecta, atque adeo peccatis inquinata."

not do them to this intent to be made just by the doing of them. For all the good works that we can do be imperfect, and therefore not able to deserve our justification.”^a “The light of nature,” observes Hooker, “is never able to find out any way of obtaining the reward of bliss, but by performing exactly the duties and works of righteousness.”^b Basnage lays it down confidently as the uncontroverted and incontrovertible doctrine of the reformed churches, “that it is impossible to be justified before God, except by one or the other of two methods;—the one method being by the perfect accomplishment of the whole law; the other being by the merits of Christ, whose merits supply the defects of our virtues. These two methods,” he adds, “are so wholly opposed, that it is absolutely necessary to choose one, and to reject the other.”^c Locke, in the beginning of his *Reasonableness of Christianity*, argues at length, that as on one side “righteousness or an exact obedience to the law seems by the Scripture to have a claim of right to eternal life,” so, “on the other side, it seems the unalterable purpose of the divine justice, that no un-

^a Homily of Salvation, p. 13, fol. 1726. See also *ibid.* pp. 15—17; or see Nowell’s Catechism, p. 284.

^b Ecclesiastical Polity, I. xi. 5.

^c Basnage *Hist. de la Religion des Eglises Reformées*, Part III. Chap. VI. Sect. 3.

righteous person, no one who is guilty of any breach of the law, should be in Paradise.”^a “By one breach of the law,” observes Doddridge, “you are in a sense, a scriptural sense, guilty of all, and are as incapable of being justified before God by any obedience of your own, as if you had committed a thousand offences”;^b and again: “That must be spotless and complete which the infinite sanctity of God can approve and accept, if he consider thee in thyself alone: there must be no inconstancy, no forgetfulness, no mixture of sin attending it.”^c With the same, as to me certainly it appears, great temerity it is observed, by a considerable living writer, that, God being holy and perfect, “it is utterly incongruous to imagine that sinful man can be justified before the Lord by any righteousness save that which is pure and perfect;”^d whence, of course, it follows, as is remarked in the foregoing citation from Basnage, that he *can be* justified only by Christ. All these affirmations, however, of which I need not multiply examples, are, I think, evidently

^a Works, Vol. II. p. 476, fol. edition.

^b Rise and Progress of Religion in the Soul, Ch. IV. Sect. v. I do not enlarge on the misinterpretation here implied of James ii. 10; a misinterpretation into which Locke also has fallen in the place referred to in the last note; but see the observations on Gal. iii. 12, in Chap. XIII.

^c Ibid. Chap. VII. Sect. v.

^d Faber on Justification, p. 270.

either unmeaning, or untrue; unmeaning, if it be asserted that man's works may be good, though not perfect, and yet that nothing less than perfection can be accounted of as good; and untrue, if it be meant to affirm that no good less than perfection can be accepted by God. "The fallacy of this argument," says a very sensible writer, "manifestly lies in the terms; in slipping the words *good work* and *good works* into the place of *perfect work* and *perfect works*, and needs no other confutation, but that of setting them right."^a Compare farther on this subject Witsius de *Œconomia Fœderis* ^b, Jonathan Edwards on Justification ^c, and Ludlam's Essays ^d.

SECTION XIV.

A brief abstract of two passages in Mosheim, implying, and explanatory of, the identity of principle in justification and sanctification, when spoken of severally.

"God's requirement from us is that they who are justified by faith, go on in the course of holiness which their conversion begins."^e "Most divines

^a Hardy's Letter from a Clergyman, 1753, p. 61. See also Dr. Hey's Lectures, Vol. III. p. 306.

^b V. Sect. xiii.

^c Vol. III. pp. 359. 363. 365, and Vol. V. 369, in the New York edition of his works.

^d p. 223.

^e "Postulat Deus ut qui per fidem justificati sunt conversionem continuant Intelligimus tamen per renova-

speak of faith in Christ as being the one only condition of God's covenant with us. In so speaking they speak rightly. Christ himself says the same thing. The exposition here given is in substance, though not in form, the same doctrine. I lay down, indeed, as necessary to our salvation, not one condition, but three, these three being, first conversion, then faith, then sanctification. Faith cannot be without previous conversion, cannot be a true faith, unless it bear its fruit of sanctification. This all divines allow; all agree that there is this process, and my object is only to distinguish the different parts of this one process, in order to place them the more clearly before the eye."^a See also on this subject Cranmer's *Institution of a Christian Man*^b. A very

tionem et sanctificationem continuationem conversionis subindicatæ." *Elementa Theologiæ Dogmat.* II. 138.

^a Ibid. p. 159.

^b *Remains*, II. pp. 63, 64. Oxford, 1833. See also the extract from Jerome in Note c, p. 90, and that from Tertullian in p. 102 of this Treatise. In Nowell's Catechism, we have baptism spoken of as the commencement of our regeneration [regenerationis initium]; and the new life, into which we emerge, as its second part, or completion. "Postremo vero, quum ab aqua quam ad momentum subimus statim emergimus, nova vita, quæ est regenerationis nostræ pars altera atque finis, repræsentatur." "Videris," it then follows, "aquam effigiem tantum quandam rerum Divinarum efficere." To which answer we have then the following reply: "Effigies quidem est, sed minime inanis aut fallax, ut cui rerum ipsarum

intelligent writer in the *British Critic*, for April, 1835^a, observes that “although they may visit us hand in hand together, *nothing can be more distinct in their own nature than the pardoning mercy and the sanctifying grace.*” Definitions may be made which shall rescue this distinction from the charge of absolute error; but I still cannot imagine anything more calculated to produce the confusion which the writer proceeds to deprecate, than the attempt to draw it,

SECTION XV.

A review of various selected passages from the Fathers, in which the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness, in its extrinsecal sense, has been supposed to be held. Also, of the same doctrine, as held by Melancthon, and others of the Reformers; and of the degree in which it is recognised in our own articles; and also in the opinions, or rather practice, of the Church of Rome.

I. I CANNOT pretend to offer anything which deserves the name of even a sketch of the history of opinions on this subject. I nevertheless hope that the following review of what I believe to be some of the most important passages which bear, or have been supposed to bear, on it, is, for all purposes of reasonable illustration, sufficiently full.

veritas adjuncta sit atque annexa.” pp. 314, 315, in the *Enchiridion Theologicum*; and see what follows.

^a Page 269.

I must, however, observe preliminarily, that it is, I believe, admitted that Scripture nowhere teaches this doctrine expressly¹; and that if it be to be collected from Scripture, it must be collected from it by inference; which, I apprehend, cannot be done.

The first passage which I extract from the Fathers is a well known passage in the epistle to Diognetus, which is ascribed to Justin Martyr, and which is undoubtedly by some writer of great antiquity. "He himself," says this writer, "bare our sins. He gave his own Son a ransom for us, the holy for transgressors, the innocent for the wicked, the just for the unjust, the immortal for

¹ "The words of imputing Christ's righteousness to us, I find not in God's word, and therefore think them not necessary to the church's peace or safety." Baxter's Breviate of Justification, p. 22. "But as for the sense of these words, no doubt but it may be good, and the papists themselves own them in the same sense as many Protestant divines, as I have often proved."^a "But it hath been said that faith alone is necessary to men's justification, because thereby they lay hold of the righteousness of Christ, and receive it by imputation. To this it is sufficient to answer that no such operation of faith is taught in Scripture. Neither is it said there that Christ's righteousness is imputed to believers." Macknight on Rom. iii. 28. Compare Rom. iv. 3, and Macknight's Note on this verse. "Certum est," says Bull, "locutionem illam in SS. nusquam occurrere." Exam. Cens. p. 36. Grabe's edition.

^a Baxter, *ibid.* See what has been said on this subject in Chap. II. Sect. ix. pp. 87—89.

mortals. For what else," he adds, "could cover our sins except his righteousness; in whom could we, who are transgressors of the law, be justified, except in the Son of God alone? O happy commutation! O unsearchable work! O beneficence beyond expectation! that the iniquities of the many should be hid in the just one, and that his righteousness should justify transgressors."^a It is here said, it will be observed, not only in the words of Scripture, that Christ has taken on himself our sins, and is our ransom; but also that we even find a *commutation*^b for our own iniquities in his righteousness. It must also be allowed that this word *commutation* is a word which *may* be used to denote a set-off of one thing against something else wholly extrinsecal to it. But whether or no it be really so used depends on the text and the context. It *may* also be, and here is, used only rhetorically; and, when so used, we can collect from it nothing of doctrine, or nothing except that Christ died *vice nostra*, or *in our stead*, or that we might not die, but on the contrary, live^c. That Christ's death produces this effect is, I think, most certain. The only question is *how*, or *in what manner*, we may affirm that the effect is produced. It is not said or implied, that it

^a In Sylburgius's ed. of Justin M. p. 500. Paris, 1636.

^b ὅτι τῆς γλυκείας ἀνταλλαγῆς.

^c See Note 1, Chap. III. p. 95.

either is or can be produced, except by our conforming ourselves, through God's aid, and Holy Spirit, to his image or likeness. In fact, the writer proceeds to draw the inference, that the gifts and graces conferred become effective through knowledge, or faith; or because from a right knowledge and a right faith must arise love; a love coupled, on the part of those who have been thus redeemed, with the desire to renew that image of God in which they were formed; an image which had been lost by sin, but which we *may* recover.

Thus again Irenæus: "Man must accustom himself to receive God into himself: God is to accustom himself to dwell in human nature. The Mediator between the two must restore the communication between them by means of his affinity to both, and must sanctify every [condition] of human nature by means of the perfect likeness of God. In a human nature he condemned sin, but he required of man to become like him."² So also in like manner Origen, if we

² The learned and excellent writer, from whom I take, though with some omissions, this citation, proceeds to observe that "the whole mode of conception of the doctrine of redemption at this period pledges for the recognition of the intimate connexion between the faith in Christ, and that inward divine or moral life which was to be received by man through faith into himself, and to be appropriated to himself, and his whole nature to be constantly more penetrated by it." Neander's Church History, II. 310-314.

may take his opinions on this point from Mosheim, who would not, if he could have helped it, have censured this eminent father for ignorance of, or for disclaiming, all benefit from Christ's merits to mankind, except as given through their moral application of the lesson conveyed. The censure, which he, on this account, passes on Origen, is in all respects similar to that which he had before passed on Carpocrates^a.

I now proceed to the remarkable and often cited legend recorded of St. John, by Eusebius. This legend is, in brief, as follows; that St. John went to rescue from evil life and society a young man of dissolute habits, who, abashed at his approach, turned and fled. St. John pursued, exclaiming: "My son, be not afraid. The hope of salvation may still be yours. I will give account for you to Christ^b; if need be, I will voluntarily die for you, or in your stead, as the Lord died for us." And then in conclusion it is said that the apostle, "reiterating that he would himself be surety for the culprit's forgiveness by Christ, restored him to the church, thus showing forth," it is said, "in him a great example of true repentance, and emblem of regeneration, and of a visible resurrection from the dead."^c There is assuredly nothing

^a De rebus Christianis, pp. 363. 625. 628.

^b Ἐγὼ Χριστῷ δώσω λόγον ὑπὲρ σου.

^c Hist. Eccl. III. 23.

here from which we can infer any other doctrine, or that Eusebius would have held that the apostle, if he could have been interrogated, would have taught any other, than the following: "I will be your surety that Christ will forgive your sin on repentance, as Christ is surety to me on the part of God. I am also ready to die for you, as Christ died for all, if so I can but reconcile you to God." There is nothing to show that this is not still subject to the assumption, that as God could be reconciled only by repentance, so repentance, by whatever process brought about, would certainly reconcile him. Life for life, death for death, is doubtless an antithesis which runs much through the writings of the Fathers, though not more than through the inspired epistles. But this does not in any way imply that Christ's death is available to our life, except as we make him our own by obedience or love, or as the Spirit kindles his righteousness in our own breasts: in which case, as Bull has very well and pertinently observed in a passage which I have already cited elsewhere^a, it is not Christ's righteousness, but our own faith which is imputed for righteousness.

In the same manner in the following passage from Athanasius, a passage on which Mr. Faber, who quotes it in his work on Justification, greatly relies. "Christ," it is here said, "has redeemed us

^a See note a, p. 76.

from the curse of the law, so as that the fulfilment of the law by him the first fruits is imputed to the whole lump.”^a We have in this passage the *word* imputed. But so we have also in the confession of Augsburgh³, which, as is agreed by all parties^b, does *not* recognise the doctrine of imputation in its extrinsecal sense. Nor does this passage of Athanasius in itself prove anything more for that extrinsecal sense than the passages from the epistle to Diognetus, and from Eusebius, quoted before.

In the book *De Baptismo*, which is attributed to Basil, we find the texts Matt. xxvi. 28; Rom. iii. 23; v. 8. 17; vi. 3; 2 Cor. v. 21; and Eph. i. 5. so quoted as, I think, to show quite clearly that not even any idea of any righteousness, but an infused righteousness was in the mind of the writer^c.—I have already referred to a passage in Theophylact^d, which states that “Christ is [or is made] to us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption, *as he* makes us wise and righteous, and holy and free.” “Thus,” says

^a Adv. eos qui damno afficiunt genus nostrum. Opp. II. 270, quoted by Mr. Faber, p. 125.

³ “Sed hæc est sententia, consequi nos remissionem peccatorum, et imputationem justitiæ [hoc est acceptationem personæ, p. 145] per misericordiam propter Christum.” Confess. August. p. 144, in Syll. Confess. Oxon. 1804.

^b Bull Exam. Cens. p. 36, ed. Grabe; and Faber p. 264.

^c Lib. I. Sects. vii. viii. ix. Opp. II. 634, 635. Ed. Benedict.

^d P. 94. Chap. II.

Bull, "this father rightly explains the text 1 Cor. ii. 30." "In the first place," proceeds Theophylact, "he makes us wise, by freeing us from error, and giving us the knowledge of God: then [he makes us righteous, or] justifies us, by granting us remission of sins; and lastly sanctifies us by his Spirit, and thus imparts to us a perfect deliverance from all evils."^a And so also Augustin himself. "But if," he says, "as in Adam all die, so in Christ all shall be made alive, what Christian can doubt but that they who in the interval of time between Adam and Christ led lives pleasing to God, shall live hereafter because made alive in Christ: but they will be made alive in Christ as being members of his body; they will be members of his body because he is their head: and he is their head because he is the only mediator between God and man: which to them he could not be, unless through his grace they had been taught to believe in his resurrection. But this they could not have learned, if left in ignorance that he was to come in the flesh, nor if their virtues had not arisen out of this belief."^b Nothing, surely, can be clearer

^a *Examen Censuræ*, p. 42.

^b *De Peccato originali contra Pelagianos et Cœlest.* Cap. XXVIII. *Opp.* Vol. X. p. 267, ed. Benedict. In this passage Augustin doubtless attributes to the "old fathers" a much more definite expectation of Christ's coming in the flesh, than it is reasonable to suppose them to have really had: but this error does not affect his testimony on the point in question.

than this: and accordingly Melancthon, whose own opinions I shall state sufficiently in a following part of this section, blames Augustin for holding only what he did. "Augustin," he observes, "does not in all things come up to the doctrine of Paul, although he approaches it nearer than the schoolmen. And I cite Augustin," he adds, on this point, "on account of the deference generally paid to his authority. But yet believe me that you cannot rightly understand this great and obscure controversy concerning justification by faith, unless you turn away your eyes altogether from the law, and from Augustin's imagination about the fulfilling of it, and fix your mind solely on the free promise." ^a The extract from Augustin which, of all which I have seen, most *seems* to speak a different language from that on which Melancthon here animadverts as inadequate, is the following: "All who are of Adam are born in sin, and are sinners; all who are made righteous in Christ are righteous not in themselves, but in him." ^b But it is wholly absurd to think of in-

^a Ad amicum quendam Epist. Lib. I. ep. xcix. "Ut sentias," he proceeds, "quod ex promissione propter Christum justi, hoc est, accepti simus, et pacem inveniamus."

^b "Omnes tamen qui ex Adam cum peccato peccatores: omnes qui per Christum justificati, justi non in se, sed in illo." In Ev. Joan. tract III. Opp. Vol. IX. p. 8, as quoted by Mr. Faber, p. 171.

ferring anything to the point from such a passage as this; and if anything more to the purpose were to be found in the writings of this great father, neither Mr. Faber, nor Milner, who “supposes the correct view of justification by faith to have been lost to the church—at least from the second century to the Reformation; and who like Melancthon confesses of even Augustin, that he did not understand its precise nature,”^a would have failed to produce it. Calvin, in his Institutes, quotes a passage from Ambrose, in which our putting on the righteousness of Christ is compared to Jacob’s obtaining his blessing by clothing himself in the vestments of Esau^b. It must be allowed that the extrinsic doctrine can scarcely be carried farther than this. But neither can it be much more completely refuted than by instituting such a comparison. Thus much of Augustin and his contemporaries.

II. To come down to later times. The declaration of the Synod of Arras in 1025, which Mr. Faber quotes as affirming the doctrine of an extrinsic righteousness, appears to me to be directly against it. “The effect,” it says, “of God’s grace through Christ is to make the foolish wise, to give faith to the infidel; not only to point out the

^a I take what is thus said of Milner from Knox’s Remains, Vol. II. 59, 60.

^b Inst. III. xi. 23.

right way, but to recal from error; to expel earthly desires, and to inspire the desire of a heavenly kingdom; to extirpate evil by implanting goodness; and to expel envy and hatred by giving and infusing kindness and mutual love. Justly, therefore, do we ascribe all these benefits to the free and inexhaustible bounty of God, who of his mercy and pity stirs us up to good works, in order that, by first making us righteous, he may find in us qualities which he may justly crown with that eternal reward of righteousness which he bestows.”⁴

Again.—A century later, the exposition or theory of our redemption is stated by Lombard to be as follows. “That we are redeemed or delivered by Christ’s death from the devil, and sin, and punishment, because we are justified in Christ’s

⁴ “*Gratia Jesu, per Jesum Christum dominum nostrum, cujus hæc est inexhausta pietatis munificentia, ut ex insipientibus sapientes efficiat, infidelibus fidem tribuat, errantes non modo vocet, sed etiam revocet, desideriiis terrenis expulsis, desiderium regni cœlestis inspiret, inserta bonitate malitiam extirpet, benignitatis dono invidiam expellet, odilibus quoque et odientibus invicem donum dilectionis infundet. . . . Jure igitur gratuito beneficio divinæ bonitatis adscribitur, qui nos ideo ad bona opera misericorditer excitat, ut habeat quod in nobis juste coronari debeat. Quibus sicut per misericordiam præparavit gratuitum justificationis donum, ita per justitiam præparavit æternæ justificationis præmium.*” Faber, pp. 324, 325.

blood, or released by his death, from those fetters of sin in which the devil held us. But how," he adds, "does Christ's death so release us? Because it commendeth to us, as the apostle says, and is a pledge of, that exceeding love of God towards us in which he gave his own Son to suffer for sinners, and so excites in our hearts the love of that God, who has done such great things for us, and by our loving whom in return we are made just, or are *released* from our sins. And, again, we are said in another sense to be justified by Christ's death, because by our faith in it we are also *cleansed* from them. For Christ, by his one most true sacrifice of himself, has destroyed all that guilt which gave the devil his hold on us, so that though he tempt us in the same way as before, he can no longer conquer us. As in the case of Peter, who though while Christ lived he denied him through fear of the damsel, yet, after his death, gave not way, though led before rulers and kings. And why was this difference? Because Christ's death had given him strength: because Christ coming into the strong man's house, that is, into the human heart, where the devil dwelt, bound the strong man, that is restrained his seducing power, so that the temptations which he is still permitted to exercise seduce no longer. Thus in Christ's blood we are redeemed from sin, and so from the devil." "Not," it is said again, "that

Christ's death has reconciled us to a God who did not love us before^a. But if he loved us before, how are we *reconciled*? Because sin had alienated us from him, and made us enemies, and that charge (the charge of sin) being dismissed, the alienation ends."⁵

^a Compare Outram de Sacrificiis, 341, 342.

⁵ Sententiarum, lib. III. xix. I look upon this passage as expressing so much of the whole drift of almost all antiquity on this subject, that I beg here to subjoin the original, and this the rather as I have considerably abridged it in the very free translation given above. "Nunc ergo quæramus quomodo per mortem ipsius a diabolo et a peccato, et a pœna redempti sumus. A diabolo ergo et a peccato per Christi mortem liberati sumus, quia, ut ait Apostolus, in sanguine ipsius justificati sumus, et in eo quod sumus justificati, id est a peccatis soluti, a diabolo sumus liberati, qui nos vinculis peccati tenebat. Sed quomodo a peccatis per ejus mortem soluti sumus? Quia per ejus mortem, ut ait Apostolus, commendatur nobis charitas Dei; id est, apparet eximia et commendabilis charitas Dei erga nos in hoc, quod filium suum tradidit in mortem pro nobis peccatoribus. Exhibita autem tantæ erga nos dilectionis arra, et nos movemur, accendimurque ad diligendum Deum, qui pro nobis tanta fecit, et per hoc justificamur, id est, soluti a peccatis justi efficimur. Mors ergo Christi nos justificat, dum per eam charitas excitatur in cordibus nostris. Dicimur quoque et aliter per mortem Christi justificari, quia per fidem mortis ejus a peccatis mundamur. Unde apostolus: Justitia Dei est per fidem Jesu Christi. Et item: quem Deus proposuit propitiatorem per fidem in sanguine ipsius, id est per fidem passionis, ut olim aspicientes in serpentem æneum in ligno erectum a morsibus serpentum sanabantur. Si ergo recte fidei intuitu in illum respicimus, qui pro nobis pependit in ligno, a vinculis

Every word, it will be observed, of this long extract (and much more well worthy of being diaboli solvimur, id est, a peccatis; et ita a diabolo liberamur, ut nec post hanc vitam in nobis inveniat quod puniat. Morte quippe sua uno verissimo sacrificio quicquid culparum erat, unde nos diabolus ad luenda supplicia detinebat, Christus extinxit, ut in hac vita tentando nobis non prævaleat. Licet enim nos tentet post Christi mortem quibus modis ante tentabat, non tamen vincere potest, sicut ante vincebat. Nam Petrus, qui ante Christi mortem voce ancillæ territus negavit, post mortem ante reges et præsides ductus non cessit. Quare? quia fortior: id est, Christus veniens in domum fortis, id est, in corda nostra, ubi diabolus habitabat, alligavit fortem, id est, a seductione compescuit fidelium, ut tentationem quæ ei adhuc permittitur, non sequatur seductio. Itaque in Christi sanguine, qui solvit quæ non rapuit redempti sumus a peccato, et per hoc a diabolo." Sent. Lib. III. xix. And again: "Reconciliati enim sumus Deo, ut ait apostolus, per mortem Christi. Quod non sic intelligendum est, quasi nos ei sic reconciliavit Christus ut inciperet amare quos oderat, sicut reconciliatur inimicus inimico, ut deinde sint amici, qui ante se oderant: sed jam nos diligenti Deo reconciliati sumus^a. Non enim ex quo ei reconciliati sumus per sanguinem filii nos cœpit diligere; sed ante mundum priusquam aliquid essemus. Quomodo ergo nos diligenti Deo sumus reconciliati? Propter peccatum cum eo habebamus inimicitias, qui habebat erga nos charitatem etiam cum inimicitias exercebamus adversus eum operando iniquitatem. Ita ergo inimici eramus Deo, sicut justitiæ sunt inimica peccata, et ideo dimissis peccatis tales inimicitiae finiuntur, et reconciliantur justo quos ipse justificat. . . . Reconciliavit ergo nos tota Trinitas virtutis usu, scilicet dum peccata delet: sed filius solus impletionem obedientiæ, in quo

^a Compare Outram de Sacrificiis, 341, 342.

consulted is to be found in the same place) recognises clearly both that the whole plan of our redemption proceeds from the original love or bounty of God, and that its effect follows from our own application of it. Of the writer, who is usually accounted of as the founder of the great sect of the Schoolmen, I suppose that I may add that he was also the most eminent of them. At the period of the Reformation, especially, he was so considered: and to him as much as, or more than, to any of his successors, both Melancthon^a, and also Luther and Calvin, appear to have attributed what *they thought* the depravation of that doctrine of the (extrinsecal) imputation of Christ's righteousness, in which they were not satisfied with Augustin himself.

Priestley, in his history of what he calls the corruptions of Christianity^b, after referring to, and partly translating, this passage from Lombard, proceeds to say of *Bernard*, that *his* doctrine on this subject, namely on the imputation of man's sin to Christ, and of Christ's righteousness to man, approaches nearer to that of the moderns than anything else which we meet with before the time of the

patrata sunt secundum humanam naturam ea per quæ credentes et imitantes justificamur." Ibid. Compare Nowell's Catechism, pp. 254, 255, as printed in the Enchiridion Theologium.

^a As in the extract which I have given in p. 336 of this Section.

^b Vol. I. pp. 237-239.

Reformation. It however appears to me that this *concession*, for such it is from Priestley, though somewhat qualified in another sentence or two, concedes too much. It does *not* appear to me that Bernard, though some of his *expressions*, taken alone, may seem, at first sight, to affirm that we are saved by Christ's extrinsecal righteousness, means any such thing. "The righteousness of another was assigned to him because he had none of his own."^a These *words* are remarkable; and similar modes of speaking are repeated, both in the passage from which I take this sentence, and also elsewhere^b. But the whole turn of the argument, as I apprehend it, is that Christ's victory over sin makes its pardon consistent with that *political* good order and justice of the divine government, of which no one doubts it to have been a part, or the plan. And this, I think, is evident from the passage immediately following the sentence which I have quoted above. "But that assignation was on this principle, that because the devil slew the innocent, he was justly deprived of his power over the guilty."^c

Thus far clearly we have divine regimen, or plan,

^a "Assignata est ei proinde aliena, qui caruit sua." Epist. CXC. p. 1556. Opp. Paris, 1640.

^b Ad milites templi, Cap. XI. pp. 837-839.

^c "Et ipsa sic est. Venit princeps hujus mundi, et in salvatore non invenit quicquam, et cum nihilominus innocenti manus injecit, justissime quos tenebat amisit."

or political order, exactly in consonance with what is said by Lombard⁷ on the same subject, or rather with what Augustin, whose very words Lombard copies, and, I think, refers to, had said long before. Bernard then proceeds: "That thus the satisfaction made by that one man who alone bare the sins of all should be in like manner imputed to all. But if he (the devil) argue in return that Adam the original father of the human race gave up into slavery his guilty posterity, it is a just answer to say, on the other hand, that Christ has redeemed his brethren. Why, as we confess ourselves guilty through another's act, may we not plead also another's act for our release?"⁸ I still do not see that we here travel out of the former argument; or that this righteousness, thus said to be not our own, but that of another, implies anything of a real principle of commutation, or that Christ's righteousness does anything for us except so far as *we*, through his Spirit, make it our own.

III. NOT so, certainly, in the age of the Re-

⁷ "Sed qua justitia [victus est diabolus]? Jesu Christi. Et quomodo victus est ea? Quia in illo nihil dignum morte inveniens, occidit eum tamen. Et utique justum est ut debitores quos tenebat liberi dimittantur, in eum credentes, quem sine ullo debito occidit." Sentent. Lib. III. xx.

⁸ "Ut videlicet satisfactio unius omnibus imputetur, sicut omnium peccata unus ille portavit Quod si dixerit, pater tuus addixit te, respondebo: sed frater meus redemit me. Cur non aliunde justitia, cum aliunde reatus?" Ibid.

formation. "Turn away your eyes, altogether," says even the wise Melancthon, "from that renewal of heart, and from the law, and fix them wholly on the promise, and on Christ: for whose sake alone, and not on account of any such renewal, we can be esteemed righteous, that is, can be accepted by God and find peace of conscience. For that renewal is not enough. We are justified, or accounted righteous, through faith alone: and this not because faith is the root, as you say, of Christian virtue, but because it lays hold of Christ, for whose sake only we are accepted without any the least reference to that renewal of mind, which, though it ought to follow necessarily on a true faith, yet brings not peace to the conscience. Neither yet does love, though it be the fulfilling of the law, any way justify. It is faith only," he then repeats, "which justifies, and this not because it is a perfection, or virtue, in us, but because it lays hold of Christ."⁹ Thus far Melancthon: and

⁹ "Sed tu rejice oculos ab ista renovatione, et a lege, in totum ad promissionem et Christum, quod propter ipsum justi, hoc est, accepti Deo, simus, et pacem conscientiae inveniamus, non propter illam renovationem. Nam hæc ipsa novitas non sufficit. Imo sola fide sumus justi, non quia sit radix, ut tu scribis, sed quia apprehendit Christum, propter quem accepti sumus, qualis qualis sit illa novitas, etsi necessario sequi debet, sed non pacificat conscientiam. Imo non dilectio, quæ est impletio legis, justificat: sed sola fide, non quia est perfectio in nobis, sed tantum quia apprehendit Christum, justi sumus."

in the same manner the Westminster confession: "Those whom God effectually calleth, he also freely justifieth, not by infusing righteousness into them, but by pardoning their sins, and by accounting and accepting their persons as righteous; not for anything wrought in them, or done by them, but for Christ's sake alone: not by imputing faith itself, the act of believing, or any other evangelical obedience as their righteousness, but by imputing the obedience and satisfaction of Christ unto them." "Christ by his obedience and

Ad amicum quendam hærentem in disputatione mota ab Osian-dro in articulo de justificatione. Epist. Lib. I. xcix. Lond. 1642. Cf. sqq. et Epist. cv. libri ejusdem. Also Opp. I. fol. 65, pag. versa. Much of the explanation of the, as I think, very erroneous language of this extract may be found by comparing with it the much more temperate statement in Nowell's Catechism^a.

"Non ergo inter hujus justitiæ causas fidem principem locum tenere dicis, ut ejus merito nos ex nobis justî coram Deo habeamur ?

"Nequaquam : id enim esset fidem in Christi locum substituere. Verum hujus justitiæ fons est Dei misericordia, quæ in nos per Christum derivatur ; per evangelium vero nobis offertur, et a nobis fide, quasi manu, prehenditur.

"Fidem igitur non causam sed instrumentum esse justitiæ dicit, quod scilicet Christum, qui est justitia nostra, amplectitur, tam arcta nos conjunctione cum illo copulans, ut omnium ejus bonorum participes faciat.

"Sic est." See farther on this subject what will be said in Sect. XVI.

^a P. 282, as printed in the *Enchiridion Theologicum*.

death did fully discharge the debt of all those who are thus justified, and did make a proper, real, and full satisfaction to his Father's justice in their behalf."^a In speaking of an opinion which in the age of the Reformation was so generally avowed and which is still considered by many as its most essential principle, I need not add, I think, any farther citations¹⁰. I do not find, however, either

^a As quoted in Mr. Faber's book on Justification, p. 268.

¹⁰ Mr. Faber refers on this subject to the confession of Augsburg, Articles IV. and VI: to the Saxon Confession, pp. 250. 254, in the *Sylloge Confessionum* published at Oxford in 1804: to the Belgic Confession, Art. XXII.: and to the Heidelberg Catechism, Part II. quæst. 12-16. See also the Helvetic Confession, Art. XV. Any fuller history of this controversy than it is here my purpose, or than indeed I am competent, to give, would require, I believe, in the first place an account of the part taken in it, at the time of the Reformation, by Osiander, who appears to have been vainly desirous to steer something of a middle course between the doctrine of the Church of Rome and that of Melancthon and Luther. Baxter, and afterwards Bishop Bull and his opponents, entered largely into it. Of Bull's writings on the subject we have a sort of abstract in Nelson's *Life of that eminent and most able prelate*: and we have also a short reference to him in the preface to a recent volume, on "*Oxford Divinity*," by the present Bishop of Ohio. Against Bull, as against many later and living writers, who agree in the same view of the case, the charge was made of his taking a Popish (and also, if I recollect rightly, and with exactly the same justice or injustice, that of his taking a Socinian) view of it^b. His view of it, though too much embarrassed, perhaps, by minute distinctions, is substantially the same with that which

^b Mac Ilvaine's *Oxford Divinity*, p. 212.

among the divines of that age itself, or among their defenders, any intelligible explanation either

I have endeavoured in this treatise to state plainly and broadly. I shall be sorry, for many reasons, to be considered as liable to the same censure. But though the question is one of argument, or of scriptural interpretation, and not of authority, any charge to this effect made against BULL, and which also includes HAMMOND, BISHOP TAYLOR, BAXTER, GROTIUS^a, and EPISCOPIUS, however it may, and ought to, be regretted on other and higher grounds, can scarcely be supposed to excite much distrust of their own reasonings, in the minds of any to whom the question appears in the same or a similar light to that in which it was regarded by these great divines. Among modern writers, I make the following brief extract from Mosheim: "Fides non proprie justificat, nam nullus actus mentis nostræ Deum commovet, ut nos justificet, sed illa fides quæ Christi meritum amplectitur." Elem. Theol. Dogmat. II. 286: and the following from the Essays of the late Mr. Scott: "But whatever faith may effect as the active principle of a man's conduct, it justifies him before God, only as it receives Christ Jesus and applies to him for salvation." (Essay XI.) See also Jonathan Edwards on Justification. Works, Vol. III. pp. 357. 359. 363. 369, and D. Williams's note, p. 366. See also the fifth Vol. of Edwards's Works, pp. 369. 395. This most able writer, exactly in the same manner with Melancthon in the extract quoted in page 345, distinctly rejects all regard to any "moral suitableness" in ourselves, and even that love

^a That GROTIUS must have *anticipated* that he would be classed on this point with Socinus is plain, I think, from the following sentence in his epistle to Vossius, prefixed to the Treatise De Satisfactione: "Neque me pudeat consentire Socino, si quando is in veram veteremque sententiam incidit, ut sane fecit in controversia de justitia per fidem, et aliis nonnullis." Opp. fol. p. 294.

of the principle which they thus think they affirm, or of the words which they use. "Faith," they say, "saves or justifies us not through its moral import, as accepted through God's mercy, or as it brings us to holiness, but as it enables us to lay hold of, or as it unites us with, Christ." But it is a most vain attempt to imagine that we can ever in any way be united to Christ by faith, except as our faith leads us to do his commands. He makes us his church, as far as we can see, only for the sake of sanctifying us; that he may be able to present us "a living sacrifice, holy and unblamed," or "without spot and wrinkle," as far as our weak nature permits, before the face of God. If there be any reader who can entertain any doubt on this subject when thus stated, I beg to refer him to the conclusion of the fourth of Barrow's Sermons on the Creed, where he will find it treated of with perhaps an excess of fulness and power.

IV. At the same time, though thus, as I have said, it is not to be denied that this doctrine of the imputation of Christ's extrinsecal righteousness both *was* a doctrine very prevalent among the re-

which is the fulfilling of the law from the office of justifying, and assigns it purely to the relation which faith has to the mediator. "Why," he asks, in what I have before shown to be one of the worst abuses of the analogy on which he relies, "Why is there any more absurdity in this supposition than in a merchant's transferring debt or credit from one man's account to another?"

formers, and still *is* among the great body of their successors; it is not on the other hand less certain that the Reformation itself is, if I may so express myself, no way pledged to it^a. It has been observed by Bull, that not even a tittle of this doctrine is to be found either in our own articles; or in the Augsburgh, and several other confessions¹¹. In saying this thus unreservedly, I cannot think that Bull speaks with his usual accuracy. I really see no material difference between saying that we are saved by the imputation of Christ's extrinsecal righteousness, and the saying that we are saved *propter illum*, or for his merits, or his sake: that is, supposing that we use these words in their proper and natural signification, and that which I believe they are commonly, though not often perhaps distinctly, understood to bear, when thus employed in speaking of Christ^b. At the same time, agreeably also to what was said before^c, it is but fair to confess that they both may be, and often are, used in what we may call a *good* sense nevertheless. And this is also the sense in which we *do* use these words, so far

^a See the second extract from Baxter in note 1, p. 329.

¹¹ *Æque manifestum est ipsam in plerisque, iisque nobilissimis eccl. Reformatarum confessionibus omnino deesse. De imputatione justitiæ Christi ne γεν quidem reperias, vel in nostra confessione, vel in Augustana, Argentinensi, Wittembergica, Bohemica, Belgica," &c. Examen Cens. p. 36. Ed. Grabe.*

^b See what was said before on this subject in Chap. II. Sect. ix. p. 84. sqq.

^c Chap. II. Sect. ix. under Head 3, p. 84, and in pp. 87, 88.

as we really interpret them by the universal consent of divines of all ages and countries^a, that the whole process of the Redemption is from the original love and bounty of God.

Thus our own eleventh article: "We are accounted righteous," it is here said, "before God, only for the merit of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, by faith, and not for our own works or deservings."^b These words *may* mean, and doubtless it was contemplated that some would understand them to mean^c, only that we are put by Christ's

^a See particularly the extracts from Grotius in Sect. ii. of this Chapter, pp. 269, 270, and in the notes *ibid.*; also the extract from Outram, in note 5, p. 272, and the extract from Gregory, in note 6, p. 274.

^b The Latin corresponds entirely, "Tantum propter meritum Domini ac Servatoris nostri Jesu Christi, per fidem, non propter opera et merita nostra justi coram Deo reputamur."

^c See again the second extract from Baxter in note 1, p. 329. Dr. Hey observes on this subject as follows: "Those virtues which we practise in imitation of Christ must be supposed, when accepted, to be accepted on his account." Lectures, Vol. III. pp. 348, 349. *Must be accepted on his account* here means necessarily, if it mean anything, and if we are to take this sentence singly, that these virtues are to be referred to Christ, inasmuch as he has shown or taught us *what* to imitate; or because, if we had not him to imitate, and strength from him, we could not practise them. And this together with the abnegation of all pretence to perfection, and of all *such* merit as can intitle us to claim as of right the reward which is given in bounty, is, I think, the substantial meaning of the Homily of Salvation. This homily was written by Cranmer,

merits, or, which is the same thing, by what Christ, with infinite merit, has done for us, into a capacity of working out for ourselves that work of faith, which, but for the strength and principle which he has given, we should not possess. This is a very legitimate parallelism of expression to what is, in fact, only another mode of stating the same doctrine,—namely, that we have his righteousness *infused* in us by the Spirit^a.

If, moreover, it had been meant to exclude this doctrine altogether, the exclusion, as is the case in the passages which I have before cited^b from Melancthon, and from the Westminster confession, might have been made absolute. And thus accordingly, Tucker, speaking of the notion of Christ's death operating as a motive, or consideration, with God, says as follows: "Neither do I believe that it was in the thoughts of the compilers

and what I have said will, I think, be manifest to any one who will carefully peruse the whole of it. One sentence which is, I believe, frequently quoted as teaching the doctrine of our being justified by the external imputation of Christ's righteousness, rather appears to me to have quite an opposite meaning. "And this form of speaking use we in the humbling of ourselves to God, and to give all the glory to our Saviour Christ, who is best worthy to have it." Page 17, fol. 1726.

^a See Bull as before quoted Chap. II. p. 76. Lord Bacon's Confession of Faith (Works, Vol. II. 8vo, p. 486) is worth referring to on this subject.

^b In pp. 345, 346.

of our liturgy, nor designed to be inculcated in the Scriptures."^a

Burnet, in his explanation of this article, implies like the many other divines, whom I have quoted elsewhere^b to the same effect, that Christ's death is to be accounted of as being that "valuable consideration" with God, "for which," or *propter quod*, he "pardons and justifies." I subjoin the entire sentence in a note^c. But if this very temperate and sensible writer had been asked whether he would accept the following statement, as comprising the whole doctrine which we have a right to lay down, he would have answered, I do not doubt, in the affirmative.

The statement which I would thus make for him is as follows: "No faith or repentance of sinful man can be accounted of in itself as giving him an actual title to that forgiveness which God bestows in Christ. Christ only was sinless. He only, of all men, was ever intitled to set up a claim of perfect merit with God. But God, of free grace and mercy, grants to all who embrace Christ's religion, and follow his steps, a kind and bounteous

^a Light of Nature, Vol. VI. Chap. XXII. Sect. xi.

^b Chap. I. pp. 10, 11.

^c "Our faith and repentance are not the valuable considerations for which God pardons and justifies. That is done merely for the death of Christ, which God having out of the riches of his grace provided for us, justification is upon that account said to be free." On Article xi. p. 163, 8vo, 1759.

reward." Nothing, as I apprehend, can be more correct than the statement thus made, nor, of course, than Burnet's original statement thus understood.

In thus excepting, as I think we both may and ought, our own confession, to which I might add some others, together with the opinions of many of our best and soundest divines, from the charge of real error on this point, I still do not mean to qualify what I have said in Chapter II.^a respecting the language in which they are expressed, or express themselves. It is language which may, and indeed must, be explained as I have here explained it, and *made*, as thus it *is* made, consistent with that real truth which was *understood* by those who used it. But it is, nevertheless, injudicious and mischievous. It has, and must have, some effect, and that an evil effect. This effect is precisely the same with that of our being led by the *abuse* of even those good and authorized analogies which were spoken of in Chapter II. Sect. i. into the same error. And this error is that of allowing ourselves to account of something, anything, (for it matters not what,) as interposed between God's pardon of sin, and our own repentance or sanctification. Whether this be stated in the form of his remitting us a debt because paid by another, or of his accepting anything else as done by another, makes no difference. Neither does it make any difference,

^a Sect. ix. pp. 84—87.

even though we say that he accepts Christ's righteousness only as transfused into us, provided we say also, or, if we do not say, yet, if we apprehend, or imagine, that, except for him, he would not accept, if it could exist, the same righteousness, or not so willingly. For that is the point: namely, the point of an interposition between us and God in the pardon of sin, or in the acceptance of holiness.

V. Neither yet, although the desire to recede as far as possible from the church of Rome led many of the Reformers into extravagances of doctrine on this point, which never before assumed a character so formed or substantive, are they and their successors alone chargeable with it. The practical error involved in their doctrine is not to be accounted of as in any way peculiar *to them*, or not to be found existing in at least an equal degree in the church of Rome itself, and perhaps also in every other church, or religious society, which has ever been. In point of fact, this same error of imagining Christ's death, extrinsecally of our moral application of it, to have weight with God, is in its principle that inveterate error which is almost as old as the world itself, and which will last to the end of it, the error of supposing that sacrifices, extrinsic of morals, can be well pleasing to him. To transfer that estimate, which cannot be too high, of the importance of real goodness, from the thing itself to the means by which it is

communicated, and to rest in these, either in whole or in part, is the weakness of all countries, and of all creeds; and though it is one of the great errors from which Christ came to deliver mankind, we may, I think, feel well assured, even if we had not distinct evidence of the fact, that mankind was never without it^a. In the very earliest times of Christianity this was the error of all those who held, as we know that many practically did hold, or felt as if they held, that the administration of the mere rite of baptism, exclusively of any moral application made of it, had effect to conciliate the favour of God. I am inclined to think, also, that the very strongest of *all* the cases of this error is that by which the purchase of indulgences, a practice which is said to have had its rise in the twelfth or thirteenth century^b, was often accounted of in the church of Rome, as a commutation for sin, or as taking place of repentance. Even the divines of that church do not scruple, I believe, to allow that in the infelicity of the times preceding the Reformation this was the case. But nothing can be plainer than that if either Christ's merits, or those of the saints, could be pleaded in this way of regular transference, or as such a commutation, they must have been so far clearly, though falsely,

^a Compare what is said on this subject in Section vi.

^b Burnet on the 22nd Article, pp. 290, 291; and Hey's Lectures, Book IV. Art. xiv. Sect. i.

accounted of, as *not* infused, or made inherent, in those who pleaded them. All the early Christian writers, however, set themselves so determinately to correct *that* error as to baptism, that I do not think it can be fairly imputed, as a doctrinal error, to the early church, or rather to anything *in* the church which deserves the name of authority^a.

^a Courayer has a note [Note 2, p. 306, Vol. I.] to Father Paul's history, from which, if it were well founded, it would appear that this doctrine of the imputation of an *extrinsic* righteousness in baptism, has been essentially the doctrine of the church itself from the earliest times. His words are as follows: "L'enfant fidèle est juste avant que d'opérer la justice, puisque il n'est juste que par l'imputation qui lui est fait de la grâce dans un âge, où il est encore incapable d'aucune justice infuse ou inherente." If this "justice," or this grace of imputed or reputative righteousness, be not infused or inherent, it must of course be extrinsic. I do not see, however, that this argument is a correct argument, or that this grace cannot be infused, because the child is as yet incapable of all moral perception of it. It may still be supposed, according to the common, though I think unfounded, notion, to be infused *mystically*. See Sect. vii. of Chap. II. pp. 71, 72. I do not know, indeed, that the *word* justification is ever used to denote that mystical effect which baptism is thus so often supposed to have. The words ἀναγέννησις, ἀνακαίνωσις, παλιγγενεσία, ἄφεσις, λύσις, φωτισμός, οἰκείωσις πρὸς θεὸν ^b, and other similar words, not *justitia* or δικαίωσις, are commonly the words by which its operation, be it what it may, is expressed by the Fathers. But since the theory of those who hold the effect of baptism to be a mystical effect, assumes always, or ordinarily, that the rite of baptism has an effect in justifying, over and above any

^b Vide Suicer in voce Βάπτισμα.

And all Roman Catholic divines, so far as I have observed, set themselves also so determinately to correct *this* abuse of indulgences, that although no possible care or cautions can be adequate to restrain the mischiefs of so vicious a practice, I do not think that it can fairly be imputed *as a doctrinal error*, to any authorities of the church of Rome. At the same time, I cannot but think that practically, and therefore the more mischievously, that church even *amplifies* the same error in the homage which it still allows and offers to the Virgin and the saints. The prayer to the Virgin to intercede with her Son^a, when it is not idolatry, yet certainly means something more than is to be measured by the moral transfusion into man of Christ's virtues. The same corruption of meaning adds, moreover, to the unhallowed severance which too many everywhere make of Christ from God, a similar severance from Christ himself: an error which even at the present time we do not see the least disposition on the part of any of the Romish divines or authorities to retract or modify^b.

moral application made of it, their *meaning* must necessarily be, that *justification* is also given by the same mystical grace which they suppose to reside in the rite or office itself.

^a Jure matris Redemptori impera.

^b See Gladstone on Church Principles, pp. 355, 356, with the extract in the note in p. 357 from E. Campian's *Oratio de tutela et defensione B. Mariæ virginis*; together with the extract from the encyclical letter of Gregory XVI. in 1832.

I conclude this section with observing that the whole state of the case may be comprised in three, and only three propositions.

I. The first of these propositions is that God is to be understood to justify, or to forgive sins, by transference of the extrinsic merits of Christ to believers. This is the doctrine of imputation as held by Melancthon and Luther, and is a doctrine, as I think I have shown, wholly untenable, and which, even according to the avowal of those who press it to its consequences, makes a distinction between the forgiveness of sin, and the subduing of it^a.

II. The second of these propositions is that God justifies believers by making in them, for Christ's sake, or on account of the satisfaction made by him, a mystical change, or by infusing into them a peculiar grace, by which the power of sin is blotted out, or is weakened, and by which they are made capable, or more capable than they would else be, of working out, through him, their salvation. And this mystical change he is supposed to make, or this grace to infuse, not only in adults, but also in baptized infants; and, it has even been held, in them especially. We certainly find this doctrine in a very early, and perhaps may trace it to the very first age of the church. Nor

^a See Chap. II. Sect. ix. Head 2, pp. 81—84.

do I see, as is said elsewhere^a, that it contains anything inconsistent with what we know of the moral attributes of the Deity. At the same time, it is, as it seems to me, a very abstruse doctrine, very inconsistent with the plain and practical character of that only record of our faith to which an implicit reverence is due. There is also an evident *danger* of its leading us to make a difference which we ought not to make between Christ and God^b. And, at all events, if Scripture does not teach this doctrine, *we* must not affirm it. This is the doctrine of the infused righteousness of the church of Rome^c, if, as I hope and believe, I apprehend that doctrine rightly, and not too benignantly: and is also the doctrine, as I suppose, of most of those divines of our own church, who do not adopt the doctrine of an extrinsic righteousness stated before.

III. The third and last proposition is, that God forgives us through Christ, as he gives us through him, and through his doctrine and institutions, a *moral* power of contending with temptation and evil, which, without him, we should not, or rather do not, possess. That Scripture teaches

^a See Chap. II. Sect. vi. p. 67, and Sect. vii. pp. 70, 71.

^b See Chap. I. of this Treatise, pp. 8—13.

^c Mr. Faber states that the doctrine of infused righteousness was introduced by the schoolmen. But I think he is plainly wrong. See Faber on Justification, pp. 335—338.

this doctrine, no one doubts. And this is a doctrine which has not any danger whatever.

Which is it of these propositions which contains the truth, and the whole truth, and which we may also dare to affirm is *nothing but the truth?*

SECTION XVI.

Of the use made by Paley, in his twentieth Sermon^a, of the words cause and condition, in speaking of the efficacy of the death of Christ; also of the doctrine of external righteousness, as stated recently in a Sermon by Dr. Hampden.

THE express purport of this sermon by Paley is to advocate or explain the common tenet that the “cause of salvation is one thing, the conditions another” thing, or that the death of Christ is its cause, a good life its condition. The cause, origin, or source of salvation, the writer most justly says, is not in ourselves, nor in anything we do, or can do, but in the free will, the free gift, the love and mercy, and good will and pleasure and graciousness of the original offer of God^b. Nothing can be more true: but then it follows: “Therefore whatever shall have moved and excited and conciliated that good will and pleasure, so as to have procured that offer to be made, or shall have formed any part or portion of the motive from which it was made, may most truly and properly be said to be

^a Of the collection first printed.

^b Page 307, edition of 1808.

efficacious^a in human salvation." This sentence, it is to be observed, is from Paley, one of the most lucid of all writers. Yet nothing, as it seems to me, can be more plainly inconsistent than the thus saying in one sentence, that the *original* cause and source of salvation is the free love and good will of God, and then in another sentence that there exists *something else* to move and excite it. No doubt, as in this same sermon is clearly proved, the gift or grace is not the less free, because of the conditions with which it is coupled, or because it is not given to those who take not the method which they ought to take to avail themselves of it. But this does not turn one part of the method into a cause, while it leaves the other part only as a condition. The foregoing extract should therefore, I think, have run as follows: "And the graciousness of that offer is made evident by its being bestowed through Christ, whose whole mission, and whose death especially, we may discern to have been most truly and graciously efficacious of human salvation, and also, *in a secondary sense*, its cause."

The same writer again observes in Vol. II. pp. 49. 51^b, that the death of Christ may be of the same nature with the Jewish sacrifices, and may

^a It would have been more exact to have said "a part or portion of the *cause* of" human salvation.

^b Of the collection published in 1825.

have a spiritual and mystical effect. But it would be hard to show that the Jewish sacrifices possessed any spiritual effect whatever, except what flowed from the moral application of them made by the worshippers; or any mystical effect, except inasmuch as they were a part of that external dispensation, many or most of God's reasons for the planning of which are, no doubt, to us mysterious. Paley again speaks in p. 64 of the same volume, of the moral uses of Christ's coming into the world, but adds in p. 65, that it "has other and higher consequences" also.

In like manner Dr. Wardlaw: "Repentance is inseparably connected with forgiveness, but is not its procuring cause." Discourses on the Socinian controversy, p. 220.

Magee, on the other hand, says rightly: "Although it is through the merits and intercession [or sacrifice] of Christ that we are forgiven, yet these were not the *procuring cause*, but the *means* by which God, originally disposed to forgive, thought it right to bestow pardon." (i. 22.) How this is consistent with the objection which he states in another part of his work, to the considering Christ's death as the "instituted means" of salvation^a, it is of course for those to show who venture to account of it as being anything else.

Dr. Hampden, in whom I do not see that he

^a See Chap. XIV. Sect. ii. Note 4, p. 272.

says anything on this subject, which may not and ought not to be understood in a correct sense, says as follows in a recent sermon.

“External, indeed, is the principle of that righteousness, [or of our justification]. It arises not from anything in ourselves. We have only to lay hold of it, and cling to it, and thus make it our own. For though it is the Lord Jesus Christ who is made unto us righteousness, we must for our part own him as *our* righteousness. We must have, that is, no thought of ourselves apart from him, in seeking to justify ourselves before God. We must come for acquittal, and ask for mercy, as being dead unto sin with Christ, and raised again with him,—as vitally incorporated with him and made one with him, in the mystical body of his church.”^a I do not see that a better key can be found to all the many confusions of this most puzzled controversy, than by extracting from the passage which I have thus cited, the three following propositions.

I. That the righteousness of Christ by which we are justified is an external [or extrinsic] righteousness, or justification.

II. That we, to be justified or forgiven, must [individually] lay hold of it, and cling to it, and make it our own.

^a The Lord our Righteousness, a Sermon preached at Oxford in 1839, p. 14.

III. That our hope of justification or forgiveness consists only in our thus being made one with him, and incorporated into his body or church.

That God and Christ are external to us in one, and that the most obvious sense of the word external, or that "the ground of our pardon, the title of our acceptance,"^a is in their original mercy, and our pardon and acceptance obtained through the strength which they freely confer, is quite clear and unquestionable. It is no less unquestionable, that we have not any right to account of this their bounty or goodness as issuing out of any original or independent merit of ours. If it did, this their bounty would in point of fact be no bounty at all.

Neither of course is it less true, that it is our duty to lay hold of the bounty vouchsafed, and that so only we can hope to be forgiven. If we reject God's bounty, that is, if we reject it obstinately or viciously^b, we cannot hope for it; or, if we could, we yet should not have it through Christ.

So also again in the more startling form of words in which the same doctrine is again put in a subsequent part of the same sermon, that Christ is "our righteousness independently of anything that we do, however religious and holy," and that

^a Ibid. p. 11.

^b See Chap. IV. pp. 123—126, and compare also Sect. xxii. of this chapter.

repentance "however necessary has not any *efficacy* to repair the ruin of sin."^a *In the sense which I suppose ought here to be given to these words*, the doctrine stated in them, stands clear of all dispute or denial of that real efficacy to salvation of both our works, and our repentance, which if claimed for them *in another sense*, they may be affirmed to possess. Certainly God's and Christ's *goodness* are as much *independent* of, as they are *external* to us, and I should rather say that the word *independent* is the best word of the two. Nothing that we can do can be any way the *source* of that fountain of grace, in which our sins are washed away, or can any way *originate* Christ's plan, or any plan, of repairing the ruin brought in by the fall. Neither is it less true that the truly justified, and the best Christians, "best know the preciousness of a *gifted* righteousness."^b

That what I have thus stated is Dr. Hampden's meaning in the extract which I have here cited, follows, I think, from other parts of the same sermon; and especially from what he says, very candidly and wisely, of the doctrine of the Church of Rome on this subject^c.

He himself, in common with many of the reformers, and with, I believe, most other divines of our own church, separates absolutely and decidedly

^a Dr. Hampden's Sermon as before quoted, pp. 20, 21.

^b Ibid. page 18.

^c Ibid. page 25.

between that grace of justification which he accounts of as wholly external, and the internal process of sanctification^a. This is in effect, and if we have any meaning in making this separation, to account of our justification as being nothing else but that merciful *proffer* of forgiveness and salvation through Christ, which is freely made to all who believe in him. If the theory of our external, or extrinsic, justification be nothing else than this, it is a true theory. There is no doubt but that that proffer is freely made. But though the theory is thus made true, the use in this sense of the word justification is not the less confusing. People are apt to suppose, that all who are justified are, if they do but continue in their *state* of justification^b, also saved. And this moreover they not only are apt to suppose, but *must* suppose, unless they in real meaning identify the justified with the whole body of Christians, and include in the body of Christians many most unworthy members. But we are not *saved*, and there are comparatively few who imagine that we *are* saved, without conditions. Consequently no one, who accounts of the justification of the Christian as carrying his salvation along with it, can help accounting of his

^a Pages 23. 26. See the Extracts from Hooker and Bishop Hall in Chap. XV. of this Treatise, No. lxix.

^b "Modo in justificatione permanant." Jerome, as quoted in Chap. II. Sect. ix. note c, page 90.

justification as conditional also : and *if so accounted of*, it is plainly something more than that free proffer, which he may, or may not, accept as he wills. For these reasons it appears to me to be quite clear that, though I do not say the only correct, yet by far the most intelligible method of stating our real case is to state justification and sanctification (and we may say in like manner salvation also) only as being what they have been stated in this Treatise to be^a, so many steps of the same process. In this sense they are all equally dependent on our fulfilling the conditions prescribed; the preparation of the heart being as much a condition of our being received into the lowest step, as the performance of the work and harvest of faith is of our attaining the highest step, of God's great and free gift of favour and reward. That our *salvation* is conditional is not, and cannot be, anywhere better shown than in that sermon by Paley of which I have been speaking in the first part of this section, and which though, as I think, wholly incorrect in the use which it makes of the *words* cause and condition, does not the less show clearly and forcibly the propriety of speaking of *conditions* of salvation, and what is meant by it.

To return for one moment to Dr. Hampden's sermon. In the summary of the doctrine in pp.

^a See Chap. II. Sect. ix. pp. 91, 92, also Sect. xiv. of this chapter, and what will be said farther in Chap XV. No. xxviii.

10 and 11, it is rightly said that “the work of man’s salvation is wholly divine: divine in its first cause: divine in the means by which it is wrought: divine in its end.” “The righteousness by which man stands before God, as a sinful being saved by God’s mercy in Christ, the righteousness of the Gospel, is not the righteousness of *man*, but of *the Lord himself*, who has mercy on us.” The sense in which this is true is, that this righteousness of the Gospel is not a righteousness which man, independently of the grace given, could have worked out for himself. I here take the word righteousness as denoting the footing on which man stands before God. But it is never to be forgotten, and indeed the sentence which I have here quoted *implies*, that God’s righteousness, or the righteousness of the Gospel, as spoken of in Scripture, denotes most commonly and properly, not the footing on which man stands before God, but rather the kindness of God himself in mercifully placing him on that footing.

Again in the next sentence: “The stupendous miracle of the divine goodness displayed in the redemption of a fallen world is not, that man can now obtain the utmost perfection and the utmost felicity, of *his own nature*. The Gospel scheme of mercy is infinitely more than this. The ground of our pardon, the title of our acceptance is in the nature of God himself.” The meaning of these

last words must be that the scheme issues, and that the title is granted, of God's original mercy. Again: "As sin has abounded unto the condemnation of man, so grace has much more abounded unto his justification: inasmuch as *now* in the merits of Christ, we are blessed with a blessedness, belonging to *Him*: for the Lord himself . . . is become *our* righteousness." Our being blessed with a blessedness belonging to Christ we can only affirm to be true in the sense that by him, and by him alone, we are, of grace, rendered meet for receiving it. So only, and in his merciful acceptance of our at the best imperfect meekness, does *he* become *our* righteousness.

SECTION XVII.

Of the opinions held respecting Christ's atonement by Foster, Dr. John Taylor, Lardner, and others.

UTTERLY as I differ on the doctrine of our blessed Saviour's full divinity from all writers who detract from it in the least, I should yet think it uncandid, especially after what was said in Chap. I. p. 4, to dismiss this subject without acknowledging of some of them, that they appear to me to be intitled to no niggardly praise for stating very well, *so far as they go*, the correct and scriptural view of his *office*. Neither yet is it other than might be expected, that in the confusion in which the whole doctrine

of the atonement has long been involved, writers whose theory respecting the person of Christ, naturally led them to consider his mission as limited to the moral effect which his doctrines take on the soul, might be more studious to trace out that its moral effect, than those whose theories carry them farther. Foster, the antagonist of Tindal, has written well on this subject in a passage to which I refer in a note¹. Dr. John Taylor holds nearly the same language, and perhaps more fully and expressly than Foster: and certainly both these writers speak of the death and sufferings of the Saviour in terms which cannot be denied to include correctly the whole of every moral effect which they can possibly have. Lardner speaks to the same purport in one of his posthumous Sermons, and I also subjoin other references, and amongst these a reference to Bishop Law, whose observations on this subject are, I think, well worth the consulting; and of whom I should add that I do not mean to class him as a Socinian, although he agrees on this point with the other writers whom I have named².

¹ Foster against Tindal, 8vo, 1731, p. 355 and sqq.

² Taylor's Key to the Romans, Sect. 145. Benson's Life of Christ, p. 443. Bourne's Sermons, Vol. II. Sermon vi. pp. 157, 158. Law's Discourse on the Life and Character of Christ, as published in the second edition of the Theory of Religion, Cambridge, 1749, p. 300-302.

At the same time, though thus much is, I think, to be frankly allowed, it seems to me also important to observe, that though these writers, or at least some of them, thus *recognise* Christ's death as having that moral effect which it has, they have yet often a wrong leaning to make as little of it as they can possibly help³. They even appear to be desirous (and I am not sure that the candid Dr. Hey also does not show some symptoms of this⁴) to *back out* of the sacrificial language in which Scripture speaks of it, as if it were overpressed by somewhat too strong a figure into the representation given of the effect of Christ's death on human salvation. It also appears to me that Balguy, in his preface to his father's Essay on Redemption, understates its influence in a similar way. But that in reasoning through these analogies, on what have been shown to be the just principles of all such reasoning, no figure *can be* too strong to ex-

³ And yet why they should have this leaning I do not see: or why the wrong theory of either the Arian or the Socinian as to Christ's personal divinity need to hamper him here.

⁴ "We may regard the death of Christ as something which we should *call* a sacrifice." Lectures on Divinity, III. 321. Compare p. 324. "I would not drop," says Bishop Law, in the passage referred to in the preceding note, "something of the image of atonement or propitiatory sacrifice." "We should seem obliged to retain so much of the forementioned image, as is necessary in some respect to intitle it to the name and the notion."

press its real effect, was, I think, sufficiently proved in Chapter II^a.

SECTION XVIII.

Of the practical view of the Christian system, and of the atonement in particular, taken by Clarke.

AMONG the writers to whom I have referred in the preceding section, I have not included Clarke. This great writer and divine, although it is to be confessed of him that, learned, and able, and pious as he was, his opinions were tainted with the error of a modified Arianism, an error not less, I think, than the Socinian, yet merits on every account the greatest attention. Nor do I know where to find any kindlier, or more attractive, or more correct delineation of all those great benefits which we owe to God in Christ than in the extract from his work on the Evidences which I here subjoin. (Pages 363—367, edit. of 1727.)

“Every one of these doctrines [the Christian doctrines] has a natural tendency, and a direct and powerful influence, to reform men’s lives, and correct their manners. This is the great end, and ultimate design, of all true religion: and it is a very great and fatal mistake to think that any doctrine or any belief whatsoever, can be any otherwise of any benefit to men, than as it is fitted to promote this main end. ‘There was none of the doctrines of our Saviour’ (as an excellent prelate of our church admirably expresses this matter) ‘calculated for

^a Sect. i. p. 37.

the gratification of men's idle curiosities, the busying and amusing them with airy and useless speculations; much less were they intended for an exercise of our credulity, or a trial how far we could bring our reason to submit to our faith. But, as on the one hand they were plain and simple, and such as, by their agreeableness to the rational faculties of mankind, did highly recommend themselves to our belief; so on the other hand, they had an immediate relation to practice, and were the genuine principles and foundation upon which all human and divine virtues were naturally to be superstructed.^a Particularly, what can be a more necessary and excellent foundation of true religion than that doctrine which the Christian religion clearly and distinctly teaches us, concerning the nature and attributes of the one only true God; without any of that ambiguity and doubtfulness, those various and inconsistent opinions and conjectures, those uncertain and oftentimes false reasonings concerning the nature of God, which, notwithstanding the natural possibility of discovering very many of the attributes of God by the light of true reason, did yet in fact overspread the greatest part of the heathen world with Polytheism or Atheism? What can be so certain a preservative against idolatry, and the worship of false gods, as the doctrine that the universe, the heavens, and the earth and all things contained therein, are the creatures and workmanship of the one true God, and have a continual dependence on him for the preservation of their being? What can be so sure a ground of true piety, and reliance upon God, as the clear Christian doctrine concerning Providence, concerning God's perpetually governing and directing the issues and events of all things, and inspecting with a more especial regard the moral actions of men, which doctrine was perplexed by the philosophers with endless disputes? What can be so just a vindication of the goodness of God, and consequently so necessary in order to our maintaining in

^a Abp. Sharp's Sermon on Christmas Day, 1707.

our minds worthy and honourable notions concerning him, as the doctrine, that God created man at first upright, and that the original of all evil and misery is sin? the want of a clear knowledge of which truth, extremely perplexed the heathen world, and made many recur to that most absurd fiction of a self-existent evil principle? What can be a greater encouragement to the practice of holiness, than the doctrine that God has at several times vouchsafed to make several particular revelations of his will to men, to instruct and support them more effectually in that practice? But above all, what doctrine could ever have been imagined so admirably fitted in all respects to promote all the ends of true religion as the incarnation of the Son of God? Which way could men have been filled with so deep a sense of the mercy and love of God towards them, and have been instructed in all divine truths in a method so well accommodated to their present infirmities, as by God's sending his only-begotten Son, to take upon him our nature, and therein to make a general revelation of the will of God to mankind? How could the honour and dignity and authority of the laws of God have been so effectually vindicated, and at the same time so satisfactory an assurance of pardon upon true repentance have been given unto men, as by this method, of the Son of God giving himself a sacrifice and expiation for sin? What could have been a more glorious manifestation of the mercy and compassion of God, and at the same time a more powerful means to discountenance men's presumption, to discourage them from repeating their transgressions, to give them a deep sense of the heinous nature of sin, and of God's extreme hatred and utter irreconcilableness to it, and to convince them of the excellency and importance of the laws of God, and the indispensable necessity of paying obedience to them, than this expedient of saving sinners by the sufferings and death of the Son of God, and by establishing with them a new and gracious covenant upon the merits of that satisfaction? How could men

be better encouraged to begin a religious life, than by having such a mediator, advocate, and intercessor for them with God, to obtain pardon of all their frailties; and by being assured of the assistance of the Spirit of God, to enable them to conquer all their corrupt affections, and to be in them an effectual principle of a heavenly and divine life? In fine: what stronger and more powerful motives could possibly have been contrived, to persuade men to live virtuously, and to deter them from vice, than the clear discovery made to us in the gospel, of God's having appointed a day, wherein he will judge the world in righteousness, every man according to his works, and that they who have done well shall be adjudged to everlasting happiness, and they that have done evil to endless punishment: of which the light of nature afforded men but obscure glimpses? And may we not here, upon the whole, appeal now even to our adversaries themselves, whether in all and every one of these doctrines there be not a more powerful, a more effectual method laid down for the reforming human nature, and obliging the whole world to forsake their sins, and to lead holy and virtuous lives than was ever taught before; nay, or than was possible to have been contrived by the wit of mankind? This is the great and highest recommendation of the Christian doctrine; this is what, to a well-disposed mind, would well nigh satisfactorily prove, even without the addition of any external testimony, that the revelation of Christianity could not possibly but come from God; seeing that not only all its practical precepts, but even all its articles of belief also tend plainly to this one and the same end, to make men universally amend and reform their lives, to recover and restore them to their original excellent state, from the corruption and misery which had been introduced by sin; and to establish upon earth the practice of everlasting righteousness, and entire and hearty obedience to the will of God; which would have been the religion of men (had they continued innocent) in Paradise, and now is the religion of angels, and for ever will

be the religion of saints in heaven. Vain men may value themselves upon their speculative knowledge, right opinions, and true and orthodox belief, separate from the practice of virtue and righteousness. But, as sure as the Gospel is true, no belief whatsoever shall finally be of advantage to men, any otherwise than only so far as it corrects their practice, hinders them from being workers of iniquity, and makes them like unto God."

I have the rather made this long extract from *Clarke*, because it appears to me that there exists no other great name among English divines, to which more, or a more ignorant injustice is commonly done. Nor is this injustice done only by the ignorant or the fanatical. The late Mr. Knox, whose opinions are as deserving as any one's of attention, charges him with a *defect* of "moral feeling."^a From this charge, though a charge meant no doubt in a very qualified sense, the preceding extract furnishes, I think, enough of proof, or presumption, that he is wholly clear. I readily confess both of him, and of almost all the best religious writers of the age in which he lived, amongst whom he, both during his life, and for

^a "I conceive Fenelon's notions of divine love to be resolvable into erroneous judgment; those of the Jesuits (so well exposed by Nicole) into vitiated moral taste; and those of Dr. Clarke into defective moral feeling." Knox's Remains, II. 316, Note. It can scarcely be necessary to remark that Mr. Knox here means, and rightly means, by *moral* feeling, the same thing with *religious* feeling.

many years subsequently, stood much the highest in the public esteem, that their writings are characterized by a very cold, and hard, and dialectical *manner*. This their coldness of manner would render them very unfit models of hortatory theology for the present age, and may have been a fault in their own age, although a fault easily to be accounted for, and greatly to be excused, by referring to the history of that age, and to the particular controversies in which they were plunged. Of this fault Butler certainly had not less than Clarke.

But it still deserves to be well considered, whether the stress which is commonly laid in our own age on *mere opinions* be not a worse fault than the defect of *unction* in the religious spirit of that age; or whether that faith which overcometh the world have really increased in the same degree with any professed revival of it which may have taken place? Religion, I have no doubt, is now more *in fashion* than it was then: and I think it probable that there is much less of scepticism as to its truth^a. But that the religion of *religiously minded men*, is now either a more complete conviction of really Christian principles, or a better or more efficacious application of those principles to the will or the practice, than it was then, is, as it seems to

^a Compare what was said on this subject in Chap. XII. Note 3, p. 197.

me, much more easy to affirm than it is to prove, or render probable.

SECTION XIX.

Of the use of the word Faith, as it means THE FAITH, or the Christian religion, in a sense distinct from our apprehension of, or belief in it.

MANY, or rather most commentators, rightly observe that the word Faith is very often used in Scripture in the sense here indicated, or as denoting the *object* which our blessed Saviour and his apostles propose to us, and which they exhort us to follow, not the intellectual or moral *act by* which we embrace it. This is a distinction which, as I show elsewhere^a, it is of the very highest importance to keep in mind in all our expositions of, and commentaries on, the doctrine of Scripture, and especially that of St. Paul, in those passages of his epistles which are most controverted and misunderstood. But the faculty or principle by which the *Holy Spirit* infuses, and we discern or apply, the knowledge, or just appreciation, of the truths and doctrines revealed, is evidently that faculty or principle of faith by which we are saved, and which is the direct instrument of our salvation. It is not *the* faith, the object

^a See the observations in Chap. XIII. on Matt. xviii. 6; Acts xv. 9; Rom. iii. 28; 2 Cor. x. 15; and especially on Col. i. 23.

proposed, but *our* faith, our embracing, or mode of embracing, it to which the promise is given. And this sense, namely, that in which we speak of faith as a faculty, or the exercise of that faculty, is also, I suppose, the only sense in which it is ever supposed to be at all available to us.

SECTION XX.

Of the nature and definition of conviction.—Also of confidence : and that this is assent, or conviction, with the addition of will. —Also of the fear of God as consistent and connected with confidence in him.

THE commonest use of the *word* conviction does not, I suppose, imply anything less than a sense or feeling, undivided by hesitation, of the certainty of those things of which we are convinced. In cases in which our opinion is precarious or qualified, we use more frequently the word *assent*^a. Nevertheless, since, in the imperfection of our human faculties, we cannot help accounting in some measure of *conviction* itself as a thing of degrees, the use of this word in the extensive sense ascribed to it in this treatise^b, will, I am persuaded, be, for convenience sake, readily granted.

^a Some writers use the word *assent* differently. Thus Mo-
sheim : “ Actus secundus [fidei] dicitur *assensus*, qui certissima
convictio est de veritate evangelii. Theologia Dogm. Pars
III. Chap. II. Sect. viii. p. 182.

^b Chap. IV. p. 119.

This division of faith into the same two *senses* to which I have thus here given the titles of *conviction* and *confidence*, is stated by Cyril as follows. "Faith, though in name one, is distinguished into two kinds. For there is one sort of faith which is of doctrines, implying the acquiescence of the mind concerning some certain thing. And this faith profits the soul as the Lord saith ^a. But there is a second sort of faith bestowed as a gift by Christ in the way of grace ^b. Now this faith, which is given of grace by the Spirit, is not only a faith in doctrine, but also worketh things beyond man's power." ^c To the same effect Doederlein: "Religion requires *first*, some knowledge of God's nature, and his disposition towards us: and *then*, secondly, the desire to think and act suitably to that knowledge. Hence, consequently, its division into two provinces, the one the intellectual province of studying and learning the truth, the other the practical province of influencing the feeling and will." ^d And so, in like manner, Mosheim ^e identifies "fi-

^a John v. 24. iii. 18.

^b 1 Cor. xii. 8, 9.

^c Catechetical Lectures, V. 10, 11. I copy from the translation published at Oxford in the Library of the Fathers, 1838.

^d Institutio Theologi Christiani, Vol. I. p. 1.

^e "Fides, generatim spectata, recte a Theologis in tres actus dividitur: I. In notitiam, seu cognitionem Jesu Christi, et ejus meritorum. II. In assensum seu convictionem de harum rerum veritate. III. In fiduciam, seu acceptationem veritatum

ducia," or *confidence*, with that act of the will which flows from the perception of elementary truth. It is easy to see that in each of these definitions, to which it would be easy to add a multitude of the same kind, the substance, whatever slight difference there may be of mere expression, is but one: that the "acquiescence of the mind," the "faith in doctrine," the "notitia," or "knowledge of God and of his disposition towards man," and the "perception of truth," are what I mean by *conviction*^a: and that the "faith which worketh," the "desire to act," and the "act of the will," are what I mean by *confidence*^b.

The long tissue of confusion which has been introduced into the enunciation of this really very plain doctrine may perhaps in no other way be more easily unravelled than by consulting the second of the two extracts made from Mosheim in Sect. xiv. of this chapter^c. Rotherham, in p. 36 of his Essay on Faith, has these words: "The truth is that every history must in some de-
 illarum." (Elem. Theol. Dogm. Pars III. c. ii. Sect. viii.) See also what follows, and the passage which I shall extract in Sect. xxviii. of this Chap. Note 7, the error contained in which passage does not affect the writer's recognition of the maxim on which I refer to him here, namely the maxim that in whatever degree we really *will*, in the same degree we also *confide*.

^a Chap. IV. p. 119.

^b Chap. IV. *ibid*.

^c Pages 326, 327.

gree move us, as it is more or less interesting. We cannot separate between the truth of the history and the affections that it will naturally excite in us.”^a The late Mr. Erskine of Edinburgh observes that a “believing the proper things, not the mode of believing, constitutes true faith,” and again, that “to have faith [he means effectual faith] in a thing, to believe a thing, and to understand a thing as a truth,” are expressions of the same import^b. Rotherham goes on to argue “that the very existence of a *merely* speculative faith may be called in question,” and that “there can be no real belief of the truth of the Gospel, without a tendency to produce goodness.”^c

Now the *tendency*, or that the doctrine, or the history must *in some degree* move us, is doubtless to be granted. The doctrines of the Gospel are revealed only because they *have* this tendency. Nothing can be more correct than the statement made by the same writer^d, that faith (he here means speculative faith, or faith in its sense of conviction) “brings the best motives to act on us in favour of virtue.” That is exactly what it does. The process is, that the truths of the history, or rather our knowledge or conviction that it is true, *brings* the motives; but that the will must still minister to itself in making them act. So also

^a Compare p. 38.

^b Essay on Faith, pp. 13, 14. 23—26.

^c Pages 38—41.

^d Page 128.

the conviction of the drunkard that the habit of drinking is an injurious habit, has a *tendency* no doubt to wean *him* from it ^a. Both *his* conviction and the convictions of religion may nevertheless be, and often are, wholly inoperative. Increase the *degree*, *reiterate* the tendencies ^b, and they become effective. But till this be done, they are vain and valueless; in the same manner in which even the first film deposited by a flood *tends* to fertilize, but yet may be too thin to allow of the *growth* of any useful product whatever; and may also, according to an observation of Pascal, which appears to me to be no less true of matters of doctrine, than of matters of evidence, be easily dissipated ^c. “Faith itself,” I add from a valuable sermon by Bull, “is an ineffectual virtue unless it be excited, actuated, and enlivened by this [frequent and serious] consideration. And I am apt to think that among those multitudes of professed Christians, that perish everlastingly, there are as

^a See pp. 133–135.

^b Page 133.

^c “Les preuves de Dieu metaphysiques sont éloignées du raisonnement des hommes, et si impliquées qu’elles frappent peu : et quand cela serviroit à quelques uns, ce ne seroit que pendant l’instant qu’ils voyent cette démonstration : mais une heure après ils craignent de s’être trompez : *quod curiositate cognoverint, superbia amiserunt*. D’ailleurs ces sortes de preuves ne nous peuvent conduire qu’à une connaissance speculative de Dieu : et ne le connoître que de cette sorte, c’est ne le connoître pas.” Pensées, Chap. II. Sect. ii.

many, at least, that miscarry for want of a serious consideration of the things they believe, as for want of belief itself: and that unthinking believers take up a very great room in the regions of darkness." Sect. ix. Vol. I. p. 375; see also pp. 394, 395, edition of 1714. Mr. Hinds, in his *History of the Rise and early Progress of Christianity*^a, states and illustrates the same truth exceedingly well^b. Many of the fathers, in stating what in substance is the same doctrine which has been here laid down, make a division of faith into *πίστις* and *γνώσις*, and speak of this *γνώσις* as formed by the same sort of impression or reiteration of truth or opinion, which I have here spoken of as the basis of *confidence*^c.

^a Vol. II. p. 324-326.

^b "Quid prodest, inquit, aperta monstrare? Plurimum. Interdum enim scimus, nec attendimus. Non docet admonitio, sed advertit, sed excitat, sed memoriam continet, nec patitur elabi. Pleraque ante oculos posita transimus. Admonere genus adhortandi est. Sæpe animus etiam aperta dissimulat. Ingerenda est itaque illi notitia rerum notissimarum." Senecæ. Opp. ed. Schotti, Vol. I. Epist. I. xciv. p. 775.

^c Πίστις σύντομος ἐστὶ τῶν κατεπειγόντων γνώσις· ἡ γνώσις δὲ ἀπόδειξις τῶν διὰ πίστεως παρελημένων ἰχυρὰ καὶ βέβαιος, διὰ τῆς κυριακῆς διδασκαλίας ἐποικοδομουμένη τῇ πίστει, εἰς τὸ ἀμετάπτωτον καὶ μετ' ἐπιστήμης καταληπτὸν παραπέμπουσα. Clem. Alex. Strom. VII. 732, apud Suicer in voce πίστις, p. 730. Others make a quadruple division into πίστις, γνώσις, ὁρμή, and πρᾶξις, as Theodoret. Ἡγείται μέντοι τῆς γνώσεως ἡ πίστις, ἔπεται δὲ τῇ πίστει ἡ γνώσις· ἔχεται δὲ τῆς γνώσεως ἡ ὁρμή, ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ ταύτῃ ἡ πρᾶξις.

To this use of the word *confidence*, in a sense nearly coextensive with *will*, it may still possibly be objected, that the will to obey God's commands may be based in a *fear* of his judgments, but that fear and confidence are opposites, and therefore cannot coexist. But to this I answer,—that fear, so far as it is an active principle, is, in itself, not less than hope or joy, a confidence in, or a reliance on, either actual, or imagined, truth or reality. Hope is a confidence in, or a reliance on, the reality of the thing hoped for; fear on the reality of the thing feared. Neither yet is the fear of God, in its more enlarged sense, to be accounted of as a servile feeling. The religious *awe* of his power and sanctity is as much a moral perception as it is a useful terror, and may be not less influential for good in the one way, than in the other^a. And we may also even *love* his good-

δεῖ γὰρ πιστεῦσαι πρῶτον, εἶτα μαθεῖν· γνόντα δὲ ὀρμηῆσαι· ὀρμήσαντα δὲ πρᾶξαι. Therapeut. S. 1. p. 479, apud eundem l. c. q. v. Origen, in a passage quoted in the same page, makes a triple division; and makes πίστις come last. Ἡ θεία σοφία ἐτέρα οὖσα τῆς πίστεως πρῶτόν ἐστι τῶν καλουμένων χαρισμάτων τοῦ θεοῦ· καὶ μετ' ἐκείνην δεύτερον ἡ καλουμένη γνῶσις· καὶ τρίτον ἡ πίστις^b. But πίστις here is confidence. The thing taught and the mental process affirmed is in all these forms of expression clearly one and the same, though the distinctions are arbitrary.

^a “ Timor ergo Domini sit nobis reverentia honore illo et timore mixta. Nec mirum si utrumque effectum idem animus

^b Lib. VI. contra Celsum, p. 284.

ness the more, because tempered by a justice which will not, and cannot, grant indiscriminately gifts, which none but either the holy, or the contrite, can dare to ask, or expect to receive.

SECTION XXI.

Of conviction, and knowledge : also of the process by which religious knowledge, or conviction, is brought into the mind, and of its operation.

I HAVE spoken in the preceding section of religious knowledge (*notitia*) as meaning the same thing with “conviction.” Of course I there mean by knowledge not merely the knowledge of what religion is, but the knowledge also that is true. The mere knowledge of what it is may even be coupled with the *disbelief* of it. This distinction, which some writers make very formally^a, is quite obvious. It is also no less obvious that when this knowledge of doctrines is carried on, as it ought to be, *from* the knowledge of what they are, *to* the knowledge that they are really true, *this* knowledge is nothing less than an intellectual *conviction* of the very

recipiat : nam qui secum reputat, qualis sit nobis pater Deus, satis habet causæ, etiamsi nulli sint inferi, cur ejus offensio-
nem qualibet morte gravius perhorrescat.” Calv. Inst. III.
ii. 26.

^a See, for example, the extracts from Mosheim in note a, p. 380 ; and note e, p. 381 of the last Section.

highest degree. No conviction can be stronger than what *science*, in this sense, may be said to be.

The material point in this whole argument, as I have already repeatedly observed, is the following:—that a man often both may and will know very well what religion is, and not disbelieve or doubt of it, and yet not have enough of real concern about the matter to make it the guide of his life. He usually, in such cases, takes it on trust^a, and such a man will also often be very inquisitive about doctrines, and very well qualified to understand what they are. The religious knowledge of such people as this is that which has sometimes been called with sufficient propriety an “*otiosa notitia*,” or indolent knowledge. Luther speaks of it in the preface to his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans^b, as the “*frigid opinion or conception*” of men who, though they can talk much of Christ, and know, and have meditated on, and assent to, the truth of his history, yet have not their hearts renewed by his power. Calvin speaks also to the like effect^c,

^a Or in that $\psi\iota\lambda\eta\ \pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$, which will be spoken of in Sect. xxiii.

^b Opp. Tom. V. pp. 97, 98. Wittebergæ, 1554. I extract a part of the passage in Sect. xxviii. of this chapter.

^c “*Credunt certè plurimi Deum esse. Evangelicam historiam ac reliquas Scripturæ partes veras esse arbitrantur (quale*

and consequently denies altogether to such an assent as this, (as Luther also denies no less absolutely,) the title of faith, and, together with the title of faith, that of conviction also; if we may translate into the word conviction that "*firma et certa cognitio*" with which he identifies faith in the formal definition which he gives of it in the same part of his work. He is also so far right as that the having this conviction, or indeed having any degree of merely speculative knowledge, any "*otiosa notitia*," or "*frigid opinion*" of the truth, and stopping in it, implies an inconsiderateness of character little, if at all less sinful than even the acting against strong convictions. On these principles I apprehend that every real argument with respect to the metaphysical process by which religious knowledge or conviction is brought into the mind, or *fere judicium esse solet de iis quæ vel olim gesta narrantur, vel ipsi præsentibus spectavimus*): sunt etiam qui ultra procedunt: nam et Dei sermonem pro certissimo habent oraculo, nec ejus præcepta prorsus negligunt, et minis et promissionibus utcunque commoventur. . . . Credidisse dicitur Simon Magus. . . . Quod fides illi tribuitur, non intelligimus cum quibusdam simulasse verbis quam in corde nullam haberet, sed potius arbitramur Evangelii majestati victum qualemcunque fidem adhibuisse, atque ita Christum vitæ et salutis auctorem agnovisse, ut libenter illi nomen daret. . . . Qualiscunque autem illa est assensio, ad cor usque minime penetrat, ut illic defixa resideat, et quanquam radices egisse interdum videtur, vivæ tamen illæ non sunt." Inst. III. ii. 9, 10.

to the process of its operation, might be argued or comprised in the four following questions.

I. Whether or no we can attain to a competent intellectual knowledge both of what the truth is, and also that it is truth, without being conducted to the attainment of that knowledge by the sanctifying, or the concurrently sanctifying and illuminating, operation of the Holy Spirit^a? If this question be answered in the negative, no bad man, or none but the elect, can have that knowledge, and we run of necessity into extreme Calvinism.

II. Whether, if we have attained that knowledge, and *not* through the sanctifying operation of the Spirit, it leads us on of necessity to that virtue to which we know that it *ought* to lead us? But this, I think it is plain from what was said before in Chap. V. that it does *not*; that is, not of necessity; and also that *if* it does not, this knowledge is nothing else but the “otiosa notitia” before spoken of.

III. Whether even this “otiosa notitia,” though of itself inoperative, yet may not still be turned by the Holy Spirit to a good effect? And this I think it is no less plain from what was said in Chap. VI.^b that we cannot deny.

^a See Calvin. Inst. III. ii. 7, 8, as extracted in note 5, Sect. xxviii. of this Chapter.

^b Pages 145—148.

IV. Whether, supposing that enlightened faith to be attained, which consists in the union of a competent knowledge of the truth with the sincere will which God inspires, to act accordingly to it, this happy union may not still be subsequently dissevered; or whether the knowledge may not possibly remain, and yet the will deteriorate? But if this be not so, there is no going back unto perdition, there is no need for exhorting us to keep our calling and election sure with fear and trembling.

SECTION XXII.

A collection of references to Barrow, Balguy, Horsley, and other English divines, who speak of the acceptableness of the principle of faith as consisting in its having the same moral nature, or character, which is described in Chap. IV. pp. 123, 124.

SEE first to this effect Barrow's Sermon on Faith^a, from which I extract the following passage:—"Seeing so many noble acts of will do concur to its production, seeing it hath so many choice virtues inseparably adherent as previous or concomitant to it, it is no wonder that they [our Saviour and St. Paul] should moralize it, should render it very considerable, so capable of praise, so worthy of recompense." See also the beginning of Sermon III. and Sermon IV.^b

^a Works, Vol. II. Sermon ii. Sect. 8, pp. 33—35, edit. of 1683, folio.

^b Pages 65, 66, *ibid.*

See also Dr. Thomas Balguy's Inquiry into Faith, a tract first published in 1751, and included in the second volume of the edition of his works. That mere *credulity* is a vice, and not a virtue, is well explained in the same treatise^a. See also on the moral character of faith, a volume of Sermons, by the Rev. John Orr, Sermon VIII., or an abstract of this sermon in the Monthly Review for June, 1749; or see Tucker's Light of Nature, Vol. VI. p. 616; or Erskine on Faith, pp. 66. 87—90. 93. 98. "A just fear of God," says Bishop Sherlock, "and . . . a desire to please him, . . . are qualifications so necessary to a man's being accepted with God, . . . that without them the gospel cannot be so much as tendered to him."^b The same basis of the moral character of faith is also that on which Warburton founds the argument of Book IX. Chap. iii. of the Divine Legation, an argument, however, which he seems to me to draw out but confusedly, and with an appearance of holding that though faith is originally founded on works, it is yet rewardable, when attained, on a different principle from that on which works are rewardable. But that the principle on which God rewards both faith and works is one and the same,

^a Works, Vol. II. pp. 67 and 95—97.

^b Sherlock's Sermons, Vol. I. pp. 334, 335; and see what follows.

is, I think, made evident in the observations on Rom. iii. 28, and on Col. ii. 20—22, in Chapter XIII. of this treatise. The whole point, however, is nowhere better stated than in one of the sermons of Bishop Horsley, a writer whose precision and ability are no less conspicuous, wherever his natural vigour and penetration carry him right, than his ingenuity, when it carries him wrong. “From this general state,” he says, “of the principles on which the faith of Christians in these ages may be supposed to rest, when none can have the conviction of ocular proof, it is not difficult to understand what is the peculiar merit of that faith which believes what it hath not seen, whereby it is intitled to our Saviour’s blessing. The merit of this faith is not to be placed merely in its consequences, in its effects on the believer’s heart and actions. It is certain that faith which had not these effects is dead. There can be no sincere and salutary faith, where its natural fruit, a virtuous and holy life, is wanting. But faith, if I mistake not, hath besides another merit more properly its own, not acquired from its consequences, but conveyed to it from the principles in which it takes its rise. These, indeed, are what give to every action, much more than its consequences, its proper character and denomination: and the principles in which faith is founded appear to be that integrity, that candour, that sin-

cerity of mind, that love of goodness, that reverent sense of God's perfections, which are in themselves the highest of moral endowments, and the sources of all other virtues, if, indeed, there be any virtue which is not contained in these."^a I subjoin the following passage from a note by Dr. Williams to Jonathan Edwards's sermon on Salvation by Grace. "The supposition that 'believing with the heart unto righteousness' is not a moral act, as contradistinguished from a natural one, leads to an endless confusion of ideas. Surely to believe God's testimony concerning his Son and his righteousness is, if anything be, a moral act of obedience to divine authority."^b

SECTION XXIII.

Of the ψιλὴ πίστις of Origen, and the misty faith of Tucker.

"CELSUS in Origen could not imagine or conceive that mere faith, ψιλὴ πίστις, should work such a miracle as presently to turn a dissolute person into a saint. Zosimus saith of Constantine, that he chose Christianity as the only religion that promised impunity and pardon for his enormous practices." I copy this sentence from Barrow's Sermon on Justification by Faith^c. If the passage in Origen referred

^a Sermon XLII. pp. 259, 260, edition of 1812; and see what follows.

^b Edwards's Works, Vol. V. p. 365. New York, 1830.

^c Works, II. 83.

to be, as I suppose it is, the passage in pp. 8, 9, of Spencer's edition, it is a sentence which requires correction. At least if Barrow, by his translation of *φιλή πίστις* into "mere faith," means, and I see not that he can mean anything else, a faith which consists in a merely intellectual assent, or conviction, not carried forward into act, or into the fruit of works, he evidently mistakes the meaning both of Celsus's argumentation, and of Origen's answer to it. Celsus's *argument* is that a *φιλή πίστις*, or a faith not based on rational grounds, or on philosophy, can be but a weak faith at best, and must therefore be unsafe to depend on. Origen, in his reply, is far too able to argue against reason: perhaps, like Clement of Alexandria, he concedes, in expression at least, too much to philosophy. But his *argument* is, that even a faith which rests on but a slight or unexamined foundation, or a faith taken up at random or on authority, is yet to be accounted of as good, if a good conduct, or a conduct better than we should find in the infidel, be seen to flow from it^a. He might have added, with Aristotle, that though knowledge is in its nature stronger than opinion, yet there

^a But though this is the argument *here*, and though I have not seen the word *φιλή* applied to faith in any other sense than in this, there is no doubt but that it was a standing, though most unjust, reproach against Christianity from the very earliest times, that it taught men to place their dependence on

are some who confide no less in their opinions than others in what they know^a. This is the whole argument of this passage, which is an argument not of *mere faith*, or of faith in its mere sense of assent or conviction, against works, or against *will*, but of the weak faith and the strong.

Tucker in his *Light of Nature*, speaks of persons whose “sincere assent to truth is like the sight of objects through a mist, and leaves a secret suspicion and mistrust that perhaps they may not be true, though without any apparent reason to doubt of their truth.”^b The *ψιλλὴ πίστις* of Origen may differ from the “misty faith” of Tucker, inasmuch as the first rather argues a defect of conviction, the second a defect of realization or will. That some such secret suspicion or mistrust that perhaps even what we know may not, after all, turn out to be true, is often felt, is, I think, certain. There is hardly any juggle or palmistry, by which

“mere faith,” or on faith without works^c. And this is evidently the sense in which Constantine is reproached for becoming a Christian in the passage in Zosimus. Compare what is said on this subject in Tucker’s *Light of Nature*, VI. 19.

^a Ἐνιοὶ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν ἥττον οἷς δοξάζουσιν, ἢ ἕτεροι οἷς ἐπίστανται. Eth. VII. 3. This passage is referred to by Barrow, Sermon iv. Vol. II. p. 55.

^b *Light of Nature*, Vol. VI. p. 53.

^c This is a point which, to look no farther, is sufficiently clear from James ii.

men, when they like it, cannot delude themselves, and they also find themselves out so often in so many mistakes, as to lose the confidence which they ought to have in what they know to be true. This, however, only proves the intimate connexion, as stated in Chap. VI. of this treatise, between the faculties, concrete faculties as they are there stated to be ^a, of the understanding and the will. It does not prove the non-existence of any generic distinction between those faculties. And if any one suppose, that because I do not deny, but rather affirm, the existence both of the *ψιλλὴ πίστις* of Origen, and of the secret suspicion and mistrust spoken of by Tucker, I therefore have stated that distinction too unreservedly, I think he is wrong. All that I mean is to claim *so much* independence of the will on the convictions, as was stated in the beginning of Chap. V. of this treatise; so much, namely, as that which we see to subsist in the man who knows that he is killing himself by drink, and in the vicious man who yet believes in a future state. Whatever the metaphysical connexion of the two faculties, I account this independence as being practically very great and decided, and as fully justifying all the language which I have used.

^a Pages 144, 145.

SECTION XXIV.

That religion may subsist in some degree, as, for example, in that of the ψιλή πίστις, or misty faith spoken of in the preceding section, even without conviction, and consequently is by no means commensurate with it:—also of other inferences deducible from the same reasoning.

It was sufficiently proved in Chapter IV.^a that the degree of religion, and the degree of *confidence*, taking here the word confidence in the sense in which it is used in this treatise^b, are altogether identical. But it is a wholly different question, whether, or how far, religion is also to be identified with, or dependent on, the *conviction* or *knowledge*^c that its doctrines are true. Every degree, doubtless, of religion, or of religious confidence, must of necessity assume *some* notion, or knowledge, that God either is, or may be; or at least some knowledge that there are many who suppose that there is a God, and that he makes certain requirements from us. All religion proceeds on that notion or knowledge, and consists essentially in that *sense* of dependence on him, that *fear*, or that *respect*, or that *desire to please him*, which are our natural impulses to *will* the things required: a will which, without that notion, cannot be. The question is therefore, whether, besides this general

^a Pages 120, 121. 129, 130.

^b See p. 119.

^c See Section xxi. of this Chapter.

notion, or knowledge, that he is, or is supposed to be, and supposed to make these requirements, it be also necessary to assume in *every* degree of religion, *some* degree of what may fairly be intitled an intellectual conviction of mind, that this is really a true notion. For instance, we must, if this be necessary, assume some such a conviction as the foundation of even that *ψιλλὴ πίστις*, or misty faith, which was spoken of in the preceding Section. But this, I think it is clear that, unless we embarrass ourselves in the utmost confusion of language, we cannot do. And I apprehend that the reason why thus, the conviction here described or supposed, is *not* absolutely necessary to religion is that there exists in nature, and in many minds, a sentiment of *theopathy*, wholly independent of all conviction, and indeed of all intellectual process or ratiocination whatever. To this sentiment our own longings after a futurity, our desire to trace out a first cause, and especially our sympathies with what we see to be felt or thought by others, together with other principles which might be classed with these, are quite enough to give birth. But theopathy is religion, a very imperfect and often really weak and superstitious version of it, but still, as far as it is a real impulse, a religious impulse in substance and act.

I think we may go also in this argument a step still farther. If there exist other causes besides

conviction which give birth to religion, it is very imaginable that these same causes may tend to produce some sense of religion, not only in the absence of all proper conviction of its truth; but also in cases in which many notions and surmises altogether opposed to that conviction may have taken hold of the mind. And this I apprehend also to be the real state of the case. The most confirmed sceptic cannot move and live in a world in which he was not brought up without imbibing *some* religious impressions, and in which he is surrounded by people of whom he knows and sees that they believe in, and worship God, and yet discard all *sense* of God's real being, and power. Nor can he easily, or often, get rid altogether of the similar impressions made by Christianity. Must not this, for example, have been the case with HUME, although a man whose religious scepticism was so universal and characteristic, as to amount to nothing less than mental disease. But that sense of religion, certainly, which we must thus suppose him to have had, such as it was, *was* religion, although a very defective religion, and although it rendered the scepticism which he encouraged in himself the more inexcusable. So also, and still more, in CLAUDIAN. The doubt itself which he has expressed in the well known passage^a which precedes his recognition of a Provi-

^a Curarent Superi Terras, &c. In Rufinum.

dence in the just punishment which had fallen at length on Rufinus: so also in TACITUS^a: his “*If there be any place for the shades of the pious: if great minds do not perish with the body:*”—*doubts* such as these have at least something, or I am inclined to say have *much*, of the character of religion impressed on them. This is also a vein, which, sceptical as it is, partially redeems a large portion of the Epicurean, and still more of the Academic, philosophy. In the same manner, *Pantheism* cannot always have extirpated from the imaginations of the worshippers of the heathen Gods, all sense of those Gods having a real influence. Also, still on the same principle, the *rationalistic* theology, as it is called, of modern times, though, like its prototype of the school of Alexandria, often delusive, yet may not be, any more than that was, unchristian.

It further appears to me, that this conclusion is not only correct and important in itself, but that the same reasoning furnishes also a corollary, of still more worth than this conclusion. If religion can subsist without conviction, or, which is a consequence of this, can subsist in comparative vigour, where there exists only an imperfect conviction, conviction and religion are incommensurate. If thus incommensurate, or if religion be thus, as

^a “*Si quis piorum manibus locus? Si non cum corpore extinguuntur magnæ animæ?*” De Vita Agricolaë, in fine.

it has been seen to be, partly an affair of precept, or an affair of habit, or of sympathy, we see the *reason* of the just importance attached by all sound minds to the setting the habits, and sentiments, and sympathies, as right as possible, at an age when the convictions cannot yet come in to operate, and providing for persons of all ages, institutions, and visible worship, as helps, or I should say, as necessary helps, to devotion and conduct. We see also in like manner the reason why music, and splendour, and antiquity may come in to aid (if they do aid) the effect of those institutions, and of that visible worship: and that, though not religion, yet as far as they originate a sense of religion, they originate religion itself. Also, as it was proved in Chap. V., that the mere intellectual conviction, though the proper guide of all our efforts, may yet be barren of fruit: so all those impulses, when wisely directed, point its effect; and also serve to protect us from being misled by those many aberrations of our guide itself, into which enthusiasm, or ingenuity, or the intire absence of all controlling sentiment, often lead.

SECTION XXV.

Of the reasons for dividing faith into conviction and confidence, in preference to the speaking of faith as one thing, and practice (which is the same with works) another thing.

It has been observed to me on the heading of Chap. V. of this Treatise, that a sensible peasant

would express the same meaning much more simply, by saying "that faith and practice do not always go together: but that a truly good practice must be founded on a right faith; and that a right faith tends to good practice." As far as the real meaning goes which good and devout Christians, unbiassed by controversy, attach to these words, I think that they express very nearly the real state of the case. But the words themselves are, as it seems to me, if we come to *analyze* them, full of ambiguity.

I. That faith and practice do not always go together, is, if we use the word faith in its merely intellectual sense, perfectly true, and it is a main object of the chapter to which I have now referred to show that it is so. Doubtless also it would be very convenient to have altogether distinct appellations of the two principles of which we speak; and especially to have appellations so distinct from each other as the words faith and practice are often considered. We might thus obtain the advantage of being able to denote both principles with a precision which might render it impossible to mistake the one for the other. Nor would it be difficult to frame on such a definition of these two words as should make the one of them to stand for the intellectual, and the other for the moral principle, a very clear exposition of our whole case. For practice, in its full sense in-

cluding, as it does, all acts, includes of course every act of the will, as much as it includes all those external acts which the will originates. All confidence, therefore, in God and Christ; and consequently faith in its sense of confidence, is thus included in practice. And accordingly the title of a *practical* faith is very often assigned to the principle of faith in this, or similar, views of its operation.

But to this limitation of the use of the word faith to its sense of conviction, the insurmountable objection arises, that we so put this word down from the high meaning almost always assigned to it in Scripture, and make it only the *instrument* (for conviction considered apart from its origin and its fruits can be nothing more) of what it is there represented *to be*. In Scripture, on the contrary, faith, when spoken of as a mental act, usually denotes the active principle of virtue itself^a. This Scriptural sense of the word is also the sense most recognised by divines, and especially by Protestants^b. And in this sense of the word faith, it is so far from being true that faith and practice do

^a As was, I think, proved sufficiently in the observations on Matt. vi. 30; viii. 10; in Chap. XIII. of this treatise. Compare also Sect. xxii. of this chapter.

^b Nothing, as it seems to me, can be more decisive than what is said on this subject in Bull's *Harmonia Apostolica*, Cap. xviii. p. 114, fol.

not go together, that they always do and must go together.

II. That a truly good practice must be founded on a right faith is also one of those sentences of which the meaning, though on the whole, I am persuaded, really good, is indistinct and embarrassed. That a truly good practice must be founded on a truly good *will*, or on a conscientious principle, is indeed a proposition which is clear enough: but then it is almost an identical proposition. That a truly good practice must be founded on a right faith, meaning by a right faith either the intellectual conviction of the truth, or a just, but still merely intellectual appreciation, of any of even the prime verities of religion, is as untrue as possible. "As a science," (that is intellectually,) "religion," as has been well said, "consists in the knowledge of the relations between God and man: as a principle" (that is in the sense here given to practice) "in the exercise of the corresponding affections: as a rule of duty in the performance of the actions which those affections prescribe. The principle may thrive in healthful life and energy, though the science be ill understood, and the rule imperfectly apprehended."^a It may be at least doubted whether there be any one of the doctrines of truth, for which good men have not substituted some perversion in the place of its real sub-

^a Edinburgh Review for July, 1841, p. 314.

stance or form. See farther on this point what was said in Chap. IV. p. 125 of the faith of Abraham.

III. That a truly good practice must be founded on a right faith, taking faith in its sense of confidence, and confidence in the sense in which it is used in this Treatise, is clearly true. But then faith and practice are identical, if faith be taken in this sense: or if we do not take them as identical, but give the name of faith to the principle, and that of practice to the effect; they are yet commensurate.

IV. That a right faith tends to good practice, is true in every sense. This, if we take faith in its sense of confidence, is only the converse of what has been said under Head 3. If we take it in its sense of intellectual conviction, it is one of the points which is sufficiently proved in Chap. V., and which the reader may find treated of in more detail, and very well, by Balguy, in the passage to which I refer at its conclusion.

If, moreover, we do *not* thus divide faith into two parts, I request of the reader to read the letter which I here subjoin in a note, and then to argue, if he can, that we are saved by faith alone, meaning by faith the intellectual conviction of truth. It is a letter not of very recent date, and certainly not either feebly or irreligiously written, though by a person evidently ignorant or regard-

less of those technical systems in which faith and works are accounted of as one, or in which the one is said to grow necessarily out of the other. It is a letter which certainly, I think, shows very clearly that there *is* a contrast *in one sense* between works and faith. But if we divide or distinguish faith according to the distinction stated in this treatise, into *conviction* and *confidence*, the contrast ceases. The *practice* stated in this letter as being the writer's *main* concern, is nothing else than that moral confidence itself, or moral *will*, which truly moral or religious *convictions* ought to, but do *not* always, engender^a.

a * * * *, Esq., to the Rev. * * * *

“DEAR SIR,

“In answer to your very kind letter, I do repeat, and without hesitation, that I *am* more concerned for my practice, than I am for my faith. The case may be different, doubtless is different, with many others. There may be many, whose faith is either uncertain or unhappy, and whose first object it should therefore be to clear its foundations, or to rectify their own obliquities of vision in a matter so important to their health and peace. But with regard to myself, I cannot think that my faith, or that any essential doctrine of it, is in the least danger. Bating our disputes about free will, I do not think, indeed, that even *you* hold any doctrine which I do not hold also. Brought up, as I have been, in a not less constant belief of God's being and goodness, than of my own existence, and that it is man's duty to obey in all things *his* commands, I do not feel myself ever tempted to disbelieve. I have also been confirmed in the faith of my childhood by my own subsequent

SECTION XXVI.

Of the necessity of faith to salvation, as laid down in the Athanasian Creed.

“WHOSOEVER will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholic Faith.”

reasoning. I am sure that I sincerely wish to *know* God's will. I am sure that the vice of wishing or trying to *disguise* from myself any part of my duty by the voluntarily tainting my principles is a vice I am free from. I am at least free from the folly of thinking that God's law can be anything less than universally holy, and certain that if I mistake in anything what it is, my mistake will be the comparatively innocent error of an honest mind or conscience.

“But then with regard to my practice, the case is different. If a man believe rightly, no doubt it seems a strange inconsistency that he should not practise rightly also : but how often he does not ! I *think* I know God's will ; but then I am conscious and certain that I have not an energetic and unmixed desire to do it. I *know* my duty, but I do not *practise* it. I stand fair enough in the eyes of the world ; but then the very praise which I sometimes get rather humiliates me. I do not think myself all bad ; but still I could throw myself at almost any moment into an agony of remorse at my omissions or deficiencies, and especially at my conviction that I should certainly want resoluteness for any great exertion which might be required of me. I really do not know how to justify to myself those cheerful views and hopes of the future which, notwithstanding all this, I cannot help entertaining.

“What right have I, I often ask myself, ever to entertain them ? Born with a constitutional tendency to happiness, and of a serene temper, supplied by my position with everything

In the sense which I suppose that every decently instructed person assigns to these words, and in

which can satisfy all the wants to which I have been educated, and without even a wish beyond them, I do suppose that I practise unimpeachably the virtues of domestic life, and all the lesser morals of decent society. But then I practise them without a temptation to transgress. I am a kind neighbour to the poor. My fortune, though not what is called considerable, puts that in my power. I am accessible to every body ; it is my nature so to be. I do not doubt but that, possessing these qualifications, as I do, and taking into account how many persons there are who abuse, if not exactly *these* talents, if I may use that word, yet their own or higher talents, I must be generally looked upon as a useful and respectable man, probably as a religious man. I shall certainly leave a void in the neighbourhood whenever I die.

“ But why am I only this ? Why do I not, my friend, like you, pass my days and nights in visiting the sick, in consoling the unfortunate, in instructing the ignorant, in doing as far as I can all the duties of our common religion, which you do, and which you do without believing it more sincerely than I myself believe in it. Instead of doing this, I merely live quietly a very easy life, admiring and perhaps loving all goodness and greatness very much ; but at the same time knowing very well that if any really hard thing were to be demanded of me, I should not have the resolution to do it. I do not say that on any sudden emergency my mind might not be roused, and on a very high and good principle, to exert a strength not its own, but it would collapse afterwards. I am not sure that I could not die for religion, if I were merely to have my head chopped off at once in a merciful way. But I am sure that if to me, as to many of the primitive Christians, the alternative were proposed of either sacrificing to Jupiter, or of a *painful* death, I

which I believe that they are always subscribed; all that they are to be understood to affirm, is that a

should choose to sacrifice. And I should then try to satisfy myself with the not altogether in such a case false casuistry, that

‘He that imposes an oath makes it,
Not he that for convenience takes it.’

Or, to come down to commoner, or what may commonly be supposed less difficult duties, I am sure that the perpetual martyrdom of hearing dull children say their catechism, or of endeavouring to explain to the ignorant or the dying doctrines which they either do not, or cannot, understand, or at least not in the sense which we must attach to them, is an achievement for which I never could have resolution. Often, often, do such thoughts as these make me very melancholy for a time; but then my happy original constitution comes to my help, and I go on with tolerable composure as I did before.

“Such, my dear Sir, is my state of mind. I believe it to be the state of many others, of many who in the eye of what we call the world, are regarded as patterns of virtue, and who at the same time, and with the same injustice, are regarded by mere religionists as altogether insensible to those tidings of salvation which we have received. I suppose you will tell me that I must either grow better or grow worse. Pray for me, counsel me, and let me see you when you can come. But though, after what I have said, I am sure you will not think me conceited, I shall be deaf to any arguments that I do not *believe* as I ought.

“I am, always, my dear friend,”

&c., &c.,

* * * *

This note is already so long that I the less scruple to subjoin to it the following dialogue, which is by the same writer,

right faith, meaning by faith speculative belief or conviction of truth, is of consummate importance;

and appears to me to be not less worth preservation. The *personæ* are the magistrate, who had committed a murderer, and the chaplain of the gaol, who had attended him previously to the execution.

“*Magistrate.*—Did you find this poor wretch impressible with a sense of his guilt?

“*Chaplain.*—Very much so: but yet I am afraid that his impressions were not of the right sort after all.

“*Magistrate.*—But what were the impressions which you wished and tried to create?

“*Chaplain.*—Impressions of the mercy of God, and of faith in the Redeemer; and that he ought to be even *willing* to surrender his life upon the scaffold as a mark of penitence for his great crime against both God and society. To all this he was very attentive. Many of the chords which I attempted to touch had vibrated through his own mind in happier times. But the impression was not what I had wished it to be. After the first agonies of remorse were over, a sort of spiritual intoxication took its place, which was far more of the nature of pleasure than pain. His last words were that he died happy; and in all the later intercourse which I had with him, I found almost all his sensibility to the past swallowed up in his dreams and wild imaginations of the future. You sometimes think that I repose too much on mere faith; but I can assure you that nothing gives me more pain than thus to see the doctrine of mercy itself abused by the wrong way in which it is taken, all true repentance absorbed in hope, and because Christ has wiped out the blot of sin, everything thrown back on *him* which he meant the sinner to do.

“*Magistrate.*—But then is it not an inference from this that you present Christ to him wrongly? The true doctrine is doubtless as you state it, that Christ has taught us that the

or that a man who *obstinately* or *rebelliously* either rejects or neglects it cannot be saved.—And this too

blot of sin will always be forgiven to repentance and faith, and that we have always access to the Father through him. If also you can make this *whole* doctrine fully understood, you can do no more. The whole of religion, and of the true religion, may be shown to grow out of this doctrine readily enough. And so also will your doctrine of faith alone, if *fully understood*, do the same. A *confiding* faith in the love and mercy of that God who has done so much for us will certainly, if once created, and rightly guarded, and duly preserved, involve sorrow and penitence for all the crimes which we may have committed against him.

“ But then I apprehend also that if you preach faith only, most men, especially the ignorant, the criminal, or men in any passionate state of excitement, can seldom be depended on to go on *per saltum* quite so far, or correctly. If from the most just statement which you have now made, you go on to teach, as I suppose most people do, that the sinner, as Christ has done all for him, has only to accept in faith the salvation so offered, I apprehend that he will be very apt to conclude, although against your meaning, that as Christ has done all, he need do nothing, and consequently that the step of repentance will be very likely to be forgot altogether. If, moreover, the insolvent consider himself as thus at once discharged by an act of grace, he will *often* rather please himself at having failed for a million, instead of only for a thousand pounds. But no man who has any such feeling as this can possibly have any just ground of hope in the Saviour’s promises.

“ *Chaplain.*—Then do you object to the language which we use that Christ has done all?

“ *Magistrate.*—It is the very language which you ought to use. But you ought also always to state clearly what that all is which Christ has done, namely, all that is necessary, all that

is the whole meaning of these words in the sense given to them by Roman Catholics, or at least by the better informed Roman Catholics, no less than by Protestants: for they, no less than Protestants, hold that the sin, or punishment, of rejecting the truth attaches on the *malitia*, or *malus animus*, which leads to reject it, and consequently that *error* may be innocent, and of course so considered in God's sight. The whole real meaning, therefore, of *this* proposition may be expressed as follows: that we esteem it our bounden duty to strive to learn what the Catholic faith truly is, or in other words

is wise, perhaps we may add, all that is possible, to give us hope, promise, encouragement, instruction, example, in that only way of salvation which we can take. The old law, that we must work out our salvation for ourselves, is not disturbed. What Christ gives is an increased power of working it out.

“*Chaplain.*—But how was this poor man to work? And you would not have had him merged in despair.

“*Magistrate.*—The reflex acts of the mind are, whether critically or not in the language of theologians, yet certainly in religious import, to be accounted of as *works* of piety. I see no reason why you should not pour hope into the heart of even the murderer. Cases, certainly, there must be in which it is the duty of a Christian minister so to do. But when you *have* given him that hope of which Christ is the author, tell him, and no less distinctly, that he is now dependent not on what Christ has done, but what he has done, or must do, for himself, on what he has done in duty to God and his neighbour, and on the degree in which his sorrow for his sin, mingled with gratitude for the promise of forgiveness, may *fit* him for the forgiveness promised.”

what is true Christianity, a proposition in which all will agree. I do not mean to argue it to be *expedient* that in a popular formulary, this truth should be put forward in these words of this creed: but still I apprehend that nothing can be more certain, than that, with the explication thus properly to be made of them, they express nothing more.

The creed then goes on to state several highly speculative propositions respecting the doctrine of the Trinity, which doctrine alone it has for its particular scope. All these propositions are true, as far as they are intelligible, and I think that I have also often known them to be useful to some, and indeed to many persons, as hedging in their conceptions of this doctrine from error or heresy. I do not contend that they are not expressed much too definitely. But still there is nothing to indicate any notion that it is to be considered as a doctrine to be believed for its own sake, or for the sake of any other end than that of its influence, which is very great, to give or to strengthen in us that moral life and ability, which is the object of all religion whatsoever.

SECTION XXVII.

Of the use sometimes made of the word PERSUASION in the sense given in this treatise to the word CONFIDENCE.

AMONG the many attempts to remove the inconvenience of using the one word faith in two

senses^a, the word *persuasion* (which indeed has also much to recommend it) has been more than once adopted to designate *that* sense or signification of it, for which^b I have here used the word *confidence*. Thus, Luther, if I recollect rightly, in various passages which are the exact equivalents to the definition or description of faith, which I shall cite from him in the next Section^c. Thus, also Tucker, from whom I subjoin two extracts in a note^d. The word *persuasion* is also used in the same sense in an exceedingly able article in the *Edinburgh Review* for January, 1839, p. 308.

^a See Section xxv. of this chapter, p. 403.

^b And among other reasons for the reason stated in p. 133.

^c Sect. xxviii. note 5.

^d This penetrating writer, after having explained the *distinction* between conviction and persuasion, in Chap. XIII. Vol. V. of the *Light of Nature*, shows briefly their *connexion* in Vol. VI. p. 12. "But by frequently holding the evidences in view, assent will at length become transferred from the premises to the conclusion, as well as desire from the end to the means: from thenceforward *conviction* grows into *persuasion*; and the truth becomes a judgment of the mind discerned by sense and apprehension, not a deduction of reason, and operates as a principle of action." And again to the same effect, *ibid.* pp. 49, 50: "Only let him not rest in the conviction of his understanding, but by frequent meditation, and other methods he shall judge expedient, work it into an habitual sentiment that may rise spontaneously upon occasion, and make his theory practical, so as to have an influence on his ordinary thoughts and motives." See also Chap. XXI. p. 519.

But the *principle* is not the less in substance the same principle which was stated in Chap. IV.,^a and also in the citations given in Section xx. of this chapter.

SECTION XXVIII.

Of the definitions of the true or saving faith by Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, and Doddridge.

“THE formal object of faith,” says Aquinas, “is veritas prima,”¹ or primal truth. By veritas prima is meant, in the first instance, God, the author of all truth, and in whom all truth is and is contained. And he then proceeds to say that the matter which we have to believe is whatever is made known to us by divine revelation². He adds³, that inasmuch as primal truth is the formal object of faith, it cannot admit of any admixture of falsehood. And he again defines faith or belief⁴ as “the voluntary assent of the understanding to divine truth, an assent of which divine grace is the spring

^a Page 119.

¹ “Formale fidei objectum est ipsa veritas prima.” Summa 2. 2. quæst. 1.

² “Materiale vero quicquid creditur propter revelationem divinam.”

³ In 9. 3. “Cum fidei objectum formale sit veritas prima, ei nullum potest subesse falsum.”

⁴ “Actus intellectus assentientis divinæ veritati ex imperio voluntatis motæ per gratiam.” Summa 2. 2. quæstio ii. art. 9.

or origin." Into the other multitudinous distinctions which Aquinas makes on this subject, I do not enter.

The definitions (or rather descriptions) of the true faith by Luther and Calvin I extract in a note⁵. That by Doddridge is as follows: "Saving

⁵ "Fides," says Luther, "non est frigida quædam opinio, aut vaga humani animi cogitatio, quam quis sibi audiens Evangelii historiam posset ipse sic comminisci et stulte fingere. . . . Vera fides autem est opus Dei in nobis, quo renascimur et renovamur ex Deo et spiritu Dei, quo vetus Adam occiditur, nosque toti transformati per omnia, ut Apostolus inquit, Christo novæ creaturæ efficimur per fidem, ubi vita et gubernatio cordis fit spiritus sanctus. Tam efficax, autem, viva, spirans et potens energia in corde est fides, ut non possit otiosa esse, et non erumpere in opera."^a Calvin's definition of faith is as follows: "Nunc justa fidei definitio nobis constabit, si dicamus esse divinæ erga nos benevolentiæ firmam certamque cognitionem, quæ gratuitæ in Christo promissionis veritate fundata, per Spiritum sanctum et revelatur mentibus nostris, et cordibus obsignatur." Then arguing against the schoolmen: "Ac primo refutanda est, quæ in scholis volitat nugatoria fidei formatæ et informis distinctio. Imaginantur enim eos credere quicquid cognitu necessarium est ad salutem, qui nullo timore Dei, nullo pietatis sensu, tanguntur. . . . Superciliose, tamen, tota Scriptura reclamante, persuasionem illam timore Dei vacuum fidei nomine dignantur."^b

^a Lutheri Præfat. in Epist. ad Rom. Opp. Tom. V. Wittebergæ, 1554, pp. 97, 98. The whole of this most noble and animating description of the true faith is well worth the consulting.

^b Inst. III. ii. 7, 8. See also Sections ix. x.

faith is such a persuasion that Christ is the great Messiah, the Son of God, and Saviour of men; and such a desire and expectation of the blessings he has procured under that character, as shall engage us cheerfully to commit our souls to him in his own appointed method of salvation," that is, as it follows in the same sentence, "in all the ways of holy and evangelical obedience."^a This description, (for certainly this sentence, like those which I have referred to from Luther and Calvin, is much more descriptive of the best faith, than definite as to what a saving faith must be,) evidently presupposes that we both *know* Christ's office or character, and *know* also what those blessings are which he has procured; a knowledge which amounts at the least to our understanding the nature or principle of the doctrine revealed by him.

In all this, also, nothing can be more plain than that we have at once everything which is right, and nothing too much. Nothing can be better, nothing more, or more unexceptionably, desirable than all religious knowledge thus supposed to be made operative of all religious obedience. Yet, though thus these definitions or descriptions state nothing but what the *best* faith really is: and though it is justly to be regarded as one of the great merits of the Reformers of the sixteenth

^a Sermon on Salvation by Grace through Faith, p. 8.

century, that they *brought out* as they did the moral part of this concrete into these their descriptions of a true faith: it is alike their character, and that of their predecessors, to have mixed up far too much of doctrine with that religious principle itself, in which its acceptable quality is always found to reside. Aquinas is right in urging the basis of truth as the basis on which the best faith ought always to stand. Of the just and noble energy of the two eloquent passages of Luther and Calvin, to which I refer, it is impossible to speak with too much admiration. And yet Aquinas would have refused the ascription of a saving faith to all who severed it from an implicit submission to church authority. Luther, in like manner, would have refused it to all who held the doctrine of justification by works: and Calvin not only this, but to all who denied the doctrine of a perpetuity of faith in the elect. But this, only with the substitution of doctrine for churchmanship, is still essentially only the same principle with that of the church of Rome, and, indeed, was the principle of the Inquisition itself⁶.

⁶ Possuntne salutem adipisci, qui invincibiliter Trinitatis et Christi fidem ignorant?

R. Minime: quia si legis naturalis divino auxilio fulti observationi adhærescerent, Deus provideret, quodammodo Trinitatis et Christi mysteria callerent. Non providit de magistro? Signum evidens eos legem naturalem violasse, digno damna-

Neither Aquinas, indeed, nor Luther, nor Calvin, but neither yet did the Inquisition, hold that the absolute correctness of a man's religious opinions, any more than the perfection of his moral obedience, is altogether necessary to his possessing a saving faith. Aquinas, I think, argues at length, and Calvin (Inst. III. 2. 31.) alleges instances from Scripture, to prove that this is not the case. But then what they all substitute for an absolute correctness of the speculative faith is not that moral feeling, which really excuses or palliates error, but still, in part at least, the right intellectual appreciation of some cardinal doctrine, on which they suppose, and perhaps wrongly suppose⁷, its saving efficacy to depend.

tionis æternæ flagitio." Escobar, *Moralis Theologia*, Vol. I. c. ii. Sect. 10.

⁷ See what was observed, in Section xx. of this Chapter, note e, p. 381, of Mosheim's definition of the religious "fiducia." I subjoin the passage there referred to. "Hæc ergo fiducia, quæ fidem justificantem efficit, duos actus requirit, quorum alter est intellectus, alter voluntatis. Actus intellectus in eo consistit, quod homo non generatim modo Christum habet redemptorem mundi, sed speciatim credit, illum etiam propter ipsius peccata mortem passum esse, atque Deo satisfacisse. Actus voluntatis in eo consistit, quod homini fideli placeat hæc aliena satisfactio, meritum Christi arripiat, et propter hoc meritum, et per illud salvari velit." El. Th. Dogm. p. 183. What I think the error of this passage is that it *limits* the efficacious "fiducia," or confidence, to a confidence in doctrines, not, as I apprehend, all of them true *in that sense in which the writer supposes their efficacy to reside*

SECTION XXIX.

Of the fides formata of the Schoolmen.

THE schoolmen's notion of the *fides formata* is this. They suppose, as its preliminary, an intellectual assent to the evidences, or a *fides informis*. And they then suppose, that on this intellectual assent, love, or charity, and the other virtues supervene, all these virtues being inspired or prompted by the Holy Spirit, and that a moral or truly religious faith thus becomes *formed*^a.

To this it is objected by the Reformers^b, and it is, of course, a part of the Calvinistic theory of predestination to hold, that the true faith, instead of being composed of these two kinds, is but of one kind; and that no intellectual faith, or none which can be, or is turned by the divine Spirit to a moral effect, ever exists, without a moral faith altogether *or consist*, or of which, if true, yet the right understanding does not involve the principle of religion, or of the inward life.

^a See the Index to Aquinas's *Summa*, voce *Fides*. "Fides formata est virtus, non autem informis." "Fides formata est fundamentum spiritualis ædificii, non autem informis." Ibid. Nos. 3 and 73.

^b See particularly the citation from Calvin, in the last Section, note 5; and also Bull, who *defends* both the phrase and the doctrine of *fides formata*, and who quotes Bucer to the same effect. *Harmonia Apostolica*, Diss. II. Chap. II. Sect. viii.

concurring, and coequal, with it from its very birth.

The solution of this controversy is, as it seems to me, that we have to acknowledge of all the moral virtues, that, as has been stated in Chap. VI. of this Treatise, and as is shown more particularly in the four concluding propositions of the 21st Section of this Chapter, they *are* a highly efficient and providentially originating and predisposing cause of even our assent to the evidences, but that we have no right to assume them as indispensable to it.

SECTION XXX.

Quotations from, and references to, Augustin, and other Fathers, and also to modern divines, on the use of the word merit in speaking of human works; and on its consistency with the doctrine of grace.

“NOR let any one say that he obtains God’s grace by the merits of his own works, or prayers, or faith; or that God’s grace is given, as heretics say that it is, according to our merits, which is most false. Not that there is not in good men any such thing as merit or good, or that there is not any such thing in bad men as demerit or evil. (How, if that were the case, could God judge the world?) But the case is, that God’s mercy and

grace convert man and make him righteous, so that he becomes righteous, and thus commence the attainment of a merit which, at the day of judgment, God shall crown.”¹ “Merit commences,” it is said in another place, “not in works, but in faith;” and again, “we receive that faith which is the principle of all our own merits, without having earned it by any merits of our own.” These passages I translate from Augustin, and I subjoin in a note the originals, to which I add also some other passages to the same effect².

¹ “Nec quisquam dicat meritis operum suorum, vel meritis orationum suarum, vel meritis fidei suæ, sibi traditam Dei gratiam, et putetur verum esse quod hæretici dicunt, gratiam Dei secundum merita nostra dari, quod omnino falsissimum est: non quia nullum est meritum vel bonum piorum, vel malum impiorum (alioquin quomodo judicabit Deus mundum), sed misericordia et gratia Dei convertit hominem, de qua Psalmus dicit: Deus meus, misericordia ejus præveniet me, ut justificetur impius, hoc est ex impio fiat justus, et incipiat habere meritum bonum, quod Deus coronabit, quando judicabitur mundus.” Augustin. ad Valentinum ep. prior. Opp. Vol. X. pp. 713, 714. Ed. Benedict.

² “Non opera, sed fides, inchoat meritum.” Augustin, as quoted in Hey’s Lectures, Vol. III. p. 259. “Nempe ergo illud unde incipit omne quod merito accipere dicimur sine merito accipimus, id est, ipsam fidem.” Idem, De gratia Dei contra Pelag. et Cœlest. Sect. xxxiv. Opp. Vol. X. 245. “Vel ad pœnam si peccata meruerint, vel ad requiem si opera bona,” as quoted in Lardner’s Works, Vol. V. p. 122. “Et ipsorum enim corda eadem mundabantur mediatoris fide, et diffundebatur in eis caritas per Spiritum sanctum, qui ubi vult spirat, non

In like manner Origen speaks of Abraham as having *merited* the justification granted to him³: and Basil prays to be judged according to his own righteousness^a, a form of words which, *in his sense*, as appears from the first of the above citations from Augustin, and, as will be farther shown in the concluding part of this section, has the same meaning.

The confession of Augsburgh states distinctly that man in his progress to holiness learns “to have pleasure in good works, comes to be reputed in some degree righteous, and to merit reward.”⁴ “For though these good works are far from the perfection of God’s righteous law, they yet are righteousness, and merit reward, and are to be spoken of in the highest terms of praise, inasmuch as they are necessary, as they are a part of the spiritual worship of God, and as they merit reward.”⁵

merita sequens, sed etiam ipsa merita faciens.” De Peccato Originali, Sect. xxviii. Opp. Vol. X. p. 264.

³ “Ob hoc arbitror quod non illis [filiis Israel] erat, sicut in Abraham docuimus, ex multis partibus fidei in unum coacervata perfectio quæ mereretur ad justitiam reputari.” Apud Bull Apolog. pro Harmonia, IV. 6.

^a See the extract in Note 7, p. 174.

⁴ “Postea vero placere etiam obedientiam erga legem, et reputari quandam justitiam, et mereri præmia.” Sect. vi.

⁵ “Quanquam igitur hæc nova obedientia procul absit a perfectione legis, tamen est justitia, et meretur præmia, ideo quia personæ reconciliatæ sunt. Atque ita de operibus judicandum

Every demur, as it seems to me, to the use of the *word* merit, ought to be overruled by these authorities, to add no more. I beg the reader, however, if he can still retain any objection to it, to compare for himself the following extracts from two of Bishop Horsley's Sermons^a. "From this inquiry," observes the bishop in one of these sermons, "I hope to make appear both the certainty and the merit of our faith,—its certainty as resting on a foundation no less firm, though far less compulsive, than the evidence of sense itself: its merit, as a mixed act of the understanding and

est, quæ quidem amplissimis laudibus ornandæ sunt, quod sint necessaria, quod sint cultus Dei, et sacrificia spiritualia, et mereantur præmia. At explicatis nunc his rebus tenent piæ conscientiæ consolationem et certam spem salutis, et intelligunt veros cultus, et norunt quomodo placeant Deo, et quomodo sint meritorii." Ibid. Sect. xx. L'Enfant, in the history of the council of Constance, quotes two passages from the writings of John Huss, in which this early reformer speaks also of human works as meritorious. Pages 29 and 283.

^a The first extract is from Sermon XLII. p. 245 of Vol. III. published in 1812, and the second from p. 255 of a sermon on Rom. iv. 25 in the volume of nine sermons published in 1815. I might farther refer on this subject to Bishop Conybeare's Sermons, Vol. II. pp. 32, 33. South says as follows: "Which [namely merit] we may not improperly define a right to receive some good upon the score of some good done, together with an equivalence or parity of worth between the good to be received, and the good done." Sermons, Vol. III. p. 4. ed. of 1722. But on this notion of *equivalence*, see the Note of Grotius on Matt. vi. 1.

of the will; of the understanding, deducing its conclusions from the surest premises; of the will, submitting itself to the best of motives. Our faith, therefore, will appear to be an act in which the moral qualities of the mind are no less active than its reasoning faculties; and upon this account it may claim a moral merit of which the involuntary assent of the understanding present to sense, or to necessary proof, must be ever divested." This is the first extract: and now *per contra*. "But if the case really be that nothing future can undo the past; that the guilt of past crimes cannot be done away by future innocence," [the implication is that it cannot;] "if, after we have done all that is commanded us, we are still to say, 'we are unprofitable servants'; if we have incurred guilt without so much as the ability of meriting reward; if all that is commanded us, which were it done would not amount to merit, be still more than is ever performed,"—and so on. There must be something very unsound at the root of any phraseology which has led so clear and clever a writer to use the same word in such different senses.

Before I conclude this section I wish to add that I think that no task can be vainer than the attempt often made to disconnect the corresponding significations of the word *meritum* and the word *merces*; or, which is substantially the same attempt, to draw anything of a distinction between

the being saved *for* our works, or saved *accordingly* to them. “*Merces*,” it is said in the Heidelberg Catechism, Art. lxiii., “*non datur ex merito sed ex gratia*.” But it is plain from what has been already said^a, that it may be given *ex merito* and *ex gratia* at the same time. Nothing, as it seems to me, can be more unanswerable than the argument to this effect in the Rhemish Testament. “For though the Holy Scripture commonly use not this word *merit*, yet in places innumerable of the Old and New Testament, the very true sense of merit is contained, and so often as the word *merces*, and the like, be used, they be ever understood as cor-relatives or correspondent with it. For if the joy of heaven be retribution, repayment, hire, wages for works, (as in infinite places of Holy Scripture,) then the works can be no other than the value, desert, price, worth, and merit of the same.”^b

^a Compare also Chap. II. Sect. ix. of this Treatise, p. 81, and Note b there.

^b Annotations on 1 Cor. iii. 8, quoted in Keble’s edition of Hooker, III. 757. “Idque etiam convenit usui loquendi N. T. Nam Lucas χάριν dicit cap. vi. 32, 33, 34, quod Matthæus cap. v. 46; vi. 1. μισθὸν dixerat: et Paulus futura, præmia interdum μισθὸν 1 Cor. iii. 8, interdum ἐπαινοῦ 1 Cor. iv. 3. στεφάνου 1 Tim. iv. 8, et βραβεῖου Phil. iii. 14, quæ profecto est munificentiae divinæ, nomine commendat. Hunc usum imitatur Latinorum *meritum*, et de præmio non minus usurpatur ac de mercede.” Doederlein Instit. Christiani Theologi, Vol. II. 616.

I need not, I hope, say over again that *all these words* are still to be understood as in subordination to the one great and original principle that all we have is of God's gift, and all the good works which we do, done through his Spirit, or in strength derived from Him.

In the same manner with regard to the commonly alleged distinction between the being saved *for*, or *on account of*, our works, and the being saved *accordingly* to them. "It is one thing," observes Gregory, "to be rewarded *secundum*, or according to our works; and another thing to be rewarded *propter*, or on account of them. In using the word *secundum* we mean to denote the quality, or character, of the works, not to imply how much they deserve. For no works or endeavours of man can enter into comparison with their glorious recompense in heaven."^a This last position is true: but the *propter opera* may not be the less a very proper expression, unless it be understood to signify, which it does not signify, something of equivalence, or something which excludes

^a "Sed aliud est *secundum* opera reddere, et aliud *propter* opera reddere. In eo enim quod *secundum* opera dicitur, ipsa operum qualitas intelligitur, ut cujus apparuerint bona opera, ejus sit et retributio gloriosa. Illi namque beatæ vitæ, in qua cum Deo et de Deo vivitur, nullus potest æquari labor, nulla opera comparari." Gregorii I. in Psalm. Pœnit. vii. 9, quoted in Mr. Faber's book on Justification, p. 389.

bounty or grace. In the extract which I have given in note 1, p. 423, from Augustin, the word *secundum* itself is used in this signification. Wesley, in the minutes referred to in the note in p. 169, states the case as follows. "As to merit itself, of which we have been so dreadfully afraid; we are rewarded *according to our works: yea because of our works.* How does this differ from *for the sake of our works?* How differs this from *secundum merita operum?* which is no more than *as our works deserve.* Can you split this hair? I doubt I cannot."

SECTION XXXI.

Of credulity.

THAT credulity, a principle which, in the proportion of its strength or degree, is the same with that of the implicit submission of the understanding to authority or phantasy, is so far from being a moral virtue, that it is, in fact, its opposite, I need not prove^a. That we be not betrayed into credulity instead of being led into real truth we have of course to depend on the guidance of reason; and it is no less of course that reason must

^a See the citations in Suicer, voce *ἄλογος*, or Balguy's Inquiry into Faith; Works, Vol. II. pp. 64, 95—97: or a most wise and temperate sermon on the Duty of Private Judgment by the present Provost of Oriel College, preached at Oxford, 1838.

take in the help of Scripture, and every other help within its reach. But this nevertheless with the caution that we have also to watch our guide itself, and for the two following considerations more particularly.

I. That among the predispositions which give its birth to credulity^a, there are some which may also originate truth, and with which, therefore, the value of the good and rational, rather than of the evil and irrational use which is made of them, may become associated. Thus the disposition to concur in the opinions, as well as with the feelings, of those to whom nature or gratitude give a place in our affections, is, if partly a physical or instinctive, yet partly also one of those moral impulses which God has implanted to lead us to truth. As far as it is moral, it is in itself that very spirit of sincerity which is in all things the safest and the most correct of all mental habits whatever. The authority of the good and the wise is also, though not an infallible, yet always one of the best as well as one of the most efficient of all arguments. In almost all things we *must* have our way paled in, (though this should not be by an impassable boundary,) or we lose ourselves in it. Neither is there any case in which it is more evident than in the case of religion, that the uncontrolled ingenuity or spirit of speculation, which leads to cast off all de-

^a See Chap. VI.

ferential regard to established opinions or sympathies, is among the most fertile sources of error; and that this was so even in the earliest ages of the church quite as much as, or even more than in our own age. And on these principles, it is very imaginable, and, I believe, true, that even the *incorrect* operation of these useful qualities may proceed from principles of which, even while we check the errors to which they are liable, we have to allow that they have a general tendency to conduct us to truth.

II. And in a still greater degree.—If not from the desire of truth, credulity may yet arise out of some *other* moral quality associated with it, and of which, though an equally ill reasoned out, it may yet be an equally real, effect. As, for instance, the spirit of credulity may arise out of a disposition to act; while on the other hand a disposition to suspect, a disposition which is in its nature inert, and also often selfish in the extreme, leads often into errors at least equal to those into which we are led by credulity. We are therefore as much bound to watch on one side against the errors of suspicion, as to watch on the other side against the being misled by appearances.

SECTION XXXII.

Of faith, as rested on probable evidence, or on testimony, and not on science or demonstration.

It is very common to affirm of faith that it is a conviction or a confidence based on testimony, or on probable evidence, as in distinction from science, or from demonstration. The fathers are very full of this distinction^a; and among the moderns, who agree with them in making it, I need only mention Pearson and Locke^b. It is also a distinction which, as far as the mere use of the *word* faith goes, must, I think, be admitted. As faith is said to be merged in sight, so it may be also fairly said to be lost or merged in that full perception or knowledge, which the strict and perfect evidence of a clearly apprehended *demonstration* creates and impresses. But still I think it will also be found that this distinction is more

^a This particular distinction is, moreover, if I do not mistake, to be understood as having place in the use of the words *ἐκούσιος* and *συγκατάθεσις* by Clemens in his definition of faith. Πίστις δὲ πρόληψις ἐκούσιος ἐστίν, θεοσεβείας συγκατάθεσις (as quoted in Pearson on the Creed, p. 2, fol. edition). Πίστις ἡγείσθω τῶν περὶ θεοῦ λόγων· πίστις, καὶ μὴ ἀπόδειξις. πίστις ἡ ὑπὲρ τὰς λογικὰς μεθόδους τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς τὴν συγκατάθεσιν ἔλκουσα. Basil in Ps. cxvi. 1, apud Suicer in voce *πίστις*, p. 731.

^b See especially Pearson on the first article of the Creed, pp. 2.—4, folio edition.

verbal than real, and that it is often confusing. It is wrong to require the evidence of demonstration in cases in which we ought to rest satisfied with that of testimony. It is a part of God's wisdom not to overbear the moral qualities of the mind by imposing on it a wholly irresistible proof^a. It is a part of his wisdom to bring into habitual operation and exercise that fairness of spirit, or disposition to do right, in which the best, and the most acceptable sort of faith takes its natural root^b. The evidence of testimony, an evidence which in part consists in our being able to recognise these same qualities among the witnesses, is well suited to exercise that disposition: perhaps better suited on the whole than any other kind of evidence. But if there be any who conclude from these admissions, that to render faith acceptable, its choice should be arbitrary, they conclude wrongly, and in fact turn faith into that error of credulity of which I have spoken in the last section, and on which I do not enlarge.

^a Τὴν πίστιν, οὐχὶ τὴν γνῶσιν, ὁ Θεὸς εἰς δικαιοσύνην λογίζεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ γνῶσις ὥς ἐμπορικὴν τινα τὴν διάθεσιν ἔχει, μόνῳ τῷ γνωσκομένῳ συντιθεμένη. Ἡ δὲ τῶν Χριστιανῶν πίστις οὐχ οὕτως· οὐ γὰρ τῶν γνωσκομένων, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐλπίζομένων ἐστὶν ὑπόστασις. τὸ δὲ διακρατούμενον οὐκ ἐλπίζεται· ὃ γὰρ ἔχει τίς, φησι, τί καὶ ἐλπίζει; τὸ δὲ διαφεῦγον τὴν κατὰ νοήσιν ἡμῶν ἡμέτερον ἢ πίστις ποιεῖ, διὰ τῆς ἰδίας βεβαιότητος ἐγγνωμένη τὸ μὴ φαινόμενον. Greg. Nyss. Orat. XII. contra Eunomium. Apud Suicer in voce πίστις. p. 735.

^b See Chap. IV. pp. 121, 122.

Also, though faith, as founded on testimony, has thus, as has been shewn, in the being built on that foundation, many moral advantages, we have no reason to think that the motives or principles which make it useful or acceptable are altogether limited to this one foundation^a. It is not at all apparent that an assent to even demonstrative proof may not be as much an exercise in some cases of the moral qualities, as faith in testimony is an exercise of them in other cases. If so^b, the faith (or if the *word* faith be here objected to, the *conviction*) which rests on demonstration may be no less acceptable to our Almighty father than that which we give to testimony. We even say, also, on some occasions, in common speech, that we have, or have not, *faith* in this or that demonstration. One of the ablest of all our writers is the author of the well known book which he intitled a *Demonstration* of God's being and attributes. Some persons are of opinion that the existence of any mere mass, though only of unorganized matter, would *demonstrate* that it must have had a creator. Almost all persons are of opinion that the existence of God, or of a designer,

^a Thus Barrow : " I observe farther that this faith doth relate only to propositions revealed by God, (*or at least deduced from principles of reason,*) such as that there is a God," &c. Sermons, Vol. II. p. 63.

^b See Chap. IV. pp. 121, 122.

may be inferred from, or at the very least, is implied in, the marks of design which surround us. These evidences certainly are not testimony in the sense in which testimony is often said or supposed to be the exclusive foundation of religious faith. And yet it were the merest quibbling to contend that a conviction grounded on these evidences has not as much of the nature of a religious faith, as any conviction which might happen to be derived from our parents or other teachers, or even from Scripture itself.

SECTION XXXIII.

Of Butler's argument from analogy to the probability of our meeting with difficulties in revealed religion, and also of the analogy between the Christian doctrines, that of Christ's death in particular, and the religious philosophy of nature and heathenism.

BUTLER'S argument on this head is to the following effect^a:—That it is highly credible, or probable, (and, if he had not thought the ground of analogy a ground too weak on which to build up a previous expectation^b, he would have said to be expected,) that revealed religion, and the constitution or course of nature^c, should present to us the same or similar difficulties. And this is also the princi-

^a Analogy, Part II. Chap. III., especially pp. 248. 250. 257; and compare p. 428.

^b Page 259.

^c Page 251.

ple affirmed in the very remarkable passage of Origen, to which he refers in the introduction to his work^a, as will, indeed, become the more manifest by consulting the context of that passage.—It does not appear to me, however, that this argument holds; and indeed I have always thought that the current of that chapter of the Analogy in which it is proposed, although abounding in just and valuable observations, rather sets a wrong way. That because nature, that is, the world, a world full of immense contrivance, presents to us difficulties, of which we, ignorant mortals, cannot unravel the reason, or principle, *therefore* a revelation, of which it is the only imaginable object to declare to man doctrines or facts by which man is to be influenced or benefited may, either *credibly* (I use this word in Butler's sense) or probably, teach doctrines, or present difficulties, which man cannot unravel, we can by no means infer. It has been said, and justly said, of revealed religion, that it is to be accounted of as a part of its value, that it selects from the mass of truths which are afloat in the world, or in the human intellect, those which it is religiously useful to us to know, and thus brings *these* under the focus of our observation. Thus Butler himself: "Further: Though all knowledge from reason is as really from God as revelation is: yet this last is a distinguished

^a Page vi.

favour to us, and naturally strikes us with the greatest awe, and carries in it an assurance that those things which we are informed of by it, are of the utmost importance to us to be informed of." These things of importance the same great writer states a few pages afterwards to be such as "influence the heart and actions," "the whole end," as he says, in the same place as well as in other places, "of Christianity."^a There is nothing, as I imagine, in the analogy of nature which can furnish the least probability, that there is any one of *these* things, of which we are not enabled to work out for ourselves the reason or principle, as well as the fact or doctrine itself. The proffer which Revelation makes to us is that of a guiding and helping hand to succour a wanderer. But, as it does not follow that this is done by introducing him to new difficulties, so neither does it follow that it is done in all cases, by helping him *through* the old difficulties; and not rather by putting him in a better path, a path clearer from obstructions, than he was before able to discern. The only difficulties, it will be observed, of which I here speak, are speculative difficulties. I do not say that there are no such difficulties in revelation. On the contrary, to give an example, I think that the difficulty which consists in the fact, as stated by

^a Sermon before the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, pp. 11, 12. 17. ed. of 1739.

Butler, (in p. 260,) that miraculous gifts were conferred in the apostolical age on persons who exercised them in an irregular and disorderly manner, is a real difficulty. That there were wise reasons, some of which, perhaps, might be assigned, why this fact should have come into the plan of God's providence, I do not doubt. Yet, still it is a difficulty, and as is sometimes said, *to be got over*. So also, I think, that there is a very great difficulty in the absence of all recognition of a future state in the Mosaic law. What I here contend for is not that there are no difficulties in revelation, but that the analogy of nature gives no ground to expect them, or to make them credible or probable. What analogy gives us reason to expect, or to think probable, is, not that we should find the same difficulties in the plan of revelation, and the plan of nature, but only that we should find in the two plans that congruity and analogy, in which we may recognise the hand of the same author^a, and that what is is. We may expect to

^a “ The strength of *certain* analogical arguments does not rest on analogy as such, but they have more of cogency than the name gives one to suppose. The celebrated analogy drawn by Butler between natural and revealed religion is, if I mistake not, of this nature. He points out similarities between the two that are not on the surface, nor found without deep thought, and yet which bear a sifting inquiry. The question arises, How to account for these similarities? Only two hypotheses seem to the point. *Either* it is a chance event, if Christianity

find both plans *subject* to the same embarrassments, as, for instance, to that of the existence of evil, which indeed, in its many varieties, is, as far as I can discern, the only embarrassment of either the one or the other^a. But this does not amount to our finding any difficulty *in* the revelation itself. Or rather still,—we may expect that all the difficulties which we do find in revelation, we should also find in nature. The great merit of the work of Butler is in proving as he does *this* point, which is a point of the first importance. The converse does not seem to me to be equally true.

Again, both in this chapter of the Analogy, and in many other parts of the same treatise^b, we find

be a chance system struck out by ignorant fishermen on the basis begun by an ancient Jewish legislator, else it arises from the fact that both systems own the same author." Newman's *Logic*, p. 97.

^a And this is the difficulty stated by Origen in the sentence which follows that which, as was observed in page 436, is quoted by Butler in p. vi. of his Introduction. In fact it is a part of the internal evidence of revelation that it does *not* attempt to solve this insoluble problem. See what was said before on this subject in the conclusion of Sect. xi. of this chapter.

^b See Part II. Chap. IV. of *Christianity as a scheme imperfectly comprehended*; and see pp. 248. 250. 257. It is said in p. 272 that "Christianity is a scheme quite beyond our comprehension." Compare pp. 428, 429. That "we know as little of it as of the constitution of nature," p. 275; and that

it affirmed that the scheme of revelation is a scheme which we do and can comprehend but very imperfectly. Doubtless in one sense so it is: "For who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counsellor?" But if this position is to be understood to mean that any portion whatever of the *doctrine* taught by revelation is either *in itself* an incomprehensible or even a difficult doctrine, it is, if I mistake not, erroneous^a. Nothing can be clearer than that, as far as a doctrine is incomprehensible, it is not revealed; and that God reveals to us any facts, or teaches us any principles, of which he does not intend that every honest mind shall be able, and even readily able, to discern the reasonableness, is an assumption to which neither reason nor yet, as I think, Scripture, gives any colour whatever. No doubt it reveals doctrines, as, for instance, that of the Trinity, of which the *modus*, or I might almost say the *physiology*, is wholly inscrutable, or which, like everything else, *runs up*, as Butler himself very properly observes^b, into the incomprehensible. I allow also that there may be difficulties as to the evidences^c, and even as to the interpretation, on points not touching the prac-

"it is owned the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet understood," p. 262.

^a See the conclusion of Chap. V. of this Treatise.

^b Page 275.

^c See before, pp. 437, 438.

tice^a. Let these go for what they are worth. And though I do not myself see much in any of these difficulties which at all affects the religion itself, I am far from thinking either hardly or contemptuously of many of those in whom they create a degree of anxiety. But assuming, as we must assume, the state of the world to be what it was at Christ's coming, or what it is now, and that the object of the religion was, as Butler has repeatedly observed^b, to save or restore it from moral ruin, I really cannot see in any one of what are properly its *doctrines* any difficulty, or anything but a consummately wise adaptation to the wants of man. If the reader judges otherwise, I beg to refer him to the thirteen propositions prefixed to Chapter IX. of this treatise, and I then beg him to reflect whether, granting the truth of those propositions,

^a With regard, moreover, to *this class* of difficulties, I do not mean to deny, what Butler seems to expect^c, that there are some which may be hereafter removed by attentive criticism and investigation. And I suppose that this end, *if to be expected*, is more likely to be attained by the more restrained and correct application of *metaphysics* in our religious *theories*, than has yet been bestowed on them, than by any other means on which we can speculate. If any one chooses to call this end, supposing it attained, a farther *developement* of our religion, he cannot be hindered from calling it so. But it is quite plain, I think, that there will be no other.

^b Introd. p. xiv. and p. 295.

^c Pages, 262, 263.

he can account any one of them difficult ; and also whether there be any one *doctrine*, properly speaking, of our religion, which, either directly or by implication, they do not include. If there be still some doctrines in it, which either are, or appear to be difficulties, to the viciously instructed or prejudiced mind, and to such minds only ; as for example that scandal of the cross, which appeared as foolishness to the ancient heathens, this does not militate in the least against what I have said. Difficulties so limited are, in truth, none ^a ; nor will any honest and candid, though ignorant, mind, ever account of them as difficulties, unless it assume some principle or other in religion, to which it has not a right.

Neither yet, I may here, I think, add in conclusion, *was* the philosophy of the *wiser* heathens averse *in itself* from the reception of even that doctrine of the cross, which to the many, no doubt, proved a stumbling block. As the general character of the religions of antiquity was not irreligious ^b, so neither were its moralists blind to the truth, that virtue is perfected by suffering, and patriotism by death. Put in the place of patriotism that universal benevolence which was felt by our

^a The real difficulty would perhaps be on the other side, or if *these* did not exist.

^b See what was said on this subject in Sect. vi. of this chapter under Head 2.

blessed Saviour for the whole race of mankind ; —put in the place of stoical perfection a death unto sin, and advancement in holiness : and we have thus even in heathenism the very ends of Christianity itself, only portrayed less graphically and effectively, and in a less direct and demonstrable relation to the personal goodness and providence of God^a.

^a Λεγέτωσαν οὖν οἱ βουλόμενοι ἀπιστεῖν τῷ Ἰησοῦν ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων ἀποτεθνηκέναι τρόπῳ σταυροῦ, πότερον οὐδὲ τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς παραδέξονται καὶ βαρβαρικὰς πολλὰς ἱστορίας, περὶ τοῦ τινὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ τεθνηκέναι, καθαιρετικῶς τῶν προκαταλαβόντων τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἔθνη κακῶν ; ἢ ἐκεῖνα μὲν γεγέννηται, οὐδὲν δὲ πιθανὸν ἔχει ὁ νομιζόμενος ἀνθρώπος πρὸς τὸ ἀποθανεῖν ἐπὶ καθαιρέσει μεγάλου δαίμονος, καὶ δαιμόνων ἄρχοντος, ὑποτάξαντος ὅλας τὰς ἐπὶ γῆν ἐληλυθυίας ἀνθρώπων ψυχάς ; Origen contra Cels. p. 25. Spencer's Ed. So also in the celebrated passage in Plato's Republic, Book II. ὅτι οὕτω διακείμενος ὁ δίκαιος μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, δεδῆσεται, τελευτῶν πάντα κακὰ παθὼν ἈΝΑΣΧΙΝΔΥΛΕΥΘΗΣΕΤΑΙ. "Quare," observes Seneca, "quædam dura [boni] patiuntur? Ut alios pati doceant, nati sunt in exemplar." De Providentia, Cap. 6. "Quid mirum, si dure generosos spiritus Deus tentet. Nunquam virtutis molle documentum est." Id. Cap. 4. These and other citations to the same effect may be seen in Mr. Grinfield's very pleasing work on the connexion between natural and revealed theology, together with references to a passage in Barrow, equivalent to that which I transcribe above, and also to Ogden's Sermons on the Incarnation and the Ascension ; to Grotius de Veritate, V. 19, and IV. 12. Sherlock's Third Discourse, Vol. I. and Tenth Discourse, Vol. III. Hartley on Man, Vol. II. Prop. xxxix. Tillotson's Sermons, Vol. II. Sermons xii. and xiii., and also to his 64th

But if our doctrine be thus analogous to the religion of even the *heathen* philosophy, much more to those still better and truer expectations, which

and 138th Sermons. Watson's Popular Evidences, Ch. VI. Pt. II. Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, Pt. I. Chap. III., and to Jortin's Discourses, pp. 40—50. See also the quotations from Lactantius in the Notes to Lardner, Vol. IV. 50.

It may very probably be observed, with regard to the first of the citations which I have made in this note, namely, the citation from Origen, that it merely alleges that the cases to be found in profane history of men who had devoted themselves for the public good, are cases analogous to that of the Christian καθάρσεις. True: but it is not the less implied, and this is the only purpose which I have in view in making this citation, that it was considered an act of admirable virtue so to do. Why else, indeed, do we account of Curtius as a hero?—So, again, with regard to the citation from Plato. The μαστιγώσεται, the δεδήςεται, the ἀνασχινδυλευθήσεται, are not expressions which affirm anything of an expiation for sin, but are merely alleged as the *proof* that this just man of the Stoics is *really*, and not in *seeming* only, that just man which he is supposed to be. This passage, rigidly taken, does not even go to affirm that the just man is perfected by this suffering. But still the Stoics held, and *must have held*, that suffering perfects. They were no more ignorant than Aristotle was^a, that virtuous acts give body, and habit, and strength, to the principle from which they flow. And that they did hold this, it would be moreover very easy to produce express proof, and proof not resolvable into any reflex operation of Christianity, from the writings of Seneca more especially.

^a Eth. VII. vii.

minds illuminated by the light derived from Christianity may learn, and have learned, to trace out from nature itself, and of which, if I subjoin the following statements from Barrow, Whichcote, and Secker, I need not, I think, add on this subject anything else.

“ Let this doctrine, I say, (the doctrine of the cross,) be scandalous and distasteful to some persons tainted with prejudice: let it appear strange and incredible to others blinded with self-conceit: let all the proud, all the profane, all the inconsiderate part of mankind slight and reject it: yet to us it must appear grateful and joyous, to us who discern by a clearer light and are endued with a purer sense kindled by the divine Spirit: from whence with comfortable satisfaction of mind we may apprehend and taste that God could not in a higher measure or a fitter manner illustrate his glorious attributes of goodness and justice, his infinite grace and mercy towards his poor creatures; his holy displeasure against wickedness; his impartial severity in punishing iniquity and impiety, or in vindicating his own honour and authority, than by thus ordering his Son to suffer for us: that also true virtue and goodness could not otherwise be taught, be exemplified, be commended and impressed with greater advantage.”^a “ Whence it seemeth,” he concludes, “ that even according to

^a Barrow's Sermons, Sermon XXVI. Sect. xii. p. 378.

the sincerest dictates of common wisdom, this dispensation was not so unaccountable, nor ought the Greeks in consistency with themselves, and in respect to their own admired philosophy, to have deemed our doctrine of the cross foolish or unaccountable.”^a

“I think I may say,” says Whichcote, “of the grand articles of Christian faith; expiation, remission of sins, that to one acquainted with his own state and condition, and considerative of God’s goodness, the matter of those articles revealed is rather a matter expected, as becoming God, god-like, than either contrary to reason or unworthy of God. I believe,” the same excellent writer then proceeds, that “in the true use of understanding, a serious and considerative mind would be apt to think, that either God would pardon sin to penitents who reform, *absolutely*, or else would propose a way, in which, and terms and conditions, on which, he would forgive and be reconciled: God being duly looked upon as the fountain and original of goodness. So that when the revelation of faith comes, the inward sense, awakened to the entertainment thereof, saith *εὕρηκα* it is, as I imagined; the thing expected proves.”^b

“That one person,” says Secker, “should undergo pains and penalties for the sake of others,

^a Barrow’s Sermons, Sermon XXVI. Sect. xii. p. 379.

^b Third Letter to Dr. Tuckney, p. 102.

and a good person suffer many things to prevent the misery, and promote the happiness of bad ones, is so common in lower instances, that, though we could not have expected, we may well believe this high degree of God's love towards us, that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us." ^a Or briefly to paraphrase what has been said to the same effect by Doederlein: "No great and good man ever restored the prosperity of his country, except at a heavy cost to himself; or ever shrank from danger, pain, or death, or even from calumny, if he might so hope to gain great benefits, though only for his own family, or for his fellow citizens. In what way, therefore, is this [analogy] broken, or not kept up, in the case of our Saviour, who took his sufferings on himself voluntarily, and under the special direction of God; who even in the severity of his most unjust death must have been consoled by the consciousness of his innocence; and who purchased by it nothing less than the salvation of all mankind, together with an eternal recompense to himself." ^b

^a Sermons, Vol. VII. Serm. ii. p. 36.

^b "Præterea, nemo vir magnus et probus sine gravi molestia patriæ salutem reddidit: nemo vitæ pericula, dolores, ipsamque mortem detrectavit, si familiæ, genti, civitati, insignia emolumenta inde parari posse, aut speravit tantum aut

etiam prævidit : nemo de injuria juste conquestus, si, ut muneris sui rationes expleret, insomniis, calumniis, civium odio, quæ interdum ipsa morte vehementius pungunt, objicere se debuit : quomodo igitur servatori nostro injuriam fieri defendamus, qui haud sine præmonitu divino in tantas calamitates venit, brevique mortis atrocissimæ dolore, qui non potuit innocentiae sensum lædere, adeoque nec pœnarum more adfligere, non paucis hominibus, nec civitati, sed universo generi humano tantam felicitatem restituit, ac denique pro insigni hoc merito summa præmia retulit." Institutio Theol. Christiani, Lib. II. Part ii. Chap. 2, Sect. 268. Obs. 4. q. v.

CHAPTER XV.

FRAGMENTS.

I.

I SUPPOSE it to be agreed that in all cases in which truth and falsehood are mingled, [and doubtless they are mingled in most cases,] it is the true part, not the false part of the complex notion entertained, in which any salutary influence which it possesses always resides. It does not follow from this position that we ought always to wage relentless war against error. What follows is, that the only reason for being at peace with it is, lest in plucking up the false part of the notion, we root out the truth also.

II.

The *confiding* faith is in its nature the most active faith. It is also *of its nature* to act with the most firmness when it is based on right opinions: but individual cases furnish, and to this last part of the rule especially, many exceptions.

III.

The clearing away of those errors, moral and intellectual, which deprave our moral sense of God's purity and holiness, is a no less essential part of

religion than to teach his love or his power. If we are convinced that God is not only loving and powerful, but *also* holy and pure, we may have the *more* confidence in him,—inasmuch as this conviction gives, or is calculated to give, to a faith which rests on reason, the greater and the more rational soundness and force.

But still this conviction is not *in itself* a motive power, but only the regulator of it. The *pace* at which we go is best and surest, and at all events goes naturally the farthest, when regulated, and in the right direction. We do not on this account the less clearly see and know that the *regulation* is not the *pace*.

IV.

There have been many disputes about *fundamentals*. Doederlein^a speaks of the foundation of Christian faith as consisting in that portion or perception of truth, which is necessary to originate the religious disposition to trust in Christ. I see not that this differs from that honest will which is spoken of in Chap. V. of this Treatise. That portion, or perception, is, of course, greater or less, according to the country or the station in which the man is born, or the opportunities which he may happen to possess. See also Tucker's *Light of Nature*, vi. 71.

^a I. 56. 58.

V.

“ If Adam’s sin hurt those who were not guilty, the righteousness of Christ profits those who believe not.”

These are the words of Pelagius, words either ambiguous or inconclusive, as referring to the doctrine of original sin. But query? Is it supposable that Pelagius would have thus treated as an absolute, perhaps an unheard-of, absurdity, the very notion that the righteousness of Christ could profit any who did not believe in him, if it had been the doctrine of his own time, or of the early church?

VI.

The heart **MUST** to a certain degree be prepared before any good can be done: and, even when it is prepared to a certain degree, it is possible, though I believe not common, to attempt too much, and by so doing to weaken the moral and religious powers instead of strengthening them. The earthy particles of which we are made cannot be sublimed into pure ether while we are mortal: and our minds may be kept in quite as unproductive a state by planting in them exotics which will not grow, as by not planting in them anything at all.

But when the heart is adequately prepared, and the knowledge of the Christian doctrines, or rather of the *facts* of the Christian history, duly impressed

on it, that knowledge is, and must be, in natural order, the parent, spring, or producer, of every Christian virtue. No one, when plunged in danger or distress, has ever seen a kind friend come to his relief, and die to save him, without loving that friend in return, and feeling himself moved to do the things which that friend had required of him: or, if he does not do these things, we have no other way so good, perhaps no other way, of inducing him to do them as by retracing, so as to bring vividly before him, *the facts* of that friend's conduct and history. If this argument does not prevail with him, nothing will prevail with him. If we had *this* faith in Christ as we ought to have it, it would still remove mountains; that is, it would make us heroes, Howards, martyrs, what you will.

It is clear also that the preparation wanted must always be the preparation of the heart, and not of the head. The rudest and most ignorant peasant is quite as sensible to the value of salvation as the best scholar.

VII.

Bunyan's Pilgrim had set out from the City of Destruction before he met with Evangelist.

VIII.

Let it be supposed that the characteristic error of the Church of Rome is to rest too much on

church authority, or on positive ordinances. Some of its opponents set up, on the other hand, the Bible, or what they consider, and perhaps rightly consider, to be some of its most important doctrines, in the place of the church, and this also they perhaps do rightly, or on a right principle. But *why* is this their principle a right principle? Answer: Because neither reason nor Scripture afford much, if any, ground for the Romish notions of church authority, or the belief of the existence of any specific or mystical virtue in merely positive ordinances: while, on the other hand, these doctrines are assumed to be the true doctrines, and also to furnish both the stimulants and the nutriment of moral improvement.

But then again, also, *if* the Romanist be led, *as he may be led*, by his deference for church authority, to depend the more humbly on God, or to turn what he supposes to be the mystical virtue of the Sacraments to a moral use, these institutions are not to him sanctified the less, because his notions of them may be erroneous or unscriptural. If the Romanist and the Protestant rest the same weight on their several sets of opinions, without carrying on either the one set, or the other, into moral improvement, the superstition of both is equal; and it matters not as to the real religion of either, that the opinions of the one are error, and that those of the other are truth. If the Roman-

ist have more charity for the Protestant, than the Protestant for the Romanist, the Romanist, though his creed may have the more of error, is probably the better man of the two. Nor is this conclusion vitiated by the apparent vice, and real folly, of the Romanist in supposing that though a heretic may be saved, he yet can only be saved by what are called the uncovenanted mercies of God. For this exception, though it does not remove the error, or *neutralize* the mischief of his irrational tenet, yet may be, and sometimes is, so held as to expunge its uncharitableness.

Or we may put the same case as follows. The religion of some persons is a religion of forms : that of others is a religion of opinions. Some forms are useful, many opinions are true. But the relative importance both of forms and of opinions depends on their tendency to produce resignation, purity, charity, and the other Christian virtues,—the love of God and Christ being at the head of the list. Such, and such *only* (but this *only* may be everything) is the difference in point of importance between the surplice, the organ, the chrism, the use of the cross in baptism, and the doctrines of the Trinity, or even the atonement. And I can imagine cases in which the stripping a man's religion of the first *form* would do him more practical mischief, than ignorance or error as to the last *doctrine*.

IX.

It is a saying of Wesley's that "right opinions are but a very small part of religion;" "if indeed," he adds, "they are to be accounted any part of religion at all." Wesley is wrong, and Warburton proved him to be so. But the principle on which he is wrong is that right opinions of God, *as worked out by honest and diligent thought or inquiry*, are, as is shewn in Chap. IV. pp. 121, 122 of this treatise, religion itself.

X.

It has been observed by Paley, that a man may have a great curiosity to know what is said, and at the same time little or none to know what is true. In the same manner, a man may have, and often has, a great curiosity to know what is true, and even what is God's will, and yet have little or no disposition to do it.

XI.

If the Christian religion be so simple a thing as it is described to be in Chap. V. pp. 136—139, and if all its real importance is comprised within the limits there stated, why write so long a treatise as this about its doctrines?

Answer.—Because the errors which have obscured its simplicity may have taken deep root; or because the arguments necessary to *prove* it to be what *it is* may need explication.

XII.

Assent may be given to error as well as to truth. It is held by many that a man's conviction of the truth of that which is really error, can never reach the same degree of assurance with his conviction of the truth of that which is really true^a. I do not *say* that it can, supposing both convictions to exist in their highest degree. I do not suppose that it does, *naturally* or *ordinarily*. But query? Are there not many who have quite as much confidence in a quack, and quite as strong a conviction of the truth of his pretensions, as many have in the best physician? Are there not many who have more? Query again? though to this query I do not mean to insinuate the answer; Have not *the* many? Query again? Is not this the same in religion as in every thing else?

XIII.

Christ purchased salvation for us by his merits. Though this is nowhere affirmed in these words in Scripture, I see not that any objection can be taken to them. But Christ's merits are human merits. It were a high arrogance to speak of *merit* in the divinity. But all Christ's *human* merits *we* may imitate. Dr. Townson observes^b:

^a See, however, Aristotle's well-known observation to the contrary, as quoted in note a, p. 396.

Sermons, p. 398.

“For the merits of Christ were not personal, and confined to himself; but being the merits of the Son of God, redounded to the benefit of mankind in general.” But whose merits, are, in this sense, personal, of all those great lights or benefactors of mankind,

“Inventas aut qui vitam excoluere per artes,
Quique sui memores alios fecere merendo?”

XIV.

If a *fashion* sets against the doctrines of Christianity (this has been the case, and may be again); it is yet to be remembered that *fashion* is one thing, *nature* another thing. When the bad fashion is over, *natura recurrit*, at least with the many.

XV.

A Prayer.

“Grant to us, gracious Lord, these our petitions, not according to any merits of our own. We all are sinners: we all have broken thy law, and we set up no claim of right to blessings which we can owe to thy goodness alone. But yet, sinners as we are, we feel ourselves encouraged to approach thy heavenly throne by our knowledge of that great love in which thou sentest thine only Son to take our nature upon him, and die for us; sentest the sinless to be an offering for sin. Through him only, and in humble faith in his doctrine, and

imitation of his obedience, and gratitude for his merits, we pray that through thy blessed Spirit thou wilt both teach and enable us to approach thee, and to do thy commands, not trusting in our own righteousness, but desiring to be clothed in Christ's, through that application of it which thou wilt graciously teach us to make ; confessing ourselves to be unprofitable servants even at the best, and reposing our hope only in thy mercy."

That this prayer expresses the whole meaning commonly conveyed and understood in speaking of Christ's merits, I do not say. But it would be hard to affirm anything more of them without trespassing on the cardinal truth that as the Son loveth us, so loveth us the Father also.

There still remains an ambiguity in the word *according*. We pray that we be *not* rewarded according to our own merits : and yet we know that we *shall* be rewarded according to our works : (Matt. xvi. 27.) and merits and works are the same. The word *according* must therefore be used in the above prayer, and in the verse of St. Matthew, to which I refer, in different senses. Its meaning in the above prayer is expressive of our hope that God will not, as we know that he will not, limit his bounty to us to any equivalent to our poor deserts. Its meaning in St. Matthew is to state that even the reward which he grants in bounty, will be measured out *in the proportion* of those deserts, though it will greatly exceed them.

XVI.

“But the strength of our faith is tried by those things wherein our will and capacities are not strong.” Hooker’s Eccl. Polity, V. lii. 1. That is, by those things to which our assent is required on *probable* evidence. But these things try, strictly speaking, not the strength of the faith, but the goodness of the character: or if they try the faith, they try it only as it emanates from that goodness, or is its fruit.

XVII.

“It is an error,” says some ancient writer, (I forget who,) “to think that the gods created man, when on the contrary it is plain that man created [i. e. imagined] the gods.” Startling as this sentence is, there is a truth hidden in it. It is certain that our *conceptions* of God are altogether formed by what we know, or have experienced, of the nature and actions of men. Of course, however, this is independent of that original knowledge both of God, and of man, and of the condition of life in which we are placed, which *must have been* infused into our first parents at the creation. Moses’s saying that “God made man in his own image,” is only the same thing as to say that man derives his best and truest notion of God from the image of man; or that the creator is possessed of like affections to those of

the creature whom he has made. We have no intimation whatever here given us of what God's image is, as it is God's, or of what man's is, *as like to his*; but we have merely the common argument from analogy affirmed and authorized. So also to affirm, or to prove, that the character of Jehovah differs from that of Baal, is to affirm or prove, that the man from whose image we have to take our notion of God, is the man whose affections are moral or good, not the man whose affections are immoral or evil^a.

XVIII.

Man is the *subject* of Christianity. Is not the whole *object*, which Christianity sets before him, just as simple, and to be understood with as little refining, as that which a child understands his father to mean, in saying to him, "I will forgive you the past, if you will behave well for the future"? Is not everything else in Christianity either fact or argument by which man, its *subject*, is to be influenced:

^a See on this subject Bishop Copleston's Enquiry into the Doctrines of Necessity and Predestination, Discourse III. pp. 88. 96, and the note appended to that discourse, pp. 139, 140. I should not have left it to this place to refer the reader to this able work, if it had not been my object to enter as little as possible into any inquiry into the *science* of analogical reasoning. That inquiry, in which much, if I mistake not, yet remains to be done, is, I hope, in very much better hands than mine. My own only meaning is to apply the *art* correctly to the purpose before me.

almost all these facts or arguments being in proof of, or for the purpose of impressing, the great two-fold doctrine, that man is a sinner, but that God loves him still ?

XIX.

“ Thus the Gospel operates to our benefit chiefly by its sacredness, and having the authority of a law established in heaven Wherefore it is that we are so continually exhorted to believe in the name of Jesus,” &c. Tucker’s *Light of Nature*, VI. xxi. p. 498. And so again, p. 499, “ We find the rock whereon Christ erected his church to be the authority of a great name supereminent above all other names ;” and so forth.

Doubtless the teaching the law of the Gospel *on authority* was one of the purposes of our Saviour’s coming into the world, one of the ends, as in this chapter of Tucker’s is farther argued, for which we are vouchsafed a *divine* lawgiver. But it is too much to affirm, that the authority with which he taught operates *more* to our benefit than his doctrines themselves. I of course say this on the supposition that we can divide the doctrines from the authority, which is not by any means altogether the case ; and also on the supposition that the doctrines are true, and are acknowledged as true.

I the rather insert this observation, because the

same writer adds, in p. 512, that the main object of religion is to work upon and discipline "the lower part of our human composition." There is much also to the same purport in other parts of this most unequal work. But this view of the object of Christianity is a view far too much akin to the ancient error of supposing that the Christian doctrines may all but disappear under a perfect *γνῶσις* or philosophy, and are to be held as subordinate to it. The true notion, on the contrary, is that Christ has brought in new knowledge, or, if the word be preferred, a new philosophy, and this for the purpose not only of reforming our sins, but also of raising our characters. This new knowledge or philosophy gives us the means of attaining, over and above the stimulant with which it also supplies us to seek, both truer notions of God, and a holier nature, than any other knowledge or philosophy can possibly reach. In other words, words which I believe I borrow from Mr. Alexander Knox, Christianity is not less to be accounted of as an *advancing*, than as a *remedial* process of mind. But then also we never advance, or can advance, to any superiority or elevation above the real facts of the case. The supposing that this can be done was the Gnostic error to which I have adverted above^a.

^a Even Origen fell into this great error, so far as to extol the happiness of those "who have made such progress, that

XX.

A wicked man makes himself the *victim* of his own sins ; or, in the Scripture language, of the wrath of God. If Christ by making himself a victim, or offering himself up for mankind, puts that man into a condition of working out his own salvation by repentance and amendment of life, he makes himself as really the victim of that man's sins, as the man himself would have been, had he persisted in them.

All agree that Christ does put into that condition : and though the Socinians say, and say wrongly, that he is a victim not really, but figuratively, this is so far rather a *confused* than a *false* view of the case. The true view of it is that he is a victim *both* really and figuratively, that is both really and analogically.

XXI.

“Faith,” says Jeremy Taylor, “is much more in the will than in the understanding.” And yet

they need the Son of God no longer as their physician who heals their sick, nor as their shepherd, nor as their redemption, but require him only as the truth, as the Logos, as righteousness, and whatsoever he is besides to those who from their own perfection are able to conceive him in the utmost splendour.” I copy the translation given in the second volume of Neander's Church History, p. 225, where, and in the preceding and subsequent pages, a very sufficient delineation of the nature of this visionary philosophy may be found.

there are senses in which faith may be in the will, and yet not a Christian virtue; may be in the understanding, and yet be a Christian grace.

XXII.

Faith, that is faith in its sense of conviction, is to the Christian exactly what the compass is to the mariner. It makes no sail, it avoids no currents, but it enables *him* to do both, and is not considered by him as a less valuable possession than his sails or his oars.

XXIII.

As far as a man acts on what he believes, he has so far confidence in what he believes. He may act on what he does not believe to be either his duty or his interest: that is, he may act, as the drunkard acts, from inclination alone. He never acts, unless he thinks that he has something to gain by his act. So far the advocates of the selfish principle have some poor colour for their theory. The drunkard not only gets, but calculates on getting, the gratification of his dominant appetite. But *this*, although, so far, an acting on faith, is plainly not to act on it, but to act contrary to it, *in every reasonable or religious sense of the word*. And though man always calculates on gaining something, yet in those very cases in which he gains most, all that he calculates on may be the

attainment of a disinterested end, or the approbation of his own conscience, or of God.

XXIV.

It has been sometimes observed by writers on education, that *hints*, however intelligible and significant, and however clearly apprehended, avail but little with children. They are repelled by the elastic surface of the youthful mind. The case may be exactly the same in respect of *faith*; and this, although instead of merely *hinting*, we *demonstrate* its claims. The mind's eye, in this case also, requires breadth, a breadth from which it cannot escape, on which to rest. The whole *breadth* accordingly of our blessed Lord's history, the full meaning and application of the doctrines which he taught, together with the knowledge of our own personal wants, and faults, and characters, ought to be brought fully before it. Else, we being what we are, they will not affect us. Faith, therefore, to be an efficacious faith, includes, or ought to include, an earnest attention to, and occupation of the understanding with, the things believed. The very object of it is to make these things as much present to our mental vision as possible, and to make them fill as large a space in it as anything not actually seen by the bodily eye can be made to occupy.

XXV.

Whether the institution of sacrifice originate from revelation, or be the natural device or imagination of the human mind, man's making a moral application of it must have been its design, at least in part. Even if we had no authority for believing that such an application of it was actually made, we could not have doubted but that what was so obvious *must have been* made. But that either Gentile or Jew ever even dreamt of the transference of the virtues of the "melior anima" to themselves, or of any "balance of account" in which the virtues of the slain animal should be imputed or reckoned as theirs, we have not, that I recollect, any evidence whatsoever.

XXVI.

The heathen sacrifices had a moral application, although less distinct than those of the Jews. Nor is it suitable to the analogy of the divine dispensations that the sacrifice of Christ should pertain both to the Gentile world and the Jewish, unless it struck on a chord with which both these worlds were in unison.—In like manner in which a perfect *vision* of the truth is in almost all cases reserved for those only, who have already received it *in a figure*.

XXVII.

Dialogue between A. and B.

A. If mere opinion be a matter of indifference, how do you account for it that when the conscience of a sinner is awakened, he does not feel more remorse on the score of practice than on that of faith?

B. I do not say, or think, that mere opinion is a matter of indifference. Far from it. But to answer you to the point. No doubt, if the first, or the sole duty which you inculcate, as some do, on the sinner, be the duty of faith, he will conclude very naturally, and this, on your authority, that his previous want of faith was the sin of his mind. If then by faith he understands mere assent, or opinion, he will be inclined to regard any errors in his past opinions as the gravest errors of his life, and to think that having changed *them*, he has reformed his *character*. He did worship Jupiter, he now worships Christ. But still, possibly, Christ is to him now, only what Jupiter was formerly. He is, while merely under this teaching, little else, as regards his religion, than a sort of territory, now of Umbrenus, now of Ofellus, as may be determined by chance or chronology.

XXVIII.

Question.—If^a justification, sanctification, and salvation, are to be regarded as steps of the same process, why is it not usual to speak of them *all* as *conditional*?

Answer.—Because both justification and sanctification are commonly spoken of as the act of God: salvation often as the recompense of man, or as the crown of his own human efforts or holiness. In one sense, it would be as wrong to speak of conditions of salvation, as to speak of conditions of anything else. God saves as freely as he justifies. The legitimacy of the use of the word condition depends entirely on the sense in which we use that other word with which we connect it.

If we identify justification with baptism, and account of baptism as being anything else but admission into the visible church, this is as clear in the case of baptism as of anything else.

So also the holy and free Spirit of God actually *sanctifies*, only where man performs his part of the work required.

XXIX.

Nothing can be more vain than to attempt to state anything of the *mode* or *manner* of the union

^a As was observed in Chapter II. Sect. ix. pp. 91, 92, and in Chapter XIV. Sect. xvi. pp. 367, 368.

of God with Christ. That mode or manner as being incomprehensible cannot be penetrated. But no key to the interpretation of Scripture is of more importance than to keep the *fact* steadily before the mind.

XXX.

If any one think that even abstractedly from the *mode* or *manner* of union, there be anything incomprehensible or unintelligible in the mere proposition that God and man are united, I add that this is a proposition quite as intelligible as the proposition that God is. We do not *see* him certainly. But that is the whole difficulty. Get over that, and it is no less intelligible to affirm that Christ was *not* mere man as that he *was* mere man. If he was *not* mere man his person was compound. What made it compound was God. This is all. There is nothing more in the whole case. But this is everything.

Or, if I may dare on a subject not to be thought of without reverence, to use an illustration purely human ;—Recal Cellini, and put into his hands a network of silver and gold, into which our modern machinery has introduced a finish and delicacy which he knows it to be impossible that human hands can have executed. It is not the less conceivable to him that the material is silver and gold, because he comprehends not the method in

which they are worked. The parity of the two cases is disturbed only by God's not being visible to the eye, or cognizable by any of the bodily senses.

XXXI.

Christ redeems as he was God, but he also redeems as he was man: and as man he died. In the first sense he is the original, in the second sense he is the secondary cause of human salvation.

XXXII.

"That Christ as the only begotten Son of God, having no superior, and therefore owing honour to none, neither standing in any need, should either give thanks or make petition unto God, were most absurd." Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, V. xlvii. 5. This excellent writer, however, immediately after saying this, travels abundantly into the unintelligible in speaking of the compound nature of Christ in Sect. lii. 3, 4, of the same book.

XXXIII.

In speaking of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Scripture defines not (and it would be absurd in man to attempt to define) how they are severed. Neither does it define how they are identified. What it identifies is not the persons, if that word may be used, but the character.

XXXIV.

If we do not recognise the true place to be given to *creeds* or *articles*, one of two things must follow. Either we must assign too high a place in our estimation to the merely speculative knowledge of truth, as being an *end* in itself, or as partaking of the nature of an end: or else we must assign too low a place to it among the *means* which conduct to the end designed.

XXXV.

The principle of persecution, so far as it has a principle, assumes that heresy is an act of the will. But if heresy, so is faith also. It is held by many divines of the church of Rome, and perhaps out of that church also, that wherever there is a moral will, God always gives grace to see the truth. This position is untrue, but it *has* a foundation.

XXXVI.

Reason *not* limited or pointed by revelation to the study of true good, if not a *fallacious*, is yet a *discursive* guide. Revelation is a sort of *finger-post*.

XXXVII.

“The circumstance that the ancients agree in the usage, but differ as to the reasons, shews that the reasons were built on the usage, not the usage on the reasons.”—Tracts for the Times, iv. 20. As the reasons to the usage on which they were

built, so all theories of the doctrines of Faith, Redemption, and other popular doctrines, to the doctrines themselves.—Consequently, both the reasons, and the theories, though they may be *true*, are of very little *authority*.

XXXVIII.

“The work of redemption, and the work of salvation are the same thing. What is sometimes in Scripture called God’s *saving* his people, is in other places called his *redeeming* them.”—Jonathan Edwards’s History of Redemption, General Introduction, Works, Vol. III. p. 168.

XXXIX.

“From hence we may see the imputation of righteousness, the mediation and intercession for sinners still continuing such, are only figurative expressions to denote that we derive our righteousness from Christ, and are enabled by the medium of his example and aids, to fulfil the laws of nature which were impracticable by us before. Yet still the righteousness must be actually derived to ourselves, and become our own before it can be imputed to us: and though he has rendered the way passable by going before us, we must travel it after him with our own feet, or shall never arrive at our journey’s end: we may expect to be helped forward, but not carried, for any the most pressing, repeated importunities whatever. There-

fore, our trust, our devotion, and our religious exercises, will not commute for the want of that righteousness which is the sole operating cause of our salvation, and which we may now attain by derivation from him: nor are they of any other avail than for the effect they may have upon ourselves towards generating in us the like moral wisdom, as exemplified by our leader, in the ready resistance of pleasure, desire, and temptation, and unreluctant endurance of the severest trials.”—Tucker’s *Light of Nature*, Vol. V. Chap. xiv. Sect. 11.

Nothing, as I apprehend, can be more correct, unless it may be observed that the words “example and aids,” and the concluding phrase “the unreluctant endurance of trials,” are expressions scarcely equal to the *strength* of the case.

XL.

I. God accounts not of any as righteous, who are not first made righteous. He accounts of all men as what they are.

II. But they who *are* righteous are *not* they of whom it is said that God accounts of them *as* righteous, or *as if* they were righteous.

How are these two *truths* to be reconciled? Answer: By our knowledge that though he accounts of all men as what they are, he yet in his mercy grants to imperfect virtue a place in his

favour, which, according to the strict letter or precept of a holy law, none but the perfect, of whom there are none, can be intitled to claim.

XLI.

“*Religion itself* is always the same, but things *about religion* are not always the same. These have not in them the power or virtue of *religion*: they are not of a sanctifying nature: they do not purify our minds, as the things of a *moral* nature do: so that religion may stand without them.”
Whichcote’s Aphorisms.

And yet it might stand *ill* without them nevertheless, especially since *doctrines*, no less than *ceremonies*, are in strictness to be classed among the things *about religion*, and not as *religion itself*. Religion *strictly* is in the application of the doctrines, not in the doctrines themselves.

I here quote this passage, however, chiefly for the sake of observing that there is much in the pithy sentences of the clever volume from which I extract it, and also in the writings of Cudworth, and the other Platonic divines of the seventeenth century, which may serve to impress usefully the best and justest views of the true nature and design of Christianity. These views may be, and are, by some of these writers, by Henry More, as I suppose, especially, distorted into mysticism: but they are not on that account the less just in them-

selves. Cudworth, in particular, has an excellent sermon, in which he argues even to redundancy, that the seat of true religion is in the heart, and not in the opinions. I know not whence he takes the following citation: "Deus ipse, cum omni sua bonitate, quatenus extra me est, non facit me beatum, sed quatenus in me est." This sentence he translates as follows: "God himself cannot make me happy, *if* he be only without me, and *unless* he vouchsafe a participation of himself and his own likeness into my soul." ^a The rendering thus given of the word *quatenus* is somewhat remarkable.

XLII.

"We cannot put in Christ too much between sin and repentance, nor put him in too little between repentance and God." This position is not true. Query, *How* is it false?

XLIII.

It is observed by Mr. Knox ^b that it is "a superficial and shadowy explanation" of "the peculiar blessings of the Gospel," to represent them as consisting "in new external privileges granted alike to Jews and Gentiles, in fuller and more liberal instruction, and in higher and more engaging mo-

^a Sermon on 1 John ii. 3, 4, p. 415, in the reprint in Bishop Jebb's *Piety without Asceticism*.

^b *Remains*, II. 36—38.

tives." "To him," he adds, "who knows himself, his mental weaknesses and wants, his spiritual diseases, and his moral capabilities, the assurance of a divine power in gracious readiness to enfranchise his immortal spirit, to subdue his corruptions, to purify his heart, and to unite it to that sovereign good for whom it was created will, of all communications which could be made from heaven, be the most satisfactory and delightful." So assuredly it is. But how is this *communication* or *assurance* NOT included in those "external privileges," that "fuller and more liberal instruction," and in those "higher and more engaging motives," to which it is here represented as something additional?

Again Mr. Knox speaks, in pages 44, 45, of the sacrifice of Christ as making salvation attainable, as removing obstacles, as procuring every prerequisite, as providing the preliminaries to a great moral purpose. This is intelligible only on the supposition that he supposes it to have some influence independently of that moral purpose itself. In the same manner, in page 57, he speaks of it as [not the moral only but also as] "the *mysterious* consideration on which threatened vengeance was averted." But we have undoubtedly no right to account of its having any other than a moral effect, unless we are taught this in Scripture, which, I think, is not the case. That Mr. Knox, considering the general tone of his theological views,

should have thought otherwise, is, I think, surprising.

XLIV.

“Salvation, according to Calvin, is the same thing with that moral effect which reclaims the mind and heart from thralldom and rebellion.” Knox’s Remains, II. 55. “Augustin, Calvin, Dr. Twisse, the Prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly, and other eminent men, [as is acknowledged even by Dr. Owen,] conceived that the necessity for expiation did not exist in the divine attributes, but in the divine government: and that, consequently, Christ did not die to appease divine wrath, but to reconcile gratuitous mercy to man with what may be called the *political* good order of the intelligent universe.” Ibid. p. 52.

But the *political* good order of the universe is the same thing with its *moral* good order, and only to be worked out, as far as we can see, through a moral influence.

What that *universe* is over which the moral influence of the death of Christ is more or less extended, we cannot pronounce. See what is said on this subject in Chap. II. Sect. iv.

XLV.

Christ really is to the Christian, but in a better form, what the Jewish sacrifices were to the Jews.

What was that? What did the Jews really gain by those sacrifices?

Answer: They gained God's favour by them, so far as they profited by them to repentance, faith, and holiness. Theirs were only carnal ordinances: Christ was the mediator of a better covenant, a spiritual one. His mediation does the same thing, but does it better: according to Taylor's observation, "He that does a counsel evangelical does not do more than his duty, but does his duty better." Ductor Dub., II. iii. 12. 4.

XLVI.

There exists in the world, as will be universally acknowledged, and has long, if not always existed, a very strong political bias against human authority. This bias has not in it, of necessity, anything wrong. The bias against authorized oppression or tyranny is a right bias. But, whether right or wrong, the habit of feeling or acting on it, has a tendency to set the opinions against *all* authority, against just as well as against unjust human authority, and against divine authority as well as human.

So also still more with regard to particular doctrines. If any doctrine have a show of what is called *liberalism*, very many persons of what are called liberal politics, are predisposed to embrace it. If the orthodox doctrine be espoused by the state, the parties in opposition to the go-

verning party are predisposed to be heterodox. Hence it follows that much of the repugnance against religion, or against orthodoxy, which exists, or is supposed to exist, is not irreligious *in principle*, although it may not be much less mischievous than if it were so.

XLVII.

It has been said that faith varies in its nature or character accordingly as we repose it in a *person* or a *thing*, as for instance in our Saviour himself, or in the doctrines which he taught; that in the one case faith is *trust*, in the other case *assent* or *perception*. But though this distinction may, *perhaps*, be so stated as to be real, I see not that any end is to be obtained by any attempt to sever our Saviour from his doctrines, or that we can rightly sever his doctrines from him. We may be said to trust in the efficacy of his doctrines as much as we trust in him^a; and our faith, considered as the act of the mind, in both him and his doctrines is properly the act of that concrete faculty of will and understanding, which a truly religious faith must always be.

XLVIII.

Faith, as it signifies mere conviction, may be compared to a *circle*. As it signifies confidence, it may be compared to a *globe*, the globe being

^a See Barrow's Sermons, Vol. II. Sermon iv. pp. 55, 56.

produced by that same circle when it has revolved on itself, or has acquired *volume* or *substance*.

XLIX.

It is very easy to mould the same truths into different systems: and on the principle that there is much virtue in *If*, all these may be true.

Some say that faith is everything. True, *if* you add to it that practice of which it is the principle, and which it ought to infer.

Some say that practice is everything. True, *if* based on a right principle.

Some, that sincerity is everything. True again, *if* we reckon into sincerity the sincere desire to learn God's will, and also to do it.

L.

A. B. C. D.

A. I say that people are saved by faith.

B. I say that they are saved by works.

A. Nonsense; to talk of works. A man may set up a charity, or subscribe to a mission, and for no other purpose than to gain an election.

B. But I do not call that a *good* work. Nobody calls it so. But as for your faith, what does that do? Nothing.

A. But I mean by faith a working faith. So does everybody.

B. Then what you call faith I call works.

A. Then what you call works I call faith.

C. Where then is the difference?—But why is that faith which is in Christ the only good faith?

D. I believe that I must come in. And my answer is: Because, *ordinarily*, no faith except faith in Christ, has strength to do works really good, or to overcome the world; and also because, *ordinarily*, they who are taught Christ's doctrine cannot be good men, that is, cannot be men of good moral feeling, if they reject his teaching. Except *so far as this* foundation bears it out, *that* proposition stating faith in Christ to be only *good* faith, is not a true proposition. That it is the only *true* faith, is a different matter. We use *here*, however, the word *true* in the sense of *perfect*.

LI.

If the analogy of Christ to the legal sacrifices is to be interpreted rigidly, would he have been *crucified*? Is it not rather to be expected that he would have been brought like the legal victims to a real altar, and slain like them? In the same manner in which it is argued that if *his* priesthood were identical with the Aaronical, he would have been born not of the tribe of Judah, but of that of Levi? “Quia igitur sacerdotium veteris legis erat figura sacerdotii Christi, noluit Christus nasci de stirpe figuralium sacerdotum, ut ostenderetur non esse omnino idem sacerdotium, sed differre

sicut verum a figurali."—Aquinas. Summa, Pars III. Q. xxii. Art. 1.

LII.

" Dr. Sykes, in his Essay on Redemption, and Dr. Henry Taylor^a, prove that Christ's having died *for* us means on *account of*, not *instead of* us."^b

But where is the difference? Christ died that we might not die. Is not this both *on our account*, and also *instead of*, or vicariously. All discussions as to the relative meanings of the words *περί, ὑπέρ, διὰ*, and so forth, seem to be of the same true no-meaning when we come to the thing.

LIII.

I do not imagine that good men are disposed to exaggerate the degree of evil which exists in the world. The truly good are always so *desirous* to see virtue everywhere, that they may often think that they see it where it is not. But if the judge charge even vicious men on a false principle, the law suffers by his so doing. Compare Chap. XII.

LIV.

The goodness of the digestion depends, in a great degree, on the wholesomeness of the food;

^a Ben Mordecai's Letters, pp. 786, 787.

^b Magee on Atonement and Sacrifice, I. 249.

but a perfectly healthy habit will extract more and better nourishment from even unwholesome food, than a bad habit will extract from the best food.

LV.

“Supposing the punishment of a penitent sinner to redound to the public benefit, the inflicting it would be pure benevolence.”—Balguy on Redemption, p. 52.

In other words : “Because man, a creature of limited powers, can only do the most good in his power, therefore God, whose powers we account of as unlimited, can do no more.”

LVI.

That the moral disposition to seek after God, and to obey his commands, is the natural root of true religion, appears to have been one of the reasons why our Saviour did not show his miracles more openly, and why he kept himself chiefly in communication with men of humble and teachable minds, (men who *had* that moral disposition;) and why he chiefly worked his miracles as the reward of that disposition. Where that still, small voice is wanting, no display of pomp or power will, I suppose, often touch the heart. Query, How far had the miracles wrought by Moses a truly religious effect on the Israelites? There could probably be but few persons in Judea during our Saviour's

life sincerely desirous, and this from a religious principle, to know the truth, from whom his miracles were hid, or who might not readily find access to him.

LVII.

It is a common, probably *the* common belief, that, besides the directly moral stimulants or advantages supplied by the Sacraments, God also infuses into their recipients a *mystical* power or grace which is denied to those who are not recipients of them. And it is admitted that this mystical virtue of the Sacraments, if it exist, is in a strict analogy to the natural fact that some persons are actually born with better dispositions, or with less of hereditary depravity, than others are born with. Proof therefore may, I think, be admissible, if it can be given, of this doctrine, or fact, affirmed of the Sacraments. But still, though this doctrine or fact be supposed to be true, it cannot be of any imaginable *moral* use *to us* to be told it. *If* a fact, it is yet only a fact thrown out, and thrown out by God, and yet which furnishes no nutriment; and a fact also which is disbelieved by a large body of, I suppose, as pious and as zealous Christians as any other body of Christians who can be named.

Hence it follows, I think, that because this difference has an analogy in nature, we have not

therefore to *expect* to find it also in grace. The analogy also of revelation, if, as I believe, we are allowed, in all other instances, to contemplate the reason of the hope that is in us is, if not against the fact, yet against our being told it; and if not told, we must not assume it.

LVIII.

“The life of Christ as the humanization of the divine, [i. e. of the divine grace and goodness, or of the τὸ θεῖον,] of which the design was to give a divine elevation to man, is the self-revelation of the divine Logos (as the revealing principle of the mysterious essence of God) in the form of humanity, appropriated by him in order to communicate divine life to human nature, and to transform it into a revelation [Qu. is this the right word?] of the divine life.”^a

This sentence, though perhaps somewhat abstruse, will, I believe, be found, on studying it, to express the whole doctrine *per se* of our Saviour's divinity, both fully and accurately. I do not suppose it possible to express this doctrine more definitely, and at the same time comprehensibly. It is also utterly impossible to comprehend anything of the *manner* in which the prophets of the Old Testament were *inspired*. The notions of the *exist-*

^a Neander's History of the Planting of the Christian Church, II. 247.

ence of a union between God and Christ, and also of the existence of a communication between God and the prophets, are amongst the clearest notions which we have^a. But then these are the only real notions which we *can* have on these subjects. If we *talk* of anything more, I do not say that we may not allege some possible analogies, as for example that of emanation, or of the sun and his rays: but we cannot possibly know whether or no these analogies are applicable to the real case. Scripture says not anything on the subject, does not allege any such analogies. This silence of Scripture is of itself a considerable presumption that we are not meant to confide in them: and we have not any other guide to which to resort.

On these principles, all those persons who deny, or who attempt to qualify, the doctrine of our blessed Saviour's divinity, must of necessity do one of three things. They must either

I. Which is what we have no right to do, use the word God in two senses, which is what the Arians do, who have in fact two Gods: or

II. They must deny Christ to have been in any other relation to God, even of office or character, than that of the prophets:—or

III. And lastly, they speak without knowing

^a See No. xxxi. of this Chapter; and see also what was said in p. 288 of the case of the union between body and soul.

whether what they say, or whether the analogies of which they make use, be or be not really applicable.

The second of these errors is that of the Socinian, and is an error for which neither Scripture nor reason affords any foundation. Certainly Scripture nowhere *limits* the union, whatever that was, or is, between God and Christ, by affirming it to consist in merely the same sort of communication, whatever that was, which God had with the prophets. Nor can *we* limit God to the having only one manner of communication.

The error of all the ancient heresies respecting this doctrine was also, I believe, on exactly the same principle. The errors of the Docetæ, of the Cerinthians, of the Nestorians, were all of them attempts to define, or limit, in different ways, that union of God with man in the Saviour which *must be* undefinable, and illimitable. Forbear altogether this useless attempt, and even *this* distressing controversy may be cleared away.

LIX.

“ The conviction from which Marcion set out was that Christianity had appeared in human nature as something wholly new, unexpected, and unforeseen; that it had communicated to human nature a divine life to which there had hitherto been nothing akin in man; that the God who ap-

peared in Christ had never before revealed himself, either by nature, or reason, or the Old Testament, and that nothing bore witness to him but Christianity.”^a Query, Was Marcion a heretic?

LX.

A true Christian philosophy consists in *combining*, instead of *severing*, the *realistic*, and the *idealistic* spirit of the ancient theology; and this, as I apprehend, may to a certain extent, be usefully done.

LXI.

A Dialogue.

A. Then you set practice before faith!

B. No, indeed, I do not, for I think that faith comes first.

A. But you think practice of the more importance!

B. Which is of the most importance in an apple-tree, the root, or the apples?

A. The root, to be sure: I could not myself have asked you any question more decisive or pertinent.

B. Yes, the root is of more value than any small number of apples, or than the apples of any one, or of but a few, years. But I ask the question

^a Neander's Church History, II. 124. See the same work, pp. 133. 152. 171, 172, and compare what is said of Montanus, in pp. 179, sqq.

concerning the root on the one part, and, on the other part, *all* the apples which the tree produces as long as it lives.

A. The answer is plain. The root would be of no use without the apples: and the apples could not grow without the root.

B. Agreed, but whether is the root made for the sake of the apples, or the apples for the sake of the root?

A. [very unwillingly.] The root for the sake of the apples.—And so ended the conversation.

LXII.

The ritual works of the law were *not* external, if performed on the religious principle, or for the sake of pleasing God by obeying his commands. What are commonly called the moral works of the law *were* externals, if not performed on a moral principle.

LXIII.

All writers worth attending to rank works of usefulness and charity as among the effects of Christian faith. Query, Are all writers equally and sufficiently careful to rank them also among the means of nursing up, and establishing, the Christian character? These works, if proceeding from a good, though it may yet be an imperfect principle, (as in the case of the young ruler spoken of in Luke, xviii.,) are a part of the education of

faith, as well as among the fruits of that faith when *formed* or created, and tend at once to secure the health of the soul, and strengthen its energy.

LXIV.

Some perception there must be of an end, or there can be no will. But clear perceptions may be coupled with a weak will, and a strong will with faint perceptions.

LXV.

Christ, and it may be justly said Christ only, gives us the strength with which we can work, and unless we follow up his gift with our own working, we are barred from pleading the pardon granted us. Few points are more uncontested. Yet, say many divines, the pardon is still granted for his sake alone, and we take no share in working it out. Is this any way more intelligible, than in tracing the passage of a ship through the water, to attempt to draw a distinction between the wind as the propelling principle, and the same wind as it fills the sails?

LXVI.

The original *cause*, as all agree, of man's salvation is the original love and mercy of God. All other *causes* flow out of this, and are therefore less properly causes than *means*. Christ's death is among these means, and is so preeminently. So is faith

among these means, so is repentance. But Christ's death comes first in order among these means, inasmuch as it is the paramount object, or motive principle, of which faith lays hold, and which excites repentance.

LXVII.

It is common to speak of Christ's death as the *cause*, and of faith, or repentance, and the other Christian virtues, not as the cause, but as the *condition*, by which we are saved^a. But there is, as it seems to me, exactly the same propriety, and impropriety, (and I think there are both,) in using these words in either case. If by the use of the word condition, we mean anything of an independent entering even of God's Son himself into any contract or terms with God, we doubtless use it in a sense which the true doctrine of the atonement will not bear. But then again, on the other hand, if we exclude from our sense of the word condition every meaning but that of the means, means which we embrace humbly and thankfully, as the only means by which we are saved, Christ's death and our obedience are equally conditions, and should so be regarded.

LXVIII.

It was observed in the first pages of this Treatise, as the character of the *Socinian* error on the doc-

^a See the Observations on Paley's XXth Sermon, in Chap. XIV. Sect. xvi.

trines of the atonement, that it gives an *inadequate* view of its real nature and efficacy. But there are many who will also hold that to take *any* view of this doctrine which interprets Christ's death as operating to our benefit only through its moral effect, is to take an *inadequate* view of it. To make out this objection, however, we must at least be able to *imagine* some greater benefit rendered to us by the atonement than that which is rendered to us through its moral effect. And this accordingly is what the Fathers, and after them, the Schoolmen, very often attempt to do^a. These writers press, and press very much, as at least the best representation to be formed of the real case, the contest between Christ and the Devil. Here is a great, and *an extrinsic*, difficulty to be surmounted, and Christ surmounts it, atones for it, surmounts it as a ransom or sacrifice clearly enough. But I do not see that he does *more* by surmounting an external difficulty, than he does by removing an internal weakness. Man, it is said, *might have* repented without him. True; but he *did not*. And I do not see that it is a less benefit, (and if not less in itself, it is not less deserving of the most emphatic description or eulogy,) to remedy the defects of a weak will which kept man back from salvation, than it is to conquer an external adversary who did no more.

^a See Chap. XIV. Sect. xv. pp. 339—341. 343, 344, and Notes 5, 6, and 7, *ibid*.

St. Paul, in the beginning of the Epistle to the Romans, does not imply that man *was* kept back by anything else than the defects of his own will.

LXIX.

“The righteousness of sanctification we deny not to be inherent, only we distinguish it as a thing different *in nature* from the righteousness of justification. That whereby we are justified is perfect, but not inherent. That whereby we are sanctified is inherent but not perfect.”^a “What can be more contrary than these opinions to each other. The Papists make this inherent righteousness the *cause* of our justification, the Protestants the *effect* thereof. The Protestants require it as the companion or page; the Papists as the usher, yea, rather as the parent of justification.”^b

That which is perfect is the graciousness of the proffer^c. That is God’s only. Man’s weakness comes in to do its own imperfect work, before that perfect graciousness has its effect. The *proffer* is *uncaused*; or, if caused, the cause is in the God who makes it. But still the cause, why our imperfect profiting by it is accepted, both may be, and is, partly in ourselves,—or, to speak more

^a Hooker’s Discourse of Justification, Sects. vi. and iii., as quoted in Bishop M’Ilvaine’s Oxford Divinity, p. 145.

^b Bishop Hall’s Works, IX. 46. Ibid. p. 144.

^c See before Chap. XIV. Sect. xvi. p. 367.

fully, the cause of our acceptance is properly *compound*, is compounded primarily of that same graciousness of God which made freely the original proffer, and secondarily, of that imperfect sanctification, through which only we through the Spirit lay hold of, and which is a condition of, the offered gift.

LXX.

Hampton, in his answer to Priestley, observes, or rather admits, that no more is intended by the phrase of Christ's dying in our stead, than that he died that we might live, or escape death^a. Neither is this *phrase* "in our stead," as it seems to me, to be urged farther. But the *fact* of his *dying* to save us from *death*, makes the analogy the closer, and the more instructive.

LXXI.

"There is no absurdity in supposing future punishment may follow wickedness, of course, as we speak, or in the way of natural consequence from God's original constitution of the world."^b

If this supposition be true, Query, Does not the truth of the whole argument of this Treatise follow also?

^a See the Note in p. 95.

^b Butler's Analogy, Part II. Chap. V. p. 286. See also Mr. Conybeare's excellent Theological Lectures, pp. 361, 362.

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
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
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Penrose, John

Of the Moral Principle of the Atonement Also of Faith and of its two sorts,
conviction and confidence and of the connexion between them

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